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Abstract
This thesis is a comparative historical analysis of the understanding of an-
tisemitism in Britain and Germany since 1945. Motivated by recent trends to
equate antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentments – or Jews and Muslims, it
shows where the idea came from that these two hostilities can be compared.
It critically analyses how concepts of antisemitism have been framed by na-
tional discourse and debates about identity and immigration by looking at the
dynamic relationship between major events and debates about this issue and
theorisations of antisemitism. The main finding is that although antisemitism
is a global phenomenon, it is understood very differently in different contexts.
Conceptualisations and comparisons differed between Britain and Germany,
which is due to the ways in which national identity and racism in general
were understood and critiqued. In Germany, there was, in reference to the
Holocaust, a strong theoretical focus on antisemitism while racism and anti-
Muslim resentments were initially much less dealt with, and later only through
a prism of antisemitism theories. In Britain, racism theories developed in the
context of colonial immigration and were open to an inclusion of particular
anti-Muslim resentments, however, they not only largely omitted Jews as vic-
tims of any form of discrimination, they also failed to include the Holocaust
in their analyses. The thesis shows how the equations of Jews and Muslims
that were later made grew out of these different theoretical contexts in the two
3
countries. In both countries, however, there have been trends to find universal-
ising explanations for antisemitism, even though the explanations themselves
remain particular and embedded into national discourse.
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1
Introduction
This thesis is concerned with the development of conceptualisations of con-
temporary antisemitism in Germany and Britain in the context of labour im-
migration from the postwar years onwards. It is motivated by recent trends
to emphasise comparisons between anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim hostilities. In
the past decade it has been increasingly asserted by commentators, academics
and politicians that Muslims are the ‘new Jews’. In both Britain and Germany,
commentators have argued that antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiments have
significant similarities. The aim of this research is not to become part of this
trend by listing similarities – or differences – between antisemitism and ‘Is-
lamophobia’1 or Jews and Muslims. Instead, it seeks to trace the origin of the
idea that the two hostilities can be compared and the reasons why compar-
isons are deployed. In an interdisciplinary framework, it uses a comparison
between Britain and Germany as a methodological tool to examine conceptu-
alisations of antisemitism and comparisons with anti-Muslim resentments in
specific national contexts. The basic argument is that comparisons between
antisemitism and Islamophobia promote certain narratives of national iden-
tity. Comparisons are part of a narrative that determines how the past is
related to and that assigns the place of Jews and Muslims within wider soci-
ety. This thesis shows that this narrative significantly differs between Britain
and Germany. In the case of Britain, this means that comparisons support the
perception of Britain as a multicultural country of immigration, in which Mus-
lims, just like Jews, will naturally progress to become British. In the case of
1Although usage of the term ‘Islamophobia’ has become an established practice, it is highly
contested and will therefore not be used as an accepted term in this thesis. For a
discussion of this issue see chapter 4.
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Germany, comparisons are part of a ‘discourse of normalisation’ that seeks to
normalise the German past and reinvent a positive German identity by equat-
ing antisemitism with hostilities against other minority groups. The result is
that in both countries, dominant concepts of antisemitism fail to acknowledge
its particularity. This introduction will give a brief overview over the research
that has been undertaken so far, and outline structure and methodology of the
thesis.
This thesis originally started out as a comparison between antisemitism and
Islamophobia in the context of recent debates about this issue. In both Ger-
many and Britain, it had been increasingly asserted that ‘Islamophobia’ is very
similar to, or has indeed substituted, antisemitism. One example for this was
the reaction by German historian and antisemitism researcher Wolfgang Benz
to the racist remarks of Thilo Sarrazin, former financial senator for Berlin and
then chairman of the German federal bank, in September 2009. Sarrazin had
stated in an interview for the cultural magazine lettre international in Berlin
that he does “not have to accept anyone who lives off this state, rejects this
state, does not properly care for their children’s education and continuously
produces little veiled girls. That is true for 70 percent of the Turkish pop-
ulation and 90 percent of the Arab population in Berlin”. He also pointed
out that “a large number of Arabs and Turks in this city do not have any
productive function other than selling fruit and vegetables and are unlikely to
develop any perspective”.2 Although his statements found supporters, among
them German-Turkish feminist Necla Kelek, it also resulted in a threat to ex-
clude him from the Social Democratic Party - as he was accused of harming
the party’s image - as well as in a sharp reduction of his responsibilities at
the federal bank. Benz equated Sarrazin’s statements with the anti-Jewish
remarks that were made in Germany in the late 19th century. He argued
that statements like that of historian Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896),
who warned that the “ambitious, trouser selling youngsters” who pour into
2See “Sarrazin muss sich entschuldigen”, 1 October 2009, in: Zeit Online
[online]. Available from: http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2009-10/
sarrazin-aeusserung-integration [Accessed on 23 May 2010].
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Germany from the “inexhaustible Polish cradle” will soon be “controlling Ger-
many’s stock markets and news papers”, were comparable to the contemporary
fashion of using “Muslim fertility” as an argument in debates around “Islami-
sation”.3 Statements like that of Sarrazin, he emphasised, were comparable to
antisemitic statements during the emancipation period in so far as they were
characteristic of a debate about German identity at the time. According to his
argument, anti-Muslim resentments today played the national identity shaping
role that anti-Jewish resentments played then.
Similar claims were being made in Britain: in 2006, the Times’ India Knight
saw in Jack Straw’s criticism of the veil a “sign of separation and difference”
and the beginning of an “open season on Islam – Muslims are the new Jews”.4
The comparison was also made by Muslims themselves: in 2008 MP Shahid
Malik said that Muslims today felt targeted like the Jews of Europe.5 In
Britain however, the argument took two different directions. It was either as-
serted that British Muslims were comparable to British Jews in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, or it was argued that British Muslims are to an
extent reliving the fate of German Jews before the Second World War.
Another example for a comparison was the Channel 4 TV documentary
The Enemy Within (2009), which was first aired in October 2009 and which
equated the anarchist movement of Victorian England – “a minority are pre-
pared to bomb and kill to get what they want” – and the Islamist extremism
of today. In the film, young Muslims spoke the words of the nineteenth cen-
tury anarchists to point out that “parallels can be drawn with the modern day
war on terror”. The striking parallel, it was suggested, was that the anarchist
movement of the time largely consisted of East European Jewish immigrants,
3Benz, Wolfgang: Hetzer mit Parellelen, in: Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung, 4 Jan-
uary 2010. Online available from: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/
antisemiten-und-islamfeinde-hetzer-mit-parallelen-1.59486 [Accessed on 13
June 2014].
4Knight, India: Muslims are the new Jews, in: The Sunday Times, 15 October 2006.
5As reported in “Muslims feel like ’Jews of Europe”’, in: The Independent, 4 July
2008 [online]. Available from: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/
muslims-feel-like-jews-of-europe-859978.html [Accessed on 23 May 2010].
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who were then as a whole group targeted as alien and threatening to Britain
by the press, just as Muslims were today, although only a small group of them
could be held responsible for terrorist attacks. On the Channel 4 website, the
TV documentary was advertised as examining the “feelings of oppression, per-
secution and anger that can lead to extremism”.6 The intention of the show, it
seemed, was to point out not only that there are recurring patterns of British
hostility towards immigrants, but more importantly that the immigrant groups
themselves are comparable.
This comparison did not only appear in popular culture, it was addressed by
academics as well. The subject of comparing antisemitism and Islamophobia
as well as the Jewish and Muslim communities had been dealt with in a num-
ber of studies and research papers. These studies attempted to analyse the
relationship between anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim hostility or the relation of
Jews and Muslims to a majority society. Some of them focused on Germany or
Britain, but they all significantly differed in their methodological approaches
and use of categories. Matti Bunzl, for example, analysed and compared anti-
semitism and Islamophobia with regard to their functions for the formation of
a national and European identity. In this regard, he argued that while tradi-
tional antisemitism “has run its historical course with the supercession of the
nation-state, Islamophobia is rapidly emerging as the defining condition of the
new Europe”.7 He did not equate the two hatreds, but argued that they are
time and place specific phenomena: “Whereas anti-Semites questioned Jews’
fitness for inclusion in the national community, Islamophobes are not par-
ticularly worried whether Muslims can be good Germans, Italians or Danes.
Rather, they question whether Muslims can be good Europeans. Islamopho-
bia, in other words, functions less in the interest of national purification than
as a means of fortifying Europe.”8 This is exemplified, he argued, in the fact
6“The enemy within”, Channel 4 [online]. Available from: http://www.channel4.
com/programmes/the-enemy-within/episode-guide/series-1/episode-1 [Accessed
on 23 May 2010].
7Bunzl, Matti: Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe,
Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press 2007, p. 4.
8Ibid, p. 13.
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that no significant European party champions an antisemitic agenda, while
they do champion an Islamophobic one. Both antisemitism and Islamophobia
“are exclusionary ideologies mobilised in the interest of collective engineering”,
but each has its time and place.9 Bunzl was right in emphasising that it is diffi-
cult to straightforwardly equate both forms of social hostility, but his analysis
neglected to take into account post-Holocaust forms of antisemitism, which,
if not on any political agenda, may nevertheless function for the formation of
national identity.
The idea of this thesis was initially to contribute to this ongoing debate and
compare antisemitism and Islamophobia in Germany and Britain. The aim
was, by looking at the period from the 1960s onwards, to establish the validity
of contemporary comparisons between Jews and Muslims and, in relation to
that, the representation of Jews and Muslims in public discourse and the use
of similar or dissimilar stereotypes. The research was motivated by a desire
to provide clarification in this debate. What soon emerged in the course of
the research, however, was that the more valuable question was not whether
Jewish and Muslim histories and prejudices against them as minorities can
be compared, but how this comparison actually originated and what ideas
and concepts it is built on. Rather than listing similarities and differences
between Jewish and Muslim histories and experiences, and becoming part of
a particular debate, the research thus became about the genealogy of this
comparison. Rather than situating itself as part of the debate, this research
subsequently became about the debate. This new research focus required a
more fundamental and theoretical approach than initially intended. It ceased
to be an analysis of the discourse about Jews and Muslims, and became an
analysis of the discourse about antisemitism and Islamophobia. This also
required to take a step back to look at how antisemitism came to be understood
and how this understanding provided the seeds for concepts of equation of
and comparison between Antisemitism and Islamophobia. This thesis does
therefore not deal with antisemitism and Islamophobia in equal measure, but
9Ibid, p. 45.
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traces how concepts of antisemitism dealt with the relationship between hatred
against Jews and hatred against other social groups, especially in the context of
emerging multiculturalism and Muslim immigration from the 1950s onwards.
Emerging anti-Muslim resentments
It is important to note that the notion of asserting that Muslims are ‘the new
Jews’ did not come out of nowhere. The comparisons between antisemitism
and anti-Muslim resentments were made at a time when the issue of Islam in
Europe had become an important issue. Most Western European states had
effectively become multicultural states with significant Muslim populations.
Both the integration of Muslim communities and the difficulties these commu-
nities faced, in the form of hostile attitudes of the majority population, were
defining issues for multicultural policies and practices. It is therefore under-
standable that when struggling to understand and explain attitudes towards
Muslims in particular, one is tempted to make reference to earlier forms of
hostility against ethnic minorities in Europe.
Hostility towards Islam in particular has received increasing public atten-
tion since September 11th 2001, when a series of coordinated suicide attacks
by radical Islamists upon the United States took place. Members of Mus-
lim communities and also researchers point out the potential problems related
to the negative stereotyping of Muslims in the media following the attacks.10
The coordinated suicide attacks by Islamists in London on 7 July 2005 and the
train bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004 have had similar repercussions for
the Muslim communities in Britain and Europe. Since then, hostility towards
Muslims and Islam as a particular form of social resentment has been a subject
of research, but has also been subject of a political debate. Official European
10See for example Allen, Chris: From Race to Religion: the New Face of Discrimination,
in: Abbas, Tahir: Muslim Britain: communities under pressure, London: Zed Books
2005, pp. 49-65; see also his: Islamophobia in the Media Since September 11, Paper
presented at the conference: Exploring Islamophobia, Deepening our Understanding of
Islam and Muslims, organised by the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism, London,
29th September 2001.
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bodies have recently acknowledged that Muslims in particular have been sub-
jected to racial discrimination and violence and have incorporated this into
their reports on racism in the EU member states. In these reports ‘Islamo-
phobia’, derived from the term ‘xenophobia’, is measured based on available
quantitative data. Their findings showed that Muslims feel increasingly dis-
criminated against because of their religion as opposed to their nationality or
skin colour.11
Some researchers emphasise that the contemporary public hostility towards
Islam surfaced a lot earlier and coincided with major events which led to
greater public acquaintance with Islam. Most famously during the Satanic
Verses controversy, the British (and also German) public noticed the pres-
ence of Muslims in their country, because Muslims voiced their concerns in the
controversy as Muslims. Poynting and Mason pointed out that the Satanic
Verses controversy as well as the first Gulf War have to be understood as the
pivotal period framing the rise of Islamophobia, which led to the perpetua-
tion of “deviant and enemy images of Muslims” in the media.12 Consequently,
derogatory representations of Islam and Muslims were the subject of research
before September 11. One of the first studies on contemporary hostility to-
wards Islam in particular was conducted by the Runnymede Trust in 1997.
Their report titled: “Islamophobia, A Challenge for Us all” still serves as one
11See EUMC reports: Anti-Islamic Reactions in the EU after the terrorist acts against the
USA, a collection of country reports from RAXEN National Focal Points, 12 September
to 31 December 2001, Report on Germany; Muslims in the European Union, Discrimi-
nation and Islamophobia, Vienna 2006; Perceptions of Islamophobia and Discrimination
- Voices from members of Muslim communities in the European Union, Vienna 2006;
Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001 on behalf of the Euro-
pean Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, by Christopher Allen and Jorgen
Nielsen, Vienna, May 2002; The Impact of 7 July 2005 London Bomb Attacks on Muslim
communities in the EU, Vienna 2005.
12See Poynting, Scott and Mason, Victoria: The resistible rise of Islamophobia - Anti-
Muslim racism in the UK and Australia before 11 September 2001, in: Journal of Soci-
ology, Vol 43 (1), 2007, 61-86, here p. 62; see also Vertovec, Steven: Islamophobia and
Muslim Recognition in Britain, in: Yazback Haddad, Yvonne (ed.): Muslims in the West
- From Sojourners to Citizens, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002.
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of the major reference works in this field of study.13
The negative representation of Muslims did not only relate to struggles tak-
ing place in British or German society, but needs to be understood in the
context of major geopolitical changes after the end of the Cold War, in which
context the “Islamic World” was constructed as the new main enemy of “the
West”. This has been argued most prominently by Samuel Huntington, who
predicted a “clash of civilisations” amid the incongruity of “Western” and “Is-
lamic” societies.14 More recent studies of representations of Muslims and Islam
in British and German discourse consequently came to the conclusion that in
both societies, Muslims and Islam were mostly portrayed in the context of
foreign affairs, which arguably had an effect on how the public views Muslims
living in Britain and Germany, possibly leading to sweeping allegations and
suspicions of disloyalty.15 To address the problem of hostility towards Muslims
because of their religion, the British government passed the Racial and Reli-
gious Hatred Act in 2006, which came into force in amended form in 2007 and
which outlaws the incitement of hatred against another person on the grounds
of their religion.
In this context, Muslim media as well as anti-racism organisations pointed
out the rise of Islamophobia in Britain today and referred especially to one-
sided and bigoted media coverage. Comparisons with antisemitism included
the equation of the stereotyping and prejudiced media coverage of Muslims
as well as the far-right concern with Islam with pre-Second World War anti-
Jewish prejudice in Germany. A conference paper held by Christopher Allen at
the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism conference on September 29 2001
in London stated that media depictions of Muslims resemble pre-war German
antisemitism: “Such expressions (...) warrant serious analogies being made
to the representation of the Jews in such early twentieth century literature as
13See Runnymede Trust: Islamophobia, A Challenge For Us All, London 1997.
14See Huntington, Samuel P.: The Clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order,
New York: Simon and Schuster 1996.
15See Poole, Elizabeth: Reporting Islam: media representations and British Muslims,
London: I.B. Tauris 2002; Schiffer, Sabine: Die Darstellung des Islams in der Presse,
Wu¨rzburg: Ergon 2005.
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Hitler’s Mein Kampf, where gross exaggeration and dehumanisation had ex-
tremely dangerous consequences.”16 The paper went even further and pointed
out that “attitudes towards Islam and the current climate of hate against it
could provoke a situation like the one that prompted Germany’s Kristallnacht
in 1938. As we saw then, once the enemy was so dehumanised and parasitical,
what justification was needed to persecute and finally exterminate it?”17
Relevant for this research, however, is that while anti-Muslim prejudice has
emerged as a pressing issue in recent years, this was not accompanied by
a decrease in antisemitism. Surveys and opinion polls regularly show that
significant numbers of British and German citizens hold antisemitic attitudes.
There have also been significant numbers of antisemitic hate crimes across
European countries. Recent antisemitism statistics showed that in Britain, 8%
of the population harbour antisemitic attitudes, while in Germany, this number
is 27%.18 This suggests that the notion that Muslims may have replaced Jews
as the outgroup of European societies is an oversimplification of a complex
issue.
Adding to the complexity of this issue are newest findings of some reasearchers,
who have pointed out that one major source of this form of antisemitism are
Muslim minorities in Europe as well as countries where Islam is the majority
religion.19 In this context, some commentators and researchers argued that
there has been a resurgence of, or a ‘new’, antisemitism, which has most often
been expressed in anti-Zionism.20 These findings further question the value
16Allen: Islamophobia in the media since September 11th, p.6.
17Ibid.
18see ADL: Global 100, An Index of Anti-Semitism, Anti-Defamation League 2014
[online]. Available from: http://www.adl.org/press-center/press-releases/
anti-semitism-international/adl-global-100-poll.html#.U4Hc35RdU1Z, [Ac-
cessed on 25 May 2014].
19See Ibid; Ku¨ntzel, Matthias: Djihad und Judenhass, U¨ber den neuen antiju¨dischen
Krieg, Freiburg: Ca Ira 2002; also Jikeli, Gu¨nther: Antisemitismus und Diskrim-
inierungswahrnehmungen junger Muslime in Europa: Ergebnisse einer Studie unter jun-
gen muslimischen Ma¨nnern, Essen: Klartext Verlag 2012.
20See Chesler, Phyllis: The New Anti-Semitism, The current crisis and what we must
do about it, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 2003; for a discussion see also: Iganski, Paul
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of comparisons between antisemitism and Islamophobia. They rather support
the need to trace the genealogy of these comparisons and analyse the theo-
ries of antisemitism and/or Islamophobia that are used as the basis of these
comparisons.
Comparing Britain and Germany in this respect proved particularly helpful,
as the respective concepts of antisemitism could not be more different. It was
asserted in both countries that (present) Muslims and (past) Jews are compa-
rable, sometimes, as mentioned above, even across national boundaries. Both
countries, however, have very particular Jewish and Muslim histories. The
British Jewish community developed under very different circumstances - an
already (re)established, if challenged, community grew in the late nineteenth
century when Eastern European Jews fled persecution – to the Muslim com-
munities, the members of which came to Britain mostly from the colonies and
for economic reasons, most of them after 1945. German Jews faced continu-
ous persecutions and achieved integration, if a fragile one, before their near
complete annihilation between 1933 and 1945, while the arrival of Muslims in
Germany is connected to labour recruitment schemes after 1945 as well as the
relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire.
The complex and differing histories speak against easy comparisons between
a Jewish and Muslim experience. In context of this doubtful validity of com-
parisons, the question remains what purpose they might serve. In order to
find an answer to this question, this thesis is concerned with tracing how con-
ceptualisations of antisemitism are framed in order to allow comparisons with
hostilities towards other minorities. The premise of this research is the assump-
tion that there is not only an antisemitic discourse, but that conceptualisations
of antisemitism are formulated as part of, and serve, a discourse as well. The
aim of this research is therefore to find out how antisemitism came to be un-
derstood in Britain and Germany and how comparisons with other hostilities
derived out of this understanding. This means that rather than taking a side
in the above mentioned debates, this thesis is concerned with deconstructing
and Kosmin, Barry (eds.): A new antisemitism? Debating Judeophobia in 21st-century
Britain, London: Profile Books: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 2003.
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dominant concepts of antisemitism by tracing their evolution.
The differences in understanding antisemitism in Germany and Britain are
also the result of different understandings of citizenship. The relationship
between minorities, whether ethnic, cultural, or religious, and majority society
in Britain and Germany is markedly different. While Britain is effectively
a multicultural country, governed by the idea of cultural plurality and the
management of relationships between distinct groups, Germany has always
had difficulties to accept itself as a country of immigration, and has thus made
less effort to establish the integration of minorities. When comparing Germany
and Britain, it becomes evident that approaches to integration vary according
to different understandings of national identity. But what does this mean
for Jews and Muslims in particular, and how does this affect comparisons of
antisemitism and Islamophobia?
The integration of Jews and Muslims was framed in a fundamentally different
way in Britain and Germany. In Britain, Jews and Muslims were both seen
as minorities within a framework of a multicultural state. There was thus a
direct relationship between them, as they are both ‘the Other’ to the majority
culture. In Germany, in contrast, Jews and Muslims had very distinct positions
in public discourse. Jews were in that sense a ‘special’ minority, set apart
by history and the significance of the Holocaust for contemporary notions
of German identity, which has wide repercussions. How Jews and Muslims
were seen in each country built the basis for analyses and comparisons of
antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentment.
In this thesis, I will trace how approaches to minority integration developed,
and assess what this meant for the relationship between Jews, Muslims, and
British and German majority society by revisiting some of the major debates
that shaped this relationship. The appearances of antisemitism during par-
ticular crisis events and their aftermaths often prompt public and academic
controversies. It is hotly debated why anti-Jewish hostilities appear, how they
can be evaluated and categorised, how serious they are and how they should
be addressed, if at all. Strategies to deal with this phenomenon are derived out
18
1 Introduction
of the understanding of its history as well its evaluation in these controversies.
Defining Antisemitism
One major issue with research about antisemitism and the above summarised
comparisons are their categories, which are by no means academically agreed
upon. As this thesis shows, term and usage of ‘antisemitism’ has become highly
politicised, which makes its use as a scientific category somewhat difficult.
For this reason, some scholars have decided to refrain from using the term
altogether. Although the main concern of this thesis is the discourse about
conceptualisations of antisemitism, and therefore places itself beyond these
debates, this does not mean that antisemitism is merely a social construct.
The discourse-theoretical approach of this research means that rather than
making the case for or against a particular definition and conceptualisation
of antisemitism and its relationship to ‘Islamophobia’ at this point, it takes
exactly these debates about the terms and understandings of the phenomenon
as its subject. It refrains from using antisemitism as an agreed upon term but
rather examines its usage in German and British discourse. This approach
is reflected in the methodology, which includes a comparative analysis of the
formation of anti-Jewish hostility in Germany and Britain in a historical and
theoretical frame, but which also uses elements of historical discourse analysis
to examine understanding and assessment of anti-Jewish hostility and its re-
lationship to anti-Muslim resentments in British and German public, cultural,
and academic discourse since the 1960s.
This thesis shows that there are still many unresolved issues regarding the
categorisation and conceptualisation of ‘antisemitism’. It is yet unclear, for
example, how exactly it relates to contemporary anti-Zionism. The contested
nature of the definition of antisemitism became evident through its most widely
used definition, the 2005 working definition of antisemitism of the European
Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), later Fundamental
Rights Agency (FRA).21 This definition was the basis for many European
and international parliamentary inquiries on antisemitism, including that of
21This definition was published on the EUMC website in 2005 and was based on the dis-
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the British Parliament. In their 2006 British parliamentary inquiry into anti-
semitism, the all-party parliamentary group against antisemitism argued that
the nature of contemporary antisemitism could not be adequately addressed
with the existing definition of harassment established in the Race Relations
Act 1976. Instead, they requested the implementation of the EUMC defini-
tion, which stated that antisemitism was “a certain perception of Jews, which
may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifes-
tations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals
and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious fa-
cilities”.22 Calling for the killing of Jews in the name of an ideology or a
religion, making allegations about the power of Jews as a collective, holding
Jews collectively responsible for that acts of Jewish individuals, denying the
Holocaust, accusing the Jews or Israel as a state of inventing or exaggerating
the Holocaust and accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel than
to their own nation were all cited as examples of antisemitism in public life.
Additionally, the EUMC stated that with regard to the state of Israel, the
following examples can be categorised as antisemitism: denying Israel’s right
to exist, applying double standards, using classically antisemitic symbols to
characterise Israel or Israelis, comparing Israeli policy to that of the Nazis and
holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel. However,
the EUMC also stated that “criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against
any other country cannot be regarded antisemitic”.23 This definition remained
initially very broad, but then itemised particular examples of which some dis-
tinguish antisemitism from other forms of social hostility. However, its more
descriptive character neglects to adequately conceptualise antisemitism. Not
only is this definition strongly contested and has been rejected by a number of
public organisations, like the University and College Union (UCU) in Britain,
cussion on concepts and definitions in the earlier report: EUMC Report: Manifestations
of Antisemitism in the EU 2002-2003, Vienna 2004. It was taken down from the EUMC
website in November 2013.
22All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism: Report of the All-Party Parlia-
mentary Inquiry into Antisemitism, London, September 2006, p.6.
23Ibid.
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it has also recently been taken down from the website of the FRA, who subse-
quently insisted that they were not able to define antisemitism. For those who
have based their efforts against antisemitism on this definition, this is most
certainly a major setback. Rather than arguing for or against the use of this
particular definition, the aim of this research is to show why it was adopted or
rejected by particular organisations and individuals.
Previous Research
Locating this research within a field of previous research is difficult, as almost
any work on antisemitism in Britain and Germany qualifies as the object of
analysis of this research. In order to find out how a particular understanding
of anti-Jewish hostility developed, it is important to analyse and critically as-
sess the assumptions held and categories used by researchers, rather than to
further develop their ideas. In that sense, much of this thesis is of a critical-
theoretical nature. In addition, not only the methodology used in this thesis
is interdisciplinary, but the sources are as well. Scholarship on antisemitism
has appeared in a wide variety of disciplines. While there is a fair amount of
literature on post-war antisemitism, especially in Germany, there is only very
little scholarship on the development of antisemitism theories after 1945 in par-
ticular. An important if marginal study was that of Ismar Schorsch in 1964,
who gave an overview over existing theories of antisemitism in Germany that
were developed by Jewish and West German historians.24 In Britain, David
Ceserani’s work on the study of antisemitism remains the only comprehensive
overview on the subject.25 A related study for the British context is John
Solomos’s book on the study of racism in Britain.26 Helen Fein’s contribution
in The Persisting Question provided an overview over different sociological
24See Schorsch, Ismar: German Antisemitism in the Light of Post-War Historiography, in:
Leo Baeck Institute Year Book XIX, London: Seeker and Warburg, 1974, pp. 257-271.
25See Cesarani, David: The Study of Antisemitism in Britain: Trends and Perspectives,
in: Brown, Michael (ed.): Approaches to Antisemitism, Context and Curriculum, New
York: American Jewish Committee 1994, pp. 249-275.
26See Solomos, John: Race and Racism in Britain, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2003
(first edition published in 1989).
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approaches to antisemitism.27 In recent years, it has also been more common
in Germany to reflect on existing scholarship on antisemitism. Most notably,
the recently published reference book on antisemitism by the Centre for the
Study of Antisemitism in Berlin contains overview articles on antisemitism the-
ories, and on the development of antisemitism research in Germany.28 Samuel
Salzborn’s book, in which he critically evaluated and analysed a number of
well-known theories of antisemitism is a sociological study that tested these
theories for their validity.29 Nevertheless, or perhaps because of that, his work
is important for historians as well.
But this research is not only concerned with the development of social the-
ories of antisemitism, it is also a comparison between two countries. It uses a
comparison between Britain and Germany in order to conduct a meta-analysis
of theories on antisemitism in both countries. It is therefore also related to so-
ciological studies that compare minority integration and the understanding of
citizenship in different European countries, like that of Karin Scho¨nwa¨lder30,
Joel Fetzer and Christopher Soper31, as well as the most recent comparative
analysis of European multiculturalisms by Anna Triandafyllidou, Nasar Meer
and Tariq Modood.32 These studies came to the conclusion that Britain is
27See Fein, Helen: Explanations of the Origin and Evolution of Antisemitism, in: Fein,
Helen (ed.): The Persisting Question - Sociological Perspectives and Social Contexts of
Modern Antisemitism, Berlin: De Gruyter 1987, pp. 3-22.
28See the entry on ‘antisemitism research’ by Angelika Ko¨nigseder in: Benz, Wolfgang (ed.):
Handbuch des Antisemitismus, Judenfeindschaft in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Vol. 3
(of 7), Begriffe, Theorien, Ideologien, Berlin: de Gruyter 2010, pp. 16 - 21, and the entry
on ‘antisemitism theories’ by Klaus Holz in Ibid, pp. 316-328.
29See Salzborn, Samuel: Antisemitismus als negative Leitidee der Moderne, Sozialwis-
senschaftliche Theorien im Vergleich, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag 2010.
30See Scho¨nwa¨lder, K.: Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralita¨t. Politische Entscheidungen
und o¨ffentliche Debatten in Grossbritannien und der deutschen Bundesrepublik von den
1950er bis zu den 1970er Jahren, Essen: Klartext Verlag 2001.
31See Fetzer, Joel S. and Soper, Christopher J.: Muslims and the State in Britain, France
and Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005.
32See Triandafyllidou, Anna; Modood, Tariq; Meer, Nasar (eds.): European Multicultur-
alisms, Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press 2012.
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more multicultural than Germany, and minorities have been able to gain com-
paratively more recognition.
A further interesting approach is the use of the sociological concept of frames
when comparing German and British culture. Peter Ullrich has used this ap-
proach to analyse how the British and German Left understand the conflict in
the Middle East.33 He found that the differences in German and British cul-
ture lead to completely different understandings of the same topic. There are
different frames of reference when Germans and Britons evaluate the Middle
East.
In a sense, this thesis deals with exactly these frames of reference and how
they differ. However, in contrast to Ullrich’s study, this research is not primar-
ily of an empirical sociological nature, but sees itself located in social theory
and intellectual history. It examines conceptualisations of antisemitism and
locates antisemitism as well as the attempts to understand it in a historical
context. It further examines how these attempts have shaped strategies to
address anti-Jewish and, in relation to it, anti-Muslim hostility. It analyses
and compares crisis events, scandals and media affairs relating to anti-Jewish
and anti-Muslim hostility and stereotyping and how these discourse events
have been evaluated by the public and in academia. It traces the origins of
the notion that hostility towards Jews and hostility towards Muslims can be
compared and how and why this notion is deployed.
Methodology and Structure
Numerous publications in various disciplines have been consulted on anti-
semitism and racism in Germany, and on antisemitism and racism in Britain.
But rather than merely giving an overview over these studies, the aim is to
also put them in their historical context. This thesis therefore includes an
analysis of the debates over the manifestations of antisemitism in Britain and
Germany since 1945. The chapters comment on case studies and studies of
33See Ullrich, Peter: Die Linke, Israel und Pala¨stina - Nahostdiskurse in Grossbritannien
und Deutschland, Reihe: Texte Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung; Bd. 48.. Berlin: Karl Dietz
Verlag 2008.
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discourse events. These are major crisis events or media affairs in which antag-
onism towards Jews and Muslims has played a significant role, like the scandal
around Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s Garbage, the City and Death in Germany
in 1985, but also those controversies which have had a major impact on un-
derstandings of citizenship and minority-majority relations, like the Satanic
Verses controversy in Britain in 1988/89. Most of these debates have been
abundantly commented on at the time and often analysed by scholars. The
thesis examines how public figures, commentators, and academics have under-
stood and analysed these events. Most importantly, the thesis shows in how
far understandings of antisemitism have influenced approaches to hostility to
Muslims, and vice versa. Although this research essentially is a ‘meta-discourse
analysis’, it makes use of elements of historical discourse analysis, which Ruth
Wodak et al define as operating “multimethodologically and on the basis of
a variety of empirical data as well as background information”.34 The case
studies and comments were examined in themselves as well as in their context,
for which a variety of data was used. The data used in the thesis therefore
focuses on scholarly texts, but also includes literary texts, political statements,
newspaper articles and pamphlets that emerged in relation to the crisis events
and media affairs, as well as other background information.
As mentioned earlier, this thesis used a comparison between Britain and
Germany as a methodological tool for a meta-analysis of concepts of anti-
semitism and anti-Muslim resentments. A comparison between British and
German theories, debates and controversies about antisemitism and ‘Islamo-
phobia’ is beneficial because it shows in how far anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim
hostility and their understanding is country-specific, relating to and resulting
out of a particular history and in how far it is related to European or even
global developments.
The research concentrates on contemporary Germany and Britain from the
postwar years onwards and focuses especially on the period of labour immigra-
tion to Germany and Britain. The 1950s and 1960s mark a significant period
34Wodak, Ruth and Reisigl, Martin: Discourse and Discrimination: rhetorics of racism and
antisemitism, New York: Routledge 2000, p.65.
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regarding ethnic relations for both Germany and Britain when the arrival and
settlement of Turkish ‘guest workers’ in Germany and workers from the Com-
monwealth in Britain received increasing public attention and their status was
subject of subsequent legislation.
The first part of the thesis gives a historical overview of the establishment
of the Jewish communities and the genealogy of antisemitism in Germany and
Britain up to the postwar years. It analyses and compares in detail how the
Jewish communities were established, the adversity they faced and how they
chose to respond. The detailed narrative serves as an essential basis for the
following chapters, which, in a chronological fashion, evaluate how perceptions,
stereotypes and appearances of violence against Jews have been assessed af-
ter the Holocaust and increasingly in the context of emerging debates about
economic migration to Britain and Germany. The second chapter on the pe-
riod between 1945 and the late 1970s accordingly includes a discussion of how
minority-majority relationships have been assessed in academic discourse and
how this differed between Britain and Germany. In this regard the chapter
shows that in Germany there was largely a denial of antisemitism in public as
well as in historic and sociological scholarship, but also emerging theories of
antisemitism in relation to the Holocaust, which were later also applied to prej-
udices against ‘guestworkers’. In Britain, on the other hand, antisemitism was
largely downplayed and marginalised. This was partly due to the timid men-
tality of the Jewish society in Britain, who did not acknowledge even violent
outbursts as a serious threat. On the other hand, antisemitism became theo-
rised in the context of approaches to colonial immigration and anti-racist poli-
cies, even though these approaches themselves neglected Jews as a racialised
minority, and did not develop in reference to the Holocaust.
The third chapter follows up on this and further gives an account of the
history, theorisations and explanations of antisemitism in the 1980s in Britain
and Germany. The 1980s were a period of big debates in both Britain and Ger-
many about citizenship, national identity and multiculturalism. In Germany,
these issues were in fact negotiated through discussions about antisemitic ex-
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pressions and about how the past should be related to. In Britain, in contrast,
these debates were sightly different in their nature and content. The Rushdie
affair formed the beginning of a struggle for recognition of British Muslims and
defined the status of religion in social cohesion. This had a significant impact
on how minority-majority relations were understood and, indirectly, also on
how antisemitism was conceptualised.
The fourth chapter covers the period from the 1990s up to recent times. It
is during this period that comparisons between antisemitism and anti-Muslim
resentments became increasingly popular. This chapter explains how this was
related to particular national narratives by critically analysing the different
approaches towards this issue. In Germany, dominant approaches explained
antisemitism as one form of prejudice against an outgroup. Stripped of its
particularity, antisemitism became a model for other forms of hostility. This
explanation served a narrative of how Germany overcame its past and became
a multicultural European nation just like any other. In Britain, concepts of
antisemitism were conceived within the framework of dominant racism theories,
which resulted largely in a denial of contemporary antisemitism, as it was either
relegated to the past, or only accepted when expressed in particular ways that
satisfied post-colonial and post-modern definitions of racism and racialisation.
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The History of Antisemitism in
Britain and Germany
This chapter seeks to give a comparative overview of the history of antisemitism
in Germany and Britain. The aim is to show how anti-Jewish hostility has
impacted on Jewish communities in both countries and how the communities
chose to react to it. This chapter forms a vital basis for the following chapters,
as it is this history that is referred back to in contemporary discourses about
antisemitism. How this history is interpreted determines how past and present
forms of antisemitism are conceptualised.
In this chapter it becomes apparent that the integration of Jews, both in
Britain and Germany, was shaped by their status as members a stateless mi-
nority that was entirely dependent on the good-will of its environment. The
often timid actions and reactions of Jews and their eagerness for accultura-
tion can be understood in this context. The Jewish response to anti-Jewish
hostility in Britain shows that the history of Anglo-Jewry is much more a
history of antisemitism than often acknowledged. The story of a successful
integration of Jews into British society neglects to consider how the currents
of anti-Jewish hostility have shaped Anglo-Jewish behaviour. Although Jews
in Britain cannot be described as a homogeneous entity, they tended and tend
to be more unified in their response to antisemitic challenges. Jews have in
fact felt a pressure to acculturate in order to be accepted as British citizens.
This is perhaps similar to German Jews and their record of acculturation in
light of hostility and integration pressure. However, as this chapter also shows,
no form of antisemitism in Britain can be compared to that in Nazi Germany.
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2.1 Jews and Antisemitism in Britain
2.1.1 Early History
A Jewish community in Britain existed in the late eleventh century, when
Jewish merchants from France settled in Britain. During the reign of Henry I
(1100-35), a charter of protection was issued that put the Jewish community
in a position of privilege as a separate group protected by the king. The
‘fanatical spirit’ of the Crusades led to incidents of anti-Jewish hostility: in
1130, London Jews were accused of killing a sick man, which led to persecution
and in 1144 the infamous Ritual Murder accusation emerged after the body
of a young man was found near Norwich. During the reign of Henry II (1154-
89), Jews were protected again, but were financially exploited by the king.
The Ritual Murder accusation appeared several times between 1168 and 1183,
and during the years 1189-1216 persecution became more serious and also
manifested in violence.1 Before 1290, Jewish merchants and moneylenders
performed unpopular economic operations but were an important source of
income for the crown due to taxes and extraordinary levies. The decline of their
wealth and their loss of fiscal utility along with a growing religious hostility
paved the way for their expulsion in 1290, when Jews, at least in theory, lost
their right to settle in England.2
2.1.2 Readmission and Resettlement
The readmission has to be understood as the outcome of complex and unfore-
seeable events and long-term currents.3 The new beginnings of Anglo-Jewry
were unique compared to the rest of Europe: the Jewish community in Britain
grew out of a secret body of Marranos - the members of this are known as
Sephardim - which was detected only after the government had publicly dis-
1See Roth, Cecil: A History of the Jews in England, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1949,
p.1ff.
2See Endelman, Todd: The Jews of Britain 1656-2000, Berkeley: University of California
Press 2002, p.15.
3See ibid., p.19.
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cussed the question of a Jewish resettlement in England.4
In 1656 Jews were informally (re-)admitted to reside in England. The read-
mission process was based on an amalgam of politics, economics and religion.5
Between 1649 and 1656, the readmission of Jews into England was discussed
and gradually became reality.
An important figure in the readmission process was Menasseh ben Israel,
a member of the Jewish community in Amsterdam, who negotiated Jewish
resettlement with the English government, most notably during the Whitehall
Conference in 1655, where Oliver Cromwell and the Council of State discussed
readmission with a group of lawyers, merchants and divines.6 The Dutch
Jews had a particular interest in the establishment of Jewish settlement in
London as that would enable them to circumvent the Navigation Act of 1651,
which required merchandise imported into England to be carried in English
ships or in ships belonging to the country where the goods originated.7 The
outcome of the ‘Whitehall conference’, however, only secured the theoretical
possibility of a readmission of the Jews. Although Menassah ben Israel was
keen on establishing formal readmission, the secret Jewish community gained
informal toleration by other means: after a humble petition sent to Cromwell
in 1655/6 was rejected, the declaration of war against Spain in the same year
forced the Marranos to avow their Judaism to avoid arrests and confiscation of
their goods. This led to the reality of an open Jewish community in London.
After Cromwell’s death in 1658, the Jewish community was firmly established.
Although some disagreements remained, their position can be seen as more or
4See Katz, David (1994): The Jews in The History of England 1485-1850, Oxford: Claren-
don Press 1994, p.107.
5See Pollins, Harold (1982): Economic History of the Jews in England, London and
Toronto: Associated University Press, p.36., for a discussion on the readmission pro-
cess see also: Katz, David: The Jews in The History of England 1485-1850; Mechoulan,
H. and Nahon, G. (eds.): Menassah ben Israel: The hope of Israel, Oxford: Brill 1987;
Endelman, Todd: The Jews of Georgian England 1714-1830, Jewish Publication Society
of America 1979.
6On ben Israel see Mechoulan and Nahon: Menassah ben Israel: The hope of Israel.
7See Endelman: The Jews of Georgian England 1714-1830, p.15.
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less secure from then on.8
In light of a possible return, however, some fantasies about the Jews emerged
among Christian Britons: there was the claim that Jews were organising to
buy the Bodleian Library or St. Paul’s Cathedral in order to turn it into a
synagogue.9
In 1660 London City circles petitioned to expel the Jews, as they “had
just renewed the usurious practices with which they had oppressed the nation
before their medieval expulsion, and flourished so profoundly during the reign
of Cromwell that they tried to buy St. Paul’s cathedral with an eye towards
transforming it into a synagogue”.10 Nevertheless, in 1664 the Jews were
granted a formal statement of toleration by the state. Although they did
not become emancipated until the middle of the nineteenth century they were
assured that “there is no Law that forbids the Jews return into England.”11
The immigration of Jews to England in the first three decades of the new
community remained relatively small. It was only at the end of the seventeenth
century that the Anglo-Jewish community started to grow rapidly, which was
mostly due to immigration from central Europe. Up to the 1730s mostly
Sephardim arrived from Portugal in flight from the Inquisition, but from the
early eighteenth century on, the great majority of immigrants were Ashkenazim
from Germany and Poland, who were mostly poor.12
Jews faced certain civil ‘disabilities’: they were not legally equal to English-
men and did not have full civil and legal rights. No special laws or privileges
were enacted with regard to their legal position. Although the Blasphemy Act
of 1698 as well as the Marriage Act of 1753 allowed some special provisions for
Jews, their basic legal position was equal to that of other non-Anglicans. Jews
were thus not permitted to hold municipal office, could not be employed in any
office or trust, civil or military, were barred from taking a degree at university,
could not vote nor be elected to parliament or engage in retail trade, because
8See Katz: The Jews in the history of England, p.140.
9See Ibid., p. 114.
10Ibid, p. 140.
11Cited ibid, p. 144.
12See Pollins: Economic History of the Jews in England, p. 48.
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these activities required an oath on the new testament. They were, however,
permitted as wholesale traders.13 Those who engaged in foreign trade had to
pay high ‘alien’ duties. Harold Pollins pointed out, however, that while Jewish
economic activities in the middle ages were characterised by imposed restric-
tions, the seventeenth century brought with it a freer atmosphere and legal
restrictions were gradually removed. The barriers were religious, not racial,
which means that a Jew who was willing to convert could enter the otherwise
restricted occupations. While the main occupations of Jews in England were
indeed to do with overseas trade, broking and finance, in fact “there is no
evidence that Jews had to take up certain occupations, such as broking.”14
While in the late eighteenth century, some Jews were occupied in the before
mentioned trade, some were to be found in shopkeeping, as domestic servants
and most of them were occupied as peddlers and old clothes dealers, an activity
often bordering on criminality.15
After 1664, the basic issue of Jewish residence in England was never again
seriously questioned. It was, however, difficult for Jews to become fully as-
similated ‘Englishmen’. Their status was not easy to define and social and
religious barriers existed between Jews and ‘Englishmen’. Allegations of an
international conspiracy of Jews in England and Holland that posed a threat
to national commerce and security appeared, despite the fact that the Jews
were never politically organised and their status was characterised by their mi-
nority position.16 Historians have traditionally argued that hostility towards
Jews during the time in England was negligible. Harold Pollins pointed out
that there are numerous examples of antagonism towards Jews to be found
from the seventeenth century to the present day, but that “the formal restric-
tions they faced and the informal hostility they experienced were negligible
compared with the majority of Jews in the world.”17 Endelman, similarly,
concluded that “there is no question that the Jew’s position in England at the
13See Katz: The Jews in The History of England 1485-1850, p. 241.
14Pollins: Economic History of the Jews in England, p. 59.
15See ibid., p. 71.
16See Katz: The Jews in The History of England 1485-1850, p. 188.
17Ibid., p. 41.
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end of the seventeenth century was superior to that of Jews in other Euro-
pean states”, which he thinks was due to the fact that the state ignored their
presence and their legal status remained undefined. However, he admitted
that “it would be incorrect to infer from this that the Jews of England no
longer encountered the old vulgar prejudices or were accepted as members of
the English nation.”18
When analysing English cultural attitudes towards Jews at the time, on
the other hand, it becomes evident that most scholars have wrongly dismissed
and underestimated eighteenth century antisemitism. There was a certain
stereotypical assertion about Jews that was deeply ingrained in popular wis-
dom at the time and the acceptance of Jews by the English “was frequently
compromised through the haphazard endurances of anti-Semitic myths and
folktales, many of which can be traced back at least to medieval times and
more often than not to exegesis of the text and meaning of the Bible”.19 The
Jew was in fact perceived as “the perpetual outsider whose unsettling presence
serves to define the bounds that separate the native Englishmen from the alien
Other”.20 These folktales evolved around the ‘Wandering Jew’, the blood libel,
and ‘Shylock’. Popular attitudes came to light especially during the time of the
controversy around the ‘Jew Bill’. In 1753 the Jewish Naturalisation Bill was
passed in the English parliament which allowed foreign Jews naturalisation.
After it became law in May that year, however, critics mounted a campaign
against it. Even Endelman depicted the language of these critics as “intemper-
ate”, “alarmist” and “hysterical”. He stressed that “the opponents of the act
resurrected crude medieval libels” who were convinced that “Britain would be
swamped with unscrupulous brokers, jobbers, and moneylenders, who would
use their ill-gotten gains to acquire the estates of ruined landowners”. They
warned that “Jews would control Parliament”, “convert St. Paul’s to a syna-
gogue, circumcise their tenants, and perpetuate countless other anti-Christian
18Endelman: The Jews of Britain 1656-2000, p. 37.
19Felsenstein, Frank: Anti-Semitic Stereotypes, a Paradigm of Otherness in English Popular
Culture, 1660-1830, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1995, p. 2.
20Ibid, p. 3.
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crimes”.21
Although Britons mostly defined themselves against the Catholic and French,
the ubiquity of centuries-old stereotypes of Jews were used to define what was
British. “The ‘Jews’ to whom the act’s opponents referred were largely imagi-
nary creatures, constructed to represent threats to British national traditions,
Christianity, manhood, landed property.”22 The bill was perceived as a men-
ace to Church and state in particular: one writer expressed that “Naturalising
the Jews, who are Infidels and Antichrists (...) will soon let in all Infidelity
bare-fac’d; and open a Door to even the Great Antichrist”.23 As a result of a
storm of opposition, the bill was finally repealed in December 1753.
Despite this controversy, the outcome of which may have significantly de-
layed emancipation, there was a high degree of acculturation of the Anglo-
Jewish middle class in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Jews in
Britain deserted or altered Jewish traditions to fit with the values and insti-
tutions of European culture and “the Jewish middle class began turning to
the majority society for patterns of behaviour and modes of thought they had
found previously within the confines of Jewish life”.24
Over the course of the eighteenth century the Jewish population grew from
750 to 15,000 persons, but the “communal institutions necessary to sustain
a traditional Jewish culture for a population that size failed to keep pace”.25
There was widespread literary hostility towards Jews and that although the
lifestyle of the Anglo-Jewish elite was not different from that of other wealthy
Englishmen, Jews were for example criticised for their “sexual misconducts”
with Christian women.26 It is noteworthy that the Jews of the time were
neither directly involved nor contributed to the English dialogue concerning
their condition, nor did they attempt to refute the antisemitic charges made
against them.27
21Endelman: The Jews of Britain 1656-2000, p. 75.
22Ibid, p. 76.
23Cited in Felsenstein: Anti-Semitic Stereotypes, p. 193.
24Endelman: The Jews of Georgian England, p. 118.
25Ibid.
26See ibid, p. 289.
27See Felsenstein: Anti-Semitic Stereotypes, p. 8.
33
2 The History of Antisemitism in Britain and Germany
2.1.3 Emancipation and Immigration
In 1851, on the eve of Jewish emancipation, around 35,000 Jews lived in
Britain, most of them in London’s East End, only the wealthier of them in
the West End, and a minority in other industrial centres, rural areas, naval
towns, and seaside resorts.28 The majority of them were Ashkenazim, who
had migrated to London from Germany and Holland and other parts of cen-
tral Europe to escape persecution and deprivation. Although many of them
had started out as peddlers and hawkers, by 1850 many had moved into craft
skills occupations like watch manufacturing. Nevertheless, the stereotype of
the criminal Jewish peddler remained common.29
There were various synagogues in London, one of the Spanish and Portuguese
Jews in Bevis Marks and three Ashkenazi houses of worship. East London
also housed Jewish almshouses, houses of study, and the Jews’ Free School,
which was situated in Bell Lane, Spitalfields. Jewish migrants from Poland
and Germany established further congregations. In these neighbourhoods,
Jews of all economic conditions lived side by side, so there was generally no
movement with upward social mobility. Some of the wealthier Jews, however,
did move to the West End, where three Jewish communities evolved out of a
first congregation that was established in 1768 and which was the origin of the
Western Synagogue.30 It is important to acknowledge, however, that even if
they moved, Jews generally stayed among Jews.31
Structures of communal authority and cohesion had to be produced by Jews
themselves, as there was - in contrast to Germany for example - no statutory
recognition of Jews in Britain.32 The communal authorities were the Jewish
Board of Deputies, founded in 1760 but more widely active only from the 1830s,
28See Alderman, Geoffrey: Modern British Jewry, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992, pp. 4,
15, 19.
29See ibid, p. 11.
30See ibid, pp. 6-15.
31See Gartner, Lloyd: The Jewish immigrant in England 1870-1914, London: Vallentine
Mitchell 2001 (3rd ed., 1st ed. 1960.), p. 144
32See Feldman, David: Englishmen and Jews, Social Relations and Political Culture 1840-
1914, New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1994, p. 23
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that claimed authority over secular matters, as well as the Jewish Board of
Guardians, created in 1859 to care for the metropolitan Jewish poor. In 1836
the Board of Deputies “received statutory recognition as the body competent
to record marriages and ensure they were performed ‘according to the usages
of the Jews”33 and thus gained a powerful position in the community. Not all
Jews recognised the Board of Deputies’ claim that it represented the Jewish
community, but it was recognised by the non-Jewish community. It lobbied
for legislation that was designed to place the Jewish community on a footing
of equality with other religious groups. David Itzkowitz has argued that their
perspective was that the English society needed to make special concessions
to the Jewish community in order for them to become fully integrated into
English society.34 He stressed that “increasingly after the 1850s the Board of
Deputies was willing to argue that Jews deserved special exemption from laws
that continued to apply to non-Jews. This willingness was not the result of
a belief in Jewish separatism, but rather the result of a growing belief that it
is legitimate for a polity to recognise the cultural differences among its con-
stituent parts.”35 Thus, they were arguing “for a Jewish inclusion in British
society and were, by implication, enunciating a new vision of British society
based on pluralism.”36 The Anglo-Jewish response to the “Jewish question”
was in this sense unique compared to that of other Jewish communities in
Europe. However, in sharp contrast to Itzkowitz, other historians have in-
terpreted the Board of Deputies as reactive and essentially defensive. Jews
generally accepted the hegemony of Christian society and sought exceptional
status only when significant interests were at risk, as will be discussed below.
While the Board of Deputies had self-proclaimed supremacy over secular
matters, the Chief Rabbi had the supremacy over religious matters. The
Anglo-Jewish newspaper, the Jewish Chronicle, which first appeared in 1841
33Ibid, p. 24.
34See Itzkowitz, David C.: Cultural Pluralism and the Board of Deputies of British Jews,
in: R.W. Davis and R.J. Helmstadter (eds.): Religion and Irreligion in Victorian Society,
London and New York: Routledge 1992, pp. 85-101, here p.89.
35Ibid, p.91.
36Ibid, p.98.
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and then weekly from 1847, “enabled English Jews to perceive themselves as
members of a Jewish community.”37
The Jewish emancipation process in Britain can be described as occurring in
a “piecemeal fashion”, took place between 1830 and 1871 and was connected to
gradual changes in the Jews’ legal status and their admission to Parliament.38
The Jewish Municipal Relief Act in 1845 permitted Jews to hold all municipal
offices. There is evidence, however, that Jews held such offices earlier than
that. Followed by further permissions to engage in the retail trade (1828), to
attend the secular University College London (1828) and to be admitted to
the Bar (1833), by mid-century the legal equality of Jewish with non-Jewish
citizens of the United Kingdom was almost complete.39 However, there was a
debate around Jewish involvement in the English parliament and it was only
in 1858 that the Jewish Relief Act gave the House of Commons permission to
alter the words of the oath for Jews.40 In the same year, Lionel de Rothschild
was allowed to sit in the House of Commons. By then, Benjamin Disraeli, a
Christian with Jewish heritage had already become an MP and was to become
Prime Minister in 1868.
In some ways the emancipation debate in Britain was unique: whereas in
most European states emancipation was conditional - Jews were expected to
abandon their social cohesion, national consciousness, ritual separatism and
skewed occupational profile - in Britain, Christian supporters of the admission
of Jews to the political nation did not set conditions of their emancipation.
Supporters of Jewish emancipation did not make their support conditional,
they found the Jews worthy of admission, as they were “sober, diligent, hard-
working, loyal citizens.” Furthermore, “there was no public clamour that Jews
renounce particularist rituals and doctrines in order to be integrated into soci-
ety.”41 At the same time, however, British Jewry was intensely concerned with
37Feldman: Englishmen and Jews, p. 25.
38See Endelman: Jews of Britain 1656-2000, p. 101ff.
39See Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 55.
40See Finestein, Israel: Jewish Society in Victorian England, London: Valentine Mitchell
1993, p. 2.
41Endelman: The Jews of Britain 1656-2000, p. 108ff.
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its public image. Jewish writers, for example, were expected to describe their
community in ‘glowing’ and ‘angelic’ terms, they were supposed to show that
“Jews were deserving of civil and social equality, and that their full emanci-
pation could not be construed as a danger to Christian Britain.”42 In light of
these findings the emancipation process might not have been as unconditional
as Endelman has suggested.
The Jews themselves were at the time divided regarding the question of
emancipation. Many were in favour of emancipation, but there was also oppo-
sition, if unorganised, as well as indifference. While emancipationists favoured
legal equality and thought that “the English Jew differed from his fellow-
subject only in the matter of creed”, oppositionists feared that emancipation
“would wean the Jews from Judaism”.43
Jewish leaders and the Anglo-Jewish press tried to shape the ways in which
the Jewish question was politically debated and tried to establish expressions
of Jewish identity that did not contradict being Englishmen. Hostile commen-
tators, however, used the terminology of race to show the racial character of
Judaism and how it could never be a universal religion and actually prevented
Jews from ever becoming true patriots.44
It is important to take into account the timid character of Jewish culture
in Britain at the time, the high degree of Anglicisation, the exaggerated pa-
triotism of British Jews and their ambivalent response to Jewish immigration
from Eastern Europe when analysing the emancipation process. In addition
to that, hostility towards Jews in the eighteenth century, the centrality of
Protestantism and the conversionist ethos to English national identity, and
the pressure on British Jews to conform to ideal Britishness were important
aspects of the British struggle of self-definition.45 David Cesarani showed that
the Jewish question that emerged in Britain after 1876 was tied to the search
42Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 69f.
43Finestein: Jewish Society in Victorian England, p. 13, 7.
44See Feldman: Englishmen and Jews, p.127.
45See Cesarani, David: British Jews, in: Liedtke, R. and Wendehorst, S.(ed.): The emanci-
pation of Catholics, Jews, and Protestants - Minorities and the nation state in nineteenth
century Europe, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1999, pp. 33-56, p. 36.
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for a British identity and was in this sense parallel to the dealings with the
Jewish question in other countries. Whereas continental traditions were built
upon romantic nationalism, the British Jewish question “grew out of the in-
tolerance of liberalism towards particularism” and further bore in effect the
same outcomes as in Germany until 1914.46
Although there is a strong argument for the significance of anti-Jewish hos-
tility for British nationalism, Endelman continued to stress the relatively in-
nocuous character of antisemitism and argues that “before the late 1870s Jews
did not loom large in the political or cultural imagination of the English”, so
that “in politics and culture, the ‘other’ was more likely to be a Catholic, an
Irishman, a Frenchman, or one of England’s colonised peoples than a Jew.”47
However, he acknowledged that “at a more popular level, in novels, newspa-
pers, and the theatre, malicious or crude images of Jews were common fare”
and that writers “manipulated stereotypical Jewish characteristics for artistic
ends.”48
From the late 1870s there was a change in attitudes towards Jews. Public
attention focused on Jews more frequently, which became apparent in the lib-
eral and radical criticism of Benjamin Disraeli’s policies. Jews were accused of
aligning with Turks during the period 1875-1878 and for supporting Disraeli in
his ’anti-Christian’ policy, in which British interests were allegedly subverted
to those of Jewish bondholders. Furthermore, during the Boer War (1899-
1902), “liberal and socialist critics of imperial expansion claimed that Jewish
financiers in London and mine owners in Johannesburg had pushed Britain
into war in order to safeguard and extend their interests in South Africa.”49
There was also hostility against what was perceived as a threatening concen-
tration of Jewish businesses and workers in London’s East End. From the
1860s “educated opinion believed that the presence of a nonindustrial, casual
labouring class in the heart of the capital - described as immoral, vicious,
46See ibid., p.55.
47Endelman: The Jews of Britain 1656-2000, p. 150.
48Ibid., p. 151.
49Endelman: The Jews of Britain 1656-2000 , p. 153.
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besotted, atheistic, and feckless - threatened Victorian civilisation.”50
Bryan Cheyette showed that the uses of Jewish stereotypes in English lit-
erature between 1875 and 1945 in fact had a social significance and were not
merely instruments for artistic ends. He emphasised “that writers inside an
imperial culture were able to define ‘the self’ in relation to a semitic ‘other’
points ultimately, (...), to the power of such narratives to segregate and ex-
clude in the name of a higher ‘culture’.”51 In addition, “the indeterminacy
of the semitic representations under consideration meant that ‘the Jew’ can
be constructed to represent both sides of a political or social or ideological
divide.”52
Taking into account Cesarani’s and Cheyette’s findings it is in fact possible to
interpret British Jewish emancipation and its aftermath as a time of constant
pressure by the dominant liberal culture and an expectation of Jews to show
that they were worthy of being English. This underlying pressure can for
example be detected when analysing the reaction of the established Anglo-
Jewish community towards Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe.
Anglo-Jewish life was greatly affected by Jewish immigration from Russia
and Eastern Europe following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II. By 1882,
the Jewish population in Britain had increased to around 60,000 persons.53
Most of the 2.5 million Jews who emigrated from Eastern Europe - for economic
reasons or to escape persecution - settled in the United States of America, but
about 150,000 of them settled in Britain - the majority of them again in Lon-
don’s East End - some of them certainly with the intention to continue their
journey to America and stay in Britain only temporarily.54 When the tem-
porary stay turned into permanent settlement the existing Jewish community
in London felt overwhelmed by the newcomers. Many objected to foreign-
born Jews coming to Britain because “these foreign Jews drew attention to
50Ibid, p. 156.
51Cheyette, Bryan: Constructions of ‘the Jew’ in English Literature and Society - Racial
Representations 1875-1945, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993, p.9.
52Ibid.
53See Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 103.
54Ibid, p. 111.
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themselves, and brought political controversy in their wake, so that the public
mind became focused on the Jews as foreigners and a cause for concern at the
very time at which the established Jewry was trying its hardest to blend it-
self, chameleon-like, into its non-Jewish environment”.55 Endelman, who made
a similar argument, stressed that the settling of the East European Jews in
Britain between 1881 and 1914 led to a radical transformation of Anglo-Jewry.
In fact, it was perceived that “their poverty, occupations, and foreignness drew
unwanted attention to them and native-born Jews alike, fuelling the fires of
xenophobia and antisemitism.”56 The existing community felt that their safe
and stable status within the majority society was threatened.
Immigrant Jewry initially formed ‘a society apart’ and there was little con-
tact with neighbours. Immigrants generally “maintained much of their outward
appearance and even the flavour of their former way of life”.57 That gener-
ally meant “strict marital fidelity, mutual affection and self-sacrifice between
the generations, the home as the seat of most religious observance, patriarchal
authority with a prominent role reserved for the mother”58 The immigrant’s
religion was not only a form of personal expression but the basis of a social
life as well. Newly arrived Jews went to their relatives and former neighbours
for help regarding employment and marriage and in order to “recreate the so-
cial and religious life which they had left behind”.59 The Jewishness of the
immigrants was different from that of the settled community as “their iden-
tity included a strong element of national-ethnic distinctiveness, almost an
inchoate nationalism”, which led to clashes with the old leadership over com-
munal matters.60 In the new environment, however, it was difficult to maintain
these traditions, as it meant for example finding a job where the Sabbath could
be observed, which was not always possible.61 Through taking care of the edu-
cation of the children of the immigrants in Board or Jewish voluntary schools,
55Ibid, p. 120.
56Endelman: The Jews of Britain 1656-2000, p. 127.
57Gartner: The Jewish Immigrant in England, p. 166.
58Ibid, p. 167.
59Ibid, p.185.
60See Endelman: The Jews of Britain 1656-2000, p. 180.
61See Gartner: The Jewish Immigrant in England, p.194.
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both the State and the native Jewish community tried to “make them En-
glish, Jewish, or Anglo-Jewish”.62 One example for this is the Jewish Lads’
and Girls’ Brigade, which started as an organised youth club for Jewish boys
run by middle-class Anglo-Jewish gentleman in 1895, and which aimed at An-
glicizing the Yiddish-speaking East European immigrants and turning them
into respectable ‘Englishmen of the Mosaic persuasion’.63 Despite this effort,
however, immigrant Jews continued to educate their children in the heder,
where a headmaster taught the children in religious matters and where only
Yiddish was spoken.64 In addition, the immigrants “were practically without
representation in the institutional framework of British Jewry”.65
Through prejudice and discrimination almost none of the jobs were open to
Jews, so most of the new arrivals, males and females alike, were engaged in
the tailoring trades, some of them in boot, shoe and slipper manufacturing.66
By 1911 the majority of them was engaged in clothing trades, a minority in
cabinet-making. Endelman, however, suggested that the impact of occupa-
tional discrimination was minimal and that most newcomers looked for work
inside the Jewish sector voluntarily - most of them found low-paid work in
sweat-shops.67 However, it is important to acknowledge, as Alderman has
done, that there was anti-Jewish sentiment in the British public that con-
nected Jews to the abominable conditions in sweat-shops and the poor housing
conditions in the East End, even though these were of course not inherently
“Jewish”. By this time, intellectuals and politicians had begun to take an in-
terest in the issue of “aliens” in Britain and the problems that were perceived
to arise out of their presence. Alderman emphasised that they adopted a tone
towards Jews that was more racial in character and saw a problem in the char-
acter of Jews themselves, not in their numbers or occupations.68 In the face
62Ibid, p. 220.
63See Kadish, Sharman: ‘A Good Jew and a Good Englishman: The Jewish Lads’ and
Girls’ Brigade 1895-1995, London: Vallentine Mitchell 1995, pp. 36 ff.
64Ibid, p. 221.
65Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 152.
66See ibid, p. 121.
67See Endelman: The Jews of Britain 1656-2000, p. 134.
68See Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 123.
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of a general high rate of unemployment, claims were also heard that Jewish
workers displaced native workers and were the cause of low wages in clothing
and footwear industries.
Bill Fishman has described the rather grim conditions this form of occu-
pation entailed. Due to the high supply of immigrant labour, the new immi-
grant, the ‘greener’, “made his way to the chazar mark (pig market!) - an
open thouroughfare where the masters came to select ‘hands’ seeking employ-
ment”.69 This forcing down of wages due to the over-supply of labour and
de-skilling eventually evoked a radical response among some immigrant Jews.
The ‘radical intelligentsia’ that had fled from the Tsarist police found their
people in the East End “exploited by their own masters, despised and rejected
by the Gentile workers”.70 They founded radical groups dedicated to social-
ism which challenged Judaism and organised strikes as well as other forms of
worker activism. One of the better known publication of the radicals was the
monthly Arbeter Fraint, which was first published in 1885. By 1914, “the An-
archists were the most dynamic element in East End political life”, but that
the movement eroded so that “by the early 1920s a few small esoteric groups
remained, hovering on the periphery of the extreme Left, already functioning
in obscurity”.71
Although there were claims that the Jewish immigrants and their radical
unions were revolutionaries, Jews were at the time nevertheless “seen as eco-
nomic individualists whose loyalties were to other Jews rather than to members
of the same class”.72 In fact, “it was as if within every Jewish tailor there was
a Rothschild bursting to get out.”73
In her essay on trade unionism in London and Leeds from 1872 to 1915,
Anne Kershen analysed the work of Jewish trade unionists and pointed out
that “the antagonisms that existed between English and alien workers stemmed
69Fishman, William J.: East End Jewish Radicals 1875-1914, Nottingham: Five Leaves
2004, p. 45.
70Ibid, p. 97.
71Ibid, p. 302, 308.
72Feldman: Englishmen and Jews, p. 143.
73Ibid.
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from a mutual concern for economic welfare plus, undeniably, that degree of
anti-semitism that is to be found beneath the surface of all levels of English
society”.74 She concluded, however, that the English labour movement did
support Jewish workers in times of industrial strife, even though this was more
a means to ensure acceptable wages and conditions to the English working man.
The Jewish workers, on the other hand, did not initially see the advantages
in uniting with English workers and many Jewish unionists did not want to
sacrifice their Jewish identity.75
Mass Jewish immigration quickly aroused a public backlash. The general
public perception was that the Jewish immigrants brought with them poverty,
health hazards and immoral work ethics. During the 1890s the “aliens” ques-
tion became an important issue in British politics. In 1892, the Conservative
government was in favour of an “Aliens Bill” that would control immigration
and there was also a small Jewish lobby in favour of this legislation. But the
bill was not passed until 1905, when, for the first time in British history, im-
migration was restricted to those seeking to avoid persecution and punishment
on religious or political grounds.76 Alderman emphasised that this came at
a time of general anti-Jewish prejudice.77 John Garrard and Bernard Gainer
have demonstrated how antisemitism was present in the anti-alien agitation at
the time.78
If one takes into account the different aspects of Jewish life in Britain, it
is difficult to speak of a unified Jewish social experience or a clear-cut Jewish
identity. ‘Anglo-Jewry’ therefore describes a wealth of experiences and iden-
tities, but one common aspect of these might have been the general hostility
74Kershen, Anne: Trade Unionism amongst the Jewish Tailoring Workers of London and
Leeds 1872-1915, in: Cesarani, David (ed.): The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry, Oxford:
Basil Blackwell 1990, pp.34-54, here p.51.
75Ibid, p. 52.
76See Alderman, Modern British Jewry p. 137.
77See bid, p. 134.
78See also Gainer, Bernard: The Alien Invasion: The Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905,
London: Heinemann 1972, p.17; Garrard, John: The English and Immigration: A Com-
parative Study of the Jewish Influx 1880-1910, London: Oxford University Press 1971,
ch.3.
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Jews encountered, that did not discriminate between Jews in different social
positions. In addition, it was significant for the shaping of a British national
identity.
2.1.4 British Jewry in the interwar period
Although there was extreme poverty - and some extreme wealth - among Jews
at the beginning of the twentieth century, they did move up the economic
and social ladder. They progressed in institutions of higher education and
were present in significant numbers as students at Oxford, Cambridge and
other universities. In addition, Jews increasingly flourished in the armed forces
and the civil service. There was also a number of Jewish artists. The more
prosperous of the immigrant generations moved to the North-Eastern quarters
of Hackney and Stamford Hill, from 1907 also to Hampstead and Golders Green
in the North-West, as well as Finchley and Hendon. The anglicisation and
patriotism that characterised British Jewish life at the time becomes especially
apparent in the high number - 50,000 - who served in the British Armed Forces
during the First World War.79
By 1918, the Jewish community in the East End “had become Anglicized if
not fully integrated into the local non-Jewish society and had become almost
entirely working class”.80 Upwardly mobile Jews moved to North-East and
North-West London.
As Alderman has stressed, the “underlying theme of the communal poli-
tics of British Jewry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was
the tension created by the desire of the established, Anglicized ruling elites to
maintain their control of communal organisation and leadership, and the de-
termination of the newer arrivals that these should ultimately fall under their
sway”.81 Zionism played an important part in the communal affairs of British
79See Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 210 f.
80Smith, Elaine R.: Jews and Politics in the East End of London, 1918-1939, in: Cesarani,
David: The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1990, pp.141-162,
here p. 141.
81Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 207.
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Jewry at the time, so much that “during the 1880s a number of what might be
termed Palestine support groups enjoyed meteoric existence” in Jewish com-
munities in Britain. Although there was evidence for widespread support for
Zionism among British Jewry, who called for the establishment of a “publicly
recognised, legally secured home for the Jewish people in Palestine”82 in a pe-
tition in 1915, Alderman concluded that in general, Zionism could not claim
mass support among British Jews before the war.83
The Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which Britain formally stated that it
supported the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Pales-
tine, and the establishment of British Mandate Palestine in 1923, were impor-
tant events for the Zionist organisations in Britain. Despite the success of
the Zionist movement in obtaining the Balfour Declaration and securing the
British Mandate for Palestine from the League of Nations, Zionism did not put
down wide or deep roots in Jewish society in Britain. The old elites continued
to dominate the Board of Deputies and most other communal organisations
until the 1930s, when a new struggle for power ended with the victory of im-
migrants - many of whom were pro-Zionist. It has to be acknowledged though,
as Cesarani has pointed out, that although there was a “triumph of Zionism”,
it did not lead to an exodus of British Jews to Palestine, because “in practi-
cal terms the agenda of the Zionists in Britain was oriented entirely towards
domestic affairs. The ideology of the movement, as in other countries, pro-
vided a viable Jewish identity which enabled Jews to remain in the Diaspora
and a rhetoric of revolt for middle-class elements denied access to communal
power.”84
The hostility Jews encountered during this period was frequently anti-Zionist,
although it also appeared as anti-Bolshevism or anti-alienism.85 At the begin-
ning of the 1920s The Jewish Peril (The Protocols of the Learned Elders of
82Cited ibid, p. 229.
83See bid, p. 221, p. 225.
84Cesarani, David: Communal Authority in Anglo-Jewry, 1914-1940, in: Cesarani, David
(ed.): The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1990, pp. 115-140,
here p.140.
85See Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 263.
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Zion) appeared and caused intense concern among British Jews.86 “Jewish
shopkeepers were subjected to increasing criticism on account of aggressive
and innovative sales and marketing techniques” and “the employment of eye-
catching advertising gimmicks, and the abandonment of prices fixed by manu-
facturers (...) were projected in both the trade and the Fascist press as stereo-
typical aspects of an unacceptable face of capitalism which Jews were said (...)
to embody”.87 There were concrete forms of anti-Jewish discrimination - for
example many restaurants and hotels refused to cater to Jews - during the
inter war period, so it is somewhat surprising that Endelman thought that, in
sum, it was “neither brutish nor shrill.”88
Although there was no evidence of official governmental antisemitism be-
tween 1879 and 1939, various strands of oppositional anti-Semitism were present
and, in addition to that, “there was abundant evidence of an attitudinal hostil-
ity towards Jews which assumed different forms”, appearing in discrimination
against Jews in the East End as well as in the “quiet genteel atmosphere at
Oxford.” It is noteworthy that “both before 1914 and afterwards there was a
tendency for some of this hostility towards Jews in Britain to manifest itself
within a conspirational framework.”89
Gisela Lebzelter showed the significance of political antisemitism in Great
Britain during the interwar period. She says that it “served no longer merely
as a ‘safety valve’ to release social tensions, or as an explanatory model to
neutralise objective problems by attributing them to a scapegoat, the Jew, but
became the central justification for the Fascist’s claim to power”. However,
she interpreted antisemitism in Britain as only short-lived and less powerful
than elsewhere.90
Cesarani, on the other hand, emphasised that there was in fact also political
86Ibid, p. 263.
87Ibid, p. 289.
88Endelman: The Jews of Britain 1656-2000, p. 201.
89Holmes, Colin: Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939, London: Edward Arnold
1979, p. 227 ff.
90See Lebzelter, Gisela: Political Anti-Semitism in England 1918-1939, London: Macmillan
1978, p. 171.
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antisemitism in Britain and that the tenure of William Joynson Hicks, who
was anti-alien, anti-communist and anti-Zionist, as Home Secretary between
1924 and 1929 caused great concern among Jews. He stresses that in England,
an “anti-Jewish feeling was mobilised under the guise of anti-alienism, anti-
Zionism and anti-Bolshevism by mainstream political figures”.91 Not only the
Alien Act of 1905, but also the subsequent Acts of 1914 an 1919 had harsh
impacts on Jews and its application was particularly oppressive to Jewish
‘aliens’.92
From 1933, Britain faced immigration from Jews seeking refuge from perse-
cution in Nazi Germany. But the prospects of these Jews coming to Britain
“gave rise to an anti-refugee lobby among some of the most respected sec-
tors of British middle-class society”.93 Alderman depicted how “in 1933 and
1934 the British Medical Journal began reporting hostility from the medical
profession to refugee doctors, in 1934 The Times carried a similar correspon-
dence regarding university appointments”.94 There was in fact a policy of
“ultra-cautious selectivity” and only “where it could be demonstrated that
their permanent resettlement in Britain would benefit the British economy,
they were welcomed”.95 The British attitude towards Jewish immigration in
the 1930s was that Jews created antisemitism and should therefore only be
allowed to immigrate in the least possible number, their wellbeing, moreover,
was to be the responsibility of British Jewry, not the British taxpayer. This
assessment is shared by Louise London, who pointed out how “British policy
started from the position that anti-semitism was at least in part caused by
Jews and hence must be contained by limiting total Jewish immigration to
Britain”.96 The Anglo-Jewish community shared this attitude to an extent
91Cesarani, David: Joynson-Hicks and the radical right in England after the First World
War, in: Kushner, Tony and Lunn, Kenneth (ed.): Traditions of Intolerance - Historical
Perspectives on fascism and race discourse in Britain, Manchester: Manchester University
Press 1989, pp.118-139, here p. 134.
92Ibid.
93Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 272.
94Ibid.
95Ibid, p. 273.
96London, Louise: Jewish Refugees and British Government Policy 1930-1940, in: Cesarani,
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and feared an antisemitic backlash.97
As a consequence, the Jewish community did initially comply with the rules
set up by the government and only after Kristallnacht in November 1938 made
some efforts to gain relaxation of entry rules, so that between 1938 and 1939
around 50,000 Jewish refugees, among them around 9,000 children - were al-
lowed to enter Britain.98 It needs to be acknowledged that “the approach of
British Jewry to the refugee question, (...), was very heavily influenced by the
fear of anti-Semitism”.99 This has to be seen in the context of the activities
of the British Union of Fascists (BUF), for whom anti-Jewish propaganda be-
came a central feature after 1934. It was the BUF who attempted a provocative
march through the East End which ended in the battle of Cable Street and
who was responsible for the reprisals against Jewish property in the area in
the week following the battle.100
As Tony Kushner has shown, between the late nineteenth century and 1939
Jews were on the one hand urged to assimilate, but were on the other ex-
cluded from many parts of British society. This became especially apparent
in the immigration legislation. Although the alien legislation was not ‘per se
antisemitic’, Kushner stressed that “in practice it was used specifically against
the Jews in Britain”, for example to limit the inflow of Jewish refugees from
the Nazi oppression in the 1930s.101 The period of alien internment in Britain
in 1940, which specifically targeted Jewish refugees, indicated a high level of
intensity of British antisemitism that may get overlooked when compared to
‘German standards’.102
David (ed.): The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1990, pp.163-
190, here p. 165.
97Ibid, p. 166.
98See Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 280.
99Ibid, p. 282.
100See Holmes: Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939, pp. 193-194.
101See Kushner, Tony: The persistence of prejudice - Antisemitism in British Society during
the Second World War, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1989, p. 10.
102See Kushner, Tony: British Anti-semitism 1918-1945, in: Cesarani, David (ed.): The
Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1990, pp.191-208, here p. 200.
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2.1.5 Jews and antisemitism in contemporary Britain
British Jewry was in no respect united after 1945. While there were about
450,000 Jews in Britain in the mid-1950s - about 0.8% of the total population
- this number reduced to 410,000 in 1968 and 330,000 in the 1980s.103 In
the 1970s the number of synagogues reduced and Jews moved away from the
original areas of settlement. At the same time, they moved up into the middle
class and only a minority could still be considered working class.
The Anglo-Jewish community today is in fact “a series of communities some
of which overlap to a greater or lesser extent”.104 In 1990, 22% of Jews in
Britain were Reform and Progressives, 6.2% right-wing orthodox, just under
3% Sephardim and 68.5% central orthodox.105 These can only very roughly
indicate the religiosity and attitudes of British Jews today and it needs to be
acknowledged that there are certainly a number of people of Jewish descent
who consider themselves completely secular.
The period between 1945 and 2000 can be described as a time of diversi-
fication and fracturing of Anglo-Jewry. Endelman described the increase in
economic mobility and suburbanisation, a radical assimilation that worried
religious leaders, the disappearance of opposition to Zionism - except among
the ultra-Orthodox and hard left, decreasing antisemitism and an expansion
of strict Orthodoxy. He suggests that support for the State of Israel along
with the memoralisation of the Holocaust became “the pillar of Anglo-Jewish
identity.”106
However, in his assessment of post-war antisemitism, Endelman disregarded
the fact that anti-Jewish hostility continued. There was, for example, signif-
icant social and institutional discrimination against Jews. Jewish survivors
of the Holocaust were excluded from British labour recruitment schemes - al-
though DPs who had fought for Germany were allowed to enter Britain under
the scheme.107 Sports and social clubs denied Jews a membership and private
103See Alderman: Modern British Jewry, pp. 321-322.
104Ibid, p. 378.
105Ibid, p. 366.
106Endelman: The Jews of Britain 1656-2000, p. 229.
107See Cesarani, David: Lacking in convictions: British War Crimes Policy and National
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schools maintained a Jewish quota.
Many of these exclusions were abolished through the anti-discrimination
legislation in the 1960s and 1970s and it is today illegal to discriminate against
Jews in any form. Nevertheless, there are growing concerns about a ‘new’ form
of hostility towards Jews that has since the 1970s mostly appeared as anti-
Zionism. Anthony Julius described this hostility as an ideological challenge to
Israel that sees Zionism as a reactionary - and oppressive - form of nationalism.
He maintains that this attitude is expressed across the political spectrum,
but especially among leftist liberals, which makes it hegemonically present in
the public sphere. It poses a threat to Jews in Britain, Israel and indeed
globally, especially because it is also expressed by Islamists, even though it
is sometimes propagated by Jews themselves.108 Although this form of anti-
Zionism is not the only possible expression of anti-Jewish hostility, it does make
up a significant part of the incidents reported yearly by the Jewish Community
Security Trust.109
British antisemitism has found different forms of expression over time, but
its seriousness cannot be underestimated: it has had obvious effects on British
Jews. In addition, it is important to acknowledge that there is an inverted
relationship between Jews and majority society with regard to antisemitism:
it is not the behaviour of Jews which causes antisemitism, but it is antisemitism
that has shaped Jewish behaviour.
2.2 Jews and Antisemitism in Germany
2.2.1 Jews in medieval Germany
Although Jews were present in Germany in Roman times, “for a long time
Jewish life in Germany was a small scale affair, a matter of mere 5 commu-
Memory of the Second World War, in: Evans, Martin and Ken Lunn (eds.): War and
Memory in the Twentieth Century, Oxford: Berg, 1997, pp. 27-44, here p. 31.
108See Julius, Anthony: Trials of the Diaspora, A History of Anti-Semitism in England,
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010, pp. 441 ff.
109See for example CST: Antisemitic Incidents Report 2013.
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nities established between the mid-10th and the mid-11th century”.110 This
settlement, however, provided the basis for the development of a distinctive
Jewish tradition and culture: Ashkenaz Jewry.111 In 1096, the so called Cru-
sade massacres led to bloodletting and forced conversion, but Jewish life was
quickly re-established in all the affected places.112 The communities grew sig-
nificantly in the Middle Ages through the immigration of Jewish traders into
the Rhineland area, which became thriving centres of Jewish life. Jews had
economic privileges, synagogues were established in Cologne, Worms and Trier
between 1012 and 1066 along with Jewish schools and cemeteries.113 Jews lived
in special Jewish quarters within the towns and were allowed a local autonomy
which left them responsible for their own schools, culture and taxes. In the
twelfth century, Jews were increasingly occupied in credit business, due to the
Christian attitude towards interest.114
Although special charters of protection were issued for Jews, in medieval
Germany, like in Britain, “German Jews too had to face hostility and persecu-
tions”. Toch suggests that German Jews were in a better position because they
did not experience a wholesale expulsion from the medieval Reich.115 However,
this perception is highly questionable given the amount and seriousness of anti-
Jewish hostility in Germany during that period. Like in Britain - and indeed
the rest of Europe - in Germany too, legends about Jews were propagated in
order to legitimise anti-Jewish hostility. In 1144 the myth emerged that Jews
conducted a ritual murder every year, and in 1215 the blood libel was added to
110Toch, Michael: Peasants and Jews in Medieval Germany, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, chap-
ter IX, p. 68.
111See Meyer, Michael A. (ed.): German-Jewish History in Modern Times, Volume 1, Tradi-
tion and Enlightenment, 1600-1780, New York, Chichester: Columbia University Press
1997, p. 7
112See Toch: Peasants and Jews in Medieval Germany, p. 68.
113See Meyer: German-Jewish History, Vol 1, pp. 16 ff.
114Ibid.
115See Toch: Peasants and Jews in Medieval Germany, p. 54.
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the canon of anti-Jewish legends.116 Jews were additionally accused of the sac-
rilege of ritually repeating the sufferings of Christ by torturing a consecrated
wafer with knifes, nails and thorns. Wolfgang Benz points out that pilgrim-
ages and literature aggravated as well traditionalised the religiously motivated
anti-Jewish hostility. It also caused pogroms: during the “Rindfleischaufruhr”
in 1298, 5,000 Jews were killed in Franconia, while during the “Armleder-
Verfolgung” in Southern Germany between 1336 and 1338 6,000 Jews died.117
Jews were discriminated against and segregated, they were depicted as pariah
people, Christ murderers and prophets of Satan.118 Jews were accused of form-
ing an alliance with Satan and being bloodthirsty. Wistrich points out that
they were “indeed perceived as the spearhead of Antichrist’s legions in the
coming battle to annihilate Christendom.”119
Jewish settlement apparently reached its farthest extent in Germany in the
14th century. Due to the new waves of persecution - Jews were attacked and
locally expelled - the first half of the 14th century was thus, as Toch points
out, marked by an increased forced mobility. This increased mobility has to be
seen as a significant aspect of the formation of Jewish communities in Germany.
Toch identifies “the logic of dislocation as a trigger for the establishment of
new places of residence” that “comes fully into its own in the second phase of
Jewish settlement history, the one lasting from 1350 to the close of the middle
ages”.120
During pogroms in the thirteenth and fourteenth century, many Jewish com-
munities in central Europe were annihilated. Helen Fein points out that reli-
giously motivated anti-Jewish attitudes also became secular. Jews were now
116See Fein, Helen: Explanations of the Origin and Evolution of Antisemitism, in: Fein,
Helen (ed.): The Persisting Question - Sociological Perspectives and Social Contexts of
Modern Antisemitism, Berlin: De Gruyter 1987, pp. 3-22, here p. 7.
117See Benz, Wolfgang: Antisemitismus: Zum Verha¨ltnis von Ideologie und Gewalt, in:
Salzborn, Samuel (ed.): Antisemitismus - Geschichte und Gegenwart, Netzwerk fu¨r poli-
tische Bildung, Kultur und Kommunikation e.V., Giessen 2004 pp. 33-50, here p. 38.
118See Wistrich, Robert: Demonizing the Other - Antisemitism, Racism, and Xenophobia,
Amsterdam: Harwood Academic 1999, p. 3.
119Ibid, p. 5.
120Toch: Peasants and Jews in Medieval Germany, p. 69.
52
2 The History of Antisemitism in Britain and Germany
additionally accused of causing worldly evil, for example causing the black
death by poisoning wells. Cities and rulers marginalised Jews through ghet-
toization and special regulations.121 In addition to that, the image of the
Jewish profiteer emerged as Christians were not allowed to lend money at
interest.122
While the early and central middle ages of German Jewry, as Toch argues,
“can be likened to the European expansion, its later middle ages were surely an
age of adversity”. The reason for this were the “inner and outer colonisation”
that “gave way to a special type of Wu¨stung, towns and regions depopulated of
their Jewish component, most of which were only to be repopulated, under very
different circumstances, in the 19th century”.123 By 1520 most Jews had been
driven out of their former centres and occupations - even the credit business
- and survived as small scale pawnbrokers, peddlers and beggars. Many were
only allowed to stay in one town temporarily, forcing them to ‘wander’ in
search of new opportunities.124
Although Jews eventually resettled in their former places of residence through
new immigration in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - their number
grew from 25,000 in 1700 to 60,000 in 1800125- they continually had to face
hostility and violence. Werner Bergmann suggests that as a result of the en-
during hatred, Jews were a discriminated group that was different concerning
clothing, language and lifestyle and therefore detached from society. With the
emergence of ideas of natural justice and secular thinking, however, the de-
tached position of the Jews lost its legitimation and in the 18th century - as
part of a general process of implementing legal equality, political and economic
freedom, but also cultural homogenisation - the demand for an emancipation
of the Jews was articulated. Yet the emancipation was contested, as Jewish
culture was by some considered as ‘foreign’ and ‘unfit for assimilation’.126
121See Fein: Explanations of the Origin and Evolution of Antisemitism, p. 15.
122See Benz: Antisemitismus, p.39.
123Toch: Peasants and Jews in Medieval Germany, pp. 77-78.
124Ibid.
125See Meyer, Michael A.: German-Jewish History in Modern Times, Volume 1, p. 147.
126See Bergmann, Werner: Geschichte des Antisemitismus, Mu¨nchen: C.H.Beck 2006 (3rd
53
2 The History of Antisemitism in Britain and Germany
2.2.2 Emancipation
Mosse differentiates a number of phases or stages in the process of Jewish
emancipation in Germany: “The first of these, extending from 1781 to 1815,
witnessed the initial debates on the ‘Jewish Question’ accompanied by some
early legislative enactments. This is likely to have culminated in the abortive
attempt in 1815 to achieve an all-German solution. The next phase, extending
to 1847, to the accompaniment of continued debate, saw a series of retrograde
measures. The revolutions of 1848-49 then became the occasion of a second
unsuccessful attempt at general emancipation. During the following period
extending to 1871, initial political setbacks, accompanied, however, by rapid
economic advance, were followed by a period of Liberal ascendancy that saw
the completion of legal emancipation“.127 This process was accompanied by a
process of rapid acculturation which resulted in a limited social and cultural
integration into German society. However, there remained a tendency for Jews
to be socially segregated.128 This assessment is shared by Katz who points out
that “in Germany the struggle for emancipation was focused first on the leg-
islative bodies of the respective states” and that “important improvement in
their legal status was achieved by the Jews of Frankfurt and the country of
Wu¨rttemberg in 1824 and 1828 respectively”.129 But although free choice of
occupation and rights of residence were obtained, he argues, these can only be
considered piecemeal amendments that “fell short of the coveted equality of
rights”.130 Although the claims for Jewish legal emancipation gained strength
in 1848-49, “ a radical and universal remedy was secured only in 1866 and
1871 when, through the unification of the northern countries of Germany and
the of the whole Reich by Bismarck, a new constitution, promulgated for the
ed.), p. 17.
127Mosse, Werner E.: Jewish Emancipation in Germany, in: Birnbaum, Pierre and Katznel-
son, Ira: Paths of Emancipation - Jews, States, and Citizens, Princeton: Princeton
University Press 1995, pp.59-93, here p. 60.
128See ibid, pp. 77, 80.
129Katz, Jacob: Out of the ghetto: the social background of Jewish emancipation, New York:
Schocken 1978, p. 197.
130Ibid., p. 197.
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North German Federation in 1869, accepted the principle of citizenship inde-
pendent of religious confession”.131 By law, Jewish emancipation in Germany
was completed in 1871, when the constitution prompted equal legal status to
Jews and Germans. Although Jews remained barred from positions in the
German armed forces and were not admitted to the bar, they became consid-
erably acculturated and thrived in academia and other fields of occupations,
successfully established small businesses and became industrialists.132
However, the long road to formal emancipation was uneven and the trans-
formation of Jewish society took a long time. Reinhard Ru¨rup observes how,
before the onset of emancipation, “Jews constituted a minority inexorably set
apart from the majority by its religion, its language, culture and customs, its
ancestry and its economic practices. They were looked upon as aliens whose
residence in the country was of limited duration in in principle revocable, even
where they had been settled for generations in one and the same locality.”133
Although they enjoyed the protection of the state, Jews were not members
of civil society. Similarly, Werner Mosse points out that “a distinctive so-
cial stratification had developed within German Jewry in the course of the
eighteenth century” due to restrictions on Jewish economic activity.134 Most
Jews lived in precarious social and economic conditions as Hausierer (ped-
dler) and Tro¨dler (second-hand dealer), only very few of them were situated
higher on the social scale as Hofjuden (court Jews), Adelsbu¨rger (gentry) and
Mu¨nzjuden (coin Jews).135 Jews were excluded from professional associations
like guilds.136 The majority of Jews lived in villages or towns of fewer than
twenty thousand inhabitants and Jewish communities in major cities were rel-
131Ibid.
132Ibid.
133Ru¨rup, Reinhard: The Tortuous and Thorny Path to Legal Equality: ’Jew Laws’ and
Emancipatory Legislation in Germany from the Late Eighteenth Century, Leo Baeck
Institute Yearbook 31, London and Tu¨bingen: M. Siebeck 1986, pp. 4-5.
134See Mosse, Werner E.: Jewish Emancipation in Germany, p. 61.
135Ibid.
136See Brenner, Michael; Jersch-Wenzel, Stefi and Meyer, Michael A. (eds.): German Jewish
History in Modern Times, Volume 2: Emancipation and Acculturation 1780-1871, New
York: Columbia University Press 1997, p. 60.
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atively small: Hamburg in 1816 had 7,000, Breslau 4,409, Frankfurt 4,309 and
Berlin 3,373 Jewish inhabitants.137 The Jewish legal status varied between
and within the different territories of the German Empire until the second
half of the nineteenth century. Generally, the situation was comparatively less
restrictive for Jews in the newer provinces of South and East Prussia, where
local Jews did not face professional disabilities and were allowed to work in
handicrafts, farming, cattle breeding, transport and were admitted to perform
wage labour.138 The percentage of Jews varied in the different German states,
as well as their living conditions - in Bavaria, for example, they were banned
from the cities.139
Shulamit Volkov points out that:
“Up until the end of the eighteenth century, and in many cases well
into the nineteenth, the majority of Jews were still living among
their kind and their contacts with non-Jews, though perhaps more
intense than one usually assumed, remained within clearly defined
boundaries. They spoke a western Yiddish that was close to a
German medieval dialect, and their conspicuously different dress
marked them as strangers everywhere. (...) While they were not
officially enclosed in real ghettos, they did usually live on certain
streets (Judengassen) and in separate houses (Judenha¨user).”140
But through the removal of restrictions on their economic activity Jews were
able to move up the economic - and perhaps social - ladder. Mosse emphasises
that “assisted by large and industrious families and notably wives, endowed
with commercial expertise, an entrepreneurial spirit, and varying amounts of
capital, they had risen not only into the rising German Bu¨rgertum but also
within it”, so that “upward economic mobility had preceded the completion of
137See Mosse: Jewish Emancipation in Germany, p.64.
138See Brenner, Jersch-Wenzel, and Meyer: German Jewish History in Modern Times, Vol-
ume 2, p. 7.
139See Volkov, Shulamit: Germans, Jews and Antisemites - Trials in Emancipation, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press 2006, p. 173.
140Ibid.
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legal emancipation”.141
The emancipation process did not reduce prejudice. On the contrary, it fos-
tered negative perceptions of Jews. Humanist thinkers, most notably Christian
Wilhelm Dohm, argued that Jews should be granted the same civil rights in
order to make them “happier, better people, more useful members of soci-
ety”.142 This legal equality therefore needed to coincide with a “moral educa-
tion” of Jews in the values of the Enlightenment. Many German states con-
sequently pursued an “educational policy” with regard to the Jews, in which
legal equality was only granted in accordance with their “improvement”.143
Other thinkers however disagreed with Dohm and argued that “Mosaic law
prevented the total integration of Jews within Christian society”.144
Many humanist thinkers, however, recognised that the social status of the
Jews was not due to their ‘nature’, but due to prejudices and discrimination
against them. They were thus in favour of a legal emancipation of the Jews.
In turn, however, they expected Jews to give up their Jewishness in order
to be part of a secular society, which, as they saw it, would also eradicate
antisemitism. They favoured an ‘educational’ approach to integrate Jews into
the majority society, meaning that Jews should be taught how to become
‘bu¨rgerlich’.145 This perspective shaped the emancipation process in Germany,
so that German Jews only very slowly gained legal equality and always on the
condition of assimilation.
Although humanist thinkers recognised that anti-Jewish attitudes were based
on prejudices, they considered Jewishness to be an obstacle for emancipation.
Jews were only considered equal members of society without their Jewishness.
Thus, the humanist’s approach to antisemitism was in itself anti-Jewish.
Jews themselves were divided on how to respond to the demand for change,
141Mosse: Jewish Emancipation in Germany, p. 77.
142Cited in Brenner, Jersch-Wenzel, and Meyer: German Jewish History in Modern Times,
Volume 2, p.12.
143Ibid, p. 13.
144Ibid, p. 14.
145The major publication on this subject was Dohm, Christian Wilhelm: U¨ber die
Bu¨rgerliche Verbesserung der Juden, Berlin 1783.
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but eventual transformations in Jewish self-government, education and religion
led to acculturation. The religious reform movement within the Jewish com-
munity even aimed at altering the image of Judaism for the general public and
at adapting it towards the Christian example.146 Jews - and Christians alike
- “came to believe that in the future Jews would share in the common culture
and differ from Christians in their religion alone”.147 For most Jews, therefore,
the aim was to become culturally German, while maintaining a Jewish belief.
Although Jews were increasingly integrated into German cultural life, and
similarly into the political and social life - Jews were for example allowed into
the army and local parliaments - they nevertheless remained excluded from
state offices, clubs, and dignitaries’ associations. Michael Brenner concluded
that “even as the door to German society was being opened to them, Jews
were still barred from entering its innermost chambers”.148
The German-Jewish population also experienced a major demographic change.
After 1848 a rapid urbanisation occurred and Jews moved from rural areas
and small towns to larger urban centres. Profound changes in the social and
economic spheres coincided with this development and the majority of Jews
moved up into the middle class.149 The number of Jews residing in the Ger-
man states grew from 400,000 in 1848 to 470,000 in 1867, 1.2 per cent of the
total population. But there was generally a high rate of emigration, despite
the immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe150
As in Britain, German Jews reacted apprehensively to Jewish immigration
from Eastern Europe during the 1880s. “Many of them found it necessary
146See Meyer, Michael A.: Chapter 3, Jewish Communities in transition, in: Brenner,
Michael; Jersch-Wenzel, Stefi and Meyer, Michael A. (eds.): German Jewish History
in Modern Times, Volume 2: Emancipation and Acculturation 1780-1871, New York:
Columbia University Press 1997, p. 127.
147Ibid: Chapter 5, Judaism and Christianity, p. 168.
148Brenner, Michael: Chapter 7, From Subject to Citizen, in: Brenner, Michael; Jersch-
Wenzel, Stefi and Meyer, Michael A. (eds.): German Jewish History in Modern Times,
Volume 2: Emancipation and Acculturation 1780-1871, New York: Columbia University
Press 1997, p. 251.
149See Ibid: Chapter 8: Between Revolution and Legal Equality, p. 279.
150Ibid, p. 295.
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to reiterate the distinction between themselves and the ‘backward’ newcom-
ers”.151 This can be interpreted as an attempt by Jews to display a ‘true’
German identity and loyalty to the German state, which they felt was neces-
sary in order to be accepted as Germans. The immigrants quickly joined the
assimilationist efforts.152 Still, by 1919, 12% of all Jews in Germany, mostly
from the East, did not possess German citizenship and were legally consid-
ered resident aliens. The former immigrants and their descendants generally
lived in an urban areas. About two thirds of them spoke German as a mother
tongue.153
The population of the Jewish community in Germany grew again between
1871 and 1910 from 512,000 to 615,000, but remained a proportion of around
1 per cent of the population.154 For German Jews at the time religious prac-
tice and identity became increasingly family-focussed. Bildung (cultivation), a
trait that brought with it bourgeois respectability and yet fitted with a Jewish
identity, became a central value. Bourgeois status was maintained through
education, but also arranged marriages.155 The education of Jewish children
equalled that of other German children - discipline, nationalism, the classics
- and Jewish children received religious lessons only in private. Most Jews
worked in commerce, some in industry, and some were able to build larger
enterprises out of their small shops or their peddler stock and consequently ac-
quired considerable wealth. But during the emancipation era, Germans were
generally hostile to what they perceived as the ’money grubbing’ exploita-
tive ’Jewish’ work ethic. The German work ethic, meaning housekeeping and
agriculture, on the other hand, was described as ’productive’.156 With the
changing economy and growing capitalist middle class, the Jew came to em-
body everything the Germans disliked. This was a theme of the best-selling
151See Volkov: Germans, Jews, and Antisemites, p. 264.
152Ibid, p. 272.
153Ibid, p. 266.
154See Kaplan, Marion: As Germans and as Jews in Imperial Germany, in idem (ed.): Jewish
Daily Life in Germany, 1618-1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005, p. 175.
155Ibid, p. 200.
156Ibid, p. 215.
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Bildungsromane (educational novels) at the time, most notably in Soll und
Haben (Debit and Credit) by Gustav Freytag, whose story evolves around a
corrupt ‘Jewish’ speculator and an honest capitalist.
While the process of Jewish assimilation into German society was based on
upward mobility, the Bu¨rgertum was actually actively constructed by Germans
and Jews who were climbing up the social ladder.157 The integration of Jews
can therefore not be understood as an imitation of German culture, but has to
be analysed against the backdrop of the complex processes and transformations
of German nation building.158
But while the Verbu¨rgerlichung of German Jews in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries was similar to that experienced by other members of
the lower social strata,159 in contrast to any other social climbers, the integra-
tion of Jews into German society was discussed and disputed, because Chris-
tian society doubted if the Jews were willing and able to integrate.160 The
Jewish cultural and legal emancipation process was always accompanied by
a general anti-Jewish climate. There were numerous deliberately anti-Jewish
laws in various German states and frequent violent attacks against the Jewish
population. Emancipation was also characterised by an idea of “education”
and “betterment” which meant total assimilation and implied the negation of
any Jewish identity.161
When the positive economic trend of the previous years was reversed and
the Great Depression began in 1873, lasting until the mid -1890s, there was
again widespread anti-Jewish hostility. “Anticapitalist resentment found a
ready target in the Jews, widely blamed for fraudulent manipulations of the
so called Gru¨undungsschwindel”.162 Jewish social integration received a major
setback. There were anti-Jewish campaigns and petitions, incidents of expul-
157Volkov: Germans, Jews and Antisemites, p.178.
158Ibid.
159Ibid., p. 192.
160See Erb, Rainer and Bergmann, Werner: Die Nachtseite der Judenemanzipation - der
Widerstand gegen die Integration der Juden in Deutschland 1780-1860, Berlin: Metropol
1989, p. 8.
161See bid, pp. 27, 55, 84, 251.
162See Mosse:Jewish Emancipation in Germany, p. 88.
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sion of immigrant Jews and demands for restriction on immigration. “There
was a general anti-emancipatory and anti-Jewish atmosphere”.163 Historian
Heinrich von Treitschke, most notably, wrote in 1879 that Jews of the Di-
aspora were people without a state, without history and without language,
that they lived scattered around the world and abandon their identity, but at
the same time always remain a separate nation and thus are at fault for the
justifiable popular feelings against them.164
It was during this time that the term ‘antisemitism’ (or ‘anti-Semitism’)
was coined by the German Wilhelm Marr in 1873. It was the attempt to
establish and rationalise anti-Jewish hostility. It ‘enhanced’ previous existing
prejudices against Jews. Marr classified all Jews as ‘Semites’ and established a
counter movement against the perceived threat Jews posed to German culture.
In pseudo-scientific ‘race’ theories, which became popular in the nineteenth
century, the ‘Semitic race’ was constructed as a clearly defined ethnic group
inferior to the constructed ‘Aryan race’. In Nazi Germany, this racialised anti-
Jewish ideology merged with perceptions of Jewish power and a Jewish world
conspiracy, which allegedly posed such a serious threat to Germany that it
could only be averted with the destruction of all Jews on earth.
The assimilation that was demanded of German Jews during their emanci-
pation did not eradicate antisemitism, but the question of Jewish emancipation
and the idea of the ‘danger’ unassimilated Jews pose to Germany was revived at
the end of the nineteenth century in the Berliner Antisemitismusstreit. Hein-
rich von Treitschke explained that emancipation was a gift of the Prussian
monarchy to the Jews, who should behave accordingly. Treitschke warned of a
cultural mix of German and Jewish heritage and proclaimed that the Jews as
Jews were Germany’s misfortune.165 The Antisemitismussstreit was accompa-
nied by massive anti-Jewish agitation and physical attacks on Jews.
In addition, to the Jews’ misfortune, Treitschke’s ideas of a danger of mixing
163Ibid, p. 89.
164Cited ibid, p. 89.
165See Treitschke, Heinrich von: Unsere Aussichten, in: Preussische Jahrbu¨cher Vol 44, 1879,
pp. 559-576.
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different cultures was easily connected with the emerging race science at the
time, which gave antisemitism a pseudo-biological basis. Race science under-
stood anti-Jewish resentments as part of a necessary conflict between different
‘races’.166
Many German Jews were very aware of the threat antisemitism posed to their
community, but there were different opinions on how antisemitism could be
explained. Jacob Katz pointed out that there were two fundamental concepts
that attempted to explain the antisemitism of the 1870s. One concept, which
was predominant in the Jewish community, believed that antisemitism was
a kind of social disease that could be avoided if only the competitors of the
Jews were not as jealous, if only the Jews were less ambitious, if only the
Christians were truly tolerant. This approach was characterised by a hope for
eventually achieving good minority-majority relations. The other approach,
as Katz emphasised, was the Zionist hypothesis, which was characterised by
“despair of ever seeing Jews integrated fully into Gentile society as equals”.
The only remedy proposed to this was emigration.167 Katz added that there
was also a socialist hypothesis, which saw antisemitism as part of the nature
of the capitalist system. Jews filled a highly visible role as investors and as
soon as the system showed signs of weakness, they would become a target for
criticism and accusation.168
Mosse argues that the antisemitism of that time had a novel feature, as
it targeted precisely emancipated and assimilated Jews. He points out that
in the 1880s and 1890s, Jews were virtually eliminated from German public
life. What he calls the great antiliberal and anti-emancipatory reaction led to
manifestations of anti-Jewish sentiments and the exclusion of Jews from volun-
166For an overview of German race science and its adaption in National Socialism see
Schmuhl, Hans Walter: Rassenhygiene, Nationalsozialismus, Euthanasie. Von der
Verhu¨tung zur Vernichtung ‘lebensunwerten Lebens’, 1890-1945, Goettingen: Vanden-
hoek 1987.
167See Katz, Jacob: From Prejudice to Destruction, Anti-Semitism 1700-1933, Cambridge
Mass.: Harvard University Press 1980, p. 5.
168Ibid., See also Schorsch, Ismar: Jewish Reactions to Anti-Semitism 1870-1914, New York
& London: Columbia University Press 1972.
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tary associations like fraternities and sports clubs.169 In practice, “the eighties
and nineties witnessed the virtual elimination of Jews from German public
life, not by the revocation of emancipation, but by administrative means”.170
As a result, “Jews were thrown back on their own resources”, so “wherever
they were barred from membership, conspicuously in student fraternities and
corporations, they created their own organisations”.171 As a response to the
challenge of antisemitism, Jews founded a defence organisation in 1893, the
Centralverein Deutsche Staatsburger Ju¨dischen Glaubens (Central Associa-
tion of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith), known as C.V. The C.V. was
pro-assimilationist and was therefore opposed to Zionist organisations, which
it considered displayed a disloyalty to the German state.172
One aim of the Centralverein was to combat the rising antisemitism in Ger-
many.173 Through publications and later through their weekly newspaper,
which appeared from 1922, the CV tried to raise awareness on the issue. From
1928 and with the support of Alfred Wiener, it documented Nazi activities
and disseminated anti-Nazi material.
Historians disagree on whether these developments mean that Jewish eman-
cipation in Germany failed. Michael Meyer points out that “the assimilated
German Jews, paradoxically, drew attention to themselves on account of be-
haviour that was intrinsically assimilatory”. He argues that “if they truly
wanted to be like everyone else, they had certainly failed”. Instead they “be-
came more educated, more cultured than the norm”, which “aroused resent-
ment”.174 As an objective, Meyer concludes, the process of assimilation pro-
169See Mosse: Jewish emancipation in Germany, pp. 90-91.
170Ibid, p. 90.
171Ibid.
172On the Centralverein see Schorsch: Jewish Reactions to Anti-Semitism 1870-1914.
173See for example Steinitz, Inbal: Der Kampf ju¨discher Anwa¨lte gegen den An-
tisemitismus, Die strafrechtliche Rechtsschutzarbeit des Centralvereins deutscher
Staatsbu¨rger ju¨dischen Glaubens, Berlin: Metropol 2008.
174Meyer, Michael A.: German Jewry’s Path to Normality and Assimilation: Complexities,
Ironies, Paradoxes, in: Liedtke, Rainer and Rechter, David (ed.): Towards Normality?
Acculturation and Modern German Jewry, Schriftenreihe des Leo Baeck Instituts, Lon-
don and Tu¨bingen: M. Siebeck 2003, pp. 13-26, here p. 23.
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ceeded very far, but “as a way of calling less attention to Jews it failed” because
“in seeking to become more like everyone else, the German Jews nonetheless
had remained different”.175
Volkov stresses that although Jews participated in the intellectual life of
the new Germany and consumed its cultural and material products, were in-
tegrated into new professions and residential areas, and relinquished many of
their customs and social institutions, they had, at the same time, developed a
unique private culture, a new form of Judaism that was accepting modernity,
but still tied them together as a group.176 She argues that Jews were seeking
to preserve their identity and at the same time integrate into German culture.
Antisemitism, Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe and the complexities
of the assimilation process itself led to a “dissimilation”, in which Jews distin-
guished themselves from the majority society, for example by founding Jewish
organisations as substitutes for German organisations that did not grant them
membership. Volkov interprets the establishment of the C.V., intended as
an organisation serving the fight against antisemitism, as a form of organised
return to Judaism.177
The attempt to preserve a distinct Jewish identity was in Christian Wiese’s
view an “anti-colonial” impulse “inherent in the demand to recognise Judaism
as a cultural force of at least the same value as the Western Christian tra-
dition”.178 In his study on the Wissenschaft des Judentums, a nineteenth
century movement based on the analysis of Jewish traditions from a delib-
erately Jewish point of view, he points out that “by contesting the master
narrative of Western history, which was rooted in concepts of Christian re-
ligious supremacy and which metaphorically described Judaism as a “dead”,
175Ibid, p. 25.
176See Volkov: Germans, Jews and Antisemites, pp. 223, 263.
177Ibid., p.260.
178Wiese, Christian: Struggling for Normality: The Apologetics of Wissenschaft des Juden-
tums in Wilhelmine Germany as an Anti-colonial Intellectual Revolt against the Protes-
tant Construction of Judaism, in: Liedtke, Rainer and Rechter, David (eds.): Towards
Normality? Acculturation and Modern German Jewry, Schriftenreihe des Leo Baeck
Instituts, London and Tu¨bingen: M. Siebeck 2003, pp.77-101, here p.81.
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obsolete and even dangerous tradition, and by exploring Christianity from a
Jewish point of view, the Wissenschaft des Judentums served as an important
element of Jewish self-empowerment and provided a new version of Jewish and
of European history, subversive and disturbing from a Christian perspective
but bringing relief from a Jewish perspective”.179 The Jewish experience can
be interpreted as ‘refused normality’, as “the majority of non-Jewish society,
including most of the liberal intelligentsia, developed a completely opposite
concept of ‘normality’ that culminated in the claim that Jews should gradu-
ally give up their so-called Sonderbewusstsein and thereby demonstrate their
successful social and cultural integration”.180
But the Jewish enthusiasm for the First World War perhaps shows that Jews
still felt obliged to demonstrate their Germanness. Although Ulrich Sieg argues
that neither total assimilation nor hyper-patriotism characterised the Jewish
war experience, but a “normal” German national engagement accompanied by
a careful note of rising antisemitism,181 it is plausible that they had hoped
to gain equality in German society through proving their patriotic spirit.182
Nevertheless, there were continuous efforts to discriminate against Jews in
the German military and Jews were denounced as ‘cop-outs’ (Dru¨ckeberger).
The right wing parties in the German parliament succeeded in lobbying for
a ‘Jew count’, which was intended to examine the Jews’ commitment to the
armed forces. It was never published. This gave way to yet more antisemitic
charges and Bergmann argues that Jews felt generally disappointed in their
country.183 But anti-Jewish hostility only grew more serious and culminated
in the ‘Dolchstosslegende’ (stab-in-the-back-legend), which implied that inter-
national Jewry and German-Jewish revolutionaries were responsible for Ger-
179Ibid, p.82.
180Ibid, p.100.
181Sieg, Ulrich: “Nothing more German than the Jews”? On the Integration of a Minority
in a Society at War, in: Liedtke, Rainer and Rechter, David (eds.): Towards Normal-
ity? Acculturation and Modern German Jewry, Schriftenreihe des Leo Baeck Instituts,
London and Tu¨bingen: M. Siebeck 2003, pp. 201-216, here p. 215.
182Bergmann: Geschichte des Antisemitismus, p.66.
183Ibid, p. 67.
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many’s defeat in 1918.
After the First World War Jews continued to live in the Weimar Republic
without drastic changes to their status - other than perhaps those originat-
ing in economic losses due to the financial crisis. But although integration
developed further, anti-Jewish hostility increased as well. There is evidence
that in light of the still difficult social relations, there was a ’renaissance of
Jewish culture’ among Jews in Weimar Germany. The systematic construction
of a particular Jewish sphere was actually compatible with a participation in
the larger non-Jewish society and culture.184 According to Brenner, the Jews
of modern Germany served as an example of a minority population inventing
or reinterpreting its tradition. “The process of establishing a distinct Jewish
sphere in various cultural branches was expressed by a discourse whose basic
patterns were taken over from the larger German society and transformed into
a distinctly Jewish context”185 Jews were thus, Brenner points out, attracted
to the same ideas as many non-Jewish Germans at the time: Gemeinschaft, ir-
rationalism, wholeness, statistics and hygiene. The Jewish cultural renaissance
“promoted an allegedly authentic Judaism, just as German society propagated
genuine forms of culture, as opposed to what was conceived as the decadent
and superficial civilisation of the modern Western world”.186 Brenner fur-
thermore notes that the changing self-definition within the liberal majority
of German Jews led to a gradual shift from a community of faith to a com-
munity of common descent, exhibited in the fact that the Jewish Gemeinde
in Weimar Germany was more and more dedicated to secular tasks in social
welfare, culture and education.187
The renaissance of Jewish culture in Weimar Germany can thus be inter-
preted as an attempt at Jewish self-definition within the majority culture,
rather than as opposition to it. Jewish identity in Weimar Germany can more
adequately be described as ‘hybrid’: Jews integrated into society but kept ex-
184See Brenner, Michael: The Renaissance of Jewish Culture in Weimar Germany, New
Haven and London: Yale University Press 1996, p. 2.
185Ibid, p.6.
186Ibid., p.6.
187Ibid.
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clusively Jewish networks. As Marion Kaplan puts it, “they had succeeded in
redefining their “Jewishness” as individuals and as communities”.188
Jewish life in Germany before 1933 - and even after for that matter - cannot
be neatly pressed into one single scheme. This would neglect “deep schisms in
German society during the era of modernisation, and the actual participation of
minorities in all the tribulations of ambivalence brought about by that era”.189
Nevertheless, the German Jewish experience up to 1918 is characterised by
encounters of serious hostility and only piecemeal integration, which not only
becomes apparent when examining public discourse at the time, but also the
Jewish responses to it, which often show that Jews felt it especially necessary
to display patriotism and loyalty.
2.2.3 The Holocaust
Although Jews succeeded in establishing a ‘hybrid’ identity and indeed con-
tributed much to a German society that was as a whole dealing with a process
of emancipation, their integration into German society remained fragile. As
Sieg points out, the war enhanced social fragmentation and boosted racist
and vo¨lkisch thought in Germany.190 Shortly after the First World War, anti-
semitism became more radical than before and frequently erupted in violence;
it was furthermore not only expressed by radical groups but also by parts of the
majority population, which was connected to a general political radicalisation
and the economic situation.191 While economic stabilisation led to a calmer
period between 1924 and 1928, there was, despite a high level of integration,
a silent exclusion of Jews from public organisations, clubs and universities.192
Peter Pulzer argues that it is difficult to fit the story of Weimar Jewry into
one scheme. Although formal rights were now complete, as they had not been
under the Empire, and discrimination by public bodies diminished, all of these
were uncertain gains. “The new rights for Jews and their increased partic-
188See Kaplan: Jewish Daily Life in Germany 1618-1945, p. 382.
189Volkov: Germans, Jews and Antisemites, p. 169.
190See Sieg: “Nothing more German than the Jews?”, p. 216.
191See Bergmann: Geschichte des Antisemitismus, p. 72.
192See ibid., p. 78.
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ipation were contested, because they were part of a wider democratisation
also contested. The best measure of this was the fluctuating impact of anti-
semitism”.193 Antisemitism increased yet again in the 1930s and in 1933, with
the establishment of the National Socialist German state, antisemitism became
state-sponsored and Jews were forced out of the German “racial” collective.194
The exclusion of Jews from German society gradually radicalised; early dis-
crimination and economic boycotts were soon followed by laws and measures
that deprived German Jews of their civil rights and affected their professional
as well as private life. Jews were forced out of public positions by law, quo-
tas were implemented concerning Jewish students at schools and universities,
Jews who had immigrated from Eastern Europe in 1918 were deprived of their
citizenship, Jews were excluded from the press and Jewish students lost their
right to finish their degrees in certain subjects. The Nu¨rnberger Gesetze from
1935 made intermarriages illegal, deprived all Jews of their rights as citizens
and defined who was to be considered “Jewish” according to racial science.
Being a Jew in Germany from then on not only meant a lower social status,
it led to various forms of persecutions that affected daily life: personal docu-
ments were stamped with the letter ‘J’, park benches were reserved ‘for Aryans
only’ and Jews were prohibited from visiting public swimming baths.195 Since
1935, anti-Jewish violence had increased and several pogroms took place. On
November 9 1938, a state-coordinated and planned nation wide attack on Jew-
ish people, synagogues and shops took place during which over 90 Jews lost
their lives and around 30.000 Jewish men were arrested and temporarily incar-
cerated in concentration camps. Jews were forced out of the German economy
and in 1938 a law was implemented that led to an Arisierung - expropriation -
of Jewish businesses. The daily reality of deprivation, ghettoization and social
stigmatisation led to Jewish emigration; in 1939 75,000-80,000 Jews managed
193Pulzer, Peter: Between Hope and Fear, Jews in the Weimar Republic, in: Benz, Wolfgang;
Paucker, Arnold and Pulzer, Peter (eds.): Jews in the Weimar Republic, London and
Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck 1998, pp. 271-279., here p. 276.
194See Kaplan: Jewish Daily Life in Germany 1618-1945, p. 382.
195See Bergmann: Geschichte des Antisemitismus, p. 105.
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to emigrate, despite immigration restrictions in the countries they wished to
move to. With the onset of the war, however, emigration became severely
restricted. The 200.000 Jews who remained in Germany - forced or voluntarily
- were increasingly socially stigmatised, they were used for forced labour, were
rounded up to live in distinct Judenha¨user and were only allowed to shop dur-
ing limited times. A police order from September 1941 obliged Jews to wear a
yellow star visible on their clothing. From October 1941, German Jews were
systematically deported to Eastern Europe and killed by German forces.196
At the end of the Second World War in 1945, around 6 million Jews from all
over Europe had died in a planned, systematic genocide that took place in
extermination camps in Chelmno, Auschwitz-Birkenau, Treblinka, Majdanek,
Belzec and Sobibor, as well as in various ghettos, killing sites, concentration
and labour camps across Germany.197
There is not a single Jewish experience in Germany between 1933 and 1945,
there are many experiences. Discrimination, persecution and the inconceivable
atrocity of the Shoah, however, had an impact on every single Jewish life in
Germany and has therefore an unparallelled significance for a post-Holocaust
Jewish identity.
2.2.4 Jews in postwar Germany
Eva Kolinsky points out that “while scenarios of a new beginning varied be-
tween individuals, all shared a fear of Germany”.198 They reasonably asked
themselves how they could “live in a country where anyone and everyone might
have been a perpetrator, a guard, a tormenter and killer, and where the vast
majority of the population had looked on or away when Jews were deported
and maltreated?” Clearly, “in the eyes of Jewish Holocaust survivors, Ger-
many was no place to live, let alone build a future in”.199
196Ibid, p.106.
197Ibid., p. 115.
198Kolinsky, Eva: After the Holocaust, Jewish Survivors in Germany after 1945, London:
Pimlico 2004, p. 2.
199Ibid.
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In 1946/47, around 230,000 displaced Jews waited for resettlement in Ger-
many.200 Most of them were placed in Displaced Persons camps. The few that
decided to live elswhere had to rely on state benefits, because their former
possessions were not returned to them.201
Atina Grossmann describes the Jewish experience and identity formation in
the DP camps:
“From a ragged and exhausted group of displaced persons with very
different backgrounds and wartime experiences there emerged over
several years a new and self-conscious Jewish collectivity. They
publicly identified as survivors of Nazi extermination plans, even
if, as was the case for many of them, they had escaped because they
had landed, either by choice or by force, in the Soviet Union. They
appeared fiercely committed to Zionism and Jewish identity, even
if, in many ways, this collective was only invented in the transitional
protected and highly ideologized life of the DP camps.”202
In addition to that, Grossman points out, Jewish officials in the young Fed-
eral Republic identified and criticised antisemitic tendencies, which seemed
to intensify. Germans perceived the remaining DPs not as victims of perse-
cution, but “as ‘asocial’ and ‘homeless’ foreigners, ‘parasites’ on West Ger-
many’s developing economy and efforts to integrate millions of ethnic German
refugees”.203
Against this background, many Jews indeed emigrated to Israel as soon as
possible, some, however, did decide to stay in Germany as they gained a voice
and protected space in the stabilising democracy.204
Michael Brenner identifies a total of 18,000 Jews living in 70 communities
across Germany in 1952.205 This small heterogeneous group - the Jewish com-
200Ibid, p. 4.
201Ibid.
202Grossmann, Atina: Jews, Germans, and Allies, Close Encounters in occupied Germany,
Princeton: Princeton University Press 2007, pp.10-11.
203Ibid, p. 257.
204See Kolinsky: After the Holocaust, p. 6.
205See Brenner, Michael: Epilogue or Preface, in: Romberg, Otto and Urban-Fahr, Susanne
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munities in Germany are immigration communities that are culturally not
homogeneous - grew and diversified in the subsequent decades. In the 1960s
and 1970s, as Brenner points out, Jews immigrated to Germany from Per-
sia, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union. In addition, “there was also a
large, difficult-to-estimate influx of Israeli Jews of Ashkenazic and Oriental ori-
gin”.206 In the 1980s Jews gained more public representation, new synagogues
and schools were built and their infrastructure boomed. The most significant
change in the German Jewish community, however, has been the immigration
of around 50.000 Jews from the former Soviet states in the 1990s.207
These Jews gained privileged entry into Germany, but remained foreigners
by nationality and thus disadvantaged in their treatment.208 It seems paradox-
ical, but the Jewish population in Germany is the only one that is increasing
in comparison with other European states and is only surpassed by Jewish im-
migration to Israel and the USA.209 Kolinsky argues that by offering refuge for
Russian-Jewish immigrants, “Jewish communities have affirmed their belief in
Germany as a place where Jews might live safely”.210
Because they were so small in size the Jewish communities in Germany ini-
tially had to rely on help from abroad in establishing their community struc-
tures, schools, and religious education.211 In the 1950s many organisations
were rebuilt, like the Zionist organisation and the Jewish student union. The
Allgemeine Ju¨dische Wochenzeitung reappeared in 1946.
Despite these rebuilding efforts, German-Jewish relations have remained
fraught with difficulties. Although public expressions of antisemitism became
a taboo, there were nevertheless continuous forms of antisemitism in German
(eds.): Jews in Germany after 1945, Citizens or “Fellow” Citizens?, Frankfurt: Tribu¨ne
2000, pp.48-56, here p. 50.
206Ibid.
207Ibid, pp. 52-53.
208See Kolinsky: After the Holocaust, p. 234.
209Ibid, p. 235.
210Ibid.
211See Richarz, Monika: Juden in der BRD und in der DDR seit 1945, in: Brumlik, Micha
(ed.): Ju¨disches Leben in Deutschland seit 1945, Frankfurt am Main: Athenaeum 1986.,
pp. 13-30, here p.25.
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society. Post-Holocaust antisemitism took on a variety of forms, but so called
‘secondary’ antisemitism, anti-Jewish prejudice that accuses Jews of being re-
sponsible for the German suffering after the Holocaust and of (financially)
exploiting the memory, has had significant meaning for post-Holocaust Ger-
man national identity and has widely appeared as an attitude beyond right
wing circles.212
212See Rensmann, Lars: Demokratie und Judenbild, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fu¨r Sozialwis-
senschaften 2004, p. 79.
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The Development of Post-War
Antisemitism Theories in Britain
and Germany
As we have seen in the last chapter, there was a history of antisemitism in
both Germany and Britain, and in both countries there were forms of postwar
antisemitism. The question I am trying to answer is what concepts were de-
veloped to understand this phenomenon, and how did these concepts relate to
impressions of postwar immigration of non-Jewish minorities?
What this chapter shows is that in Britain, in contrast to Germany, the
Holocaust did not prove a similar source of motivation to understand anti-
semitism and develop theories and approaches to the issue. While just after
the Holocaust, some corresponding developments with regard to theorisations
of antisemitism can be detected in both countries, the British and German
paths soon diverged and British theories on antisemitism developed differently
than their German counterparts. Paradoxically, antisemitism in Britain came
to be understood not through the prism of the Holocaust and exterminationist
antisemitism, but through the prism of colonial immigration to Britain. This
development has to be understood in the context of how colonial immigration
was perceived, what effects it had and what role it played in British national
self-understanding.
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3.1 Britain: Understanding antisemitism through
colonial immigration
When analysing approaches to antisemitism in the 1960s in Britain, the most
glaring fact is that there were almost none. Antisemitism was of almost no
interest outside the Jewish community, and although it was certainly a concern
for British Jews, there were initially no explanations or theories at hand to
understand antisemitism, and, on this basis, to build campaigns against it.
This situation has to be understood in the context of the timid character and
anxiety of the Anglo-Jewish community. Although there were fears among
British Jews with regard to domestic antisemitism, the strategy of the Jewish
community was to stress integration and loyalty to the British state, rather
than to emphasise any anti-Jewish tendencies in British society.
Richard Bolchover has indicated that this mentality was characteristic for
the Anglo-Jewish community even during the Holocaust. His study of Anglo-
Jewish reactions to the Holocaust showed that these were overwhelmingly
timid.1 To be sure, in light of events on the continent, some explanatory
attempts were made. James Parkes, an early anti-antisemite, for example,
interpreted antisemitism as an abnormal hostility towards Jews. Abnormal in
the sense that “there is no adequate explanation for the form or severity of its
manifestation in the actual contemporary conduct of the Jews against whom
it is directed.”2 Although Parkes was further ahead than many of his con-
temporaries when he emphasised the disconnection between Jewish behaviour
and antisemitism,3 his theoretical attempts did not translate into practical ap-
proaches against antisemitism. There was no effective or popular campaign to
push the British government to help persecuted Jews from the continent. But
1Bolchover, Richard: British Jewry and the Holocaust, Oxford: The Littman Library of
Jewish Civilization 2003, first published by Cambridge University Press 1993, p. 156.
2Parkes, James: Anti-Semitism from Caesar to Luther, in: Query Books, no 2, London:
Query Books 1938, p. 12.
3For an overview of James Parkes’ works on antisemitism see also the introductory chapter
in Kusher, Tony and Valman, Nadia (eds.): Philosemitism, Antisemitism and ’the Jews’,
Perspectives from the Middle Ages to the Twentieth Century, Aldershot: Ashgate 2004.
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Bolchover explained this with the insecurity the British Jewish community felt.
“It was because British Jews had neither collective self-esteem nor a sense of
being in control of their own lives. As a result they had no inclination to take
risks. Anglo-Jewry had a phobia about anti-semitism - a neurosis which at
times verged on self-hatred. Thus there could be no self-assertion in the face
of adversity, rather paralysis marked by a series of absorbing and debilitating
conflicts.”4
The most notable exception to what Bolchover described was the work un-
dertaken by Alfred Wiener, a German Jew who had fled to Holland in 1933 and
then to Britain in 1939. Wiener had been an executive in the Centralverein
deutscher Staatsbu¨rger ju¨dischen Glaubens in Germany and took with him
large amounts of documentation on the Nazi regime that he had amassed
since the start of the Third Reich and which served as a source of information
for the British government and the press. The Jewish Central Information
Office, as it was first called, became the Wiener Library in 1947.5
But although British Jews were concerned about what happened in Ger-
many, this did not translate into more serious attempts to conduct research
into English antisemitism. Only in 1954, two social-psychological studies were
undertaken by J. H. Robb and H. J. Eysenck, who, inspired by continental
approaches to the issue, wanted to understand attitudes towards Jews among
members of British society.
3.1.1 Psychological approaches to antisemitism in the 1950s
and beyond
Because antisemitism was not acknowledged as a serious social problem in
Britain, no attempt was made to adequately explain and understand it. How-
ever, for a brief moment in the 1950s, antisemitism became a subject in po-
litical psychology. The above mentioned quantitative study by Eysenck in
4Bolchover, Richard: British Jewry and the Holocaust, p. 156.
5On this subject see Barkow, Ben: Alfred Wiener and the making of the Holocaust Library,
London: Vallentine Mitchell 1997.
75
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany
1954 on political opinions and attitudes also looked at attitudes towards Jews.
James H. Robb undertook a study in working class antisemitism in 1954.6
Both Eysenck’s and Robb’s study were influenced by the social-psychological
approaches to antisemitism and fascism developed by Theodor W. Adorno
and others in the Authoritarian Personality, a study conducted in the US.7
Eysenck’s study established different categories on a personality scale, ranging
from radicalism to conservatism and tough-mindedness to tender-mindedness.
He understood antisemitism, as, for example, ‘anti-Negroism’, as one item
on a personality scale, in this case correlating with conservatism and tough-
mindedness, therefore explaining antisemitism as part of an individual’s psy-
che.8
In comparison, Robb took a more sophisticated theoretical approach in his
psycho-analytical study. As a basis for his study, he established that prejudice
is not biologically inherited, but arises in the course of an individual’s social
development. Additionally, he took it as a matter of fact that Jewish stereo-
types do not correspond with reality.9 Through interviews and psychological
tests with a sample of members of the working class in Bethnal Green, the
author came to the conclusion that some individuals are predisposed to anti-
semitism. These individuals were affected by anxiety-creating situations and
suffered from feelings of powerlessness, pessimism and isolation. Devoid of the
ability to reflect their situations and see themselves in a critical light, these
individuals then blamed their misfortune on an ‘outgroup’, which in Bethnal
Green happened to be the Jews. As an example, the author described one of
his interviewees, Bob, whose career as a mechanic had been characterised by
security and stability. The one dismissal that he did experience, however, Bob
indirectly blamed on the Jews: “those Yids”, he said, can drive Englishmen out
of their livelihood. Additionally, Bob expressed that “Jews have manoeuvred
6See Eysenck, H. J.: The Psychology of Politics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1954;
Robb, J H: Working-Class Anti-Semite, A Psychological Study in a London Borough,
London: Tavistock Publications 1954.
7See Adorno, T.W. et al: The Authoritarian Personality, New York: Harper & Bros 1950.
8Eysenck, H. J.: The Psychology of Politics, pp. 82-100.
9Robb, J H: Working-Class Anti-Semite, p.35.
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themselves into the position of being able to get the best of everything, partic-
ularly food”. Robb pointed out how Bob thought that “kosher rites (...) were
merely ways of seeing that the best English meats go on to Jewish tables, while
the likes of Bob must be content with imported frozen stuff”.10 Robb therefore
came to the conclusion that it is essentially a feeling of deprivation that causes
antisemitism among individuals like Bob. The study’s ratings showed that
people who suffered less deprivation, or who interpreted their deprivation dif-
ferently, were less likely to be antisemitic. One major finding of the study was
that “the characteristics attributed to the Jewish group under these circum-
stances are likely to reflect some of the needs and repressed wishes of the hostile
individual”.11 The author additionally found that antisemitic individuals have
“narrow, constricted, poorly organised personalities which are frequently dis-
played as clear-cut neurotic and even psychotic symptoms”, and that “they
display a marked degree of pessimism and lack of confidence in themselves
and in the groups to which they belong, but the weaknesses implied in these
attitudes are not expressed and the attitudes are justified by the reference to
the power of external forces”.12 According to Robb, the antisemitic character
probably had a difficult, inconsistent childhood that produced a severe anx-
iety. This anxiety might then be turned inwards, resulting in depression, or
projected onto another group. The study also came to the conclusion that
there is no apparent connection between fascism and antisemitism, as only
very few of the antisemites interviewed supported the movement. The main
conclusion was that antisemitism “is a particular manifestation of prejudice
rather than a unique situation”.13 Robb suggested that it is therefore related
to what he called ‘anti-Negroism’.14
Just like Eysenck’s study, Robb’s theoretical approach was also clearly in-
spired by American studies on the Authoritarian Character. Antisemitism was
explained in terms of psychoanalytical categories, in which feelings of depri-
10Ibid, p.161.
11Ibid, p. 163.
12Ibid, p.165.
13p.173 f.
14Ibid, pp. 156-173.
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vation can lead to prejudiced attitudes. While this explanatory approach had
been very influential in German antisemitism research,15 it remained an aberra-
tion to approaches to antisemitism in Britain. In contrast to the overwhelming
majority of later antisemitism theories, Robb assumed that anti-Jewish stereo-
types do not correspond with reality, but in fact describe the felt shortcomings
of the antisemite. This has by no means always been agreed upon in later
antisemitism research in Britain. As in Germany, the theory of the Authori-
tarian Character also influenced empirical studies on attitudes towards recent
immigrants in Britain, for example W.W. Daniel’s study on racial discrimina-
tion.16 However, in contrast to Germany, social-psychological approaches to
antisemitism (or racism) did not become a dominant topic for researchers.
One exception was Michael Billig’s 1978 study on the radical right National
Front. In contrast to Robb and Eysenck, who saw antisemitism as similar to
what they called ‘anti-Negroism’, Billig in fact criticised those comparisons
that stated that “the National Front is just like the British Union of Fascists
except that it attacks the blacks and not the Jews”. He argued against the cur-
rent thinking within social psychology that prejudices can be easily substituted
for one another, since they are only outward signs of inner frustration and dis-
content and which predicts that economic frustration will lead to an increase
in prejudice against the nearest available and identifiable ethnic group. He ar-
gued that this is problematic, and that the National Front is the best example
for this, as “at the deepest levels of the National Front’s ideology anti-black
prejudice has not replaced anti-Semitism”.17 It has to be noted that Billig’s
point of view remained a rare exception in any antisemitism theories of the
time. As will be discussed later, even most antisemitism researchers held the
view that there may have been antisemitism in the past, but that this had now
been replaced by hostility against other ethnicities.
15see section on Germany in this chapter.
16See Daniel, W.W.: Racial Discrimination in England, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
1968.
17Billig, Michael: Fascists, A Social Psychological View of the National Front, London:
Academic Press 1978, p. 8.
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As mentioned earlier, these social-psychological approaches were inspired
by and therefore perhaps more similar to German approaches to antisemitism.
But there were other and more dominant theoretical developments in Britain,
which mark a significant difference between Germany and Britain with regard
to approaches to antisemitism. While antisemitism was for example of inter-
est to social psychologists, in the same time period, Anglo-Jewish historians
marginalised the history of domestic antisemitism, which had profound effects
on how contemporary antisemitism was thought about, too.
3.1.2 Approaches to domestic antisemitism
Antisemitism has in fact not been seriously discussed in Anglo-Jewish histo-
riography until relatively recently. Where anti-Jewish currents were discussed
they were characterised by their dismissal of antisemitism as a serious factor
influencing Anglo-Jewish history.
The first professionally trained Anglo-Jewish historian, Cecil Roth, treated
antisemitism as an un-English phenomenon and praised English tolerance. In
his History of the Jews in England of 1941, Roth acknowledged the persecution
of Jews in Britain up to their expulsion in 1290 as well as the hostility Jews
encountered after readmission until the onset of emancipation. He described
how many Jews found refuge in Britain from persecution on the continent,
but that there was a “burst of xenophobia” when Jews immigrated from the
continent during and after the French revolution. The Jews were suspected
of “Jacobin sympathies” and the “Aliens Act of 1793, which placed foreigners
settled in England under strict control, resulted in sporadic raids on Jewish
pedlars and petty traders throughout the country, and the deportation of a
number of them”.18 However, he understood the attitude of English Christians
towards Jews between 1815 and 1858 as generally benelovent:
“No longer were the unbelievers considered an object for insult
and reviling; they were approached in a spirit not only of friend-
ship but almost of veneration, as the ancient people of God (...). It
18Roth, Cecil: The History of the Jews in England, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1941, p. 238.
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was freely admitted that Christendom owed a profound shame in
respect of the past centuries of persecution and maltreatment (...)
Hence in Evangelical circles the movement resulted in the develop-
ment of a spirit of friendliness, which insisted on the recognition of
the Jews as members of English society.”19
Roth interpreted appearances of antisemitism after that as merely an anachro-
nism. His interpretation of past antisemitism of course needs to be understood
in the context of a general mentality of Anglo-Jewry at the time, which, as
mentioned above, placed an emphasis on their loyalty and gratitude towards
the British state. As antisemitism was not believed to be a serious threat in
Britain, there was no need to develop a theory of it, not even in light of the
Holocaust.
This attitude towards domestic antisemitism among historians did not change
significantly until the 1980s. It also became evident in the ways the Jewish
community reacted towards anti-Jewish violence. The Anglo-Jewish commu-
nity at times faced serious violence, for example in Manchester and Liverpool
after the explosion at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in 1946 and the hang-
ing of two British soldiers by Jewish guerillas at Natanya in 1947. There was
a trend among leaders and members of the Jewish community to emphasise
their strong roots within British society, which also involved the denial of any
threat from antisemitism in Britain. This denial was upheld even during the
most vicious antisemitic attacks on Jewish individuals and property.
During the anti-Jewish attacks that swept across Europe in 1960, for exam-
ple, Jews continuously downplayed British antisemitism. The attacks started
with a swastika daubing on a synagogue in Notting Hill in London on 31
December 1959, but vandalism against Jewish institutions and buildings con-
tinued throughout the first weeks of January 1960 and spread to many cities.
This was generally seen as part of the worldwide ‘swastika plague’ that began
with daubings on Christmas Eve in Germany. The Jewish Chronicle noted
that the British Nazi Movement claimed responsibility.20
19Ibid, p.245
20“Jew-Baiters Smear Swastikas In Twenty Countries – Threats to M.P.s and Communal
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The British public condemned the events, but the Jewish community inter-
preted the attacks as marginal. In accounts and analyses of the incidents in
the Jewish Chronicle these were interpreted as emulation of German neo-Nazi
activities perpetrated by a ‘lunatic fringe’. The Minister of the Notting Hill
Synagogue, Kensington Park Road, Rev. B. Susser, was cited as saying:“I
think whoever did it was just trying to emulate the Germans. I do not think
that we can regard it as a serious threat” 21 Similarly, “a spokesman for the
Board of Deputies said that the defacement of the Board’s offices and the
Notting Hill Synagogue were “undoubtedly the work of a lunatic fringe of an-
tisemite and Nazi sympathisers in Britain”. The Board had no doubt that
the British people would not tolerate this scurrilous exhibitionism.”22 Com-
ments in the Jewish Chronicle showed a similar analysis. In an article titled
‘Sincerity is not enough’ in the edition of 8 January 1960, the point was made
that “the widespread condemnation of the outrages by all the British press
and all segments of public life are a gratifying reminder that the overwhelm-
ing majority of the British public is horrified by these squalid manifestations
which offend everything which is hallowed in British tradition. This massive
repudiation gives every reason for confidence that necessary measures will be
taken, and is a reminder that though there is no room for complacency, there
is even less room for alarm or despondency”.23 This interpretation of contem-
porary British antisemitism stood in sharp contrast to how the same author
saw post-war eruptions of antisemitism in Germany. Jew-baiting in Germany
was in fact understood as by no means limited to a lunatic fringe, but it was
acknowledged that “neo-Nazi organisations have tens of thousands of mem-
bers, and, worse still, tentacles extend into many spheres of German life.”24
Leaders – Home Secretary Promises Effective Action”, in: Jewish Chronicle Friday 8
January 1960, title page.
21“Swastika Menace Renewed – German Neo-Nazis Active – Synagogue and Monuments
Defiled”, in: Jewish Chronicle, Friday 1 January 1960, title page.
22“Strong Public Protests”, in: Jewish Chronicle Friday 8 January 1960, title page, contin-
ued on p. 9., see also “Outrages ‘Not Organised’ ” on the same page.
23“Sincerity is not enough”, in: Jewish Chronicle Friday 8 January 1960, p. 18.
24Ibid.
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The comment in the following week continued in a similar tone. While not
enough had been done in Germany to fight antisemitism, there should be no
alarmism over antisemitic incidents in Britain: “While vigilance and firmness
are as necessary as ever, it would be self-defeating to inflate clandestine daub-
ing and anonymous letters into a major political movement, and to suggest
that large-scale organised antisemitism is in the offing. What is happening
outside Germany is the eruption, as though from a saturating pimple, of the
poison which has been allowed to flow into the world’s bloodstream from the
still active Nazi virus. Any tendency to compulsive pessimism which refuses to
envisage improvement in the Jewish position can only hinder rational action
and even encourages the antisemites.”25
However, while the Jewish community insisted on the marginality of British
antisemitism, the attacks and vandalism against Jewish institutions, including
arson and petrol bomb attacks, in fact continued through the 1960s. The
National Socialist Movement of Britain held a rally in Trafalgar Square in
July 1962, at which it proclaimed to “Free Britain of Jewish Control” and
which led to a fight with Jewish demonstrators. However, antisemitism was
still seen as limited to a lunatic fringe that need not be taken too seriously. In
Troubled Eden, Chaim Bermant came to the conclusion that “The antisemitism
that manifestly does exist in this country is neither so deep nor so widespread
that it can be harnessed for political ends.”26
Bermant’s view of the issue was shared by others who studied British anti-
semitism. Although Colin Holmes acknowledged that “racial nationalists who
operated in Britain in the late 1950s and early 1960s were undeterred and car-
ried on their own tradition of hostility towards Jews, and continued to draw
attention to what they categorised as ‘Jew-power’ and ‘the Jewish menace”, he
eventually came to the conclusion that “down to 1971, however, anti-Semitism
never became a serious social issue for the older and newer segments of Anglo-
Jewry, and a number of factors have been brought forward to account for its
25“Action and Reaction”, in: Jewish Chronicle, January 15 1960, p. 18.
26Bermant, Chaim: Troubled Eden, An Anatomy of British Jewry, London: Vallentine
Mitchell 1969, p. 261.
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limited appeal.” As reasons for this Holmes counted “the so called ‘recoil ef-
fect’ of the Holocaust, the favourable image of Jews which derived from the
building and defence of Israel, the presence of easier targets, such as Blacks
and newcomers from the Indian sub-continent, the relative aﬄuence of postwar
Britain and the alignment of interests between successive British governments
and Anglo-Jewry.”27
In light of later research, Holmes’s analysis seemed to miss a number of
key factors with regard to antisemitism in Britain entirely. It is for example
questionable if there was what he called a ‘recoil effect’ of the Holocaust, or
a favourable image of Jews because of the building of Israel. In hindsight,
the opposite might be closer to the truth, especially with regard to the vi-
olent outbursts in reaction to events in British Mandate Palestine. But his
comments make more sense when their context is taken into account: exist-
ing approaches to antisemitism were generally marginalising and dismissive.
The Jewish community itself at times actively contributed to this particular
perception of antisemitism. Any historic research into antisemitism by histo-
rians, most of whom were Jewish themselves, reified this position rather than
challenging it.
This also applied to studies on fascism in Britain. In the 1960s antisemitism
became a subject for scholars of British fascism in light of the re-emergence
of fascist groups in Britain and discussions about the role of antisemitism for
these groups. These approaches exactly reflected the reaction of the Jew-
ish community to antisemitic attacks from the radical right. Colin Cross and
Robert Benewick argued that antisemitism was a continental phenomenon that
was only adopted by British fascists for tactical reasons and failed to win mass
support.28 A later study by Gisela Lebzelter drew similar conclusions. Lebzel-
ter investigated fascist antisemitism in Britain between 1918 and 1939 and said
about antisemitism after the first World War that although widespread,it did
27Holmes, Colin: John Bull’s Island, Immigration and British Society, 1871-1971, London:
Macmillan 1992 (2nd ed.), p. 245.
28see Cross, Colin: The Fascists in Great Britain, London: Barrie and Rockliffe 1961;
Benewick, Robert J.: The Fascist Movement in Britain, London: Allen Lane 1972.
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not win over the masses as it “lacked the organizational transmission neces-
sary to stimulate a popular movement and was never exploited by any relevant
political force in a deliberate attempt to stimulate anti-Jewish feelings”.29 She
explained that this was due to the “relatively smooth” assimilation of Anglo-
Jewry during the nineteenth century, and the absence of a historical tradition
of antisemitism. She acknowledged that fascist agitators in the 1930s used
antisemitic propaganda, but concluded that they did not convince the masses.
The impact of antisemitic campaigns “remained limited to where it was di-
rected against an identifiable body of foreigners, as was the case in Jewish
settlement areas like the East End”.30
This downplaying of antisemitism, even in light of antisemitic violence, char-
acterised the overwhelming majority of studies in British-Jewish history. Apart
from fascism, Jewish refugee immigration from Germany between 1939 and
1945 became a subject for British historians as well. A.J. Sherman and Bernard
Wasserstein investigated the Jewish immigration and the reaction towards the
refugees by the British. Sherman wrote that the standard charges that there
was a lack of generosity and an indifference towards the fate of Jewish refugees
from the Nazi regime “must receive the verdict ‘not proven’”.31 He argued that
although the initial Government response was “sluggish and even niggardly”,
a relatively large number of refugees “did manage to find sanctuary within
Great Britain and her dependencies, and a comparison with other countries
yields a not unimpressive record”.32 Bernard Wasserstein, on the other hand,
concluded that “in spite of this relatively hospitable reception accorded to
fifty thousand Jewish refugees between 1933 and 1939, there was a definite
undercurrent of antagonism towards the arrivals”.33 He described how Jewish
29Lebzelter, Gisela: Political Anti-Semitism in England 1918-1939, London and Basingstoke:
The Macmillan Press 1978, p.27.
30Ibid, p.175.
31Sherman, A.J.: Island Refuge, Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich 1933-1939,
Ilford: Frank Cass 1973 (2nd ed 1994), p.264.
32Ibid.
33Wasserstein, Bernard: Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press 1979.
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organizations were powerless to change the guiding principles of British policy
towards Jewish refugees during the war: the White Paper, limiting Jewish im-
migration to Palestine, remained in place, there was no admission of refugees
from Nazi Europe to Britain and no entry for significant numbers to the colo-
nial empire.34 Moreover, he emphasised that these principles formed the basis
of official decision-making: one of the first British efforts after the start of the
war was to seal the escape routes used by Jewish refugees from Nazi Europe.35
Wasserstein acknowledged that the British Government intended to halt immi-
gration to Britain from Germany and Germany-occupied territories from the
outset of the war, which mostly affected Jews trying to escape Nazi persecu-
tion. In addition, he pointed out that there was a wave of anti-alien feeling
bordering on mass hysteria in the face of an imminent invasion of Britain. The
new government formed by Churchill in 1940 decided to extend the internment
of ‘enemy aliens’ that had begun in 1939. However, Wasserstein came to the
conclusion that it was not antisemitism underlying the British actions towards
Jewish refugees, but “the narrower horizons of the official mind” which “rarely
stretched to encompass the vastness of the horror which had overtaken the
Jews of Europe”.36 He suggested that although “there is no doubt that anti-
Semitism was in the air in Britain during the war, partly as a result of general
xenophobia and war hysteria, partly arising from resentment of immigrants
and complaints of black market activity and war profiteering, (...), conscious
anti-Semitism should not be regarded as an adequate explanation of official
behaviour”.37 In sum, Wasserstein argued that the British government was
not antisemitic, but just saw the Jews as a low priority.
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw several publications on Jews in Britain
which generally emphasised the benign character of antisemitism and the tol-
erance of English liberalism and benevolence of British Christians. David Katz
suggested that the readmission of Jews into England was characterised by the
34Ibid, p. 38.
35Ibid, p.39.
36Ibid, p.350.
37Ibid, p. 351 f.
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‘philo-Semitism’ of the British.38 Todd Endelman similarly pointed out that
Anglo-Christians may not have been pro-Jewish, but they were ‘philo-Semitic’
in the sense that they tolerated the Jews and campaigned for their conver-
sion to Christianity. This attitude, he argued, was of temporal advantage for
Anglo-Jewry.39 Anti-Jewish sentiments, he suggested, although they did never
fade away completely, were reduced to small circles and did not influence of-
ficial state policy toward the Jews and secular anti-Jewish sentiments were
limited to a fanatic fringe opposing Jewish emancipation.
What these studies show is that in their interpretations of antisemitism in
British history, Jewish historians reflected the timid mentality of the Jewish
society in Britain. They deemed domestic antisemitism as only a marginal
problem, even in light of antisemitic violence. But the development of anti-
semitism theories in Britain was only partly the result of how Jewish historians
treated the issue. Another important factor were current debates about im-
migration and minority integration. In order to understand how theories on
antisemitism developed in Britain, it is vital to take into account general views
on minority-majority relations and approaches to ‘race’ and racism. Theories
that were developed in response to colonial immigration were, paradoxically,
the most significant influence on how antisemitism came to be understood
in Britain. After the 1960s, theories on antisemitism reflected developments
and concepts in British racism studies, which were concerned with minority-
majority relations in light of the recent immigration to Britain from (former)
Colonies and Commonwealth countries.
3.1.3 Managing ‘Race Relations’
When analysing theories on antisemitism in Britain from the 1960s onwards,
it becomes evident that the way antisemitism was understood reflected theo-
ries about and public attitudes towards current immigration. Racism studies
38Katz, David S.: Philo-Semitism and the readmission of the Jews into England 1603-1655,
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980.
39See Endelman, Todd: the Jews of Georgian England, 1714-1830, Jewish Publication Ser-
vice of America 1979, p. 52.
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developed explanatory models for ‘racial tensions’ in British cities in the 1950s
and 1960s and these models were used by antisemitism researchers to under-
stand hostilities towards Jews in British history as well. The early racism
theories were characterised by their intrinsic racial prejudice: tensions were
interpreted as arising out of immigration itself. Racism researchers therefore
became complicit in racist discourse by explaining racism as something re-
lated to the presence of immigrants. This was also true for approaches to
antisemitism. Hostility against Jews was explained in terms of a large pres-
ence of Jews in certain areas that brought about ‘natural’ tensions. Although
this approach was later discarded, at the time it served an important pur-
pose. On the one hand, it was an early attempt to include antisemitism in
the study of racism in Britain. In their attempt to explain hostilities against
Colonial immigrants, racism researchers for the most part disregarded anti-
semitism completely. Jewish historians therefore tried to show how hostility
towards Jews as an immigrant minority group was structurally similar to hos-
tility against Colonial immigrants. Both racism theories and public opinion
at the time, however, understood problems arising out of immigration in a
framework of ‘race relations’ that needed to be managed. Later on, racism
studies moved from a concept of ‘race relations’ and interactionist theories to-
wards theories of power structures and racist discourse. The same applied to
antisemitism research, if with a little delay. The central idea, however, was the
same: Colonial immigration experiences could be compared to earlier Jewish
immigration experiences.
Many of the immigrants who came to Britain between the 1950s and the
1970s were Muslims. From the 1950s and 1960s Muslims from the Indian
subcontinent, as well as Cyprus and Morocco, “formed part of a broader mi-
gration from the former colonies to satisfy the need for replacement labour,
both in growth industries, where a labour shortage had developed, and in
declining ones which were in the process of being deserted by indigenous work-
ers because of the low pay and poor conditions, and which therefore came to
rely on immigrant labour”.40 The migration pattern that was most promi-
40Ansari, Humayun: The Infidel Within, Muslims in Britain since 1800, London: C Hurst
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nent within this labour migration was a chain migration - used by Turkish
Cypriots, Moroccans, Yemenis and South Asian Muslims 41 - resulting in kin-
ship and friendship groups settling in the same communities, some of them
in fact established by pre-war migration, in Britain and the establishment of
institutions, organisations, and agents to facilitate the continued migration of
relatives and friends.42 At the same time, both the British government as well
as the Muslim migrants themselves assumed they would ‘return’ to the home
country and not stay in Britain long term. The chain migration patterns cre-
ated kinship and friendship networks. Language barriers as well as the lack of
official British integration measures led to an encapsulation and high degree of
dependency for many Muslim immigrants. In addition to that, many Muslims
felt unwelcomed by the British society and discriminated against because of
their skin colour.43
The immigrants’ feeling of being unwelcome in Britain was more than legit-
imate. The immigrants from (former) colonies and Commonwealth countries
who settled in Britain between the 1950s and the 1970s were generally met
with hostility:
“Especially when they have arrived in large numbers, immigrants
have not been universally welcomed. They were welcomed as al-
lies in the Second World War when every person was needed in
the struggle for national survival; they were welcomed as doctors,
nurses, drivers, conductors, cleaners and carpenters and in a huge
range of other capacities during the 1950s and 1960s, when labour
was scarce. But as people, as friends and neighbours or even as fel-
low church members, the welcome was very much less enthusiastic.
Even when recruited as replacement labour force to do the work
that the natives rejected and to occupy inner-city accommodation
that the natives wished to leave, they could still be seen by those
and Co 2004, p.147.
41Ibid, p. 149.
42See Anwar, Muhammad: The Myth of Return, Pakistanis in Britain, London: Heinemann
1979, p.214.
43Ibid, p.218.
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who remained as competitors for jobs, housing and other scarce
resources.”44
To some degree, this resentment was seen as naturally arising out of immi-
gration. Zig Layton Henry for example thought that
“Immigration has thus provided a stimulus for xenophobia and for
campaigns for immigration control. When immigrants are non-
European, latent feelings of racism may be stimulated and may
have important consequences both among members of the political
and economic elite and among the general population.”45
Even though he acknowledged that there may be a form of latent xenopho-
bia, he thought this was only triggered when Britons met actual immigrants.
His interpretation of racism at the time reflected the widely held belief that
immigration was the source of ‘racial tensions’, as opposed to, for example,
prejudiced attitudes within British society that are unrelated to - and have
existed before - immigrants arriving in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s.
This was despite there being some evidence for prejudiced attitudes: policies
and public statements made at the time indicate that there was widespread
concern and even hostility among the political and social elite in Britain
against black immigrants and that “they were stereotyped as quarrelsome,
lazy, unskilled and unenterprising.”46 Consequently, ‘coloured’ immigrants en-
countered discrimination in housing, education and the job-market and were
more strongly affected by unemployment than the population as a whole.47
Immigration legislation
It is important to note that the Jewish immigration experience was not au-
tomatically equated with that of Colonial immigrants, but that this was a
44Layton-Henry, Zig: The Politics of Immigration - Immigration, ’Race’ and ’Race’ Relations
in Post-war Britain, Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell 1992, p.19.
45Ibid, p.19.
46Ibid, p. 35.
47Fryer, Peter: Staying Power, The History of Black People in Britain, London: Pluto Press
1984, p.387ff.
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development arising out of the interaction between public debates, theorisa-
tions of racism, and policy making. Legally, Jewish immigrants were more
‘alien’ than Colonial immigrants. In John Bull’s Island, Colin Holmes stressed
that the immigration legislation of 1919 practically “remained the basis of of-
ficial policy on alien immigration down to the 1971 Immigration Act”.48 For
migrants living in Britain, there had been official restrictions on employment,
for example in the civil service and armed forces, disadvantages in securing
welfare benefits and difficulties put in path of applications for naturalisation
in place until 1971.49 While these restrictions on entry and status had an ef-
fect on Jewish immigrants and refugees migrating to and living in Britain, this
was initially not the case for the majority of immigrants coming to Britain af-
ter the Second World War. When men from the British Commonwealth were
recruited for low-skilled labour in British cities, they were, under the 1948
British Nationality Act, entitled to free movement into Britain and were not
subjected to official restrictions on employment.
Only when immigration and ‘racial tensions’ became a topic of public debate
and immigration from the Colonies was eventually restricted, early attempts
were made to see a Jewish immigration experience in Britain through the
light of Colonial immigration. Historians intended to explain antisemitism in
a framework of ‘race relations’. This was because in Britain in the 1960s,
the interaction between all ethnic minority and majority communities was
understood and dealt with as ‘race relations’ and early racism studies played
a major part in this.
In his book Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain, John Solomos gave
a comprehensive overview of the establishment of racism studies in Britain,
the dominant theories and future challenges. He pointed out that the study of
race in Britain was established in the 1940s and 1950s, influenced by American
literature on the subject.50 He emphasised that “at that time British studies
were dominated by two main themes: the issue of ‘coloured immigrants’ and
48Holmes, Colin: John Bull’s Island, p.308.
49See ibid, p.309.
50Solomos: Race and Racism in Britain, p.16.
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the reaction to them by white Britons; and the part played by colonialism
in determining popular conceptions of colour and race in British society”.51
Studies at the time dealt with patterns of immigration and labour market
incorporation of ethnic minorities. They concentrated on interaction between
minority and majority community in employment, housing and other social
contexts.52
As mentioned above, this interaction between minority and majority commu-
nities was understood and dealt with as ‘race relations’, both in social sciences
as well as public policy. The main work of the time on the subject was Michael
Banton’s Race Relations, which categorised ‘race relations’ according to six ba-
sic orders: institutionalised contact, acculturation, domination, paternalism,
integration and pluralism.53
For the state – and large parts of the public – the first solution to ‘racial
tensions’ was the restriction of immigration. The issue of ‘race relations’ was so
closely connected to immigration from (former) colonies and Commonwealth
countries to Britain that the 1960s saw the passing of several laws that intended
to control immigration on the grounds of a perceived oversaturation and at a
time of the formation and reformation of nationalist and fascist groups like the
National Front. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act and its Amendment
in 1968 therefore restricted the right of entry previously enjoyed by citizens
of the Commonwealth. These acts can be interpreted as a result of hostil-
ity against immigrants, evident for example in ‘Powellism’, the conservative,
nationalist and anti-immigration view of politician Enoch Powell, and racial
prejudice.
At the time, however, restriction of immigration was seen as a necessary
condition for social cohesion. The following Immigration Act of 1971 was, as
Colin Holmes has noted, a logical conclusion of the 1968 legislation: “Com-
51Ibid.
52see Banton, Michael: The Coloured Quarter: Negro Immigrants in an English City, Lon-
don: Jonathan Cape 1955; Glass, Ruth: Newcomers: West Indians in London, London:
Allen and Unwin 1960; Patterson, Sheila: Dark Strangers, Harmondsworth: Penguin
1963.
53Banton, Michael: Race Relations, London: Tavistock 1967.
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monwealth citizens with patrial status were allowed unrestricted entry into the
United Kingdom. However, entry for those citizens from the Commonwealth
who did not have the patrial connection was dependant on the issue of a work
permit. A permit did not confer residence rights, and all permits were subject
to the possibility of non-renewal.”54 Holmes also stressed the significance of a
general public hostility against immigrants for this restrictive legislation.
When through the government measures in 1962, 1965, 1968 and the Im-
migration Act in 1971, immigration from the British Commonwealth was re-
stricted,55 this resulted in less differentiation between ‘aliens’ and non-patrial
Commonwealth citizens. The effect was initially adverse, however, as immigra-
tion increased significantly during the 1960s when the mostly male immigrants
brought their families to Britain.56 Eventually, many workers decided to stay
in Britain - despite their wish to return - because of the better economic sit-
uation and education system and because for some the political situation in
their home country did not allow a return. These factors continued to moti-
vate migration. Thus for example Bangladeshi Muslim migration to Britain
reached its peak long after 1971 due to the economic, political and environ-
mental circumstances in Bangladesh.57 The inflow of Muslim refugees from
Third World countries after 1971 added to the variety of migration patterns,
resulting in ‘a patchwork of communities’ in England, Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland.58
While during that period the presence of diverse ethnic communities was
firmly established in Britain, government policies at the time were intended to
limit the growth of these communities to a ‘tolerable’ level. The immigration
policies of the British government at the time were clearly characterised by the
‘race’ issue. The Immigration Acts of 1962, 1968 and 1971 were also intended
54Holmes, Colin: John Bull’s island, Immigration and British society 1871-1971,
Houndsmills, Macmillian Education 1988, p. 267.
55Holmes: John Bull’s Island, p. 309.
56Fetzer, Joel and Soper, Christopher: Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Ger-
many, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p.26.
57Ansari: The Infidel Within, p. 157.
58Ibid, p.166.
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to limit the flow of ‘coloured’ persons in order to avoid problems resulting out
of ‘racial plurality’.59 Skin colour was perceived as the main issue establishing
a division between different groups of people and both racism as well as anti-
racism evolved around this factor of division, in which discrimination and
conflict were defined in terms of ‘race’.
One example for this is a report on Colour and Citizenship published by
The Institute of Race Relations in 1968. The research methodology and the-
oretical basis of the report was influenced by American Black-White relations
and what was seen as the ‘Negro’ question, as well as social-psychological
approaches to the Authoritarian Personality. Although the theoretical ba-
sis for the survey that was undertaken was similar to that of earlier socio-
psychological approaches to antisemitism in Britain, so roughly based on the
idea of the ‘Authoritarian Character’, this report deviated from this approach
in one important aspect: it assumed that prejudices grew out of actual ‘racial’
relations and therefore, to an extent, reflected reality. Although this report
was critical towards immigration restriction and the lack of anti-discrimination
legislation, and acknowledged the role of racial prejudice in British society, it
in fact supported ideas of fundamental differences between people and asserted
that interaction is the root of racism.60
The report included a survey of incidences of ‘race prejudice’ in Britain.
Its general finding regarding the extent of tolerance in the British population
was that 35 per cent of British citizens could be counted as tolerant, 38 per
cent as tolerant inclined, 17 per cent as prejudiced inclined, and 10 per cent
prejudiced.61 It also stated that conservative party supporters and members
felt slightly more superior towards ‘coloureds’ than Labour party members
and supporters and that people generally felt slightly more superior towards
59Fetzer/Soper: Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany, p.28., see also
Miles, Robert and Phizicklea, Annie: White Man’s Country, London: Pluto Press 1984,
p. 40 f.
60See Rose, E.J.B.: Colour and Citizenship, A Report on British Race Relations, Oxford,
Oxford University Press 1969.
61See ibid, p. 553.
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Africans than towards Asians.62 The 10 per cent registering extreme hostility
were spread through all sections of the white population with regards to gen-
der, age, economic situation and other factors. Women and young people in
full time education were slightly less prejudiced. The report found that the 10
per cent registering extreme hostility showed a difference in their psychology
and were much more prone to authoritarian approach to life – so much that
they had an “exaggerated need to submit to authority and acute hostility to-
wards any outgroups” .63 However, the underlying assumption of the report
was that racial prejudice was influenced by the interaction between different
‘races’. This became evident in the discussion about methodology: the initial
idea of sampling the whole population of Great Britain was rejected, because
it was assumed that the degree of personal contact correlated with the de-
gree of prejudice. The sample survey consequently concentrated on five local
government units known to contain relatively large proportions of coloured
Commonwealth immigrants.64
The report exemplified how skin colour was seen as the most important
factor with regards to ‘racial prejudice’ in British society. While the researchers
used different national origin and even religion in their analysis and dealt with
the different immigrant communities in separate chapters, they considered skin
colour to be the decisive factor in the formation of prejudice. They noticed
that “The character of the Pakistani immigration is different from that of the
others. Even after seven years or more, nearly half of them have no family over
here, and the level of remittances remains high for the earliest arrivals. Savings
are high, household expenditure is low, and the amount spent on rent, even by
the earliest arrivals, is low. Many of the Pakistanis exhibit the characteristics of
transients, which is quite unlike the others, in particular the Indians”.65 They
stressed that Pakistanis were different to other immigrants, as to Pakistanis
Britain was a “foreign land whose language, customs, religion, and way of life
62See ibid, pp. 559 and 567.
63Ibid, p. 588.
64See ibid, p. 551.
65Ibid, p. 195.
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were totally alien to them ”.66 However, in their interpretation of prejudice, the
authors of the report saw colour as the deciding factor, not culture or religion.
This is a reflection of the general understanding of ‘race relations’ and shows
that there was no conceptualisation of prejudice based on religion or culture, or
any understanding of a possible hostility or discrimination against minorities
other than based on skin colour.
This was despite the fact that prejudice and hostility against immigrants
was not only present among the radical right, but became part of mainstream
public discourse. Racist organisations like the Union Movement of Oswald
Mosley, the League of Empire Loyalists and the National Front in the 1950s
and 1960s wanted to defend an exclusive and racialised form of Britishness and
‘white’ nationalism, but their racist politics had a significant impact on more
mainstream discourses of national identity.67
One article in The Observer in 1968, for example, in a special issue on ‘Race
in Britain’, argued that ‘racial tensions’ arise from the actual relationship
between minorities and majority society. Although immigrants were not at
fault, it was their mere presence that caused problems. The author pointed
out that “over a short period, the flow of Indian, Pakistani, African, Cypriot,
Maltese and West Indian immigrants produced a highly charged situation in
Bradford, the West Midlands and parts of London”, but that “because ‘race’
had become a taboo subject, there was almost no public discussion of the
possibilities of the tensions that were being created”. In fact, “it was without
any conscious act of volition that Britain found itself an increasingly multi-
racial society”. Embedded in what is explicitly described as an ‘anti-racist’
argument, the problems that arose out of this situation were assessed within a
context of a natural limitation of tolerance amid a large inflow of immigration
and the necessity of group identification. It was argued that it would in fact
be a service to the immigrants to limit their ‘inflow’, as it would only get
increasingly difficult for them to live in an unwelcoming society, because
“in times of change and confusion it is usual that people feel their
66Ibid, p. 440.
67See Ward, Paul: Britishness since 1870, London: Routledge 2004, p. 128.
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sense of identity and security threatened: often, as in Germany in
the 1930s, they look for a scapegoat to explain their difficulties.
The accidental arrival of many coloured people at this time in our
history has confused the problems of colour with the unrelated
frustrations and grievances widely felt among both workers and
much of the middle class.”68
The idea of ‘race relations’ continued to be the major approach to racism for
quite some time and became the dominant idea within racism theories. The
first one to provide a theoretical grounding for the ‘race relations’ problematic
was John Rex. His explanation for racism was that “in relatively complex
social systems individuals react to each other in classificatory and ascriptive
ways, and that sometimes the other who is reacted to in this way is also
the target for hostile attitudes and policies”.69 In addition, he pointed out
that this “is particularly likely to be the case in situations (...) in which
distinguishable groups find themselves in situations of conflict or competition
with one another”.70 Rex saw this as in part “caused by men’s reactions to
their enemies and competitors in some kind of basic struggle to survive and to
earn a living”.71
Rex understood racism as intergroup relations in which competition and
therefore aggression arose. He emphasised that this is true for colonial societies
like Britain, because there is ‘ethnic pluralism’. He argued that “the unequal
treatment meted out to members of different groups in the colonial case will
come to be characterised by racist ideas and beliefs and by racialist practice”.72
Based on a theory of social stratification, Rex stated that immigrants from the
colonies then enter the lowest social strata in their host communities, or are in
68“Stop shouting, start talking” in: The Observer, Race in Britain – Observer Special, 28
April 1968.
69Rex, John: Race Relations in Sociological Theory, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1970,
p. 144.
70Ibid.
71Ibid, p. 146.
72Ibid, p. 87.
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fact placed “beneath the bottom of the stratification system”.73 According to
Rex, ‘race relations’ therefore occurred when two or more groups are forced to
live together in a single society, when there is a high degree of conflict between
these groups, when ascriptive criteria are used to mark out the members of
each group and when these ‘practices of ascriptive allocation’ are justified in
a deterministic theory.74 He also emphasised the role of the mass media in
disseminating foreshortened accounts of conflicts which are then interpreted
by the public in a simplified, racist way. 75
Rex’s explanation falls in the category of interactionist theories, because
he believed that ‘ethnic pluralism’ caused social tension and therefore racism.
He did not see racism as an ideology and did not analyse minority majority
relations with regard to political power. This approach to racism based on
interactionist theories on a scholarly level was reflected in public policy at the
time.
Early Race Relations legislation
At the same time the government introduced restrictions on immigration, there
were also attempts to address racism. As Colin Holmes has indicated “at the
same time as controls over entry were introduced, greater official attention was
paid to the persistence of racial disadvantage in Britain. Before the 1960s suc-
cessive governments had shown little or no interest in this issue. [...] However,
by the mid 1960s there was a degree of shift in the official outlook, towards
and emphasis on the need for ‘good race relations”.76
With the Race Relations Acts in 1965 and 1968 the state attempted to ban
discrimination on the grounds of race, colour or ethnic origin through legal
sanctions and public regulations while at the same time promoting equal op-
portunities. However, it is important to understand that the promotion of
racial equality was still based on the same assumptions that led to the restric-
73Ibid, p. 98, p. 107.
74Ibid, p. 160.
75Ibid, p. 154.
76Holmes: John Bull’s island, p. 268.
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tive immigration legislation. The underlying assumptions of these Acts were
that the growing number of immigrants was the source of social conflicts.77 In-
stead of restricting immigration, the proposed solution here was the promotion
of integrating immigrants into British society.
Both acts were inadequate to address actual racial discrimination and only
the 1976 Act acknowledged that discrimination can appear directly as well as
indirectly, and the Commission for Racial Equality was founded with powers
to investigate cases of discrimination and enforce counter-measures.
The official British Race Relations Legislation of 1965, 1968 and 1976 grad-
ually implemented equal treatment in housing, education and employment,
even in the civil service but addressed discrimination on the grounds of race
and ethnicity. For British Muslims, for example, this meant that they were
not protected against discrimination by law because they were Muslims, but
because they were considered ‘black’. Similarly, their immigration experience
was not acknowledged in itself, but subsumed under a ‘black’ settling expe-
rience, both in legal and public discourse as well as in terms of a political
category in opposition to the white majority within anti-racist discourse.
The race relations legislation had an impact on British Jews as well. There
was both social and institutional discrimination against Jews in post-war
Britain. Cesarani pointed out how Jewish survivors of the Holocaust were
excluded from British labour recruitment schemes - although DPs who had
fought for Germany were allowed to enter Britain under the scheme.78 Sports
and social clubs denied Jews a membership and some private schools main-
tained a Jewish quota. Many of these exclusions were abolished through the
anti-discrimination legislation in the 1960s and 1970s.
However, this was a side effect rather than an intended purpose. Anti-
semitism was neither high on the agenda for racism researchers and theorists,
nor for the government. Early racism theories failed to include hostility to-
77Solomos, John: Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain, p.72.
78David Cesarani: Lacking in convictions: British War Crimes Policy and National Memory
of the Second World War, in: Evans, Martin and Ken Lunn (eds.): War and Memory in
the Twentieth Century, Oxford: Berg, 1997, pp.27-44, here p.31.
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wards Jews in their theories, but this problem was rectified by Jewish histo-
rians. In their interpretation of Jewish immigration experiences based on the
methods of racism research, however, they reproduced antisemitic discourse,
as well.
Interactionist approaches to antisemitism
When analysing historical approaches to antisemitism in the 1960s and 1970s,
it becomes evident that these were heavily inspired by contemporary ap-
proaches to ‘race relations’ and the interaction between minorities and ma-
jority society. In a sense, Jewish immigration to Britain was also dealt with
in a framework of ‘race relations’. Examples of this way of thinking can be
found in the way historians started to analyse past Jewish immigration. The
1970s saw several studies on Jewish immigration to Britain at the end of the
nineteenth century. John Garrard and Bernhard Gainer investigated the ‘anti-
alien’ agitation at the time, which focussed on Jewish immigrants. Although
they described the widespread and serious xenophobic English attitudes to-
wards Jews, both reached the final conclusion that Britain was immune to
outspoken racism.79 Colin Holmes’s major study on antisemitism in Britain,
published in 1979, dealt with the period of Jewish immigration from 1875 to
1939. Although he acknowledged the anti-Jewish stereotypes present in public
British discourse at the time, he believed that antisemitism originated in the
interaction between Jews and Gentiles, between immigrants and ‘natives’.80
Holmes pointed out that the Jewish immigration and settlement especially
in the East End of London led to a ‘visibility’ of Jews in a spatial sense. He
further suggested that “such a concentration could not only aid in the creation
79Garrard, John: The English and Immigration: A comparative study of the Jewish Influx
1880-1910, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1971; Gainer, Bernard: The Alien Invasion:
The Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905, London: Heinemann 1972; on Jewish immgrants
in general see also Gartner, Lloyd P.: The Jewish Immigrant in England 1870-1914,
London: George Allen and Unwin 1960; Fishman, William J.: East End Jewish Radicals
1875-1914, London: Duckworth 1975.
80Holmes, Colin: Anti-Semitism in British Society, 1876-1939, London: Edward Arnold
1979.
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of social problems by placing additional pressure on scarce resources in partic-
ular areas; it could also be used by those hostile to the Jewish community to
add to a more generalized picture of Jewish power and influence”.81 Regarding
the stereotype of the business-minded Jew, Holmes remarked that Jews did in
fact have “an influence out of all proportion to their numbers in the general
population” when it came to the retail trades and businesses. He stressed
that the history of Jewish emancipation in Britain was an example of liberal
toleration and the belief that it was undesirable to discriminate against indi-
viduals on the grounds of their religion, but it also showed that there was the
hope that Jews would forsake their ‘separateness’ and move closer to British
society. According to Holmes, appearances of antisemitism after 1876 were
connected to the social structure of British Jewry, their particular concentra-
tion in business, which gave rise to charges of undue material gain, as well
as due to their history of migration, which produced a ‘soujourning image’.82
He suggested that additional situational pressures eventually generated anti-
semitism but that the liberal principle in Britain supported an ideology that
was favourable towards Jews.83
W.F. Mandle went even further in his study on antisemitism in the British
Union of Fascists and stressed that Jews are at least partly at fault for hostil-
ity against them, as they had always been a minority and have “consistently
refused to submit or integrate fully with the majority”, so that they “have
become particularly susceptible to the arousal of hostile feelings”.84 And “in
addition Jewish concentration upon urban, financial and manufacturing pur-
suits is subject to criticism”.85 He added that “another traditional cause of
anti-Semitism is of course the attitude of the Churches to Jews ... (as) Ju-
daism and Jews were from earliest times the subject of misrepresentation and
81Holmes, Colin: Anti-Semitism in British Society, 1876-1939, London: Edward Arnold
1979, p. 6.
82Ibid, pp. 6-9.
83Ibid, p. 105.
84Mandle, W. F.: Anti-Semitism and the British Union of Fascists, Longmans, Green and
Co 1968, p. 14.
85Ibid, p. 14.
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attack”.86 But he stressed that “we must not, however, deny the importance of
the Jewish factor in creating anti-Semitism. Jews are undeniably different and
to an extent have chosen to remain so” and that “they have remained a stub-
bornly and proudly self-conscious minority and have therefore, many would
argue, chosen to draw fire upon themselves”.87 He added that there must be
at least some evidence of social or economic frustration for antisemitism to
become attractive to the masses.88
Based on this, Mandle drew comparisons between past Jew-hatred and con-
temporary hostility towards immigrants:
“Anti-Semitism therefore appeals to deep-rooted social forces –
psychological, religious, national and economic. In an era of mass
politics such forces are available for use by parties or individuals
unscrupulous, or unbalanced, enough to use them. In our own day
the same racist feelings towards an urban, distinguishable, inter-
penetrating minority can be seen at work, and being utilized by po-
litical groups and individuals in Britain with regard to Caribbean
and Asian immigrants.”89
This ‘interactionist’ approach is characterised by the assumption that the
English are not antisemitic from ‘the inside’ - it is in fact assumed that there is
a particularly liberal and tolerant English character, but prejudices only arise
within situations of social pressure and with outside influences. This approach
initially also characterised investigations of post-war anti-Jewish violence in
Britain. David Leitch’s study on the antisemitic riots in several English cities
and towns in August 1947 explained the appearance of antisemitism to be
closely connected to the events in Mandate Palestine, where Jewish terrorists
were responsible for several casualties among British troops, most famously in
the explosion at the King David Hotel on 22 July 1946. Leitch described the
86Ibid, p. 15.
87Ibid, pp. 15f.
88See ibid, p. 16.
89Ibid, pp. 16f.
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anti-Jewish hostility in Britain as a direct reaction to these events.90 Michael
Cohen, on the other hand, suggested that the riots were connected to economic
depression.91 Although Cohen’s approach is not strictly interactionist, it, too,
assumes that there is a rational, if wrong, reason for prejudice.
It is noteworthy that while remnants of the theory of the Authoritarian Char-
acter did appear in a number of studies on antisemitism, this did not produce
the same effect as in Germany and did not significantly influence antisemitism
theories in Britain. The best example for this is Mandle’s study on the BUF.
He came to the conclusion that the BUF was antisemitic because antisemitism
could be used as a social force and because they needed an issue, but he also
argued – based on the psychologial study on antisemitism by Robb mentioned
earlier – that the followers of the BUF were ‘predisposed’ to antisemitism on
psychological grounds, meaning that they were authoritarian.92 At the same
time, however, he concluded that the BUF, in comparison with the Nazis in
Germany, were only hesitantly antisemitic, that there was no deeply-felt social
and economical stress and that antisemitism was never intense enough, so that
their antisemitism never became politically successful.93 Mandle used the the-
ory of the Authoritarian personality to depict antisemitism as a pathology that
is only limited to a ‘lunatic fringe’ and that it is not a problem of wider society.
His interpretation of the issue shows that at the time, continental approaches
to antisemitism had less impact on the development of theories of domestic
British antisemitism. More important were both the reluctance of the Jewish
community as a whole to acknowledge antisemitism as well as wider debates
about British reactions to immigration. The framework of ‘race relations’ was
adopted to explain antisemitism, as well, and hostility resulting out of interac-
tion and social tension remained the dominant explanation for antisemitism in
British history for quite some time. Although Alan Lee for example acknowl-
90Leitch, David: Explosion a the King David Hotel, in: French, Philip and Michael Sissons:
Age of Austerity, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1986, pp 43-68.
91Cohen, Michael: Palestine to Israel: From Mandate to Independence, London: Cass 1988,
p.231.
92See Mandle: Anti-Semitism and the British Union of Fascists, p. 19.
93See ibid, p. 70.
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edged the hostility Jewish immigrants encountered in Victorian England, he
suggested that when ‘Jewishness’ came to be less outstanding with gradual
assimilation it reduced the significance of ethnic groupings and imagery.94 He
emphasised that “many of the images of the Jews held before 1914 were, (...),
based upon the experience of their poverty and economic competition, and the
decline of those conditions weakened many of the responses which were tied to
them”.95
The study of antisemitism in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s was thus char-
acterised by the belief in a liberal principle as an antidote to antisemitism, as
well as the understanding that prejudices were necessarily connected to the
real appearance, behaviour and character of the group affected by this prej-
udice. This was also showcased in the way the Holocaust was remembered
in Britain. Far from being motivated by anti-racism it instead served a na-
tional narrative of the British war experience and its Jewish component was
completely ignored.
It has to be noted that immediately after the war, Holocaust remembrance
in Britain was virtually non-existent, even among the Jewish community. Ge-
offrey Alderman emphasised that in the immediate postwar period “and aided
particularly by the euphoria generated by the re-establishment of the Jewish
State so soon after the catastrophe of the Holocaust, there developed within
British Jewry a collective amnesia (...) about the precise nature of its own re-
action to news of the Final Solution and to the plight of its Jewish victims.”96
In public discourse, the Jewish experience faded against the British experi-
ence during the war. Tony Kushner describes how after the immediate postwar
trials, “the extermination of European Jewry, as opposed to Nazi atrocities in
general, faded from popular consciousness” so much that “there was essentially
no educational, cultural or artistic attempt to confront the subject”.97 The
94See Lee, Alan: Apects of the Working-Class Response to the Jews in Britain, 1880-1914,
in: Lunn, Kenneth (ed.): Hosts, Immigrants and Minorities, Historical Responses to
Newcomers in British Society 1870-1914, Kent: Dawson 1980, pp. 107-127.
95Ibid, p. 127
96Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p.301.
97Kushner, Tony: Remembering to Forget: Racism and anti-Racism in Postwar Britain, in:
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memory of the British experience during the Second World War however con-
tinued to grow and became an important narrative for postwar British identity,
but it excluded Jews and other minorities.
While Holocaust remembrance and education was at first not present at all,
it was only established after struggle by a campaign by the Jewish commu-
nity. One of these campaigns was the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial Committee,
which, in light of recent race riots sought to use Holocaust remembrance as a
pedagogical tool against racism in general. Tony Kushner however points out
how difficult this was, as “there was an atmosphere in which the state itself
blamed the victim for the existence of intolerance”, so that it was difficult “to
promote Holocaust remembrance in the form of anti-racist initiatives”.98
Further problems were the “commitment to liberal universalism” which “mil-
itated against remembering the fate of the Jews”, as well as “English parochial-
ism, (which) insisted on the continued memory of the British war effort and
the sacrifices made.”99
While the campaigns of the Jewish community were eventually successful
and the Holocaust was for example adopted as a subject in schools, there was
‘a crude universalistic tendency (...) present in the unsophisticated lumping
together of Auschwitz, Hiroshima and Dresden as ‘the casualties of war”.100
Holocaust awareness only increased in the 1980s as it became a topic in public
debate and popular culture.
It can be concluded that the marginalisation of any form of antisemitism
was very common in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s and it informed much
of the later historical study of antisemitism in Britain. It was also charac-
teristic of how contemporary antisemitism was understood. Contemporary
antisemitism was thus predominantly seen as less serious, both in compari-
son to antisemitism in other countries, as well as in comparison to contem-
Cheyette, Bryan and Laura Marcus (eds.): Modernity, Culture and ’the Jew’, Oxford
and Cambridge: Polity Press 1998, pp.226-241, here p. 228.
98Kushner, Tony: The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, A social and Cultural His-
tory, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1994, pp. 250-251.
99Ibid., p. 251.
100Kushner: The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, Ibid, p. 251- 263.
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porary hostility towards colonial immigration. Paradoxically, this neglect of
adequate study and theorisation of antisemitism was further exacerbated when
approaches to ‘race’ and racism changed from the late 1970s and moved away
from interactionist theories towards theorisations of political power, colonial-
ism and discourse. The emphasis on colonialism as a root of racism did not
include Jews as a possible racialised minority, neither in the past nor in the
present. But just as interactionist theories on colonial immigration had influ-
enced approaches to antisemitism in British history, this was again the case
with theories on racist discourse and ideology. In fact, developments from the
1960s onwards proved to be a model with regard to influences on theories of an-
tisemitism: attempts to understand racism towards colonial immigrants were
used to understand hostility towards Jews as well. This had profound effects
on the way antisemitism was understood. Compared to Germany, it is most
significant that there were early signs that in British antisemitism theories,
analyses of the Holocaust would only play a marginal role.
3.2 Germany: Theorising antisemitism after the
Holocaust
In stark contrast to developments in Britain, and perhaps for obvious reasons,
the Holocaust continually played a central role in German approaches to anti-
semitism. However, it needs to be noted that the immediate post-war period
was not characterised by a German willingness to deal with the Holocaust - or
antisemitism - at all. Quite the opposite: antisemitic attitudes prevailed while
any German responsibility in relation to the Holocaust was denied. There was
in fact a widespread latent antisemitism that was secondary in nature and con-
nected to the desire of denial of guilt in postwar Germany, so much that “the
verbal emphasis on that much desired reconciliation with the Jewish people
(was), in fact, nothing less than the ongoing reconciliation of Germany as a
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nation with its own past”.101
3.2.1 Denial of Guilt
Post-war German attitudes towards Jews were deeply connected with a Ger-
man self-perception. Already in 1945, Germans perceived themselves as vic-
tims of the War. As mentioned earlier, immediately after the war, Germans
perceived Jews not as vicits, but as parasites on the developing economy.102
As Frank Stern has noted, a very important feature of postwar German his-
tory was the ambivalence of public philosemitism and private antisemitism. He
stressed that the philosemitic pattern of thinking had “much in common with
similar, seemingly contrary antisemitic thought patterns”.103 He described
antisemitism in postwar Germany as bound up with traditional social, politi-
cal, economic, cultural, and religious anti-Jewish biases and that for Germans,
“Jews were seen as bearing responsibility for the ‘German catastrophe’, occu-
pation policies seemed to be dictated by some fictive ‘World Jewry’, return-
ing emigre´s were mistrusted as strangers, the return of Jewish property was
labelled as ‘revenge’, and the publication of writing by Jewish authors was
denounced as cultural usurpation”.104
Post-war Germany was characterised by an attempt to reframe German
identity in discourse and culture, and the German past played a central role
in this process. In the 1950s, for example, several low level literary works
and serialised novels that were read by a mass audience dealt with German
victimhood. In an analysis of serialised novels in widely read magazines like
Quick and Stern, Michael Schornstheimer came to the conclusion that in these
novels, no attempt to cope with the past took place, but that there was a
“manic, passionate, obsessive preoccupation” with the past.105 Taking a closer
101Stern, Frank: The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge: antisemitism and philosemitism
in postwar Germany, Oxford: Pergamon 1992, p.421.
102See Grossmann, Atina (2007): Jews, Germans, and Allies, p.257.
103Stern, Frank: The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge, p.392.
104Ibid, p.428.
105Schornstheimer, Michael: Harmlose Idealisten und draufga¨ngerische Soldaten. Milita¨r und
Krieg in den Illustriertenromanen der fu¨nfziger Jahre, in: Hannes Heer/ Klaus Neumann
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look at novels by writers like Kurt Ziesel, it became evident that the denial of
guilt was a common and accepted form of interpreting the past. Both of Ziesel’s
books, Und was bleibt, ist der Mensch, published in 1951, as well as Daniel
in der Lo¨wengrube, published in 1952, are full of antisemitic cliche´s. Jewish
characters appeared in these stories only to contrast the German characters
and, moreover, Jewish characters were used to affirm that Jews were themselves
responsible for their fate and that Germans were the actual victims.106
Ernestine Schlant has pointed out that early postwar German literature “fo-
cused predominantly not on the Nazi atrocities but on the wartime and postwar
travails of the German population” and that it “carried within it the burden
of an ominous silence” regarding atrocities perpetrated against the Jews.107
The work of nobel prize winner Heinrich Bo¨ll was a very prominent part of
this postwar German literature. Although Bo¨ll included Jewish characters and
even references to concentration camps in his short stories and novels, he relied
on anti-Jewish cliche´s as well as the narrative of German victimhood, which
set up a dualistic logic of ordinary men and madmen, of which only the latter
were able to actually perpetrate crimes, whereas the former were characterised
by an immense powerlessness.108
This form of absent presence of Jewishness that continuously informed post-
war German discourse has also been shown to play a role in post-war German
play109 and film: Omar Bartov has suggested that “the representation of ab-
sence is arguably one of the most crucial tropes in German literary, cinematic,
(eds): Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944, Hamburg: Hamburger
Edition 1995, pp.634-650. p.634.
106See Busch, Stefan: Auch eine Form von Vergangenheitsbewa¨ltigung: Die Darstellung von
Juden und Judenvernichtung in Nachkriegsromanen von NS-Autoren, in o’ Dochartaigh,
Pol (ed.): Jews in German Literature since 1945: German-Jewish literature?, Amster-
dam: Rodopi 1999, pp. 419-434, p. 429.
107Schlant, Ernestine: The Language of Silence, West German Literature and the Holocaust,
New York: Routledge 1999, p.24.
108See ibid, p.35.
109See Huyssen, Andreas: The Politics of Identification: ‘Holocaust’ and West German
Drama, in: New German Critique, no. 19 Special Issue 1: Germans and Jews 1980.
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and scholarly representation of recent German history”.110
The Holocaust has an unparalleled significance for post-war German iden-
tity. However, as Moishe Postone has argued, German Holocaust guilt con-
stituted “a negative historical legacy that cannot ultimately be dealt with
by normal juridical and political means”.111 He stressed that “Modern anti-
Semitism, properly understood, is intrinsically related to the ‘utopian’ dimen-
sion of Nazism as a movement. [...] Rather than proceed on the basis of this
relation, however, the public discussion has been characterized by an apparent
antinomy, whereby anti-Semitism and other dimensions of National Socialism
have, on the basis of a reductive understanding, been separated out and even
opposed.”112
3.2.2 Understanding Antisemitism: Voices from Exile
In this context it is therefore not surprising that there were significant dif-
ferences in how German historians viewed the past, and how German-Jewish
emigre´s interpreted antisemitism. A number of the earliest post-war approaches
to antisemitism were not undertaken by German historians, but by German-
Jewish emigre´s. The radicalism of National Socialist Antisemitism and the
Holocaust had a profound effect on understandings and theorisations of as
well as research on antisemitism in earlier as well as contemporary forms.
In his historiographical survey on post-war research on antisemitism, Ismar
Schorsch has shown that while some of the early approaches interpreted Nazi
antisemitism as a continuation of religious hatred or as a political tactic used to
gain power,113 later approaches acknowledged a specific ideological dimension
110Bartov, Omer: “Seit die Juden weg sind ....”: Germany, History and Representations of
Absence, in: Denham, Scott D., Irene Kacandes, Jonathan Petropoulos (eds.): A User’s
Guide to German Cultural Studies, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1997,
pp. 209-226, here p. 211.
111Postone, Moishe: After the Holocaust: History and Identity in West Germany, in: Harms,
Kathy; Reuter, Lutz R. and Du¨rr, Volker: Coping with the Past, Germany and Austria
after 1945, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press 1990, pp. 233-251, here p. 233.
112Ibid, p. 235.
113See Schorsch: German Antisemitism in the Light of Post-War Historiography, pp. 257-
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of German antisemitism.
Eva Reichmann’s intention in her 1950 study Hostages of civilization was to
explain and understand Nazi antisemitism from a vantage point of political psy-
chology. Reichmann, a German historian who immigrated to Britain in 1939,
had previously been a spokesman of the Centralverein deutscher Staatsbu¨rger
ju¨dischen Glaubens, the defence organisation of German Jewry.114 In her study
she examined the development of antisemitic ideas from Imperial Germany to
National Socialism. Inspired by psychological research, her theoretical basis
was the assumption that antisemitism was a special kind of group tension. She
argued that the co-existence of different groups generally caused social tension
because these groups had different principles of group homogeneity. On the
one hand, she believed antisemitism to originate in concrete group conflicts.
However, she also recognised that there is a ‘subjective’ aspect to anti-
semitism because it functioned as an outlet for individual aggressiveness. The
Jews were particularly suitable as an object of aggression as they were, in her
words, “late-comers, weak, ubiquitous and recognisable”. In National Social-
ism, she concluded, antisemitism was mainly ‘subjective’ and thus, the Jewish
emancipation failed, because it did not eradicate group tensions entirely. She
pointed out that there was no ‘Jewish problem’ in Germany, but many other
German problems which needed a solution, but for which the Germans wrongly
held the Jews responsible. She summed up National Socialist antisemitism in
five points: it was not entirely a result of real tensions between Jews and
Gentiles, but rather an expression of a national self-mistrust; the antisemitism
preached by the Nazis did not play a decisive part in winning adherents for the
movement; Nazi antisemitism seized upon people because it gave psychological
satisfaction and was an anti-symbol to what they resented; the antisemitism
was less directed against actual Jews, but of a ‘mythical’ character and anti-
semites did not necessarily expect measures to be taken against Jews.115
271.
114Ibid, p. 263.
115See Reichmann, Eva G.: Hostages of Civilisation, The Social Sources of National Socialist
Anti-Semitism, London: Victor Gollancz LTD 1950, pp. 225-235.
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Although Reichmann’s work was recognised, it proved not to be as influen-
tial as that of her contemporary Hannah Arendt. Arendt, a German-Jewish
political theorist who had studied with philosopher Martin Heidegger, fled to
France and then to the US to escape the Nazis in 1941. In her 1951 book
Origins of Totalitarianism she investigated the historical and political roots of
what she termed totalitarian societies, National Socialist Germany and Stalin-
ist Russia. In order to understand antisemitism and the appeal it had for the
Germans, she analysed political conflicts like the Dreyfus affair and the social
status of Jews during emancipation in Germany as well as the connection of
nationalism and antisemitism.
Arendt understood antisemitism as something that developed from a hostil-
ity against a particular group in real conflicts to a completely abstract ideology
under national socialism. She distinguished between earlier manifestations of
Jew-hatred and modern racist antisemitism. While the former was based on
‘experiences’ and historical conflicts, the latter became completely separated
from any real experience with the victims, but functioned as an ideology within
totalitarian systems.116 Arendt further argued that antisemitism had become
an abstract hostility, which meant that its victims are interchangeable. For
Arendt, antisemitism is not characterised by its content, but by a certain way
of thinking. She argued that antisemitism had in fact become part of a to-
talitarian ideology that randomly chooses its victims.117 Consequently, this
also meant that totalitarianisms are alike; not in the sense that they share a
common ideology, but in the sense that they are characterised by a totalitarian
way of thinking.118
Arendt also pointed out that it was wrong to assume that antisemitism is
necessarily related to rampant nationalism. On the contrary, she argued that
Nazism was not a simple nationalism, but in fact aimed to be a trans-national
movement.119
116See Arendt, Hannah: The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Meridian Books 1958,
p. 28; Salzborn: Antisemitismus als negative Leitidee der Moderne, pp. 119 ff.
117See Rensmann: Arendt und Adorno, pp. 120 ff.
118See Arendt: The Origins of Totalitarianism, chapter 13.
119See ibid, p. 4., on this point as the key in Arendt’s approach to antisemitism see also Stoet-
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Arendt came to the conclusion that modern antisemitism was different to
earlier manifestations of Jew-hatred. She also contended that there was a
certain specificity of German antisemitism. Arendt’s interpretations of anti-
semitism have to be seen in the context of her experiences in post-war Ger-
many. She was shocked by the ‘violent refusal’ of the German population to
work through what happened and believed that this was a sign of a continu-
ation of fascist and totalitarian ideology in German democracy.120 However,
Arendt never returned to Germany and her dark interpretation of post-war
German society was therefore different from those who actually experienced,
and had to come to terms with, life as a Jew among those who, just years
earlier, had sought to annihilate them. Their approaches were characterised
by emphasising the discontinuities between pre- and post-war German society.
The most prominent of these was Eleonore Sterling, who had fled to the
USA and returned to Frankfurt in 1953. In her doctoral dissertation about
the antecedents of Nazi antisemitism in the nineteenth century, she understood
antisemitism as a form of ‘displaced social protest’, which just happened to
target Jews. Antisemitism was opportune for several sectors of German society
and a political tactic of those who were in power.121 One interpretation of
this particular understanding could be that she, upon her return, tried to
“salvage her identification with Deutschtum” and may have drawn “needed
solace from the idea that Jew-hatred was not authentically characteristic of the
Volk but was, rather, the handiwork of Nazi fanatics and their predecessors in
zler, Marcel: Anti-Semitism, the Bourgeoisie, and the Self-Destruction of the Nation-
State, in: Richard H. Kind and Dan Stone (eds.): Hannah Arendt and the Uses of
History, Imperialism, Nation, Race, and Genocide, Oxford: Berghahn Books 2007, pp.
130-146.
120See Arendt’s essay: Besuch in Deutschland. Die Nachwirkungen des Naziregimes, 1950,
published as: Arendt, Hannah: Besuch in Deutschland, Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag 1993; see
also Rensmann, Lars: Das Besondere im Allgemeinen. Totale Herrschaft und Nachkriegs-
gesellschaft in den politisch-theoretischen Narrativen von Arendt und Adorno, in: Auer,
Dirk; Rensmann, Lars und Schulze Wessel, Julia (eds.): Arendt und Adorno, Frankfurt
a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag 2003, pp. 150-198, here p. 184.
121See Sterling, Eleonore, Er ist wie du: Aus der Fru¨geschichte des Antisemitismus in
Deutschland 1815-1850, Mu¨nchen 1956.
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demagogy who had manipulated desperate Germans into violence and ultimate
disaster. Sterling exemplified the mainstream German Jewish experience, one
committed to a dignified assimilation to the positive values of German history
and culture. She resisted the temptation to condemn the Volk and therefore
had to find less harsh explanations for its periodic descent into violence.”122
In contrast to Sterling’s more apologetic approach, German-Jewish emigre´
George Mosse saw antisemitism as the outcome of a specific German vo¨lkisch
ideology. He described it as a backward looking ideology based on ideas of
soil and nation.123 Mosse further elaborated on antisemitism in his later book
Toward the Final Solution, where he interpreted it as racism. Here Mosse
traced the history of European racism and described the role racism played
in Nazi ideology. He for example emphasised the connection between the
Euthanasia programs and the genocide of the Jews.124
The idea of a specific German vo¨lkisch ieology also characterised the ap-
proach of Shulamit Volkov, whose parents had fled to Palestine in 1933. In
her 1978 study on antisemitism in Imperial Germany, she tried to combine his-
torical and social theoretical analysis. She accepted that there was some con-
tinuation in German antisemitism, but that there was nevertheless a modern
antisemitism that developed after 1870.125 Volkov understood antisemitism as
part of a particular German ideology: “The unique German culture emerging
in the 1890s was expressed in the ’German ideology’, in a radical anti-modern
mentality, rejecting liberalism, capitalism, socialism; in a nostalgic passion for
a long-lost world.”126
She further argued that in Imperial Germany, antisemitism became a sign
122Bergmann, Werner; Hoffmann, Christhard; Walser Smith, Helmut: Exclusionary Violence:
Antisemitic Riots in Modern German History, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
2002, p. 189.
123see Mosse, George: The Crisis of German Ideology, New York 1964.
124See Mosse, George L.: Toward the Final Solution, A History of European Racism, London:
JM Dent and Sons Ltd 1978, Chapter 13.
125Volkov, Shulamit: Antisemitism as a Cultural Code. Reflections on the History and
Historiography of Antisemitism in Imperial Germany, in: Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook
Vol 23: Tu¨bingen, Mohr Siebeck 1978, p. 30.
126Ibid, p. 31.
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of cultural identity, a ‘cultural code’, as it was “a way of communicating an
acceptance of a particular set of ideas and a preference for a specific social,
political and moral norms”.127 Volkov emphasised that antisemitism did not
originate in real social tensions, but was a way for antisemites to interpret
the world. Although Volkov’s essay was first published in 1978, her theory
did not get attention among German antisemitism researchers before her work
was published in German in 1990.128 Her research was about antisemitism in
the nineteenth century, but her theory grasped aspects of continuing forms of
antisemitism and what it meant and still means for German culture. What
her approach had in common with many of those who interpreted German
antisemitism from a vantage point of personal experience, was its attempt to
grasp the ideological dimensions of German antisemitism and to understand
its political psychology. Many of these approaches had an understanding of
antisemitism that went beyond its incarnation in Nazi Germany. This was in
stark contrast to how German historians viewed the issue.
3.2.3 German historians and antisemitism
Antisemitism was not at the heart of German historical analysis. In light of
what Postone has called the pressure to normalise at all costs, historians’ in-
terpretations of past antisemitism reflected contemporary debates about Ger-
many’s past. Historians thus evaded the question of German guilt by portray-
ing National Socialism as a European, rather than a German phenomenon. In
their eyes, it was also not the outcome of older traditions, but rather a crisis
of modern liberal society. There was a general consensus among historians to
emphasize a discontinuity between National Socialism and postwar Germany,
and to portray it as a break with German traditions. This meant to trace
the roots of National Socialism not in German, but in European history.129
127Ibid, p. 34.
128See Volkov, Shulamit: Ju¨disches Leben und Antisemitismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,
Zehn Essays, Mu¨nchen: C.H. Beck 1990.
129See Kwiet, Konrad: Die NS-Zeit in der westdeutschen Forschung 1945-1961, in: Schulin,
Ernst (ed.): Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, Mu¨nchen:
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At the beginning of the 1960s, there was a trend towards letting go of the
‘break-theory’ and to adopt resistance as a main topic for research on the one
hand, and a comparison between National Socialism and communism as total-
itarianisms on the other.130 In these early approaches to National Socialism,
antisemitism was marginalised and even denied.
Konrad Kwiet has indicated that antisemitism only became a subject for
historians from the 1960s, in light of the Eichmann trial, as well as antisemitic
violence in Germany. He also stressed that the persecution of the Jews became
a subject in schools and universities, there were exhibitions and church debates.
With the new generation of historians at German universities, there was an
increasing number of studies on the extermination of the Jews. However, he
stressed that this was an inadequate way of dealing with the past, as there
was at the same time a form of immunisation among Germans against this
topic.131
In addition, these studies also often evaded the question of a continuation
of antisemitism in post-war German society. In this category are studies that
attributed the rise of antisemitism in Germany to its weak liberalism. Peter
Pulzer, for example, tried to show that the political antisemitism in Imperial
Germany was different from earlier forms of Jew-hatred. He argued that it had
not been possible before that political movements were based on antisemitism
and that antisemitism was part of a coherent set of ideas. Pulzer emphasised
that “anti-Semitism was a ‘spontaneous product’, arising out of a particular
situation, not a creed foisted on a public from above by an unscrupulous ruling
class”.132 He argued that the permanent prominence of the Jewish Question
facilitated the revival of anti-Jewish feelings with the economic down-turn. In
his view, the vulnerable status of the Jews through the period of emancipa-
tion and the high degree of religiousness of the German population played an
important role for the establishment of antisemitism. He also pointed out that
R. Oldenbourg Verlag 1989, pp. 181-198, here p. 187.
130Ibid, p. 188, p. 191.
131See ibid, p.198.
132Pulzer, Peter: The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press 1988, first edition 1964, p. 321.
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it was not in fact the declining strata that was most prone to antisemitism,
but the socially mobile who had extreme nationalist views. He said that “na-
tionalism had, by the beginning of the twentieth century, become the main
driving force behind anti-Semitism”.133 Pulzer attested a general weakness of
German liberalism and although he identified several political strains of anti-
semitism, he generally understood it to be a reaction against liberalism: “The
antisemites opposed not only the institutions of Liberalism, they fought its
whole moral system, and its whole concept of human existence”.134
As Dan Stone has argued this was a way of not questioning liberalism itself
or the relationship between German Nazism and the European liberal tradi-
tion.135 Another side effect of nearly all approaches to Germany’s past was the
fact that antisemitism was either avoided directly, or presented so that it did
not extend into the present German democracy. This is not to say that the in-
creasing amounts of studies on Nazi antisemitism and the Holocaust were not
accompanied by heavily diverging opinions on the matter. Scholars disagreed
on whether there was a plan to eliminate all Jews and that Hitler personally
gave the order to do so, or whether the destruction of the Jews was something
that arose out of the structures of the Third Reich. This became known as
the functionalism versus intentionalism debate.136 Both sides of the debate,
however, portrayed antisemitism as something that only existed in Germany’s
133Ibid, p.221.
134Ibid, p. 29-30.
135See Stone, Dan: Constructing the Holocaust, London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2003, p. 56.
136For the functionalist side see especially: Hilberg, Raul: The Destruction of the Euro-
pean Jews, New York: Harper and Row 1979; Browning, Christopher: The Final So-
lution and the German Foreign Office, New York: Holmes and Meier 1978; Mommsen,
Hans; Beamtentum im Dritten Reich, Stuttgart: Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte
fu¨r Zeitgeschichte, 1966; Broszat, Martin: The Hitler State: The Foundation and De-
velopment of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich, London: Longman 1981, for
the intentionalist side see especially: Hillgruber, Andreas: Der geschichtliche Ort der
Judenvernichtung, in: Eberhard Ja¨ckel and Ju¨rgen Rohwer (eds): Der Mord an den Ju-
den im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Entschlussbildung und Verwirklichung, Stuttgart: Deutsche
Verlagsanstalt 1985, pp. 213-224; Ja¨ckel, Eberhard: Hitler’s Weltanschauung, Entwurf
einer Herrschaft, Tu¨bingen: Rainer Wunderlich 1969.
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past.
The point here is not to retrace this debate among historians in detail,
but to stress a side effect of these debates: while from the early post-war
years though to the late 1970s, historians were preoccupied with Germany’s
past, there were significantly fewer attempts to address continuing forms of
antisemitism among Germans. Although openly expressed antisemitism had
become a taboo in 1945, this by no means had the effect that Germans changed
their attitudes towards Jews. Antisemitism in Germany did not cease to exist
in 1945, but rather found new forms of expression. The taboo to publicly dis-
play antisemitism coincided with a move of expressions of antisemitic attitudes
into private spheres.
In 1946 18% of Germans could be categorised as serious antisemites, 21%
as antisemites and 22% as racists on the basis of surveys conducted by Allied
military governments. Over the years, there was a general decline in antisemitic
attitudes in Western Germany, although there were still 20% of Germans who
displayed strong antisemitic attitudes according to surveys conducted in the
1970s. In 1992, this number was 16%.137
3.2.4 The Left and anti-capitalism
It is not surprising that German approaches to contemporary antisemitism in
the 1960s and 1970s were influenced by debates about the German past. In
order to fulfil a ‘normalisation at all costs’, it was necessary for the majority
of Germans, many of whom had been complicit in Nazi crimes, to deny any
continuation of antisemitism. But the younger generation also became com-
plicit in marginalising antisemitism. The student movement of the late 1960s
wanted to break with cultural and political continuities from the Nazi regime.
Together with the formation of the coalition governments later led by the So-
cial Democratic Party, this marked a sharp break in the history of postwar
137See Bergmann, Werner and Rainer Erb: Wie antisemitisch sind die Deutschen? Mein-
ungsumfragen 1945-1994, in: Benz, Wolfgang (ed.): Antisemitismus in Deutschland, Zur
Aktualita¨t eines Vorurteils, Mu¨nchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag 1995, pp.47-63.
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Germany.138
In this process, the extermination of the Jews became subsumed under gen-
eral categories, so that the role antisemitism played for the Nazis was not ad-
equately dealt with. As Rita Chin has indicated, this was characteristic of the
German Left, who condemned “the Federal Republic’s efforts to secure democ-
racy through capitalism as a structural, political, and moral continuity from
the Third Reich”. In this context, for the student movement, it was “precisely
the obsession with ever-expanding production and the self-congratulatory at-
titude towards prosperity [...] that obscured West German society’s failure to
deal with its troubling historical legacy”.139 Antisemitism was only a topic for
the German Left in its relationship to capitalism.
“In dealing with National Socialism, the Left tended to concen-
trate on its function for capitalism, emphasizing the destruction
of working-class organizations, Nazi social and economic policies,
rearmament, expansionism, and, to some degree, the bureaucratic
mechanisms of party and state domination. This one-sided analy-
sis resulted in an incomplete image of Nazism. It became seen in
terms of a terroristic bureaucratic police state operating in the im-
mediate interests of big capital, based on authoritarian structures,
glorifying the family, and using racism as one means of social co-
hesion.”140
This resulted in an abstraction and therefore marginalisation of antisemitism.
“Within this historical context, then, the process of theoretical abstraction
138See Postone, Moishe: After the Holocaust: History and Identity in West Germany, in:
Harms, Kathy; Reuter, Lutz R. and Du¨rr, Volker: Coping with the Past, Germany and
Austria after 1945, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press 1990, pp. 233-251, here
p. 236.
139Chin, Rita: Guest Worker Migration and the Unexpected Return of Race, in: Chin, Rita;
Fehrenbach, Heide; Eley, Geoff and Grossmann, Atina (eds.): After the Nazi Racial
State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe, Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press 2009, pp. 80-101, here p. 103.
140Postone: After the Holocaust, p. 244.
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had the curious result of normalizing National Socialism and, in the process,
marginalizing exterminatory anti-Semitism and the Holocaust.”141 This par-
ticular way of dealing with the Holocaust and antisemitism as an abstraction,
and only under broader categories like capitalism, was also characteristic for
leftist culture. One example for this is Peter Weiss’ play Die Ermittlung in
1965, which dealt with the Auschwitz trials held from 1963 to 1965 in Frank-
furt. The play was a collection of witness statements of victims which were
contrasted with statements of perpetrators. In these statements, fascism and
antisemitism are portrayed as a form of extreme capitalist exploitation.142 In
light of this marginalisation of antisemitism, it is not surprising that major
theorisations of continuing forms of antisemitism did not emanate from the
German Left. Here, again, it was German-Jewish emigre´s - and those who
returned - who first approached this topic, and whose approaches went beyond
current German interpretations of antisemitism.
3.2.5 Addressing post-war antisemitism:
social-psychological approaches
During and shortly after the Holocaust, there were a small number of attempts
to understand what was happening in Germany not by looking at Germany’s
history, but by analysing the motivations of the antisemites. Psychological
approaches to antisemitism built a basis on which later antisemitism theories
were developed. One of the first attempts to understand and explain the
psychology of antisemitism was undertaken by Sigmund Freud in his book
Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion, completed and published
during his London exile in 1939. Although antisemitism was not the major
subject of the book, but instead the evolution of the Jewish religion, it tried
to explain the psychology of anti-Jewish hatred. Freud argued that hatred
against the Jewish people is a hatred against the the intellectualism of the
141Ibid, p. 246.
142See Adelson, Leslie: Touching Tales of Turks, Germans, and Jews: Cultural Alterity,
Historical Narrative and Literary Riddles for the 1990s, in: New German Critique, No.
80, Special Issue on the Holocaust (Spring-Summer 2000), pp. 93-124, here p. 109.
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Jewish religion and a revolt against the renunciation of drives expected in
Christianity.143 Freud’s psychoanalytical approach had a profound influence
on later approaches to understand antisemitism.
Another very influential psychological approach, which built on Freud’s find-
ings, was that of Ernst Simmel, a German Jewish psycho-analyst who survived
in exile in California. Simmel tried to understand the mass psychology be-
hind antisemitism. He assumed that irrational ideas and behaviour signify a
pathological dysfunction in the character development of an individual and
that antisemitism is a backlash into primitive states of being that reverses the
process of civilisation. On this basis he showed that a whole society can be
pathological in this sense as well.144;
A significant theoretical contribution to the understanding of antisemitism
was made by French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre in 1946. Sartre was among
the first to argue that antisemitism is not caused by the relationship between
real Jews and non-Jews, but was a product of the thought and emotions of
the antisemite.145 What these approaches had in common was that they un-
derstood antisemitism not through the behaviour of Jews, but through the
attitudes of antisemites. It is most significant that none of them feature in
British approaches to antisemitism during that period, which instead focussed
on a Jewish immigration experience and concrete Jewish non-Jewish relations.
For German theories of antisemitism, on the other hand, they became highly
influential. This is partly due to the fact that those who developed them
were German-Jewish emigre´s who were inspired by, and worked together with,
American scholars of social-psychology.
This is best exemplified in the way these psychoanalytical approaches were
influenced by the theories of Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer and
other members of the Frankfurter Institut fu¨r Sozialforschung (the Frankfurt
143See Freud, Sigmund: Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion, Drei Abhand-
lungen, Amsterdam 1939, p. 191
144See Simmel, Ernst: Anti-Semitism and Mass Psychology, in: Simmel, Ernst (ed.): Anti-
Semitism. A Social Disease, New York: International Universities Press 1946.
145See Sartre, Jean-Paul: U¨berlegungen zur Judenfrage, Hamburg: Rohwohlt 1994 (first
published as: Reflexions sur la Question Juive, Paris 1946) p. 12.
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School) which was founded in 1924 and relocated to Columbia University in
New York in 1934. Although antisemitism did not play a central role in the
institute’s research before 1933, it became the main focus of the institute in
exile.146 German Jewish social scientists and psychologists who were directly
affected by anti-Jewish hostility in Germany after 1933 and who went into exile
re-evaluated their assessment of antisemitism in their approach to understand
the success of National Socialism in Germany and the role antisemitism played
within it.147
Shocked by the Nazi genocide Adorno had initially stated that writing poetry
after the Holocaust is barbaric.148 On the one hand, this could be interpreted
as a reluctance to dissect and analyse something that was perceived as unspeak-
able, whether in literary or any other form.149 On the other hand, however,
Adorno’s scholarship on antisemitism after 1945 was directed by his proclama-
tion that the most import part of any education was to prevent Auschwitz from
ever happening again.150 To that end, it was Adorno and his colleagues who
not only built the basis of modern German antisemitism theories, but who also
produced the first empirical research on contemporary antisemitism in post-
war Germany. Their approach to antisemitism became particularly relevant,
as it was one of the only responses to forms of post-war antisemitism, and be-
cause it formed, in a simplified version, the basis of later German antisemitism
research.
However, it has to be noted that as reflected in German culture and in
German historiography, German sociologists in general expressed an extreme
146On this issue see also Ziege, Eva Maria: Antisemitismus und Gesellschaftstheorie, die
Frankfurter Schule im Amerikanischen Exil, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 2009.
147On the differences between earlier interpretations of antisemitism among members of the
Frankfurt School, see Jay, Martin: Frankfurter Schule und Judentum. In: Geschichte
und Gesellschaft, Vol 5, 1979, pp. 439-454.
148See Adorno, Theodor W.: Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft, in: Gesammelte Schriften in 20
Ba¨nden - Band 10: Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft I, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 2003.
149See Introduction in Fine, Robert and Turner, Charles (eds.): Social Theory after the
Holocaust, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 2000.
150See Adorno, Theodor W.: Erziehung zur Mu¨ndigkeit. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1971,
p. 88.
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reluctance to deal with the Nazi past.151 Michal Y. Bodemann has described
the relaunch of German sociology after the war as motivated “not with the
appeal to fellow sociologists to study the catastrophe and what led to it, not
with the insistence that sociology should unveil and analyze the enormity of
mass murder and death factories, and not with the exhortation that sociol-
ogy explain the system of totalitarian rule.” Quite the opposite was the case,
and the majority of German sociologists followed an impetus of passing “over
these twelve years in silence, pick up where [they] left off, and, like many
other Germans at that time, shrug off Nazism as an extraneous force, a meta-
physical mystery that cannot be explained by rational means or the tools of
sociology.”152
Bodemann argued that the Frankfurt School was also part of this silence,
as their way of “dealing with the Shoah soon evaporated into the abstract”.153
However, for Adorno, the abstraction was not a way of avoiding Auschwitz.
Rather, the abstraction was necessary to understand antisemitism not as a
single phenomenon, but as part, and, in fact, at the centre, of a broader social
theory. In light of this, Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s approach to antisemitism
could not have been more radical. Like their analysis of society in general, it
was inspired by Marxist social theory as well as psychoanalysis. Their main
philosophical work, Dialectics of Enlightenment, was part of their attempt to
overcome the previous deterministic understanding of history in materialism
and instead investigate what they saw as the two sides of Enlightenment: the
overcoming of myth and religion in favour of natural science and rationality on
the one hand, and the potential of instrumental reason and rationality devoid
of humanism contained within this development on the other.154
151For a detailed discussion see Weyer, Johannes: Westdeutsche Soziologie 1945-1960.
Deutsche Kontinuita¨ten und nordamerikanischer Einfluss, Berlin: Duncker und Hum-
blot, 1984.
152Bodemann, Michal Y.: Eclipse of Memory: German Representations of Auschwitz in the
Early Postwar Period, in: New German Critique, No. 75, Fall 1998, pp. 57-89, here p.
80.
153Ibid, p. 89.
154See Salzborn: Der Antisemitismus als negative Leitidee der Moderne, pp. 96 ff.
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Adorno and Horkheimer argued that antisemitism was fundamentally mod-
ern, which meant that it can only develop within modernity. More impor-
tantly, however, they understood antisemitism as a fundamental characteristic
of modern society. Adorno and Horkheimer therefore distinguished between
anti-Judaism and modern antisemitism, but still sought to trace the latter’s
historical sources in earlier manifestations.155
One main element of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s theory of modern anti-
semitism was pathological projection. To explain this, it is important to un-
derstand their basic ideas about modern society in general. They assumed that
in modern capitalistic societies, individuals have paradoxically lost the indi-
viduality which to install was one of the goals of Enlightenment. This is due to
the way in which individuals relate to each other in fully developed capitalism.
Human relations became ruled by functionality and dependency. Individuals
thus became authoritarian personalities, which were in effect weak personali-
ties who gave up their personal autonomy in favour of a ’rule of society’. In
Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s view, this created a disposition for antisemitism,
because individuals gave up their autonomous critical rationality in favour of
socialisation in modern capitalism – on the unconscious level -, so they are sus-
ceptible for world explanation theories and therefore antisemitic ideas, which
explain what they cannot understand.156
A very important precondition for antisemitism as pathological projection
is that this lack of personal autonomy, unconsciously, fills people with anger
and hatred. They then direct their anger against those who do not fit into
society as they perceive it. Adorno and Horkheimer identified those to be
“Vagabunden, Juden, Protestanten, Katholiken” (vagabonds, Jews, Protes-
155See Rensmann, Lars and Schulze-Wessel, Julia: Radikalisierung oder ’Verschwinden’ der
Judenfeindschaft? Arendts und Adornos Theorien zum modernen Antisemitismus, in:
idem (eds.): Arendt und Adorno, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2003, p. 97-129, here
p. 108.
156Adorno, Theodor W. and Horkheimer, Max: Dialektik der Aufkla¨rung, Frankfurt am
Main: Fischer 2004 (first published in New York 1944, in Germany in 1969), pp, 177-
217.
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tants, Catholics).157 Because people feel betrayed – bourgeois society, capital-
ism, promised them happiness but did not deliver – they feel anger and hatred.
This hatred against others is in fact a hatred against difference, because it is
perceived that Jews indulge in something that others do not allow themselves.
Antisemitism then means to make everything the same.
Although Horkheimer and Adorno argued that this mechanism does not
necessarily have to target Jews, they pointed out that there are reasons that it
affects Jews in a specific way. The main reason was that Jews have historically
been identified with money and capitalism, which is now perceived as the
main source of unhappiness.158 The image of the Jewish banker who funds
Bolshevism then expresses the feeling of powerlessness, the image of the Jewish
intellectual expresses the desire for a life without hard physical work.159
Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s theory on antisemitism was necessarily very
complex, and a fundamental part of their social theory. The central role and
priority given to anti-Jewish resentments and fascist social structures in the
institute’s research in its American exile led to several studies on antisemitic
prejudice and fascist tendencies in individuals. This was most notably per-
haps The Authoritarian Personality in 1950, a joint study by Adorno, Else
Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson and Nevitt Sanford, in which the authors
investigated individual levels of authoritarianism, conformity, racism and prej-
udice among Americans, character traits which they believed to be related to
right-wing ideology and therefore fascism.160
Apart from the The Authoritarian Personality, which may be one of the
best known today, the institute and its affiliated members in fact undertook
a number of influential studies on the subject of antisemitism. These studies
had a different vantage point than studies on historical antisemitism, as their
intent was to understand antisemitism and how the Holocaust was possible,
rather than to contribute to the debates German historians, or the German
public, were embroiled in.
157Ibid, p. 180.
158Ibid, p. 182 f.
159Ibid, p. 181.
160Adorno, T.W. et al: The Authoritarian Personality, New York: Harper & Bros 1950.
123
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany
Paul W. Massing’s study on political antisemitism in Imperial Germany for
example was undertaken on behalf of the institute during its exile at Columbia
University.161 It was part of the Studies in Prejudice under supervision of Max
Horkheimer and Samuel Flowerman, among which The Authoritarian Person-
ality had been published as well. Massing emphasised how the Jew-hatred of
the time was deeply connected to the perception of capitalism. He showed
how the antisemitic agitation of the time in face of the economic depression
centred around a distinction between productive and honest German capital
and a perceived greedy, unproductive ‘Jewish’ capital which was assumed to
be responsible for the economic misery. He argued that this perception of
financial capital as inherently ‘Jewish’ was based on legends of Jewish greed
during medieval times. The general idea of distinguishing between productive
and rapacious economy, he argued, originally stemmed from German roman-
ticism. He pointed out that this argumentation hit the ‘weak’ spot of the
middle classes: they were able to criticise financial capital, which had always
seemed threatening to their way of life, without questioning their own economic
basis.162 Massing stressed that this was also characteristic of the National So-
cialist understanding of economy, which was anti-international and against
financial capital, but not against a national capitalist economy.
Massing’s main point was that this economic antisemitism was used to ma-
nipulate the masses. He explained how politicians used antisemitism to mo-
bilise the middle classes in their favour. However, he concluded that they lost
interest in antisemitism after 1895 when the economy recovered. The follow-
ing era was, he argued, a time of Jewish flourishing and assimilation and as
long as the Empire was perceived to be in good shape, hatred was turned
on outside enemies like Britain and France. This also meant, however, that
with the end of the dreams of international status after the end of the first
161See Massing, Paul W.: Vorgeschichte des politischen Antisemitismus, in: Frankfurter
Beitra¨ge zur Soziologie, No 8, Frankfurt am Main: Europa¨ische Verlagsanstalt 1959,
first published as: Rehearsal for Destruction, New York: Harper and Brothers 1949.
162Ibid, p. 12 ff.
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World War, antisemitism was able to reemerge only more drastically.163 Mass-
ing’s main argument was that the German population had a perception of
the world that was easily turned into Jew-hatred, but that it needed a cer-
tain political constellation in order to be mobilised. Massing’s interpretation
of antisemitism clearly spelled out Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s earlier ideas:
Jews were hated as they were perceived to embody the negative sides of capi-
talism. Massing’s study shows that the Institute positioned itself beyond the
later debates about responsibility for the Holocaust. However, it needs to be
taken into account that Massing’s approach was that of a sociologist. The aim
of the Institut fu¨r Sozialforschung was to understand the social function of
antisemitism and embed this in a wider social theory, which also meant that
the members of the Institute acknowledged that antisemitism may have cul-
minated in the Holocaust, but continued to exist and fulfil certain functions
within post-war German society. Understanding the nature of antisemitism
also meant to analyse why Jews were targeted in particular, and what this
meant for society as a whole.
On this basis the Institute also addressed contemporary forms of antisemitism,
and critically assessed exactly the earlier mentioned reluctance of the Germans
to deal with the Nazi past. After the Institute re-settled in West Germany in
1953, it continued its research on the history of antisemitism as well as its
post-war manifestations. It documented and analysed antisemitic violence
and reactions to it by the German public164 and used these observations to
understand post-war German society. From very early on, Adorno saw that
Germans hold the Jews responsible for the Holocaust and think that Jews
exploit the feeling of German guilt. This anti-Jewish hostility as a result of
the Holocaust was initially described as ‘guilt-defensive antisemitism’, but was
later termed ‘secondary antisemitism’.165
163Ibid, p. 225.
164See Scho¨nbach, Peter: Reaktionen auf die antisemitsche Welle im Winter 1959/1960,
Frankfurter Beitra¨ge zur Soziologie, Sonderheft 3, Frankfurt am Main, Europa¨ische Ver-
lagsanstalt, 1961.
165See Adorno, Theodor W.: Eingriffe. Neun Kritische Modelle. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp 1963, p. 69.
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Adorno saw in post-war German society the continuation of an anti-democratic
authoritarianism, which bore particular habits and prejudices.166 When Adorno
spoke to the Gesellschaft fu¨r Christlich Ju¨dische Zusammenarbeit (Society of
Christian-Jewish Cooperation) on the topic of ‘Educating prejudice-free hu-
man beings’ (Erziehung vorurteilsfreier Menschen) at the first European Paed-
agogical Conference on 30 October 1962, he referred to a hidden or crypto-
antisemitism in postwar German society. He stressed that antisemites today
wanted to portray themselves as the persecuted: they are not allowed to voice
their antisemitic opinions in public, and therefore feel oppressed.167 He pro-
posed an anti-authoritarian education to combat antisemitism, as one element
in the development of antisemitic attitudes were experiences as a child. In
his view, education would have to stop the formation of authoritarian charac-
ters. However, he also strongly felt that antisemitism was a mainstream phe-
nomenon in post-war Germany, and that fighting antisemitism would mean to
go against the current.168
What is perhaps significant in a comparison between Germany and Britain
during that period is that in contrast to the majority of approaches to an-
tisemitism in Britain, Adorno’s approach exhibited an understanding that
antisemitic attitudes were not related to Jewish behaviour at all. He thus
emphasized that anti-antisemitic education in this sense would not mean to
portray Jews in a positive light in order to change attitudes among antisemites.
He therefore doubted if ‘pretty pictures of Israeli irrigation plants’, or ‘eulogies
about great Jewish men’ would be helpful in combating antisemitism.169
In its research on post-war German antisemitism, the Frankfurt Institute ap-
plied Adorno’s ideas of this specific post-war German antisemitism to violent
antisemitic outbursts. On 24 December 1959, Christmas Eve, the synagogue in
Cologne, Germany, was daubed with Swastikas. The perpetrators, who were
166See Rensmann: Das Besondere im Allgemeinen, p. 176.
167See Adorno, Theodor W.: Zur Beka¨mpfung des Antisemitismus heute, in: Adorno,
Theodor W.: Kritik. Kleine Schriften zur Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1971,
pp. 105-133, here p. 109.
168Ibid, p. 120, p. 122 and p. 114.
169Ibid, p. 116.
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arrested on Christmas Day, Arnold Strunk and Paul Josef Scho¨nen, were iden-
tified as members of the nationalist Deutsche Reichspartei (DRP). However,
their crime – which was classed as an abuse of an official religious commu-
nity according to section 166 of the criminal code, did not remain an aberrant
event, but was followed by hundreds of attacks on synagogues, Jewish cemeter-
ies and buildings all over Germany.170 Even more striking, the wave of attacks
appeared in other countries, too.
According to a survey by the Frankfurt Institute right after the events in
January, the majority of Germans condemned the attacks, but many also be-
lieved that these were just pranks pulled by youths which do not need to be
taken too seriously.171 While the German government interpreted the events as
reason enough to renew their previous efforts to ban the DRP, Rabbi Zvi Asaria
of the Cologne synagogue believed that the perpetrators were just youths from
problem families and that the attacks were not part of a politically organised
action against Jews.172
In his study on the events, Peter Scho¨nbach interpreted the antisemitism he
came across as part of an Authoritarian Character. However, he tailored this
specifically to the German context. He explained that the German antisemite
after the Holocaust is not only extremely dependant on external influences
– authorities -, does not only show extreme conformism towards authorities,
wishes to see his attitudes confirmed and rewarded by the authorities and
shows repressive tendencies, he is also torn between denying any German guilt
on the one hand and legitimising the German past on the other.173 The study
showed that most of those who can be classed as antisemites – the 16 per
cent that showed mild and strong antisemitic reactions – tended to diminish
the importance of the incidents. As an explanation, Scho¨nbach said that “the
adult antisemites in Germany were likely to be reminded by the incidents of
170For a full report on the attacks see Bundesregierung: Die antisemitischen und nazistischen
Vorfa¨lle in der Zeit vom 25. Dezember 1959 bis zum 28. Januar 1960, Bonn 1960.
171See Scho¨nbach, Peter: Reaktionen auf die antisemitische Welle im Winter 1959/1960, p.31
172See “Synagogen-Scha¨ndung, Die Nacht von Ko¨ln”, in: Der Spiegel, No 1/2 1960, pp.
19-23.
173Scho¨nbach, Peter: Reaktionen auf die antisemitische Welle, p. 23.
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the persecutions of the Jews in the ‘Third Reich’ and the charges against the
Nazis. Many of them tried to ward off their disquieting associations and guilt
feelings by magnifying the psychological distance between the incidents and
themselves. They achieved this by representing the incidents to themselves
and to others as unpolitical pranks of hoodlums and foolish boys.”174
Scho¨nbach’s study is not only significant in its level of sophistication, but
it also showed how in Germany, there was not only a reluctance to deal with
the past, but there were also those who criticised this reluctance. Paradox-
ically, post-war German discourse made both possible: a denial of guilt as
well a radical social critique based on the mechanism of this denial. In con-
trast to Britain, it is most notable that there were any attempts at all to
understand antisemitism without marginalising or downplaying it. While in
Britain, antisemitism eventually came to be understood through theories on
colonial immigration, this was not the case in Germany, even though there
were similar debates about immigration during the same period. For theories
of antisemitism, debates about immigration in fact had a completely different
effect: Anti-foreigner hostility was either not analysed at all, or explained in
reference to the Holocaust by using concepts of antisemitism.
3.2.6 Approaches to anti-foreigner hostility in the 1960s
and 1970s
Although there are some similarities between debates about minorities in Ger-
many and Britain in the 1960s and 1970s, there was nevertheless a completely
different understanding of minority-majority relationships in Germany, which
also had profound effects on theorisations of antisemitism. This is best exem-
plified in the situation of the ‘guestworkers’, who came to Germany in the 1950s
and 1960s. The largest presence of ethnic minorities in Germany today grew
out of labour migration in the 1950s and 1960s. In order to recruit workers for
Germany, the German government concluded recruitment-treaties with Italy
in 1955, Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia
174Ibid, p. 82.
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in 1965 and Yugoslavia in 1968.175 This labour migration was understood as
a temporary economic measure. The “guestworkers” were mostly male, un-
skilled and semi-skilled workers that were expected to move home after a short
time of employment in Germany. They lived in designated housing and were
excluded from social services. However, the economic conditions in Germany
motivated many workers to stay, despite the recruitment halt in 1973, and to
make use of their right to family-reunification, granted by the German state.176
A temporary economic measure thus became an immigration reality that was
for a long time denied by the state. However, the workers who decided they
would stay still preserved the ‘myth of return’ in their minds, even though
they decided to let their families join them in Germany.177 Most of those who
decided to settle in Germany were Turks, so that they make up the majority
of non-Germans in Germany today.178
For the ‘guestworkers’, integration into German society was never intended
and was thus not institutionalised. The legal status of the ‘guestworker’ was
determined by a law dating back to 1938, which determines that foreigners
working in Germany were contract labour without freedom of movement or
residency rights. A new Ausla¨ndergesetz (alien law) in 1965 did not change this
principle, but was vague enough to allow de-facto settlement. Eva Kolinsky
points out that “despite the de-facto emergence of a resident non-German mi-
nority, German policy makers and German society continue to look for means
of preventing or obstructing settlement and, of course, curtailing or prohibiting
new arrivals”.179 This is exemplified in the family unification principle, under
which family members are only allowed to seek employment after 4 years of
175See Sen, Faruk and Aydin, Hayrettin: Islam in Deutschland, Mu¨nchen: C.H.Beck 2002,
p. 11.
176See Freyer Stowasser, Barbara (2002): The Turks in Germany: From Sojourners to Cit-
izens, in: Yazbeck Haddad, Yvonne (ed.): Muslims in the West - From Sojourners to
Citizens, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002, pp. 52-71, here p. 55.
177Sen and Aydin: Islam in Deutschland, p.12.
178See Kolinsky, Eva: Non-German Minorities in German Society, in: Kolinsky, Eva and
Horrocks, David (eds.): Turkish Culture in German Society Today, Oxford: Berghahn
1996, pp. 71-112, p. 83.
179Ibid, p. 87-90.
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settlement, which led to economic disadvantagement among these migrants.180
Because Germany did not consider itself a country of immigration, foreign
workers could hardly apply for citizenship. This understanding of German
nationhood originates from before the development of Germany as a nation-
state when the “prepolitical German nation, this nation in search of a state,
was conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic
cultural, linguistic, or racial community - as an irreducibly particular Volks-
gemeinschaft. On this understanding, nationhood is an ethnocultural, not a
political fact.”181 Rogers Brubaker has pointed out that thus, “the German def-
inition of citizenry is a community of descent, restrictive toward non-German
immigrants yet remarkably expansive toward ethnic Germans from eastern Eu-
rope and the Soviet Union, reflects the pronounced ethnocultural inflection in
German self-understanding.”182 Although it might have been expected that the
vo¨lkisch ideology and German understanding as an ethnocultural nation was
discredited after 1945, instead ”the peculiar circumstances of the immediate
post-war period - the total collapse of the state, the massive expulsion of ethnic
Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the imposed division
of Germany - reinforced and powerfully relegitimated that self-understanding”
and “with the unconditional surrender and total collapse in 1945, Germany be-
came again what it had been before unification: a nation without a state”.183
The postwar reconstruction of citizenship in conjunction with the establish-
ment of the FDR in fact reflected this self-understanding as a nation without
a state.184 This understanding of nationhood has greatly affected migrants in
Germany and is one of the reasons why initially, the German state did very
little to recognise, let alone meet, the educational, cultural, or religious needs
of this largely male Muslim population.185 However, after the recruitment halt
180Ibid.
181Brubaker, Rogers: Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge Mass:
Harvard University Press 1992, p. 1.
182Ibid, p. 14.
183Ibid, p.168.
184See bid, p. 169.
185See Fetzer and Soper: Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany, p. 101.
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in 1973 the growing population of migrant workers and their families became
de facto residents who had housing, educational, social welfare, and religious
needs that had to be met, needs that had essentially been ignored under the
guestworker regime.186
As discussed above, the German state did little to accommodate the ‘guest-
workers’ and meet their needs, who were in fact mostly Muslim. There were
for example only very few mosques in Germany at the time of labour migra-
tion - most of them constructed with funds from Middle Eastern countries -
and Turks used rooms in their hostels or factories for daily prayers.187 Later,
disused factories were used as mosques and over time purpose-built mosques
became more numerous, but not without meeting hostility from local German
neighbours who feared that they would “turn the surrounding district into a
Turkish ghetto, create parking problems, inconvenience non-Muslim residents,
spoil the architectural ambience of a town or neighbourhood, and encourage
the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Germany”.188
Turks were also among the most despised minority groups in Germany. They
encountered institutional discrimination, but the negative perception of Turks
was part of mainstream German discourse. ‘Guestworkers’, but especially
Turks were perceived as alien invaders. In 1973 the title story in Der Spiegel
for example read “The Turks are coming - every man for himself”189 in re-
lation to the metaphor of ’drowning in immigrants’. The article dealt with
Turkish immigration and the living conditions of Turks in Germany and in it
took the position that Turkish immigration leads to an uncontrollable crisis in
metropolitan areas. The “invasion” of Turkish immigrants into once neat and
tidy, if poor, areas, would ultimately lead to “decay, crime and impoverish-
ment like in Harlem”, according to the article. Describing changes in Berlin
Kreuzberg, the article pointed out that where one once was able to breathe
186See Ibid., p.102.
187See Karakasoglu, Yasemin: Turkish Cultural Orientations in Germany and the Role of
Islam, in: Kolinsky, Eva and Horrocks, David (eds.): Turkish Culture in German Society
Today, Oxford: Berghahn 1996, pp.157-179,:, p. 160.
188Ibid, p. 160.
189“Die Tu¨rken kommen - rette sich wer kann”, in: Der Spiegel No. 81 1973, pp. 24-34.
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“Berlin air”, now “women stroll in harem trousers”, “the vegetable display is
lately of colourful opulence, in front of the butcher’s shop hang gutted muttons,
and little Turkish flags with half moon and star everywhere show that here,
Kreuzberg is Kleen-Smyrna”. The language of the article was surprisingly war-
related. Turkish immigrants were “invading” Germany, building “fortresses”
in formerly German apartment buildings and recruiting new “brigades” from
the home country.
Surveys conducted in the 1970s and 1980s showed hostility towards non-
German workers increased dramatically over time, while 39 per cent of Ger-
mans favoured the view that guest workers should return to their home country
in 1978, this figure grew to 80 per cent in 1983, in conjunction with the per-
ception of the increasingly unstable status of German economy.190
Even though this article reflected public opinion, there were initially no at-
tempts to address these attitudes in the form of anti-racist measures. There
were no anti-discrimination laws in Germany that matched their British coun-
terparts. However, after the recruitment of workers and their subsequent settle-
ment in Germany turned into a reality, the ‘guestworker question’ or ‘foreigner
question’ nevertheless became a topic in public and political debates as well
as academic research. This situation was exacerbated when by the 1970s, the
debates around the ‘guestworkers’ were increasingly led by newly formed or
revived right-wing initiatives. Initiatives and groups like the ‘Deutsche Volks-
union’, founded in 1971, were openly hostile to ‘foreigners’ and actively took
part in the public discussions. Their ideas about German society were inspired
by ‘vo¨lkisch’ thought and related to Nazi ideology.
However, there were initially no attempts to assess and criticise the way
in which ‘guestworkers’ were perceived and portrayed in German society and
public discourse. The empirical studies rather made ‘guestworkers’ the object
of their research. It was therefore less the attitudes towards guest workers that
were investigated, or their stereotypical representation, but more the migra-
tion patterns, social status and situation of guest workers in Germany. These
190See Just, Wolf-Dieter and P.C. Mu¨hlens: Ausla¨nderzunahme: Objektives Problem oder
Einstellungsfrage? In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Vol 25, 1982, pp. 35-38.
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studies were often sympathetic of guest workers in the sense that they did
not portray them in a negative way, but with sympathy. In his 1971 study
on Guestworkers as a European problem Helmut Schrettenbrunner for exam-
ple described the situation in the home countries of the workers as appalling
and desolate, and portrayed their wish for economic migration as understand-
able.191 The ’guestworkers’ in his study were portrayed as victims of economic
exploitation, both in their home country as well as in Germany. The workers
themselves, however, were not given a voice, but represented as passive, weak
and vulnerable. Although his study did not intend to portray ‘guestworkers’
in a hostile way, his way of representing them was in fact stereotypical and
strengthened common perceptions of ‘guestworkers’.
This was reflected in German culture as well: minorities were not given a
voice, but were portrayed as victims without agency. The most prominent
example for this were the films of Rainer Werner Fassbinder. Fassbinder was
seen as a left-liberal artist whose films and plays were understood as sympa-
thetic with social outsiders and, a rarity in German culture, with immigrants.
In his earlier film Katzelmacher (1969), for example, Fassbinder explored the
dynamics of a group of people when a Greek immigrant enters their life. His
internationally acclaimed 1974 film Ali: Fear eats the soul dealt with the re-
actions towards a relationship between young Moroccan guest worker Ali and
older German widow Emmi and the psychological and physical effects this has
on Ali.
In contrast to antisemitism research, in which prejudice was automatically
assumed to be irrational and not based on real experience, one topic of social
research at the time was the question whether the negative perception of for-
eigners in Germany was legitimate or prejudiced. The result was often that
although there was prejudice, this was not completely illegitimate, as there
were in fact many criminal ‘foreigners’. Most studies of the time were char-
acterised by the viewpoint that these attitudes were more or less related to
191See Schrettenbrunner, Helmut: Gastarbeiter, ein europa¨isches Problem aus der Sicht
der Herkunftsla¨nder und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag
Moritz Diesterweg, 1971, pp. 65 ff.
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either natural tensions between ‘ethnic groups’ or legitimate economic anxi-
eties among Germans.192 In this regard these studies were similar to British
studies on immigration during the same period, which dealt with the issue of
immigration in a framework of ‘race relations’ and ‘ethnic tensions’. In con-
trast to Britain, however, there was no wider critical assessment of the context
of the treatment of ‘foreigners’ in German society. Moreover, the treatment of
‘foreigners’ was far from being conceptualised as racism.
Rita Chin has argued that this was because the Nazi legacy altered the ways
in which foreign labour recruitment could be understood. She stressed that
“because race had served as a primary mode of social distinction during the
Nazi period, a form of categorization that determined whether a person was
valued by the state or marked for destruction, one of the implicit imperatives
for the reconstruction of a more fully democratic West German society was
to make the question of race a nonissue”.193 While there was thus a reality
of racialist thinking and ideologies, neither policy makers nor scholars of the
subject addressed the issue as racism.
One exception was the study of Ernst Klee, who documented the concrete
living and working situations of ‘guestworkers’ in Europe and came to the
conclusion that they were treated as modern slaves, like African-Americans had
been treated during slavery.194 Klee acknowledged that forms of racism existed
in post-war Germany, but saw it as an import of the forms of discrimination
against African-Americans in the United States. But his interpretation was
hardly a reflection of mainstream public discourse.
But when assessing the absence of analyses and approaches to racism in
Germany in light of foreign labour recruitment, one important aspect is over-
looked: the reason that those who studied the subject did not locate it within
a racialisation framework was not that race as a category had become taboo,
or at least not only that. The more important reason was that those who saw
192See Just and Mu¨hlens: Ausla¨nderzunahme, S. 35-38.
193Chin, Rita: Guest Worker Migration and the Unexpected Return of Race, p. 80 f.
194See Klee, Ernst: Die Nigger Europas: zur Lage der Gastarbeiter: eine Dokumentation,
Du¨sseldorf: Patmos Verlag 1971, p. 31.
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anti-foreigner hostility in reference to the Holocaust and as a continuation of
Nazi ideology did not understand this ideology only as ‘racism’, but as an ide-
ology of which ‘race’ was just one aspect. There were trends towards a study of
prejudice, rather than a study of ’race relations’. Because antisemitism was not
understood as racism, anti-foreigner hostilities were not understood as racism
either. Adorno’s view on the subject was that antisemitism was structurally
equal to other forms of ethnocentric reaction, for example, as he put it, prej-
udice against ‘Negroes’.195 There was thus another important development in
approaches to anti-foreigner hostilities, which was directly related to the ways
in which antisemitism was understood. In this sense, anti-foreigner resent-
ments were interpreted in the context of post-Holocaust Germany and seen as
a continuation of Nazi ideology. This was the premise of Peter Scho¨nbach’s
social-psychological study on the different effects between the usage of the term
‘guestworker’ and ‘foreign worker’ in everyday language. The study came to
the conclusion that Germans usually associate non-German workers with nega-
tive images, but that this effect is stronger when talking about ‘foreign workers’
than when talking about ‘guest workers’.196 The theoretical understanding of
the study was that the increased ability to use words affected the ability to be
flexible with associations and therefore be less prejudiced. The study’s main
finding was that that stereotypical associations appeared more often in less
educated persons.197 Although the study was not directly undertaken with
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer at the Institut fu¨r Sozialforschung in
Frankfurt, Scho¨nbach mentioned their support in his foreword.198 His theoreti-
cal approach was influenced by the idea that during National Socialism, or even
earlier than that, the German language changed in a way that now determines
how Germans think and behave towards people and things.199 In contrast to
195see Adorno: Zur Beka¨mpfung des Antisemitismus heute, p. 122.
196See Scho¨nbach, Peter: Sprache und Attitu¨den: U¨ber den Einfluss der Bezeichnungen
‘Fremdarbeiter’ und ‘Gastarbeiter’ auf Einstellungen gegenu¨ber ausla¨ndischen Arbeitern,
Stuttgart: Verlag Hans Huber Bern, 1970, pp.71 ff.
197Ibid, p. 81ff, 105 ff.
198Ibid, p. 7ff.
199Ibid, p. 9ff.
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most studies on ‘guestworkers’ in Germany at the time, Scho¨nbach’s work was
one of the few that hinted at a continuation of Nazi ideology, in this case trace-
able in language, in reference to the treatment and perception of ‘foreigners’
in post-war Germany.
The relation between education and stereotypes remained a topic for social
psychologists, as did the equation of antisemitism with other forms of preju-
dice. This became evident in Peter Scho¨nbach’s later study on the relationship
between education and intergroup attitudes. Building on his earlier study of
the linguistic effects of using the terms ‘Gastarbeiter’ and ‘Fremdarbeiter’,
Scho¨nbach further explored his earlier hypothesis that individuals with lower
education are more inclined to stereotypical attitudes than those who are well
educated.200
Although Scho¨nbach focussed on Gastarbeiter ethnicities in Germany - Ital-
ians, Greeks and Turks - he did not differentiate between stereotypes about
different ethnic groups, but subsumed these under a general category of inter-
group relations. He used the same methods other studies have used to identify
attitudes towards Jews and what he called ‘Negroes’ in the United States.201
He came to the conclusion that “low or vulnerable self-esteem and a lack of
other bases for a positively valued social identity among many persons with
low educational status may create a specific need for national identity and
differentiation in these persons. [...] Negative attitudes towards other nations
or ethnic groups would not only be a consequence of such a need but a consti-
tutive component of a social identity thus achieved”.202 He further found that
higher education led to “a more complex and flexible cognitive or associative
disposition of a general nature that frequently facilitates, among other things,
the development and maintenance of comparatively unstereotyped attitudes
200See Scho¨nbach, Peter; Gollwitzer, Peter; Stiepel, Gerd and Wagner, Ulrich: Education
and Intergroup Attitudes, London and New York: Academic Press 1981; see also Tajfel,
H. (ed.): Differentiation between social groups. Studies in the social psychology of
intergroup relations. London and New YorK: Academic Press 1978.
201Ibid, pp. 19-20.
202Ibid, p. 173.
136
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany
towards various outgroups.”203
It is noteworthy that Scho¨nbach did not understand hostility against ‘for-
eigners’ in terms of racism, but in terms of prejudice. As later chapters will
show, prejudice research became one of the most important approaches to
antisemitism in Germany. From its inception, this kind of research did not
emphasise the particularity of antisemitism, but drew on what were thought
to be the common aspects of all types of prejudice. Perhaps unintentionally,
this opened up the possibility of marginalising antisemitism by reducing it to
merely a variant of other forms of prejudice.
One result of this was a difficulty to adequately analyse either antisemitism
or anti-foreigner hostility. This became apparent in instances in which the
image of Jewish suffering during the Holocaust was used to draw comparisons
with other victims in other contexts. At the time, Leftists for example used
the image of Jews during the Holocaust to demand attention for the plight of
guestworkers in Germany. On a provocative political poster by Klaus Staeck
in 1974, for example, one can see two obviously non-German workers emptying
German trash who have a Star of David superimposed on their shirt pockets.204
However, these kind of comparisons must be understood in the context of the
Left’s focus on anti-fascism rather than anti-racism. In that sense, the poster
did not mean to say that Turks or Muslims are exactly like Jews, but that Ger-
man fascism extends into the Federal Republic and victimises immigrants. In
line with what was discussed earlier, the perspective of the poster was not that
of immigrants, but that of Germans. The poster was thus neither about Jews,
nor about Turks, but about a particular way of interpreting the German past
in relationship to the present. In doing so, the poster managed to marginalise
both antisemitism and anti-foreigner hostility. The Holocaust was reduced to
only a reference. As such, this poster is an example for the phenomenon that
neither Germany’s past, nor Germany’s present were adequately dealt with.
203Ibid.
204See Klaus Staeck and Dieter Adelmann (1976): Die Kunst findet nicht im Saale stat:
Politische Plakate, Rheinbeck bei Hamburg: Rohwohlt., cited in Adelson, Touching Tales,
p. 109.
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3.2.7 Understanding antisemitism differently: Britain and
Germany in comparison
In both Britain and Germany, the period between the 1960s and late 1970s
was characteristic of a marginalisation of contemporary antisemitism. How-
ever, there were different reasons for this. On the one hand, German society
and German scholarship largely denied a continuation of antisemitism after
1945. On the other hand, major theoretical developments were undertaken by
German-Jewish emigre´s, who saw little difference between the structures of
Nazi antisemitism and later expressions of antisemitism. In Britain, in con-
trast, there was a complete lack of theoretical approaches to antisemitism that
did not downplay or marginalise it.
In this context the surprising development is not that antisemitism in Ger-
many was understood in light of the Holocaust, which overshadowed every
aspect of post-war German identity, but that in Britain, it was not under-
stood in light of the Holocaust. This goes beyond the fact that the Holocaust
did not happen in Britain. There is a striking absence of the Holocaust and
Nazi antisemitism as an analytical reference in British antisemitism theories
up to the late 1970s. Rather than develop broader social theories, antisemitism
researchers looked at specific periods and concrete interactions between Jews
and non-Jews in British history, and through their methods reproduced the
common assumption that prejudice only arose out of social interaction. If there
was any antisemitism at all, according to these researchers, it was the result
of antagonistic Jewish behaviour.
Although this changed somewhat, as the next chapter will show, from the
end of the 1970s onwards, the theoretical and methodological development
with regard to the study of antisemitism took almost exactly opposite paths
in Britain and Germany. While in Germany, theories on antisemitism became
a model for interpreting anti-foreigner hostilities, in Britain, racism theories
became a model to interpret hostilities against Jews. Coupled with the under-
lying timid mentality of the Jewish community - and no one else took interest
in antisemitism - this led to a serious marginalisation of antisemitism as merely
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a side issue of racism, and, as the next chapter will show, this had significant
repercussions for later research on the topic in Britain.
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Explaining past and present
antisemitism: The big debates of
the 1980s
The previous chapter dealt with influences on contemporary antisemitism the-
ories in the context of the arrival of immigrants from the 1950s onwards
and showed how these differed between Britain and Germany. Building on
that, this chapter provides an analysis of debates about racism and minority-
majority relations in the 1980s and evaluates how these have influenced anti-
semitism theories in a comparative perspective. In Britain, antisemitism was
understood through a prism of these immigration debates as well as debates
about Zionism and colonialism, which led to a neglect of any conceptualisa-
tions of antisemitism. This stood in stark contrast to ongoing debates about
anti-Muslim sentiments in particular, which provided early grounds for com-
parisons between past Jews and present Muslims. In Germany, antisemitism
theories continued to serve as a tool to understand and explain general anti-
immigrant sentiments. However, dominant explanations for antisemitism also
excluded its particular Jewish dimension.
4.1 Britain: Racism, minority recognition and the
double squeeze on antisemitism theories
When analysing theoretical approaches to antisemitism in the 1980s, it not only
becomes apparent that there were almost none, but that those who argued for
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their formulation were often silenced. On the one hand, this was due to the fact
that the Jewish community did not endorse a public fight against antisemitism,
but remained rather quiet and promoted assimilation rather than recognition.
This stood in stark contrast to general developments in minority-majority
relationships in Britain and is perhaps most notably reflected in the debates
about the position of Muslims in British society. The relationship between
Muslim minority and British majority society was shaped by ‘milestones’ like
the Rushdie affair, during which Muslims voiced their concerns and demanded
that their needs are met. Not only did these debates lead to a rethinking
of minority-majority relationships in Britain in general, which eventually also
had an effect on Jews, but evaluations of anti-Muslim sentiment that emerged
out of these debates led to early comparisons between past Jews and present
Muslims. However, at the time, these did not lead to serious conceptualisations
of antisemitism.
On the other hand this was due to the fact that racism theories did not
include Jews and antisemitism, but were formulated with recent immigration
to Britain as well as Britain’s relationship to the Colonies in mind. What
proved additionally difficult was the fact that Zionism became a major topic
in debates about racism, so much that any opposition to anti-Zionism within
an anti-racist position became almost impossible.
4.1.1 From interactionist to critical racism theories
In a sense, the political background in Britain at the time was similar to that
in Germany, which is discussed below. There was a rebirth of conservative
ideology that culminated in the election of Margaret Thatcher as prime min-
ister in 1979. The Holocaust became a topic in culture and media, too, but
discussions about how to relate to the past did not have the same function for
national identity as in Germany. For Britain, this central issue proved to be
the perceived differences between ‘race’ and ‘culture’ and how they could be
dealt with. And while similar arguments about the inherent difference of for-
eigners were made in Germany at the time, there was only peripheral research
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into the topic and not, as in Britain, any form of established critical analyses
of the way ‘race’ was understood in British society.
From the 1980s the assessment and policing of ‘racial tensions’ in the UK
changed. The Scarman report, commissioned by the Home Office following
the 1981 Brixton riots, found that ‘racial’ disadvantage and prejudice was
a serious threat to community cohesion in Britain and suggested that the
problem be addressed immediately. The report marked a shift of focus from
‘race relations’ to ‘community relations’ and multiculturalism. The basic idea
of this multiculturalism was that “integration rests on the assumption that a
process is to be created and governed between distinct but equivalent groups
whose identity is to be defined by ‘culture’ rather than ‘race”’.1 Nevertheless,
Paul Ward points out that “in the 1980s there was a strong element within
Conservatism of seeking to maintain an exclusive sense of British national
identity”.2 This can be seen in the tightening of immigration controls on
racial lines. In addition, multiculturalism was largely based on decentralised
policies of local governments rather than national policy.
David Feldman, however, has argued that multiculturalism has a longer
history and a stronger grounding in British history than previously thought.
He stressed that “policies which sanctioned cultural pluralism predate the drive
to multiculturalism in the 1980s”.3 He added that this was also true under the
Conservative government. “There were majoritarian initiatives in the Thatcher
years but their success was qualified by the persistence of pluralism”.4 He came
to the conclusion that in Britain, there was a “long history of pluralist solutions
to the problem of reconciling different cultural communities within one single
polity.”5
1Brighton, Shane: British Muslims, multiculturalism and UK foreign policy: ‘integration’
and ‘cohesion’ in and beyond the state, in: International Affairs 83, No. 1, 2007, pp.1-17,
here p. 6.
2Ward, Paul: Britishness since 1870, p.128.
3Feldman, David: Why the English like turbans, Multicultural politics in British history, in:
Feldman, David and Lawrence, Jon (eds.): Structures and Transformations in Modern
British History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011, pp. 281-302, here p. 295.
4Ibid, p. 297.
5Ibid, p. 299f.
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From the 1980s, local administrations implemented multicultural policies,
promoting the existence of various ‘ethnicities’. However, multiculturalism
in Britain was not a single policy, but rather a multifaceted conglomerate of
different national and local policies. Nevertheless, these new policies were both
informed by, and influenced, theories about racism in British society.
4.1.2 Developments in racism research
Racism researchers in fact soon pointed out that this insistence on cultural
difference was a new form of racism. Martin Barker for example stressed that
although Conservatives did not claim that any culture was superior to another,
there was still the idea that it was part of human nature to form distinct
communities. The ‘British’ way of life and ‘British’ traditions were thus seen
as having to be defended not against a perceived inferiority of immigrants but
against their cultural difference. This ‘new racism’ used notions of culture and
nation instead of pseudo-biological traits to differentiate groups and construct
a sense of Britishness.6
A concept of ‘cultural racism’ proved to be a major influence on conceptual-
isations of antisemitism in the 1990s, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
In order to explain this process, however, further developments have to be
taken into account. As mentioned in the previous chapter, at the end of the
1970s, racism research began to move away from theories of ‘race relations’ and
towards a more critical engagement with racist ideology. The Empire strikes
back, a publication by the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, was in
a sense a neo-Marxist response to the interactionist and immigrant-blaming
racism theories of the 1960s and 1970s. The authors argued that there are
links between racism and capitalist development, but also that racism was
intricately linked to imperialist ideology.
The authors stressed that
“Racism as it exists and functions today cannot be treated simply
6See Barker, Martin: The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe,
London: Junction Books, 1980, pp. 21-24.
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from a sociological perspective: it has to be located historically
and in terms of the wider structures and relations of British so-
ciety. The historical roots of racist practices within the British
state, the British dominant classes, and the ‘British’ working class,
go deep and cannot be reduced to simple ideological phenomena.
They have been conditioned, if not determined, by the historical
development of colonial societies which was central to the reproduc-
tion of British imperialism. This process generated a specific type
of ‘nationalism’ pertinent in the formation of British classes long
before the ’immigration’ issue became a central aspect of political
discourse.”7
In their assessment of racism in the 1970s, the authors argued that “the
construction of an authoritarian state in Britain is fundamentally intertwined
with the elaboration of popular racism in the 1970s.”8 They thought that
general developments in policies and economy showed how Britain developed
into an authoritarian state and that there was a general increase in social
control, which also related to racism. The authors wanted to show that the
economic crisis in Britain in the 1970s was also crisis of hegemony and that “its
content is not reducible to a cyclyc economic crisis in the traditional sense, or a
‘crisis of the political system’ in the narrow sense. It consists rather of profound
changes in the balance of forces, in the class struggle and in the configuration
of the class alliances.”9 They further argued that in the sixties the idea of ‘the
enemy within’ developed, rather than a model of subversion from without,
which had effects on how black people were perceived. Although this is not
exactly correct, as the idea of an enemy within was present in earlier anti-alien
resentments in British society as well, the authors rightly stressed that in this
7Solomos, John, Bob Findlay, Simon Jones and Paul Gilroy: The organic crisis of British
capitalism and race: the experience of the seventies, in: Centre for Contemporary Cul-
tural Studies (ed.): The Empire Strikes Back, London: Hutchinson 1982, pp. 9-47, here
p.11.
8Ibid, p. 9.
9Ibid, p. 19.
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context, race is a central issue. They showed that in the 1970s, there was the
idea that blacks as enemies within are undermining the structures of society
and that racial violence was a result of alien presence. But not only were blacks
blamed for specific problems, there had also been a reworking of the concepts
of ‘nation’ and ‘citizen’, which “deny even the possibility that black people
can share the native population’s attachment to the national culture.”10
Although these racism theories were progressive, Jews and antisemitism were
absent from them. As Michael Billig pointed out in his analysis of anti-Jewish
themes on the British left at the time, these neo-Marxist racism theories had
a very particular understanding of who can be a victim of racism. Jews were
in fact completely omitted as a minority suffering from racism.11
Nevertheless, from the late 1970s and early 1980s these neo-Marxist ap-
proaches changed the way racism, and eventually also antisemitism, was anal-
ysed. Instead of focussing on minority majority relations, they investigated
race, power relations and political structures. The most significant publica-
tions were Policing the Crisis in 1978 and, as mentioned, The Empire Strikes
Back in 1982 by a group of academics at the Birmingham Centre for Contem-
porary Cultural Studies (CCCS), among them Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy.12
As Geoff Eley has pointed out, these studies analysed the racial ideology that
characterised British politics, but they saw racism through a prism of class:
for them, ‘race relations’ were ‘class relations’.13
Nevertheless, they changed the way racism was thought about. A number
of studies dealt with the issue of migrant labour from this perspective.14 John
10Ibid, p.29.
11See Billig, Michael: Anti-Jewish Themes and the British Far Left I, in: Patterns of
Prejudice, Vol 18, No 1, 1984, pp. 3-17.
12See also Gilroy’s later publication Gilroy, Paul: There ain’t no Black in the Union Jack,
the cultural politics of race and nation, London: Hutchinson 1987.
13See Eley, Geoff: The Trouble with ‘Race’: Migrancy, Cultural Difference, and the Remak-
ing of Europe, in: Chin, Rita; Fehrenbach, Heide; Eley, Geoff and Grossmann, Atina:
After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe, Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press: 2009, pp. 137 - 181, here p. 163.
14See Phizacklea, Anni and Robert Miles: Labour and Racism, London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul 1980; Cross, M.: Migrant workers in European Cities: Concentration, Con-
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Solomos also pointed out the more serious studies on political mobilisation
and participation since the early 1990s. He emphasised that “such research
situates race and racism within a specifically political analysis of power and
considers how the latter reproduces ethnoracial domination in particular so-
cieties”.15 Other studies focussed on race within political parties,16 race in
electoral politics 17 and growth of racist movements18. From the 1990s, there
have also been studies on Muslim recognition and participation in particular.19
Race, class and rethinking antisemitism
When analysing these approaches to racism in detail, it is striking that only
casual reference, if any, was made to Jews and antisemitism. On a theoretical
level, Robert Miles criticised Banton and Rex’s earlier theories for approaching
‘race’ instead of racism. He argued that physical differences do not have a social
meaning, but that “the significance of, for example, skin colour arises from the
meaning that is given to it by the people”.20 Miles criticised ‘race relations’
as an object of study because it operates within the structures that should
actually be critiqued. Within this approach, he argued, ‘race’ is reified.
Miles was also against the idea that the ideology of racism was formulated
by colonialists in order to justify processes of slavery and exploitation.21 He
contested that racism is a simple and direct consequence of the development of
flict and Social Policy, London: Social Science Research Council Research Unit on Ethnic
Relations 1983; Ardill, Noni and Nigel Cross: Undocumented lives: Britain’s unautho-
rised migrant workers, London: Runnymede Trust 1988.
15Solomos: Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain, p. 23.
16See Solomos, John and Les Back: Race, Politics and Social Change, London: Routledge
1995.
17See Saggar, Shamit (ed): Race and British electoral politics, London: UCL Press 1998.
18See Cheles, Luciano et al: Neo-fascism in Europe, London: Longman 1991.
19See Modood, Tariq et al: Ethnic Minorities in Britain, diversity and disadvantage, London:
Policy Studies Institute, 1997; Nielsen, Jorgen: Islam, Muslims and British local and
central government, CSIC Research Papers 6, Birmingham, Centre for the Study of
Islam and Christian-Muslim relations, 1992.
20Miles, Robert: Racism and Migrant Labour, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1982,
p. 19.
21Ibid, p. 98.
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capitalism and that the history of colonialism was the most important factor in
the genesis of racism in England. This explanation, as he pointed out, would for
example not explain English antisemitism.22 Instead, he wanted to emphasise
that “racism is generated and reproduced as a real, lived phenomenon and is
not simply (...) an ideological imposition of and by the ruling class (...) in the
logical pursuit of its economic interests”.23 In his study on racism and labour
migration, Miles investigated the migration of the Irish and the discrimination
against them in the nineteenth century. He used this example of a racialised
’white’ group to emphasise how ’race’ is a construct, not a biological reality.24
He concluded that “the process of racialisation is operating in Britain to
assist both the reproduction of fractions of the working class and the structur-
ing of the formation of a new reserve army of labour”.25 He argues that the
social relations that exist between migrants and majority society are in fact
class relations that are only constructed as ’race relations’.
As a theoretical basis for his studies, Miles was interested in establishing
a concept of racism which would identify what many different instances of
racism have in common qua racism but additionally acknowledging the speci-
ficity of each case. For him, the concept of racism refers to an ideological
phenomenon, in particular “to a process of categorisation, a representational
process of defining an Other”.26 This categorisation can relate to visible so-
matic features like skin colour, but can also relate to non-visible allegedly
biological features. Meaning is then attributed to these features. This pro-
cess of ‘racialisation’ leads to racism, when these features are then evaluated
negatively. Miles pointed out that this process of ‘racialisation’ also affects po-
litical institutions and processes, meaning that that participation and power
are structured by the meanings attributed to ‘race’. This establishes an ‘in-
stitutional racism’, which occurs when “racism is embodied in exclusionary
22Ibid, p. 100.
23Ibid, p. 103.
24See ibid, pp. 121ff.
25Ibid, p. 180.
26Miles, Robert: Racism, London 1989, p. 75.
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practices”.27
He also emphasised that racism can occur as a relatively coherent theory,
but that “it also appears in the form of a less coherent assembly of stereotypes,
images, attributions, and explanations which are constructed and employed to
negotiate everyday life”. 28 Its ideological articulation, he argued, is also often
connected to the ideologies of sexism and nationalism.29
Miles therefore made a case for analysing racism not only as textual or as a
doctrine, but as a social and political relation. He emphasised that manifes-
tations of racism are not historically random but rather that “any instance of
racism will be the product of both a reworking of at least some of the substance
of earlier instances, and a creation of novel elements”. 30
Miles’ approach is a sophisticated theorisation and analysis of processes of
‘racialisation’ and could be applied to various forms of prejudice and resent-
ments. Although racism theories based on class did not include an analysis
of antisemitism, they proved influential on the ways antisemitism in British
history was thought about.
From the point of view of antisemitism researchers, it was evident that there
was a form of collective blindness to antisemitism in any form in British racism
studies. Hostility to Jews was not considered relevant. To counteract this gap
and emphasise the importance of the issue, approaches to antisemitism soon
copied the new methods and concepts from racism studies and moved away
from interactionist theories and towards an analysis of the relationship between
society, class, and hostility against Jews in British history. The results were
radically different to earlier studies on antisemitism and completely changed
the previously upheld image of a liberal and tolerant Britain. In his study on
Manchester Jewry, Bill Williams pointed out that it was a tradition of English
liberalism that reproduced antisemitism. He described how the ‘liberal con-
tract’ marked out the terms of an alliance of convenience between a Jewish and
a gentile middle-class. It was strictly functional in character as it gave room to
27Ibid, p. 87.
28Ibid, p. 79.
29Ibid, p.87.
30Ibid, p. 84.
148
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s
Jewish middle-class enterprise, but was in effect only superficial, because “it
muted the open expression of anti-Jewish prejudice (...) but could not guar-
antee (...) the validation of the Jewish identity per se or the demise of older
anti-Semitic traditions, which continued to travel freely along the informal
channels of communication and which were readily absorbed into the pages of
the new literary press and into early debates centring on the desirability of the
immigrant Jewish poor”.31
Williams’ study proved to be the beginning of a new era in antisemitism re-
search. Historians began to assess antisemitism in British history in ways that
included theories on the formation of British national identity and represen-
tation of Jews. This development took off only from the early 1990s onwards,
and will therefore be discussed in the next chapter. Racism theories at the
time, on the other hand, continued to ‘forget’ Jews in their analyses.
Race and Identity
This was especially the case in those approaches to racism that were not based
on theories of political economy, but stressed the cultural and discursive side
of racism. In this respect, another neo-Marxist approach to understand and
study racism in opposition to earlier approaches to the issue was that of Stuart
Hall and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham.
Stuart Hall stressed the importance of discursive processes in understand-
ing racism. He emphasised that within discourse, identities are constructed
and that these identities can be understood as the product of the marking of
difference and exclusion.
“Above all, and directly contrary to the form in which they are
constantly evoked, identities are constructed through, not outside,
difference. This entails the radically disturbing recognition that it
31Williams, Bill: The Anti-Semitism of Tolerance: Middle-Class Manchester and the Jews
1870-1900, in: Kidd, Alan J. and K. W. Roberts (eds.): City, class and culture, Studies of
social policy and cultural production in Victorian Manchester, Manchester: Manchester
University Press 1985, pp. 74-102, here p. 78.
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is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what is
not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its consti-
tutive outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term - and thus
its ‘identity’ - can be constructed”. 32
This also means that identity constructs a form of closure, an internal ho-
mogeneity. Hall also pointed out, however, that this is a process rather than a
static form, which is why he would prefer the term ‘identification’ over ‘iden-
tity’ to describe this process.
Hall’s point was to describe how representation creates identity as its nega-
tion. A dominant discursive representation of coloured people, for example,
then serves to create a non-Black identity. Hall described how the black expe-
rience in British culture was placed at the margins of this culture “as a set of
quite specific political and cultural practices, which regulated, governed, and
‘normalized’ the representational and discursive spaces of English society”.
Representations thus gain a constitutive role in shaping identities.33
Hall emphasised that in these representations, Blacks have usually been ob-
jects rather than subjects and their experience was simplified and presented
in stereotypical characters. However, he also argued that this hegemonic dis-
course was also the basis for a cultural politics that challenged the dominant
regimes or representation in music, literature and film. He described how this
challenge was designed both to provide access for black artists to the cul-
tural sphere and to contest the forms of representation by providing a positive
black imagery.34 He stressed, however, that there was a shift “in terms of
a change from a struggle over the relations of representation to a politics of
representation itself”.35 It came to be understood that ‘black’ was merely a
politically and culturally constructed category, which did not respond with
32Hall, Stuart: Who needs ‘Identity’?, Introductory chapter in: Hall, Stuart and du Gay,
Paul (eds.): Questions of Cultural Identity, London: Sage Publications 1996, pp. 1- 17,
here p. 4.
33See Hall, Stuart: New Ethnicities, in: Alcoff, Linda and Eduardo Mendieta (eds.): Iden-
tities: Race, Class, Gender and Nationality, Oxford: Blackwell Publ. 2003, pp. 90-95.
34Ibid, p. 90.
35Ibid. p. 91.
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reality or nature. The problem was in fact not whether black people were
presented as good or as bad, but that they were represented as the same. He
pointed out that racism “operates by constructing impassable symbolic bound-
aries between racially constituted categories, and its typically binary system
of representation constantly marks and attempts to fix and naturalize the dif-
ference between belongingness and otherness”.36 This also meant, however,
that anti-racism is often founded on the strategy of ‘reversal and inversion’,
thus also creating difference. In general, representations that are monolithic,
self-contained and stabilized only foster racist structures and it is in fact a
deconstruction of these structures that is required.
This theoretical approach built a basis for studies that dealt with racist dis-
course and representations of ethnic minorities in British culture.37 However,
for the most part, they completely omitted Jews and antisemitism. But this
was not the only particular issue they omitted: in their analysis they usually
subsumed experiences of racism in one category ‘Black’. What soon emerged,
however, was that this was inadequate to describe how racism affected partic-
ular minority communities, not only Jews. This became apparent when in the
1980s, a Muslim struggle for recognition coincided with increasing anti-Muslim
sentiments. The debates that ensued in this context provided early opportuni-
ties to compare Jews and Muslims and proved that general categories of racism
were not always able to enhance the understanding of hostilities against par-
ticular groups.
4.1.3 The Rushdie affair and anti-Muslim resentment
The 1980s marked a significant change in relation to representations of British
Muslim identity as well as the significance of religion in social cohesion. Ansari
pointed out that “the 1980s saw Muslims in Britain struggling for official ac-
knowledgement of religious rights against a backdrop of increasing anti-Muslim
36Ibid, p. 92.
37See for example the chapter on English literature in Roberts, Diane: The myth of Aunt
Jemima: representations of race and region, London: Routledge 1994.
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sentiment”.38
It has to be acknowledged that Muslims have participated in British political
life before the 1980s. Since most Muslims were British citizens, they could
theoretically take part in local and nationwide politics. After having created
organisations in the 1970s to pursue their interests, their agendas widened
after the 1980s but remained on the basis of community organisations. Ansari
showed that Muslim political participation has taken various forms, including
voting, party membership and standing as candidates for election and has
steadily grown since the 1970s.
It has to emphasised, though, that to this day there is no homogeneous
political representation of Muslims in national politics, which is due to the
ethnic differences within the Muslim community. The UMO (Union of Muslim
Organisations of UK and Eire) was established as an umbrella organisation
in 1970, but was relatively unsuccessful in securing changes, UKACIA (UK
Action Committee on Islamic Affairs) was established in 1988, but its author-
ity was soon challenged; the Muslim Parliament, inaugurated in 1992, aimed
at addressing Muslim dissatisfaction with British institutions, but it failed to
mobilise sufficient support among Muslims. The effort to achieve national co-
ordination through establishing an organisation that was not closely aligned to
any particular tradition and working within British mainstream politics led to
the founding of the Muslim Council of Britain in 1996. However, although it
may have been the most successful attempt to establish organisational unity,
it cannot be considered to represent the whole of the Muslim community in
Britain.39 In addition, economic deprivation and social exclusion has caused
some British Muslims to regard mainstream politics as ideological betrayal
and an attempt of cultural homogenisation. Nevertheless, Ansari concludes,
younger generations of Muslims have been engaging with British culture, pol-
itics, educational institutions and the media to a higher degree than their
parents.40
38Ansari, The Infidel Within, p.232.
39Ibid., pp. 360-365.
40Ibid, p.237ff.
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The question of Muslim participation in political life is tied to their struggle
for public recognition of their religion. Parveen Akhtar has noted that there
was a form of Islamic regeneration among British Muslims in light of the
hostility they faced and that this return to religion “offers individuals who feel
in some way constrained by their circumstances and alternative ideology, a
sense of belonging, solidarity, and a means of political mobilisation”.41 This
return to religion was perhaps similar to that of young German Muslims who
found a sense of identity in Islam, as we shall later see.
Given the complex character the Muslim communities have in Britain, it
is still unclear “to what degree Islam has influenced the configuration of the
British Muslim population and how significant religion has been in the rapidly
changing realities it has experienced since 1945.”42 Nevertheless, Muslims have
interacted with British society as Muslims and fought for recognition as such,
even if perhaps not exclusively as Muslims. Unlike for Jews, British Muslims
were faced with a completely new situation when settling in Britain: living
as Muslims an a society with a large non-Muslim majority, non-Muslim law,
government and institutions. There has been a variety of Muslim reactions to
this, but a number of public debates in the 1980s showed how highly Muslims
valued their religious identity and its official recognition.
This increase of anti-Muslim sentiment was closely connected to major events
taking place in the 1980s, most importantly perhaps the Rushdie affair, which
“in a way eventually concretised the place of Muslims in the public sphere”.43
Just before the Rushdie affair, one of the first ‘milestones’ of anti-Muslim
resentment in British society was the Honeyford affair. The Honeyford Affair
was a scandal that began in March 1984 when an article by Ray Honeyford,
a headteacher in Bradford, on the issue of multi-ethnic education appeared
in the Salisbury Review and triggered a major reaction and received extensive
41Akhtar, Parveen: ’(Re)turn to Religion’ and Radical Islam, in: Abbas, Tahir (ed.): Mus-
lim Britain, Communities under pressure, London and New York: Zed Books 2005,
pp.164-176, here p.165.
42Ansari: The Infidel within, p.166.
43Vertovec, Steven: Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain, p.23.
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media coverage. Honeyford eventually accepted an early retirement settlement
in December 1985, but continued to publish articles on the issue. Honeyford’s
main arguments were that immigrants should adapt to British culture, commit
to British education and practise their culture only privately. He added that
any positive discrimination of minorities would be misguided and that it is not
racism that is holding black children back, but the lack of support from their
parents as well as a lack of ambition. In his later articles, Honeyford’s tone
became increasingly sharper, and he used incidents from his work to support
his arguments. He spoke out against the Council’s multi-cultural policies that
he had to carry out at his school, and mainly criticised the introduction of halal
meat for school dinners, and that Muslim girls were allowed to cover their legs
during PE lessons. He later also mentioned that there is a problem with Asian
children visiting the Indian subcontinent during term times. His articles spoke
of a ‘race relations lobby’ that promotes misguided multi-culturalism.44
The reactions towards Honeyford were diverse. The more conservative press
was in favour of his positions and potrayed him as “the man who dared to
speak his mind” who was being “unreasonably persecuted by leftwingers”.
Leftist publications such as Searchlight accused him of “insulting ethnic mi-
norities through his articles and whipping up the fears of white people, and
had thus proved himself to be unsuitable for the headship of a multi-ethnic
school” . Another viewpoint was that the affair centred around the issue of
free speech and that Honeyford was dismissed for voicing criticism.45 Central
to the Honeyford affair was the question of free speech: were Honeyford’s al-
legations acceptable criticism or did they venture into anti-Muslim prejudice?
For Muslims, this was an opportunity to negotiate recognition as Muslims in
particular, rather than as a ‘black’ minority.
Even more than during the Honeyford affair, this was a central issue during
the Rushdie affair. The Rushdie affair began when in October 1988 the Union
of Muslim organisations in Britain called for the book The Satanic Verses
44See Halstead, Mark: Education, Justice and Cultural Diversity, An examination of the
Honeyford Affair, 1984-1985, London: The Falmer Press 1988, pp. 57-60.
45Ibid, pp. 75-76.
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by British-Indian author Salman Rushdie, that had been published by Viking
Penguin the month before, to be prosecuted. The book, for which Rushdie
later won the Whitbread award and which was shortlisted for the Man Booker
prize, dealt with Indian expatriates in contemporary England, but also con-
tained dream sequences. These dream sequences happened to a potentially
schizophrenic character and are inspired by the life of Mohammed. However,
they were altered in so far as there is doubt whether Mohammed was not in
fact a false prophet and that the Quran not in fact dictated by Satan.
Muslims were concerned about the book because they understood it as an
insult to Mohammed and Islam. The affair took a dramatic turn when in
January 1989, Muslims in Bradford openly burned the book and when in
February 1989 the Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa calling for the execution
of Salman Rushdie. Muslim ambassadors had protested to the Home Office and
asked the UK to change its blasphemy laws. The UK government repeatedly
refused to do this, so that in March 1989, Iran broke diplomatic relations with
the UK.46
Parts of the Muslim Community sought the banning of the book and wrote a
Memorandum of Request to the owners of Penguin Books Ltd, on 29 January
1989, in which they expressed their disappointment that Penguin refused to
apologise and stop publishing the Satanic Verses. Numerous people however
endorsed freedom of speech in light of the controversy: this was for example
expressed in a letter from several authors, published in The Independent on 7
February 1989, which was signed by famous authors like Angela Carter, Harold
Pinter and others. A letter from Diane Abbott, Labour MP for Hackney North
and Stoke Newington, in The Guardian on 16 February 1989 had a similar tone.
There was also a statement by the International committee for the defence of
Salman Rushdie and his publishers, published in the Index on Censorship on
23 February 1989.47
46For a brief overview of the affair and a collection of press cuttings, see: The Rushdie Affair:
A Documentation, Research Papers Muslims in Europe No 42, June 1989, published by
the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Birmingham.
47see ibid p. 8-11.
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Muslims on the other hand pointed out that freedom of speech must end
where deliberate abuse begins, which is how they understood the book. Some
Muslim leaders tried to point out that the issue here is that Muslims in Britain
had been ignored for a long time and that it is time to listen to them. Professor
Bhikhu Parekh, deputy Chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality, crit-
icised the treatment of Muslims in the press in an article in The Independent
on 23 February 1989. He stressed that
“The influence of racism and anti-Muslim feeling should not be
underestimated. The bulk of influential public opinion in Britain
tends to dismiss most Muslims as fundamentalists, and fundamen-
talism as a new form of barbarism. Thus they are infantilised,
ridiculed as illiterate peasants preferring the sleep of superstition
to liberal light, and placed outside the pale of civilised disourse.”
He also pointed out that this ignorance did not occur only during the Rushdie
affair, but that the Press did not listen to Muslims before the book burning
incident either. However, he also criticised the Muslim community for its lack
of leadership and divided loyalties.48
An article by Yasmin Ali in the New Statesman and Society on 17 March
1989 showed that not all Muslims felt hurt by the words of Salman Rushdie,
but that they could in fact relate to his analysis of Muslim identity. In the arti-
cle Ali went on to criticise multiculturalism as it created a form of community
leadership that enabled the continuation of stifling structures of power and au-
thority in Muslim communities and stunted their political development.49 At
the opposite end of the spectrum, some Muslim leaders encouraged fundamen-
talism in the wake of the affair. In an article the Observer on 26 March 1989,
Dr Shabbir Akhtar, member of the Bradford Council of Mosques, reminded
Muslims that:
“For all Muslims, as for pre-Enlightenment Christians, faith should
be an all-or-nothing affair. The reasons are as decisive as they are
48See ibid, p. 15-17.
49Ibid, p. 26-29.
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simple. One cannot properly endorse the authoritative integrity of
a partly fallible scripture. It follows that fundamentalism, far from
being a dead option, actually conceals the only defensible attitude
towards the word of God.”50
Muslim opinions on the matter were obviously varied, but what they showed
was that the issue for them was their religion rather than their ethnicity. Al-
though some Muslims saw the treatment of Muslims during the affair as a form
of racism, for the opponents of the book the issue was not racial stereotype,
but blasphemy.
For critics of Rushdie, freedom of expression should not extend to insults
of religion, and Islam in particular. Nevertheless, in a letter to The Guardian
on 23 January 1989, the Chairman of The Islamic Society for the Promotion
of Religious Tolerance compared what he saw as an insult and abuse that
Muslims had to endure in the pages of Salman Rushdie’s book to antisemitism
in Germany in the 1920s.
“Is this the purpose of freedom of expression? Can you not sympa-
thise with those who are hurt, and who do not have the literary and
publishing powers that lay at the disposal of Mr Rushdie? Would
you not agree that freedom must have its responsibility, and that
misusing the freedom of expression in this way can only backfire in
the long run, like it did in the 1920s when free expression of irre-
sponsible opinion, expressed in the waves of anti-semitic literature,
has cost the lives of such a huge number of Jews as well as Chris-
tians and Muslims? Are we to go the same way again? Are we
to stand for the expression of responsible or irresponsible opinion?
That is the issue at the centre of this controversy.”51
It is noteworthy that he did not compare any form of racist vilification of
Muslims in the press with German antisemitism, but the issue of freedom of
speech and the perceived insult against Islam. The Rushdie affair proved that
50Ibid, pp. 32-33.
51Ibid, p. 4.
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for many Muslims, religion was a more important factor for their identity than
‘race’ or ethnicity.52 However, existing definitions of racism were insufficient
to grasp this particular dimension of what Muslims felt was deeply offensive.
Nevertheless, it soon emerged that Muslims and Islam in particular became
perceived as one of the major threats against British society.
While the Honeyford and Rushdie affairs were important events with re-
gard to recognition of Muslims in the public sphere, the Rushdie affair also
“served as a watershed moment for framing the Muslim ‘other’ as a threat - the
‘stranger within’ and possible ‘fifth column’ under the influence of the Ayatol-
lah Khomeini - framed by the West in the wake of the Islamic Revolution as
the epitome of evil”.53 Research showed that media coverage of the controversy
created an image of Muslims as a homogeneous community, as antimodern and
dangerous to British society and values, both nationalist ideologies as well as
liberal notions about freedom and human rights.54 The same assessment has
been made for media coverage of the Gulf war in the early 1990s, when again
considerable attention was given to British Muslims, and again Muslims were
often portrayed as homogeneously antiwestern, antiliberal and as a threat to
British society.
What was additionally striking was that the debates about Muslim recog-
nition and anti-Muslim sentiments stood in stark contrast to the way anti-
semitism was talked about.
4.1.4 Downplaying antisemitism
While anti-Muslim resentments and negotiation of Muslim recognition became
a major topic of public discussion, especially after the affairs discussed above,
this was not equally the case for Jews and antisemitism, as it was something
that was believed to be, if at all, a past phenomenon. The British state
52On this issue see also Malik, Kenan: From Fatwa to Jihad, The Rushdie Affair and its
Legacy, London: Atlantic Books 2009.
53Poynting and Mason: The resistible rise of Islamophobia, p.69.
54Asad, Talal: Multiculturalism and British Identity in the Wake of the Rushdie Affair, in
Politics and Society 18, 1990, pp.455-480.
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certainly did not feel responsible for past crimes against Jewish minorities.
This is best exemplified in the debate about the introduction of a legislation
that allowed the persecution of war criminals who had entered and built a life
in Britain after the Second World War. As David Cesarani pointed out in his
book about the debate, when the War Crimes Bill was finally signed into law in
May 1991, it was the result of a long and drawn out debate between proponents
and opponents of the bill, which was accompanied by numerous expressions of
antisemitic stereotypes like that of the vengeful Jew. The debate took place
when consciousness of the Holocaust in general burgeoned, and public attention
was given to East European war criminals living in countries like Canada and
US, later also Australia. “Britain remained the only Anglo-Saxon country to
absorb large numbers of East Europeans after the war that had not engaged
in an exhaustive process of self-examination”.55
Even though the War Crimes debate highlighted that antisemitic expressions
remained largely uncontested in the public domain, in Britain, antisemitism
was not believed to be of British concern. The Jewish community itself at
times actively contributed to this particular perception of antisemitism. This
strategy of downplaying antisemitism and emphasising the secure position of
Anglo-Jewry continued. In the 1980s the Jewish community was seen as very
well integrated, and the leadership of the community was strongly Thatcherite.
One example of this loyalty is the 1985 report From Doom to Hope by then
Chief Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits. The report was a response to a report
published by the Archbishop of Canterbury called Faith in the City about
poverty and social deprivation in Britain. In it, the Archbishop criticised
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s strategies to combat these issues. In
his response Chief Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits defended Thatcher’s strategies
and instead called for immigrants to follow the Jewish model of integration
and work harder to achieve prosperity. The downplay of antisemitism and the
insistence on integration and assimilation were part of what can be called a
‘strategy of security’ of the leadership of the Jewish community.56
55Cesarani, David: Justice Delayed, London: Heinemann 1992, p. 190.
56See Gidley, Ben and Kahn-Harris, Keith: Turbulent Times, The British Jewish Commu-
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During a time when British Muslims pointed out that they were discrimi-
nated against and fought for recognition in British society, British Jews em-
phasised how well they were assimilated and how loyal they were to Britain.
This also became evident in the reaction of the Chief Rabbi to the Rushdie
affair. In an article in The Times on 4 February 1989, he empathised with
the sense of hurt of the Muslim community, but did not endorse a change in
blasphemy laws:
“In my view Jews should not seek an extension of the blasphemy
laws. In any event, the Jewish definition of blasphemy is confined
to ‘cursing God’ and does not include an affront to any prophet
(not even Moses, in our case). Living in a predominantly Christian
society, with an established Church, we should be quite content
to leave the legislation on blasphemy as it stands enshrining the
national respect for the majority faith.”57
He argued in favour of controlling this issue not as a religious offence, but as
a social one, for example as inciting racial hatred. The message of this quote
was that Jews were not only able but also willing to integrate into British
society. They would not try to fight for unreasonable levels of recognition -
levels that would require a change in law - out of respect for the majority
culture. By saying this in the context of the Rushdie affair, the Chief Rabbi
implied that Muslims were in fact not able and willing to integrate into British
society. The successful integration of the Jewish community was portrayed in
contrast to the Muslim minority.
However, while to the public, the Jewish community maintained the strat-
egy of ‘security’, leaders were nevertheless concerned about the safety of Jews
in Britain. The Jewish Board of Deputies has monitored antisemitic inci-
dents since 1984, and the founding of the Community Security Trust (CST)
in 1994 was a response to antisemitic attacks and threats by far-right and
nity Today, London: Continuum 2010.
57The Rushdie Affair: A Documentation, Research Papers Muslims in Europe No 42, June
1989, Published by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations,
Birmingham, p. 21-22.
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Islamist groups. The CST is a body that both monitors crimes and offences
against the Jewish community and organises security at Jewish institutions
and events. This organisation is in that sense a paradox in the narrative of
successful integration: rather than relying on the state to afford practical and
preemptive protection, the Jewish community itself felt responsible to monitor
and organise its own security.
Amid these threats that were also the reason for the founding of the CST,
more critical Jewish voices at the time pointed out that the ‘security’-centred
approach of the Jewish leadership was problematic. Not only were antisemitic
hate crimes played down and lied about, which was “part of the wider attempt
to maintain the image of a secure, comfortable community living in harmony
with its neighbours”. This also inevitably led to a neglect of “attempts to
understand anti-Semitism in relation to other forms of oppression and to forge
alliances with other oppressed or persecuted communities”.58
To an extent, these critical voices were eventually heard and the years after
1990 are characterised not only by an improvement in the acknowledgement of
contemporary antisemitism, but also by the forging of alliances between Jews
and Muslims with regard to fighting hate crimes. This was a direct result of
the action of Muslim communities in the 1980s and the subsequent recognition
of religion as a factor in social cohesion, as the Jewish community could be
construed as a religious community fighting for recognition as well. However,
this issue was further complicated by the fact that Zionism and its opposition
was a hotly debated subject at the time.
4.1.5 Zionism and anti-Zionism
As discussed above, at the same time the Muslim community started to fight for
recognition and make anti-Muslim resentments a topic, the Jewish community
remained quiet, and great efforts were made to portray antisemitism in Britain
58Bard, Julia: Review of Generations of Memories: Voices of Jewish Women by The Jewish
Women in London Group, in: Feminist Review, No 37, Spring 1991, pp. 84-94, here p.
84f.
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as only marginal. At a time when issues like multiculturalism, racialisation,
racism, and later anti-Muslim resentments were high on the public agenda,
there were initially no attempts to include British antisemitism in particular
in these debates. Leftists and critical voices within the Jewish community
therefore rightly asked:
“What theory of oppression, formulated by either Jews or non-
Jews, has incorporated an analysis of the history of anti-Semitism
outside of the movement and within it, a theory that would reflect a
caring for the fate of the Jews?....The truth is that the issue of anti-
Semitism has been ignored, has been treated as either non-existent
or unimportant.”59
Recognizing that analyses of racism have neglected the issue of antisemitism
altogether, Jewish leftists asked for an approach to describe oppression and
persecution that would include the Jewish experience. The problem was that
especially among the Left, the opposite happened: antisemitism was not con-
sidered to be an issue, while the ’anti-racist’ struggle against Zionism was
perceived as a major issue.
In both Britain and Germany, in the 1960s the Left embraced anti-Imperialism,
anti-Colonialism and Third World struggles, and saw Zionism as inherently
colonial and racist.60 Colin Holmes later argued that the Arab-Israeli War of
1967 alienated those parts of the Left that were already hostile to Zionism,
“and proceeded to generate a strand of pro-Palestinian sentiment which at
times was indistinguishable from anti-Semitism.”61
Geoffrey Alderman tried to explain the antisemitism of this part of the left
in relation to their post-colonialist stance:
“The left in Britain views Britain’s colonial era as an economic
mistake, a political catastrophe and a moral disaster. To the ex-
tent that the Palestine Mandate grew out of that era, and to the
59Wolfe, Susan J: Nice Jewish Girls, in: Spare Rib, issue 127, February 1983, pp 20-23, here
p. 21.
60See Cesarani, David: The Jews and the Left, London 2004, p. 64.
61Holmes, Colin: John Bull’s Island, p. 246.
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extent that the ‘plantation’ of Jews into Mandate Palestine was, in
whatever sense, a colonial imperative, the left views the eventual
re-establishment of the Jewish State as a post-colonial perversion,
which allegedly dispossessed thousands of Palestinian Arabs into
the bargain. Israel, viewed from this perspective, is an artificial
legacy of the colonial era, for whose creation Britain bears a very
heavy responsibility (...) Behind left-wing opposition to Zionism
lies a refusal to accept the reality of Jewish nationhood and a denial
of the legitimacy of the Jewish claim to national self-determination.
On the face of it this posture is extremely odd, since historically
the left has supported and legitimated an amazing variety of types
of national liberation movements.”62
There was thus a double squeeze on any concept of antisemitism: from a
conservative viewpoint it was, in order to create a sense of security and out of
respect for the majority culture, largely denied, while the Left did not only ne-
glect to deal with it, but instead considered Zionism to be racism. From their
viewpoint, anti-Zionism was automatically anti-racist and therefore not anti-
semitic. Furthermore, to be considered part of the Left, an anti-Zionist stance
was considered to be a necessary condition. The dominating mindset among
the Left that Zionism was racism became apparent in the numerous debates
about the issue, which were usually connected to events in the Middle East.
The arguments that were made in these debates repeat themselves in later
debates, but usually centred around two main points: Zionism is (colonial)
racism and must be opposed and Israel is perpetrating a ‘holocaust’ against
the Palestinian people.
The Israel-Lebanon war in 1982 for example spurred debates among femi-
nists about Zionism and Jewish feminist identity in Britain. Articles and com-
ments in the feminist magazines Spare Rib and Outwrite showed that many
feminists believed that feminism and anti-Zionism were politically inseparable.
62Alderman, Geoffrey, in: Iganski, Paul and Barry Kosmin: A New Antisemitism? Debat-
ing Judeophobia in 21st-century Britain, London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research,
Profile Books: 2003, pp. 223-230, here p. 229.
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Feminist writer Juliet Pope showed that during these debates, anti-Zionism
became central to the feminist movement as a whole, as it characterised its in-
ternationalism. She pointed out that there was change in women’s movement
before this debate: in the context of political struggles at home and abroad,
the feminist movement became aware of its own limitations and increasingly
became interested in analysing and fighting against for example the interrela-
tion between sexual and racial discrimination. Pope also stressed that while
there was the earlier radical feminist phase that was marked by ‘consciousness-
raising’ groups, this seemed to have given way to a more socialist phase, which
was characterized by a concern for unemployment, government expenditure on
social services affecting women. This was a form of opposition to the policies
of the Thatcher government as well as new form of internationalism. In addi-
tion, anti-Zionism appeared to be a common ground for feminists of different
political persuasions.63
Consequently, during the 1982 Lebanon war, Spare Rib published articles
that portrayed the plight of Palestinian women, but which also declared Zion-
ism as a form of racism that must be opposed to stop the perceived ‘holocaust’
against the Palestinian people. In the voice of one Palestinian woman:
“What Israel is doing now in the Lebanon is nothing new but an
extreme part of its nature. Killing people barbarically, children,
women, with poisoned gas and with cluster bombs. It’s hard to
imagine how human beings can do this (...). Women must come
out against it because our sisters are being murdered. (...) It’s
because of the bloody Western countries that they are suffering.
It’s not just Israel. It’s because of the West’s interests that all those
people died. I am calling you sisters, to come together against the
holocaust of the Palestinian and Lebanese people. There is no way
we can sit quietly and do nothing about it.”64
63See Pope, Juliet J.: Anti-Racism, Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism - Debates in the British
Women’s Movement, in: Patterns of Prejudice, Vol 20, No 3. July 1986, pp 13-26, here
p. 16.
64“Women Speak Out Against Zionism”, in: Spare Rib, Issue 121, August 1982, pp. 22-23,
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It was stressed that Israel was an aggressor using inappropriate means to
‘ethnically cleanse’ the Palestinian people by employing ‘internationally pro-
hibited weapons’ and perpetrating a ‘massacre (...) of thousands of Palestini-
ans and Lebanese”.65
Some Jewish feminists on the other hand expressed their concern that fem-
inists who do not oppose Zionism would be silenced and that their experience
as Jewish women and of racism would be invalidated. In a counter article in
Spare Rib a few months later, they stressed that
“For as long as Jewish women have been involved in the women’s
movement in Britain, it has been virtually impossible to speak
about our lives as Jewish women and our experience of anti-semitism
both within the movement and in the wider society. The recent
upsurge in ‘anti-Zionism’, while it has actively intensified our ex-
perience of antisemitism by legitimating Jew hating, also seriously
threatens to make our experience and history completely inaudible
and invisible.”66
Their warning, however, fell on deaf hears. Moreover, what crystallised in
this and other debates was that many believed that not only was Zionism
like Nazism, but that Zionists actively worked together with the Nazis to
create the state of Israel. In one Spare Rib article, Zionists were accused of
sacrificing Jews in the Holocaust. From this point of view, Zionism was only
in so far interested in fighting anti-semitism as it motivated Jews to emigrate
to Israel. The article further stated that Zionist leaders refused to save Jews
during World War II as a bargaining tool to be able to create a Jewish state.
The authors in fact claimed that the Americans and the British made several
proposals to save the Jewish people, but that the Zionist movement refused to
cooperate.67
here p. 23
65“Women Against Zionism”, in: Spare Rib, Issue 124, Nov 1982, pp. 38-39.
66“About Anti-Semitism”, in: Spare Rib, Issue 123, Oct 1982, pp. 20-21.
67See “Women Against Zionism”, pp. 38-39.
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In British anti-Zionism, however, this was taken even further, and Zionists
were accused of continuing to behave like Nazis. Feminists stressed that it is
important to differentiate between Jews and Zionists, because progressive anti-
Zionist Jews are also victims of Zionism and forced to flee Palestine. Moreover,
in their view Zionists even went so far that in order to convince Jews from Arab
countries to move to Israel, they put bombs in synagogues to create tension
between Muslims and Jews. This is based upon the idea that Israel is portrayed
as similar to Nazi ideology, because it believes that Jews cannot live among
Gentiles. Consequently, Zionism was seen as an exclusionary ideology.
“Zionism claimed to speak in the name of Jews. In fact, it was cre-
ated by European Jews who used anti-semitism for their own inter-
ests. Its aim was never to fight anti-semitism, moreover, it saw anti-
semitism as its best ally...If we are concerned about anti-semitism
we must fight Zionism. To be anti-Zionist is to be anti-imperialist,
and to be against the fact that Zionism (and the founding of the
state of Israel) caused Palestinians to be refugees”.68
But not only were Zionists accused of working together with Nazis, of still
behaving like Nazis, they were also accused of abusing the Holocaust to stifle
any criticism of Israel. One article in Spare Rib saw a direct line between
the actions of the ’Zionist movement’ during the Holocaust and the actions of
Israel today:
“Since 1948 Israel has not stopped expanding. The recent blood-
shed in the Lebanon is the last series of expansionist drives. Through-
out, the horrors of the holocaust have been used in a manipulative
way to stop any criticism of Israel’s attempt to eliminate the Pales-
tinians as a people and a nation, and carve up the Lebanon and
appropriate the South of Lebanon. The fight for justice and free-
dom of the Jewish people who died in the concentration camps has
been abused and trampled upon.”69
68“Women Speak Out Against Zionism”, pp. 22-23.
69“Women Against Zionism”, p. 39.
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The idea that the Jews in Auschwitz were Zionism’s first victims and that the
memory of the Holocaust is abused by Jews to legitimise Israel’s policies was
not limited to feminist circles, as the debate around the play Perdition, staged
by the Royal Court Theatre in 1987,70 showed. During the debate that later
ensued between the writers and defenders of the play and Jewish historians,
many of the above mentioned arguments reappear: Zionism is portrayed as a
racist ideology that must be opposed from an anti-racist stance, and Zionists
collaborated with the Nazis and sacrificed Jews in order to found the state of
Israel.
This accusation was in fact subject of the play itself: the play is a court-room
drama set in Britain in 1967, and deals with a libel case brought by Doctor
Malkiel Yaron against Ruth Kaplan, who had written a pamphlet accusing
Doctor Yaron of not only collaborating with the Nazis when he was active
in the Judenrat in Hungary during the Second World War, but of wilfully
sacrificing Jews because he was a Zionist and in order to legitimise Zionism.
During the trial Yaron at first maintains that he had no other choice and tried
to save as many Jews as possible, but at the end he breaks down and admits
that he can not live with the guilt about what he did.
Although the performance of the play was planned for early 1987, it was
first delayed, then planned for 22 January, then moved to January 27, but it
was eventually cancelled on short notice, as the artistic director of the Royal
Court, Max Stafford- Clark, who had commissioned a report by historian David
Cesarani and later also sought the advice of historian Martin Gilbert, did not
believe in the accuracy of the play any more. He had realised that people
might find it offensive and later called his choice to stage the play a mistake.71
This position was supported by David Rose’s article “Rewriting the Holo-
caust” in The Guardian on 14 January 1987. Rose criticised Allen’s conflation
between the Hungarian Zionists and the Judenrat, and also pointed out how
70For a later version of the play including the press cuttings cited below, supporting material,
and letters written in support of the play see Allen, Jim: Perdition: A play in two acts,
London: Ithaca Press 1987.
71See Stafford-Clark, Max: Why I axed Perdition, in: The Guardian, 13 March 1987.
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Allen seemed to have distorted these facts on purpose, and even exaggerated
the questionable sources he used.72
Rather than discussing the problematic historical facts in the play, the
playwright himself, Jim Allen, immediately accused ‘Zionists’ of crying an-
tisemitism and stifling his free speech. He insisted on the legitimacy of his
play and on its anti-racist message, which included Jews as victims of Zion-
ists. In a letter to The Guardian on 17 January 87, Allen stressed that Rose’s
article “summarises the Zionist viewpoint, that the play is anti-semitic, a trav-
esty of the facts, and a libel on the Jewish people”. Although a number of
historians and journalists shared the viewpoint that the play was historically
inaccurate, and members of the Jewish community saw it as ‘poisonous and
reactionary’, the play also had notable supporters, for example poet Erich
Fried, who, in a letter to The Guardian on 4 February 1987, stressed that
“the author and producer of Perdition are quite right that Zionism, as it has
developed [...] has become a death-trap for Jews in Israel and a vehicle for
anti-semitism elsewhere.” Karl Sabbagh, in a letter to The Guardian on 29
January 1989, supported Jim Allen and claimed that he had surely not made
up any facts, but that it is in fact the Jews, who “object to any public criti-
cism of Jewish actions, however legitimate, because it might fuel or give rise to
antisemitism.” He added that “the current campaign against the Royal Court
shows the characteristics of other recent organised protests against criticism of
Israel and Zionism: whatever the content of the criticism, the key accusation
is one of antisemitism; the major criticism of content comes down to the fact
that the writer had not accepted the interpretation that is most favourable to
Jews.”73
In the course of the debate, the historians who had criticised the play were
themselves accused of being part of a Zionist lobby. Jim Allen expressed how
appalled he was at the charges and accusations against him by ‘Holocaust
experts’. He stressed that “here lies the source of the pollution. Among
the ‘experts’ are Martin Gilbert, David Cesarani, and the Institute of Jewish
72See Allen: A play in two acts, p. 121.
73All cited ibid, pp. 121, 129 - 130.
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Affairs.” He claimed that these cannot be considered the only reliable sources
and that his play was indeed well researched. In a similar vein, in a letter to
the New Statesman on 20 February 87, Tony Greenstein pointed out that it is
wrong to rely on the opinions of David Cesarani and Martin Gilbert when it
comes to criticising Perdition, as “both are dedicated Zionists and both have
axes to grind”. Perdition was in fact far from antisemitic in his opinion, but a
play that Jewish people “have a right to see”.74
At this point in the debate the idea of a powerful Zionist lobby that had
forced the Royal Court to cancel the play became even stronger. In an article
in the New Statesman on 20 February 1987, titled “Censorship and Perdition”,
authors Ken Loach and Andrew Hornung criticised the “virulent attacks” on
the play. Moreover, they saw a Zionist conspiracy and pointed out how “the
play’s opponents used their influence to lobby and manipulate behind the
scenes” to get the play banned. But “the efforts of the Zionist campaign did
not end with the ban at the Royal Court. The lobby has tried to ensure that
no theatre will stage the play in London or elsewhere.” Loach and Hornung
considered this group to be the actual cause of antisemitism, as they are a
“political group had used every device to prevent discussion of its own political
past. In fact, these people encourage the very anti-semitism they seek to
prevent, because it appears that a powerful clique has, through its influence
in the press and elsewhere, stopped the play from being performed”. They
stressed that critics do not see that the play showed Jews as victims, and
depicted only Zionists as a problem.75
These debates set the tone for virtually any later debate on anti-Zionism.
Anti-Zionists were convinced that there is an anti-racist duty to oppose Zion-
ism, and the Palestinian people were victims of a second Holocaust. Moreover,
allegations of antisemitism did not have to be taken seriously, because the
merely represented a Zionist strategy to stifle any criticism of Israel.
This was later poignantly expressed by Nira Yuval-Davis and Max Silver-
man:
74See ibid, p. 135.
75See ibid, pp. 136-138.
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“Originally, Zionism’s intention to normalize Jewish existence by
making it similar to that of other nations was driven by the aim
of eradicating antisemitism. However, the endemic view of anti-
semitism has been recruited to serve a different cause: antisemitism
could not be eradiated (...) and the non-Jewish world would al-
ways be hostile, in which case any critique of Israel and of Jewish
communities could be explained in terms of antisemitism and con-
sequently delegitimized. This position - that those who criticize
Israel are antisemities - has served as a powerful weapon in the
armoury of those who supported the policies of the Israeli state,
especially after the 1967 war and the occupation by Israel of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip.”76
From this perspective, any allegation of antisemitism in connection to actions
of the Israeli state were then illegitimate. In a critical anti-racist context,
it became difficult to frame Zionism as anything other than a colonial and
oppressive power with Nazi allegiances. This meant that it also became a
challenge to conceptualise antisemitism in an anti-racist framework. What
approaches were used to overcome this issue are discussed in the following
chapter.
4.2 Germany: Remembering the past, forgetting
the Jews
Dealing with the National Socialist past has played a major role for the for-
mation of contemporary German society. Public debates about how Germans
should relate to the past and about what constitutes taboo-breaking forms
of post-war antisemitism have shaped Germany’s national self-understanding,
especially since the 1980s.77 What additionally united these debates, however,
76Yuval-Davis, Nira and Silverman, Max: Memorializing the holocaust in Britain, in: Eth-
nicities, Vol 2, No. 1, 2002, pp. 107-133, here p. 110.
77see Bericht des Expertenkreises Antisemitismus: Antisemitismus in Deutschland. Erschei-
nungsformen, Bedingungen, Pra¨ventionsansa¨tze, Bundesministerium des Innern, Berlin
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was that Jews or Jewish concerns were for the most part generally absent. This
was also true for the study of antisemitism, which moved towards abstract con-
cepts of prejudice research instead of, for example, critically engaging with the
Shoah. However, researchers saw the need to analyse both antisemitism and
hostility towards non-German minorities in the context of an emerging multi-
cultural society. In contrast to Britain, however, this process evolved not in
a framework of theorisations of colonial immigration, but in a framework of
dealing with the Nazi past.
From the conservative turn to the Historikerstreit
As touched upon in the last chapter, Germany’s collective coping strategy
regarding the Second World War and the Holocaust was for a long time char-
acterised by the attempt to fight off guilt. During the so called ‘Schlussstrich-
Debatte’ concerns were voiced about the perceived unnecessary persistence of
accusations against Germany. Germans felt that it was time to let the past
rest and move on. This negotiation of German identity has to be seen in the
context of general political and cultural developments in West Germany in
the 1980s. The election win of the Christian Democratic Party, with which
conservative Helmut Kohl became chancellor, in 1983, marked what can be
considered a ‘conservative turn’ in politics, but was also the expression of a
wider public and cultural development.
Richard Evans has pointed out that as had happened a decade and a half
before with the change to a liberal and social democratic government,
“the new change in political climate was accompanied by a change
of intellectual mood. Encouraged by the new government, its pub-
licity machine, and its appointments policy, conservative intellec-
tuals began to seize the initiative back from the liberals and Social
Democrats. This was the so-called Tendenzwende, the ‘change of
tack’ in which the achievements of the 1970s were to be denied and
reversed on all fronts. Spurred on by the new note of patriotism
2011, p. 6.
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struck by the Reagan presidency in the United States, Chancellor
Kohl’s government now began to strike a patriotic chord itself. The
moment for a renewal of German patriotism was opportune.”78
This renewal of patriotism was first evident in the new government’s plans
to build a German historical Museum in Berlin and a House of the History of
the Federal Republic in Bonn, which caused a huge controversy. While leftist
intellectuals saw an attempt to form a new German identity and ‘do away’
with the past, the idea of a German museum “was backed up by a growing
chorus of opinion on the political right, declaring that the time has come for
the West Germans to stop feeling guilty about the past and start feeling proud
of themselves once more.”79
A similar controversy was caused by President Reagan’s visit to the mil-
itary cemetery in Bitburg in 1985. As Charles Meier has pointed out, “for
Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his political advisers, the American president’s
visit was intended symbolically to wipe away the last moral residues of proba-
tion under which the Federal Republic still laboured. The pointed omission of
German representatives from the 1984 D-Day commemoration still rankled.”80
However, it turned out that forty-nine SS soldiers were also buried in Bitburg.
Germans insisted on differentiating between different segments of the SS. The
conservative CDU deputy Alfred Dregger for example warned American sena-
tors that a cancellation of the visit would be an affront, and stressed that all
fallen soldiers were entitled to equal honour.81 According to Maier, “Bitburg
history unites oppressors and victims, Nazi perpetrators of violence with those
who were struck down by it, in a common dialectic”. He stresses that “Bitburg
history finds it difficult to pin down any notions of collective responsibility”.82
78Evans, Richard: In Hitler’s shadow. West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape
from the Nazi past, London: I.B. Tauris, 1989, p.15
79Ibid. p. 19
80Maier, Charles S.: The Unmasterable Past. History, Holocaust, and German National
Identity, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press
1997 (1988), p. 10.
81Ibid, p. 11.
82Ibid, p. 14, see also Rabinbach, Anson: Beyond Bitburg: The Place of the ’Jewish
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The German past was not only a topic in politics, but in the media, too: by
the early 1980s the Holocaust was discussed in the press, on TV and in books.
The US TV series ’Holocaust’ that was broadcast in 1979 had already gained 20
million German viewers at the time, the numerous other films and series dealing
with the topic during the 1980s were hits as well. It is important to note,
however, that many of the films and also literature of the time did not deal with
Jewish victimhood as much as they dealt with an alleged German victimhood.
This is perhaps best exemplified in Edgar Reitz’s multi-episode film Heimat,
broadcast in 1984, that was well received by critics and audiences. The film
depicts the story of a German village over 60 years, and while it contains
many situations of death and mourning - of German soldiers for example, it
completely omits the Holocaust. Eric Rentschler commented on the success of
Heimat :
“Heimat proved to be successful in Germany precisely because it
recounted the most disturbing portion of German history in a way
that disavowed burdensome aspects of the past, ..., confronting
the Third Reich and at the same time evading it, neutralising and
concealing the experience of fascism, while simultaneously binding
the audience by an undeniable appeal to their emotional persons
and powers of identification”.83
This is in line with the phenomenon in post-war German literature that
Ernestine Schlant has termed a ‘language of silence’ with regard to the Holo-
caust. This silence does not mean that the Holocaust is never mentioned, quite
the opposite, but that there is ‘a contradictory endeavour to keep silent’ and
that there is no true ‘Vergangenheitsbewa¨ltigung’.84 For Schlant, this is true
Question’ in German History after 1945, in: Harms, Kathy; Reuter, Lutz R. and Duerr,
Volker (eds.): Coping with the Past, Germany and Austria after 1945, Madison: The
University of Wisconsin Press 1990, pp. 187-218.
83Rentschler, Eric: The Use and Abuse of Memory: New German Film and the Discourse
of Bitburg, in: New German Critique, No 36, Special Issue on Heimat 1985, pp. 67-90,
here p. 84.
84Schlant: The Language of Silence, pp. 21 ff.
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whether or not there are Jewish characters present at all. With regard to films,
Omer Bartov has observed that Jewish characters are not only often used to
redeem any past guilt, but also that these depictions are antisemitic, not in
the sense that these characters are portrayed negatively, but that the negative
stereotypes have been replaced by positive ones. He stressed that
“numerous postwar films exhibit an urge to use the figure of ‘the
Jew’ both as a historical embodiment of the victim and as a liber-
ating tool for the present - whether by recognising past sins, omis-
sions, and repressions, or by humanising a present reality perceived
as cold and insensitive precisely because it no longer contains this
‘Jew’. Perhaps because the burden of this double role is too great,
such films often end up caricaturing the very figure they intend
to bring back to life. In a sense, they become implicated in the
antisemitic discourse on the ‘Jew’ even as they believe themselves
to be in the process of undermining it.” 85
German culture at the time was preoccupied with a denial of guilt and re-
demption - which was in fact a continuation from the very early postwar years,
but which only now found a reflection in politics. The idea of German victim-
hood was for example publicly expressed in President Weizsa¨cker’s speech on
the anniversary of the ’Machtergreifung’ in 1985. He interpreted Germany’s
defeat in 1945 as a liberation, indicating that the German people had been
the first victims of National Socialism. As Moishe Postone has indicated, “For
many Germans, [...], the reemergence of the past has been in the form of a
renewed call for a return to normalcy, particularly among conservatives. This
time, however, normalcy was not to be based on denial, but on a more openly
affirmative attitude toward the past.”86 One example of this notion of nor-
malcy was that the the Bundestag passed a law that made it a criminal offense
85Bartov, Omer: The ‘Jew’ in Cinema, From The Golem to Don’t Touch My Holocaust,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2005, p.101
86Postone, Moishe: After the Holocaust: History and Identity in West Germany, in: Harms,
Kathy; Reuter, Lutz R. and Du¨rr, Volker: Coping with the Past, Germany and Austria
after 1945, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press 1990, pp. 233-251, here p. 239.
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to both deny or speak ligthly of the Holocaust or of the expulsion of Germans
from the East in 1944-45. Postone rightly pointed out that this was a law that
equated the sufferings of the Germans with the annhiliation of the Jews and
thereby sought to “wipe the historical ledger clean”.87
It was in this context that the ‘Historikerstreit’ ensued: a sometimes heated
discussion between German historians about the question of German guilt
and how it should be dealt with. The Historikerstreit in fact signified the
changes in the political climate and the historical consciousness of the Federal
Republic.88 Postone remarked on the Historikerstreit that “the debate really
was one which had been initiated by conservatives as part of a more general
attempt to positively revise the official public attitude toward the Nazi past.”89
4.2.1 Historikerstreit
As described in the previous chapter, the same historians involved in this
debate always had diverging opinions on the matter of National socialism and
the Holocaust. More so than the previous debates, the Historikerstreit evolved
around central ideas about German identity and remembrance.
As Charles Meier has pointed out, the central theme of the Historikerstreit
was the question “whether the Nazi crimes were unique, a legacy of evil in a
class by themselves, irreparably burdening any concept of German nationhood,
or whether they are comparable to other national atrocities, especially Stalinist
terror.” He also stressed that it was not an isolated debate about the German
past, but that it was as much about contemporary German identity and that
it “reveals a wider spectrum of loyalties and potential national orientations
than were earlier evident.”90
A sort of prologue to the debate is Andreas Hillgruber’s book Zweierlei
87Ibid.
88See Mommsen, Wolfgang J.: The Germans and Their Past: History and Political Con-
sciousness in the Federal Republic of Germany, in: in: Harms, Kathy; Reuter, Lutz
R. and Duerr, Volker (eds.): Coping with the Past, Germany and Austria after 1945,
Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press 1990, pp.252 - 269, here p.253.
89Postone: After the Holocaust, p. 242.
90Maier, Charles S.: The Unmasterable Past, p.1-2.
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Untergang. Die Zerschlagung des deutschen Reiches und das Ende des eu-
ropa¨ischen Judentums (Two sorts of demise: The shattering of the German
Reich and the end of European Jewry) that was published in 1986. Charles
Maier rightly pointed out that “the title alone suggested that the end of the
German Reich and the end of European Jewry are events or processes on
an equal level.” He saw Hillgruber’s book as first of all a defence of Ger-
man militarism. Hillgruber justified the actions of the German Wehrmacht
and suggested that only Hitler was “possessed of a monomaniacal ideological
commitment to win Lebensraum and complete his genocidal project.”91 The
Wehrmacht only acted under Hitler’s orders. At the same time, Hillgruber
evoked a vivid imagery of German suffering: how millions of German civilians
spent harrowing months under Soviet troops after they defeated the Germans.
In contrast, he did not commit as much effort and space to describe Jewish
suffering. Maier called Hillgruber’s argument the ‘geopolitics of nostalgia’,
as he emphasised the “Wilhelmine Empire was pushed into war by British
encirclement and frustration of legitimate national goals.”92
In his article ‘Die Vergangenheit die nicht vergehen will’ in the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung on 6 June 1986, Ernst Nolte went even further and argued
in favour of a ‘Schlussstrich’, an end to the preoccupation with the Holocaust
- or more precisely, especially with Jewish suffering. He claimed that only the
persecuted have an interest in keeping the idea of German guilt alive, in order
to claim a permanently privileged position. He also argued that the idea of
German guilt was dangerously close to the idea of Jewish guilt, which was
an argument the Nazis used to legitimise their antisemitism. Not only did he
implicitly compare the Nazi terror to the Allied bombings, he claimed that
the attention given to the ‘Final Solution’ only deflects from other important
issues during the Nazi era, like the Euthanasia projects or the treatment of
Russian prisoners of war. More importantly, however, he saw a deflection from
contemporary issues like the ‘genocides’ in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
It was in fact not the first time that Nolte had compared what he called
91Ibid, p. 19.
92Ibid, p. 23.
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the ‘Nazi terror’ to other forms of persecution and oppression. In an article in
the same newspaper in 1980 he even went so far as to suggest that National
Socialism was a reaction to Bolshevism. Moreover, he emphasised that the
‘Red Terror’ had been significantly worse than the ‘White Terror’, that it in
fact operated in another dimension. He claimed that the mass killings ordered
by Lenin on the basis of class were more horrific than the shootings of war
prisoners by the ‘Whites’ and that this terror was more acutely felt in Germany
at the time than in any other Western country. His conclusion was, therefore,
that the Third Reich needed to be taken out of its (analytical) isolation and
studied in context of the Russian Revolution. He added that it cannot be
accepted that the Third Reich is demonised, and that while it is singular, it
should be the subject of historical scholarship.93
Only in 1986, however, did his position provoke an extensive critical reac-
tion, most famously by Ju¨rgen Habermas in an article in Die Zeit on 11 July
1986.94 Habermas’s article was a reply to what he understood as the revision-
ist positions of Andreas Hillgruber, Michael Stu¨rmer, Klaus Hildebrand, and
Ernst Nolte. He accused the historians of pursuing the reestablishment of a
national identity by constructing an ‘asiatic danger’ for the past that is seen
as a danger today as well.
In an article in the FAZ on 29 August, Joachim Fest attempted to support
his colleague Nolte.95 He accused Habermas of ideological prejudice as he
denied national identity outright. He rightly pointed out that Nolte did in
fact state that the saw the Holocaust as a singularity. However, he went
93See Nolte, Ernst: Zwischen Geschichtslegende und Revisionismus? Das Dritte Reich im
Blickwinkel des Jahres 1980, in: Augstein, Rudolf (ed.): Historikerstreit, Die Doku-
mentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Juden-
vernichtung, Mu¨nchen: Piper 1987, pp. 13-35, originally published as: Die negative
Lebendigkeit des Dritten Reiches, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 July 1980.
94See Habermas, Ju¨rgen: Eine Art Schadensabwicklung, Die apologetischen Tendenzen in
der deutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung, in: Die Zeit, 11 July 1986.
95See Fest, Joachim: Die geschuldete Erinnerung. Zur Kontroverse ueber die Unvergleich-
barkeit der nationalsozialistischen Massenverbrechen, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
29 August 1986.
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on to support the claim that this singularity should at least be questioned,
considering the “millions of victims of genocides that have been forgotten,
from the Armenians to the victims of the Gulag and the Cambodians”.
Hans Mommsen later analysed the revisionist position taken by Nolte, Fest
and others and came to the conclusion that theories of totalitarianism can
easily be used to both equate different genocides and relativise the Holocaust
and to take political positions in the context of the Cold War. He pointed
out that the demarcation against any totalitarian dictatorship functioned as
a legitimisation of an armed democracy. He further argued that a focus on
Hitler in historic scholarship served as an apology for conservatives of the time
on the one hand and as an excuse for the German public on the other. The
history of the Third Reich was then treated as a kind of foreign body. He
concluded that any normalisation of the Holocaust and the Third Reich would
be a political act and not what historical scholarship should be about.96
The Historikerstreit dealt with the question of German-Jewish relations only
insofar as these became relevant for German national identity. In fact, although
both sides of the debate were obsessed with the Holocaust, they were much less
concerned about actual Jews. In addition, as Lars Rensmann has later shown,
the debate itself was riddled with the usage of antisemitic stereotypes.97 So the
German revision of the official attitude to the past, which the Historikerstreit
stood for, coincided with a slow but steady erosion of the taboo to openly ex-
press antisemitism. Another development that coincided with the re-emerging
themes about the past was, however, was the establishment of dedicated insti-
tutions for antisemitism research. On the one hand, this research was critical
in the sense that it allowed to call some expressions used in the Historikerstreit
antisemitic. The ‘secondary antisemitism’ displayed in the debate became an
96See Mommsen, Hans: Suche nach der ‘verlorenen Geschichte’? Bemerkungen zum his-
torischen Selbstversta¨ndnis der Bundesrepublik, in: Merkur, September/Oktober 1986,
pp 864-874.
97See Rensmann, Lars: Demokratie und Judenbild: Antisemitismus in der politischen Kul-
tur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fu¨r Sozialwissenschaften,
2004, pp. 251 ff.
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important analytical tool for German antisemitism researchers. On the other
hand, however, the establishement of antisemitism studies in Germany was
actually a crucial part of the process to positively incorporate the past into a
new German identity.
4.2.2 The study of antisemitism
While the question of German guilt was the topic most prominently discussed
in public - and among historians, there were in fact important developments in
the theorisation of antisemitism beyond these debates. In the early 1980s, anti-
semitism research became more systematic with the foundation of two research
centres focussing entirely on the history and contemporary manifestations of
antisemitism. The Vidal Sassoon Centre for the Study of Antisemitism was
founded in 1982 and is affiliated with the Hebrew University in Israel, while the
Berlin Zentrum fu¨r Antisemitismusforschung (ZfA) had already been founded
in 1979, but did not appoint its first director, Herbert A. Strauss, before 1982.
The ZfA was founded on initiative of the Jewish community in Berlin and is
an institute at the Technical University. Both centres stressed the interdisci-
plinary nature of antisemitism research and mirrored this in their publications.
This institutionalisation of antisemitism research was accompanied by a
wealth of publications on the matter in the 1980s and 1990s. The early pub-
lications of the ZfA under the directorship of Herbert Strauss were clearly
influenced by American research on the topic. The ZfA’s series on Current
Research on Antisemitism brought together previous research from different
subjects and perspectives, mainly sociology, psychology and history. However,
the series also showed that scholars disagreed on the definition, understand-
ing and assessment of antisemitism. The first publication, edited by Helen
Fein, an American historical sociologist, dealt with descriptions of and expla-
nations of antisemitism in general and with historical as well as contemporary
manifestations.98
98See Fein, Helen (ed.): The Persisting Question: Sociological Perspectives and Social Con-
texts of Modern Antisemitism, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter 1987.
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In her contribution to the book, Fein was the first to reflect critically on
current antisemitism research. She recognised what she called three different
schools: the first explained current antisemitism with its origin in Christian
traditions. It focussed on hegemonic organisations, institutions and ideolo-
gies of western civilization. The second was the ‘interactionist’ school, which
regarded the presence of Jews among majority populations as a source for
tension. The third explanation was a ‘neo-Marxist functionalist’ one, which
interpreted antisemitism as a channeled agression against outsiders in capitalist
societies.99 Fein, on the other hand, wanted to go beyond these interpretations
and understood antisemitism as “a persisting latent structure of hostile beliefs
toward Jews as a collectivity manifested in individuals as attitudes, and in
culture as myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, and in actions - social or legal
discrimination, political mobilization against the Jews, and collective or state
violence - which results in and/or is designed to distance, displace, or destroy
Jews as Jews”.100 She emphasised that she did not regard antisemitism as a
historically-specific ideology. By not distinguishing different varieties of an-
tisemitism, she intended to avoid using the attacker’s justification to define
the phenomenon.101 Her interpretation of antisemitism strongly argued for an
interpretation of antisemitism as a continuation through the ages.
However, the volume also showed that this was highly disputed, as other
scholars began to distinguish different forms of antisemitism. In the same
publication, Gavin A. Langmuir argued that there had been obvious changes
in some characteristics of hostility against Jews over time so that it is difficult
to speak of a general antisemitism.102 He emphasised that it is important
to distinguish two different kinds of threats to Jews: on the one hand Jews
may be subject to general xenophobia, “which uses the real conduct of some
99See Fein, Helen: Explanations of the Origin and Evolution of Antisemitism, in: Fein: The
Persisting Question, part 1, chapter 1, pp. 3-22.
100Fein, Helen: Dimensions of Antisemitism: Attitudes, Collective Accusations, and Actions,
in: Fein: The Persisting Question, part 2, chapter 1, pp. 67-85, here p. 67.
101Ibid, p. 69.
102See Langmuir, Gavin: Toward a Definition of Antisemitism, in: Fein: The Persisting
Question, pp. 86-127.
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members of an outgroup to symbolize a social menace”, and on the other hand
Jews are seriously endangered because “real Jews have been converted in the
minds of many into a symbol that denies their empirical reality and justifies
their total elimination from the earth”.103
What soon crystallised in the research of the Zentrum, however, was that
German research on the topic took a slightly different turn. The first sign
for this was the the ZfA started to focus its theoretical development primarily
on contemporary antisemitism, rather than its historical forms. Contemporary
antisemitism in fact became the topic of several studies and essays on particular
manifestations like cemetery desecrations, images of ‘the Jew’ in German media
and antisemitic behaviour among youths.104 Studies were undertaken on issues
like Christianity and contemporary antisemitism, right-wing extremism, and
antisemitic anti-Zionism.105
The second edition of the ZfA publication Current Research on Antisemitism,
edited by Werner Bergmann, dealt with social psychological approaches to
prejudice in general and anti-Jewish prejudice in particular. It depicted how
prejudice studies have been both influenced by psychological studies of inter-
group hostility as well as studies of prejudice against the Black minority, both
emanating from and focussing on the US. The volume argued for a revival
and reassessment of psychological research on prejudice. It was argued that
previous approaches to antisemitism based on personality theory, which un-
derstood antisemitism in terms of an underlying personality conflict, should be
substituted by approaches based on group theory and ethnic relations. These
103Ibid, p.127.
104See especially the contributions in Silbermann, Alphons and Julius H. Schoeps: An-
tisemitismus nach dem Holocaust, Bestandsaufnahme und Erscheinungsformen in
deutschsprachigen La¨ndern, Ko¨ln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik 1986.
105See chapters of Strozier, Charles B. and Ayla Kohn: Das zweideutige Bild des Juden
im Bewusstsein christlicher Fundamentalisten; Juliane Wetzel: Antisemitismus im in-
ternationalen Rechtsextremismus; Martin W. Kloke: Kathartische Zerreissproben: Zur
Israel-Diskussion in der Partei Die Gru¨nen, all in: Strauss, Herbert A.; W. Bergmann
and Chr. Hoffmann (eds.): Der Antisemitismus der Gegenwart, Frankfurt/New York:
Campus Verlag 1990.
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newer approaches combined psychology and sociology and focussed on group
relations rather than on individuals, which had mostly superseded personality
theory. Bergmann emphasised that these approaches are not only valid for an-
tisemitism, but for all prejudice in general.106 With this assessment, Bergmann
gave the directions for future antisemitism research in Germany.
But the later research of the ZfA on contemporary antisemitism did not
diminish investigations of historical antisemitism. The third volume of Current
Research on Antisemitism edited by Herbert A Strauss and published in 1993
had a decidedly more historical, comparative view-point. It summarised what
was considered the most important research on antisemitism history in different
countries from the 1960s to the early 1990s and included contributions by
Hans Rosenberg, Werner Jochmann, Shulamit Volkov, Saul Friedlaender and
Andreas Hillgruber, among others.107 The varying contributions also showed,
however, that there were very different opinions on the history of antisemitism
in Germany and its meaning for German society and identity.
The general perspective of publications on the history of antisemitism by
the ZfA was on the distinction between different phases of antisemitism. Benz
and Bergmann later argued that while there is a certain continuity on the
level of anti-Jewish imagery, there are important qualitative changes between
the antisemitism of the emancipation period and the antisemitism after the
first World War.108 Consequently, they came to the conclusion that the anti-
semitism in Germany after 1945 is not simply a continuation of what it was
before, but - in reference to Theodor Adorno - a ‘secondary’ antisemitism.
They argued that antisemitic prejudice in Germany after 1945 was not con-
cerned with legal equality, religious tolerance or even economic competition,
but was a resentment that results from the way the Holocaust was remembered
106See Bergmann, Werner: Error Without Trial: Psychological Research on Antisemitism,
Berlin/New York: de Gruyter 1988, p. 139 ff.
107Strauss, Herbert A.: Hostages of Modernization: studies on modern antisemitism 1870-
1933/39, Berlin: de Gruyter 1993.
108See Benz, Wolfgang and Werner Bergmann (eds.): Vorurteil und Vo¨lkermord, Entwick-
lungslinien des Antisemitismus, Freiburg: Herder 1997, introductory chapter.
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in Germany.109
Under the directorship of Wolfgang Benz from 1992 onwards, the ZfA, most
notably Wolfgang Benz and Werner Bergmann, later developed a consistent
theoretical approach to analyse and explain antisemitism in Germany’s past
and present based on the group relations theory Bergmann had proposed ear-
lier. This theory was in fact inclusive of other forms of social exclusion next to
antisemitism, like racism, homophobia, and later even Islamophobia. This ap-
proach was not established until well after the 1980s, however, when there was
still a lack in studies on any form of discrimination besides antisemitism. An
important part of the work of the Zentrum was the collection of quantitative
data on German attitudes towards Jews. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb
used surveys conducted by the Allies after 1945 as well as data from surveys
on German antisemitism irregularly conducted from the 1960s to the 1990s to
assess German attitudes towards Jews between 1945 and 1996.110
Although this approach to antisemitism reflected on the inability of the Ger-
mans to deal with the Holocaust, it nevertheless stood in striking contrast, and
did not engage in serious dialogue with, more critical theoretical approaches
to antisemitism by (mostly) American historians and sociologists.
Critical theoretical approaches to German Antisemitism
Mostly American scholars concerned with the wider issues of antisemitic ten-
dencies in German society, their meaning for German national and cultural
identity, investigated antisemitism as a topic in philosophy, cultural studies
and literary criticism. Their critique was based on the understanding that
antisemitism is an ideology with certain social functions and they often used
the theoretical approaches developed by the members of the Frankfurt School
- and also, but less so, Hannah Arendt - to describe and assess the recent
eruptions of antisemitism in Germany, but also to re-evaluate the history of
109Ibid, p. 434.
110See Bergmann, Werner and Rainer Erb: Wie antisemitisch sind die Deutschen? Mein-
ungsumfragen 1945-1994, in: Benz, Wolfgang (ed.): Antisemitismus in Deutschland, Zur
Aktualita¨t eines Vorurteils, Mu¨nchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag 1995, pp.47-63.
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antisemitism. Most prominently, the New German Critique, a German Studies
journal based at Cornell University, devoted several issues to the topic with es-
says by Moishe Postone, Andy Markovits, Frank Stern, Detlev Claussen, Dan
Diner and other historians and cultural theorists who regularly published on
the subject.111
Frank Stern investigated German post-war Philo-Semitism and emphasised
that the use of ‘positive’ stereotypes is just as much a pattern of differen-
tiation as the use of negative stereotypes, so that both philo-Semitism and
antisemitism are anti-Jewish. He criticised German memory politics with re-
gard to the Holocaust and observed a tendency of a diminishing philo-Semitism
and rising antisemitism between the 1960s and the 1980s in Germany that was
related to the way the Holocaust was remembered:
“Effective modification, neutralization and re-evaluation of the offi-
cial concepts of history - including current images and cliche´s about
Jews - began at the end of the 1960s, continuing through the 1970s,
and becoming socially acceptable in the 1980s. Where there had
previously been at least some acknowledgement of responsibility,
a version of history stressing ‘normalcy’ is now becoming predom-
inant. The twelve years of the Third Reich have been discarded,
filed away as no more than an unpleasant episode, a dark chapter
in Germany’s glorious thousand-year history. Trivializations and
re-evaluations abound in the media and book stores.”112
Stern showed that antisemitic stereotypes like that of the ‘rich Jew’ and
‘Jewish power’ and the ‘international Jewish conspiracy’ became prevalent in
111New German Critique No 19, Special Issue 1: Germans and Jews, 1980; New German
Critique No 20, Special Issue 2: Germans and Jews, 1980; New German Critique, No 38,
Special Issue on the German-Jewish controversy (Spring-Summer 1986)
112Stern, Frank: From Overt Philosemitism to Discreet Antisemitism and Beyond: Anti-
Jewish Developments in the Political Culture of the Federal Republic of Germany, in:
Almog, Shmuel (ed.): Antisemitism through the Ages, Oxford: Pergamon Press 1988,
pp. 385-404, here p. 389.
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Germany once again in the 1980s. He also emphasises, however, that the ap-
pearance of these stereotypes is connected to the search for a German identity
and the attempt to absolve German society from any guilt. Antisemitic stereo-
types in Germany after 1945 therefore relate to the Holocaust.113 At the same
time, he observed a convergence of intellectual right-wing extremism and the
Conservative establishment.114
In light of the current memory politics and resurging antisemitism, Moishe
Postone was concerned with understanding the particularity of (German) an-
tisemitism from a Marxist and critical theoretical perspective. He therefore
sought to relate the ideological preconditions of the Holocaust to the large-
scale social and cultural transformations of capitalism in the late nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. He argued that the Holocaust must be understood
with reference to modern antisemitism and that it is important to understand
the particularity of this form of antisemitism. Although in all forms of an-
tisemitism, a degree of power is attributed to the Jews, it is the quality of
power attributed that distinguishes antisemitism. This power is understood
as ‘mysteriously intangible, abstract, and universal’ and perceived as hidden
and conspirational.115
Postone attempted to analyse modern antisemitism with reference to the
categories of capitalism. His main argument is in fact that Jews were identified
with the abstract side of capitalism like finance capital. National Socialist
antisemitism was therefore anti-capitalist in the sense that it was “based on a
one-sided attack on the abstract - abstract law, abstract reason, or, on another
level, money and finance capital - from the standpoint of the ‘healthy’, ‘rooted’,
113Ibid, p.393.
114See ibid, p. 396.
115A first version of this text appeared as Postone, Moishe: Anti-Semitism and National
Socialism, Notes on the German Reaction to ‘Holocaust’, in: New German Critique No
19, Special Issue 1: Germans and Jews 1980; an adapted and revised version can be found
in: Postone, Moishe: The Holocaust and the Trajectory of the Twentieth Century, in:
idem and Santner, Eric (eds): Catastrophe and Meaning, Chicago: Chicago University
Press 2003, pp. 81-115, here p. 89.
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‘natural’ concrete”.116
Postone argued that the centrality of the destruction of the Jews for the
Nazis cannot be overemphasised. He concluded that “Auschwitz, not the Nazi
seizure of power in 1933, was the real ‘German Revolution’, the attempted
‘overthrow’ not merely of the political order but of the existing social forma-
tion. By this one deed the world was to be made safe from the tyranny of the
abstract. In the process, the Nazis ‘liberated’ themselves from humanity”.117
Detlev Claussen’s theoretical approach to antisemitism is similarly based on
Marxist categories and the theories of the Frankfurt School. Similar to Pos-
tone, Claussen argued that Nazi antisemitism was the attempt to ‘liquidate’
the sphere of money circulation that the Nazis saw personified in the Jews.118
He emphasised that the anti-capitalist aspect of antisemitism was not char-
acteristic of earlier forms of Jew-hatred, so that modern antisemitism must
be distinguished from its earlier forms. He further argued that this aspect of
modern antisemitism is still true for contemporary forms of this hatred. How-
ever, he pointed out that within secondary antisemitism, not real Jews are
considered to be the enemy, but characteristics perceived as Jewish, financial
speculations and intellectualism.119
Both Postone’s as well as Claussen’s approach to understand antisemitism
were of a more philosophical-theoretical nature. However, they both made
the important observation that antisemitism is often comprised of conspiracy
theories. These conspiracy theories are often based on the urge to blame con-
crete persons or groups for something that is abstract and incomprehensible -
like financial capital -, accompanied by the inability to accept any structural
dimension of for example financial speculations.120 This affects Jews in par-
ticular, as they are perceived as the ultimate capitalists. It is questionable,
however, that after 1945, as Claussen suggested, this does not target concrete
116Ibid, p. 93.
117Ibid, p. 95.
118See Claussen, Detlev: Grenzen der Aufkla¨rung, Die gesellschaftliche Genese des modernen
Antisemitismus, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer 2005 (first published in 1987), p. 74.
119See bid.
120See also Salzbach, Samuel: Antisemitismus als negative Leitidee der Moderne, p. 167.
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Jews anymore, but only ‘Jewish’ characteristics. This approach, does, on the
other hand, provide an explanation for left-wing antisemitism, as conspiracy
theories and the aversion against global financial capitalism are not solely a
right-wing phenomenon. Andrei S. Markovits has pointed out that this form
of antisemitism is also closely connected to anti-Americanism.121
The difference between how the ZfA interpreted antisemitism, and how these
more critical voices saw the issue, became most apparent in their assessments
of the Fassbinder affair.
4.2.3 The Fassbinder Affair
While the British Left at the time was pre-occupied with fighting Zionism from
an anti-racist stance, for the German Left, anti-capitalism was the much more
important struggle. Rather than interpreting Zionism as a kind of continuation
of Nazism, like the British Left did, the German Left saw an analogy between
past fascism and contemporary capitalism.
To be sure, the German left was anti-Zionist. As Thomas Haury has shown
for antisemitism in the former GDR, the strong anti-capitalist notion that
used antisemitic stereotypes was later combined with anti-Zionism. Zionism
came to be seen as connected to a conspiracy of Wall Street capitalism and
imperialism. Most importantly, this is not a form of antisemitism that is in
any way based on biological or racist arguments.122
In comparison with Britain, however, where anti-Zionism became a defining
characteristic of the Left, the anti-capitalist notion was a stronger factor for
the German Left. Unfortunately, this form of anti-capitalism was open to the
use of anti-Jewish stereotypes as well. This became evident during the major
controversy of the 1980s about the performance of the play by Rainer Werner
Fassbinder Garbage, the City and Death. The play had been written in 1976
and there was an attempt to stage it in Frankfurt in 1985, which resulted in
121See Markovits, Andrei S.: Uncouth Nation, Why Europe Dislikes America, Princeton:
Princeton University Press 2007, pp. 150 ff.
122See Haury, Thomas: Antisemitismus von links, Kommunistische Ideologie, Nationalismus
und Antizionismus in der fru¨hen DDR, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition 2002, p. 429.
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massive protests and the cancellation of performances.
The first performance on 31 October 1985 in Frankfurt had to be cancelled
after only a few minutes because several members of the audience – among
them many members of the Jewish community – decided to occupy the stage
and stop the actors from continuing their show on the grounds that the play was
antisemitic in content and effect. The protesters saw the antisemitic content of
the play embodied in the character of the ‘rich Jew’, a real estate speculator,
who is portrayed as vengeful and cold and – in the end – as a murderer. This
character says things like : “I buy old houses in this city, tear them down,
build new ones and sell them for a profit. The city protects me. It has to.
(...) I must not care, whether children weep, whether old people are harmed,
I must not care.”
The question whether or on what grounds exactly the play can be called an-
tisemitic was at the time discussed in newspaper articles and also in academia.
However, the debate around the play and its performance did not only focus
on the potentially antisemitic content, but also on a matter of principle: is it
legitimate to stop a play from being performed on the grounds of, as critics
put it, the subjective suspicion of antisemitism?123 Based on liberal values, it
was argued, this play and its text should have been made available to the pub-
lic and subjected to an open debate. Others argued in favour of Fassbinder’s
play due to its highly critical value regarding the housing market in Frankfurt.
These pro-play positions were mostly taken by left-wing intellectuals, mem-
bers of the Green party, parts of the SPD and newspapers like the Frankfurter
Rundschau. Voices against the play objected to the blatant antisemitism they
saw in it. This position was mostly taken by conservatives, members of the
CDU and FDP, the Christian churches and newspapers like the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung and most parts of the Jewish community.
This freedom of speech controversy was similar to the debate about Perdi-
tion in Britain around the same time. However, the basic premise of Garbage
was a quite different one. The play has to be understood in the context of
123See Karasek, Hellmuth in: Wo alle recht und unrecht haben, in: Der Spiegel 45/1985, p.
298-299.
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general debates about capitalism and housing situations at the time. In 1985,
and inspired by the play, articles were written about the conditions in the city
of Frankfurt and its post-war housing market, as this was assumed to form the
background of the play. In one article in Der Spiegel on 11 November 1985,
the (unnamed) author tried to trace exactly how valid Fassbinder’s depiction
of the Jew is by examining status, agents and history of the building industry
in Frankfurt. He came to the conclusion that the building industry, which he
understood as being connected to the entertainment industry in the Frank-
furter Westend, was in fact, just as Fassbinder’s Jewish hero represented, a
gangster syndicate, and in addition one in which Jews happened to appear
as agents in a relatively high proportion.124 The article investigated – to an
extent – the life of two real existing people, Ignatz Bubis and Hersch Beker,
two Jews who at the time owned a significant amount of property in Frankfurt
and asked which of them might have posed for Fassbinder’s Jewish character.
On the way to an answer to this question, the reader was informed about the
dynamics of “speculators”, “gambling dens”, of money, power and influence
and the obscenity of brothels. A prominent historian was in due course cited
to explain why Jews in Frankfurt appear in such high proportion in professions
that have to do with money, power and speculation: because they were not al-
lowed to participate in any other trade during the 18th and even 19th century,
they inevitably became bearers of the credit system. This historic situation,
according to the article, led to the emergence of Frankfurt as a banking city
and hub for international trade, a fact owed mostly to Jewish endeavour.
However, the article also stressed that “tough property business [is] not a
Jewish privilege” as there was also a Muslim business man involved. The most
important fact – as it is presented in the article - about the Frankfurt hous-
ing “monopoly” is mentioned at the end of the article and as if to underline
the validity of the argument, the conclusion was presented by citing Beker,
a Jew, who explains why he is critically opposed to the Fassbinder play. He
complained about the fact that “the executives of banks and insurance com-
124“Spekulanten, Magistrat-Gangstersyndikat”, in: Der Spiegel, No. 46, 1985, pp. 34-45
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panies are not portrayed”, but instead “the Jewish business man”, who is, in
comparison, “just a flea”. Whatever Beker’s intentions were regarding this
statement, the article certainly seemed to imply that there are higher, less
visible structures of money, power and influence connected to banks and in-
surance companies that need to be taken into consideration when examining
local housing markets.
If one takes a closer look at Fassbinder’s play, very similar lines of thought
may be traced. It is in fact not so much the “rich Jew” who all other characters
fall prey to, but he is merely one agent – albeit different from the others - within
the general conditions that turn humans into victims. The main theme in the
play is in fact the alienation and destruction of humanity, so it is the city, it is
garbage, it is modern society that causes the death of true human interaction.
Critics extensively debated in what respects Garbage, the City and Death
was antisemitic or possibly fostered antisemitism. Seyla Benhabib argued that
Fassbinder portrayed the Jewish character in the play as a flawed ‘Other’,
but that it is precisely the love for the ‘Other’ that characterised Fassbinder’s
work.125 Within this line of interpretation, Fassbinder has good intentions and
sympathises with the ‘Other’, however, these intentions become compromised
because his portrayals are not put in context and not interpreted. Conse-
quently, there is the danger that “Fassbinder’s play (can) become a metaphor
for German identity (...), expressed in the desire of large numbers of West
Germans to be able to speak not only about themselves, but also about the
others, the Jews, without being suffocated by the censure of guilt and the
past”.126 Examining Garbage in the context of other Fassbinder works and
also of other German works regarding representations of Germans, Jews and
German-Jewish history, however, makes Gertrude Koch’s interpretation more
125See Benhabib, Seyla, Markovits, Andrei S. and Postone, Moishe: Rainer Werner Fass-
binder’s Garbage, the City and Death: Renewed Antagonisms in the Complex Relation-
ship Between Jews and Germans in the Federal Republic of Germany, in: New German
Critique No. 38., Special Issue on the German-Jewish Controversy, Spring-Summer 1986,
pp.3-27, p. 18.
126ibid, p. 19.
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plausible: Fassbinder placed Jewish figures in prominent positions in his work
and although his work was characterised by empathy for the victims, for the
fringe groups of society, Jews were not actually given a place among these
groups127, the Jewish figure rather “slips into a privileged position”128. Fass-
binder may not have been an antisemite, however, “there lies at the root of
his creation an anti-Semitic motif, which often manifests itself in the form of
a philo-semitic stereotype: the picture of the Jew as the strict patriarch and
man of intellect, law abiding and austere”.129 Fassbinder’s work was in many
ways unique. The prominent positioning of Jewish figures is certainly not very
common for post-war German film and drama. However, the way in which
Fassbinder presented Jews and Jewishness was not at odds with the dynamic
of a “language of silence”130, or a “representation of absence”131, the art of
post-war German representations of Jewishness, in which Jewish characters or
the absence of these function as the anti-figures for representations of post-war
Germanness. In this sense, Fassbinder’s Jewish character can in fact be in-
terpreted as a product of the particular West-German obsession with national
identity and redemption.
But Fassbinder’s Jewish character served a further purpose: it cemented
the identification of Jews with capital. Critique of capitalism in left-wing as
well as in right-wing discourses uses simple constructions of who the enemy
is - CEOs, politicians, lobbyists. Everything that is perceived as bad in the
world is projected onto this enemy - greed, injustice, indecency. This simpli-
fied form of anti-capitalism is expressed in forms of evil vs. good patterns:
‘greedy locusts’ against ‘decent German businesses’, ‘bad financial capitalists’
against ‘good German workers’, ‘creative’ against ‘rapacious’ capital. It be-
comes apparent that capitalism is in this mindset separated into an abstract
127See Koch, Gertrud: Torments of the Flesh, Coldness of the Spirit: Jewish Figures in the
Films of Rainer Werner Fassbinder, in: New German Critique No.38, Special Issue on
the German-Jewish Controversy, Spring-Summer 1986, pp. 28-38, p. 33.
128ibid, p. 35.
129ibid, p. 37.
130See Schlant: The Language of Silence, introductory chapter
131See Bartov: “Seit die Juden weg sind ...”, p. 209.
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sphere of circulation and a concrete sphere of production, whereas the abstract
sphere is perceived as negative, the concrete sphere as positive. For Germans,
Jews therefore occupy a ‘special’ position in two ways: they are central to
a notion of German identity that is incomparable with other minorities, and
antisemitic stereotypes evolve around different themes than those for other mi-
norities. This has wide repercussions for comparisons between Jews and other
minorities, but the ZfA’s work, in contrast, emphasised the common aspects
of prejudice against different ethnic minorities.
In addition, while the ZfA generally represented - and still represents -
the view-point that contemporary antisemitism needs to be taken seriously,
it also saw strong anti-antisemitic tendencies in German society and public.
Bergmann and Erb concluded that these anti-antisemitic tendencies in Ger-
many today emanated from a fight against a possible continuation of anti-
semitic traditions in schools and in public.132 One reason for this was that just
as debates about antisemitism came to characterise German identity, the abil-
ity to deal with current antisemitism became a fundamental part of German
democracy.
Although especially later research produced by the ZfA showed a plethora
of different expressions of antisemitism in private and public, the underlying
assumption of this research was that there was a public safety net: any ex-
pression of antisemitism would ultimately be refuted. This stood in contrast
to later studies who detected a form of ‘normalisation’ in antisemitic discourse
in Germany. One could speculate on the reasons for antisemitism researchers
not to be alarmist. From the 1980s onwards, anti-antisemitism grew into a
fundamental part of German society and, as Stuart Taberner has shown, this
rejection of racialist prejudice was about a stabilisation of political culture in
132Bergmann, Werner and Erb, Rainer: Wie antisemitisch sind die Deutschen? Meinung-
sumfragen 1945-1994, in: Benz, Wolfgang (ed.): Antisemitismus in Deutschland, Zur
Aktualita¨t eines Vorurteils, Mu¨nchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag 1995, p. 63.
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the Federal Republic.133 But what is also striking about this kind of prejudice
research is that neither Jews nor the Shoah figured greatly in its theoretical
foundations. It was in fact the dangerous abstraction of antisemitism that
Postone had once warned against that characterised the approach of the ZfA:
“The abstract nature of the treatment of National Socialism and
the dialectic of guilt and identification have in common an attempt
at constituting identity through an act of abstract negation of the
past. Instead of taking responsibility for the past while rejecting it,
the attempt is made to escape from it, that is, to criticize the past
from a position that seeks to be ‘other’ by refusing to recognize its
own personal and cultural conncetions to the past.”134
In line with Postone, critical theoretical approaches saw antisemitism as
something that was constitutive for German society as a whole. Mainstream
antisemitism research in Germany faced the problem that it had to be affir-
mative of a new German society. In its analysis, antisemitism was thus limited
to a certain percentage of the German population, and its prevention meant
to work against those elements that practised social exclusion.
In this sense, antisemitism research became part of a new German identity.
This also meant that from very early on, the ZfA saw the study of antisemitism
as a model for, and an integral part of, the study of hostilities against other
ethnic minorities. It was recognised that the integration of minorities was the
yardstick by which the new German democracy would have to be measured.
This was already the case under the directorship of Herbert Strauss, who saw
the immigration problematic as related to earlier antisemitism. Under his
leadership, the ZfA dedicated two of its ‘Lerntage’ (workshops), to asylum
practices in 1985 and integration policies in 1989 respectively.135 However,
133See Taberner, Stuart: The Final Taboo? Martin Walser’s Critique of Philosemitism in
’Ohne Einander’, in: German Life and Letters, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2001, pp. 154-166, here
p. 154.
134Postone, Moishe: After the Holocaust, p. 247.
135See Strauss, Herbert A. and Kampe, Norbert (eds.): Lerntag u¨ber Asylrecht und Asyl-
praxis: 1933 vs. 1985 gemeinsam mit der Research Foundation for Jewish Immigration
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hostility against non-Germans was not analysed as racism, but as prejudice.
The involvement of the ZfA in debates about foreigners thus stood in contrast
to emerging approaches in discourse analytical studies, which framed anti-
foreigner hostility in Germany as racism, based on prominent Anglo-American
theories on the subject.
4.2.4 Discourse analytical approaches
Although there was not a theorisation of anti-‘foreigner’ hostility on a scale
comparable to theories of antisemitism, there have been attempts to take cues
from theoretical approaches to racism in other countries and apply these to
German society. From the late 1980s and early 1990s and inspired by the works
of British scholars Robert Miles and Stuart Hall, researchers of anti-‘foreigner’
hostility in Germany began to understand it as a discourse and a topic to be
investigated with the methods of discourse analysis. From very early on, they
saw their topic as ‘racism’ rather than anti-‘foreigner’ hostility, which as a
concept had dominated previous research on the topic.
Although Miles and Hall each have different approaches to racism, they gen-
erally agree that racism is a discursive practice expressed in politics, language
and culture. Most notably Siegfried Ja¨ger and his method of ‘critical discourse
analysis’ and, although much later, Ruth Wodak’s ‘historical discourse analy-
sis’ have since shaped methods, means and theory of racism research in Ger-
many and German-speaking countries. Both methods have a strong linguistic
and textual focus. Ruth Wodak and others, however, place their emphasis not
solely on the texts and discourses, but on their social and historical context as
well.136
In his studies on the topic of ‘foreigner’ hostility, Ja¨ger emphasised that he
understands racism is a discourse, meaning that it is not confined to single
New York, 24. November 1985 ; Strauss, Herbert A. (ed.): Lerntag u¨ber Ausla¨nderpolitik
1989: Das Ende der Integration? gemeinsam mit der Research Foundation for Jewish
Immigration New York, 12. November 1989.
136See Reisigl, Martin and Ruth Wodak: Discourse and Discrimination, Rhetorics of racism
and antisemitism, London: Routledge 2001, p. 41.
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actions but manifests itself in a way of thinking and speaking.137 Ja¨ger’s ap-
proach was also based on Michel Foucault’s theory of discourse and power.
Foucault argued that through language and discourse, structures of power are
produced and reproduced. Under Ja¨ger’s supervision, the study of right-wing
extremism, racism and nationalism as discourse with the help of critical dis-
course analysis became one of the main objects of the private and left-leaning
Duisburger Institut fu¨r Sprach- und Sozialforschung (Duisburg Institute for
Linguistics and Social Science), which was founded in 1987.
Ja¨ger pointed out that racism was an everyday phenomenon and not confined
to violent actions of the radical right.138 Both Ja¨ger and Wodak understood the
dynamics of racism to be the same as in antisemitism.139 Wodak emphasised
that this is also true for ‘ethnicist’ or sexist prejudice.140 A number of studies
have since used this method to investigate German racism and have for example
dealt with media depictions of asylum seekers and racism in the press.141
This discourse analytical approach was also used in one of the studies that
dealt with anti-Muslim prejudice in particular. Irmgard Pinn and Marlies
Wehner investigated how German media depict Muslim women.142 They showed
that there was a striking difference between the image of the Muslim woman in
Arab countries, and the image of the Muslim women living in Germany. While
Iranians for example were depicted as mysterious and threatening, Turkish
women in Germany were portrayed as asexual, submissive, oppressed by their
137See Ja¨ger, Siegfried and Januscheck, Franz (eds.): ‘Der Diskurs als Rassismus’, in idem
(ed): Der Diskurs des Rassismus, Osnabru¨ck: Verein zur Fo¨rderung der Sprachwis-
senschaft in Forschung und Ausbildung e.V. 1992, pp. 5-12.
138See Ja¨ger, Siegfried: Allta¨glicher Rassismus in Deutschland, Erste Ergebnisse einer diskur-
sanalytischen Studie, in: Ibid, pp. 130-147.
139Ibid, p. 141.
140Wodak: Discourse and Discrimination, p. 1.
141See especially the contributions in: Ja¨ger, Siegfried (ed.): Der Diskurs des Rassismus,
Osnabru¨ck 1992.
142See Pinn, Irmgard and Wehner, Marlies: Das Bild der Islamischen Frau in westlichen
Medien, in: Ja¨ger, Siegfried and Januscheck, Franz (eds.): ’Der Diskurs als Rassismus’,
in idem (ed): Der Diskurs des Rassismus, Osnabru¨ck: Verein zur Fo¨rderung der Sprach-
wissenschaft in Forschung und Ausbildung e.V. 1992, pp. 179-193.
195
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s
husbands and hard working.143 They pointed out that the media coverage of
the Gulf War, for example, led to the establishment of an image of Islam as
an enemy to the Western World. However, they also emphasised that this me-
dia image had real consequences on attitudes and behaviour towards Muslim
women, when they are for example not considered for higher ranking jobs or
when they are patronised and forced to decide between wearing a head scarf
or working in a public place.144
In contrast to Britain, however, studies about racist discourse remained
marginal in Germany, and, more importantly, never translated into policies.
In addition, while the 1970s and 1980s in Britain were characterised by the
struggle for recognition of minority communities and major developments in
national self-understanding towards multiculturalism, this was not equally the
case in Germany. There were neither comparable anti-discrimination laws,
nor laws that encouraged inclusion and integretation of minorities, mirroring
developments in Britain.
4.2.5 Similarities to Britain: German multiculturalism?
Some progress towards integration of especially the Turkish minority was nev-
ertheless made. While the 1960s and 1970s had been characterised by a denial
of the German government that the earlier recruited guest workers intended
to stay and build a life in Germany, this slowly changed in the 1980s. Al-
ready in 1979, the coalition of social democrats and liberals under chancellor
Helmut Schmidt attempted a new approach to the guest worker question. As
Rita Chin has pointed out, the older notion of guest workers as temporary
labour forces was abandoned in favour of an acknowledgement of the need of
‘integration’. In the wake of these changes, numerous studies were funded to
assess the situation of immigrants, the ‘Ausla¨nderbeauftrage’ was created and
a curricular reform was promoted. The ‘foreigner problem’ also became a topic
143Ibid, p. 182 f.
144See ibid, p. 190.
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for the national elections in 1983.145
As Chin has indicated, the CDU’s position at the time was that different
cultures are distinct and self-contained entities. With regard to Turkish guest
workers in Germany, this meant that they were required to fully assimilate or
to return to their home country. In this sense the CDU sought “to restore
national self-esteem based on the Federal Republic’s position as a now mature
liberal democracy” while maintaining that “national cultures could not cross
pollinate and belonged to wholly separate natural habitats.”146 Thus, the idea
of integration “relied on the idea of cultural difference to explain the inherent
difficulty of Germans and guest workers (primarily Turks) living together in
the same society.”147
This is exemplified in the publication of the Heidelberger Manifest in the
newspaper Die Zeit of 17 June 1982. It showed that the belief that ‘foreigners’
pose a threat to German society was widespread and accepted. The manifesto
claimed that the different ‘Vo¨lker’ were biological and cultural systems that
are distinguishable from each other. Multiculturalism was perceived as an
‘ethnic catastrophe’ and ‘over-alienation’ should by all means be avoided.148
The manifesto was not signed by radical right-wing activists, but by well known
politicians and academics, among them members of the conservative Christian
Democratic Party (CDU).149
In the 1990s, studies revealed that German hostility against foreigners was
145See Chin, Rita: Democratization, Turks, and the Burden of German History, in: Breck-
man, W., Gordon, P.E., Moses, D., Moyn, S., Neaman, E. (eds.): The Modernist Imagi-
nation, Intellectual History and Critical Theory. Essays in Honour of Martin Jay, New
York: Berghahn Books 2009, pp. 242-267, here p. 251.
146Ibid, p. 252.
147Chin, Rita: Guest Worker Migration and the Unexpected Return of Race, in: Rita Chin,
Heide Fehrenbach, Geoff Eley, and Atina Grossmann (eds.): After the Nazi Racial State.
Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press 2009, pp. 80-101, here p. 89.
148Heidelberger Manifest, in: Die Zeit, 17 June 1982.
149On the Manifest see also: Herbert, Ulrich: Geschichte der Ausla¨nderpolitik in Deutsch-
land, Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flu¨chtlinge, Mu¨nchen: CH Beck
2001.
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in fact mostly directed against Turks.150 Already in 1982, two thirds of the
Germans agreed that the “guestworkers” should leave the country and in 1989,
even more held this view.151 After unification there was an increase in violence
against immigrants and asylum seekers and migrants were attacked in Hoyers-
werda and Rostock in 1991 and 1992.152
It is important to acknowledge that until 1990, the majority of foreigners
living in Germany held only a restricted residency status, meaning that they
regularly needed to reapply for residency at their local authority. Only the
amendment of the foreigners’ legislation allowed for the application for perma-
nent residency after eight years. The amendment also included the right for
foreign born nationals to become Germans, providing they give up their former
nationality, when turning eighteen.153 This legislation reflects the exclusion-
ary understanding of German nationality and the extent to which institutions
perpetuated this notion.
This exclusionary notion of Germanness also became evident in the asylum
policies of the Federal Republic. Since the 1980s, an increasing number of
migrants have been seeking asylum in Germany due to the political situation
in their countries. Among these migrants were for example Iranians, Afghans,
and Lebanese. In contrast to the former labour immigrants, they often had a
different legal status and their entry into Germany was subject to an asylum
seeker policy. Their stay in Germany was only tolerated, which resulted in a
lack of fundamental rights: a work permit was usually not issued and as soon
as the political situation in their home country allowed a return - according
to the assessment of German administrative workers - they faced deportation.
After unification, the Bundestag amended the Basic Law so that refugees could
only apply for asylum if they arrived directly from the state where they were
150See Kandil, Fuad: Zwischen kultureller Stigmatisierung und ideologischer Ausgrenzung.
Muslimische Zuwanderer in Deutschland. in: Robertson-Wensauer, Caroline Y. (ed.):
Multikulturalita¨t - Interkulturalita¨t? Probleme und Perspektiven der multikulturellen
Gesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2002 (2nd ed.), pp.119-141, here p.120.
151Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany, p.104.
152Ibid.
153Kolinsky: Non-German Minorities in German Society, p. 91.
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persecuted.
In the context of the relationship between conservatism, antisemitism and
an anti-immigration stance, it is not surprising that antisemitism researchers
saw the need to combine the analysis of all three. It is striking, however, that
this kind of research did not stand in a context of a struggle for recognition
of the minorities themselves. To be sure, that struggle did happen, but in
comparison to events in Britain, it was much more subdued and quieter, and
partly bore different effects. In addition, and what most scholars of racism
and antisemitism did not realise, religion became an important factor for the
Turkish minority in Germany.
4.2.6 Religion and Recognition: Turks in Germany
There are no comparable ‘milestones’ like the Honeyford and Rushdie affair
with regard to Muslims in German discourse. The German state put only
little effort into its relationship with the Turkish minority, and disregarded
their religious needs completely. The German state in fact considered the
religious needs of their foreign workers to be part of the state’s foreign affairs.
The Turkish prime minister formed a separate division of the official religious
affairs office to handle the religious needs of Turks abroad. However, the DITIB
(Turkish-Islamic Association for Religious Affairs) was not officially founded
in Germany until 1984. Fetzer and Soper concluded that “thus, DITIB was
not sufficiently organised early enough to provide for the religious needs of at
least the first generation of Turkish Gastarbeiter.” They showed that “in its
absence, Muslims in Germany formed their own organisations to respond to the
religious, cultural, and political interests of the Muslim population” and that
“already in 1980, for example, the Verband Islamischer Kulturzentren (VIKZ,
or Union of Islamic Cultural Centres, part of the Su¨leyman movement) claimed
around eighteen thousand members, and the Milli Go¨rus - affiliated Islamische
Union Deutschlands - reported twenty thousand.”154
There is a great organisational diversity of Turkish Islam in Germany. In
154Fetzer and Soper: Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany, p. 103.
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1995, more than two thousand Turkish-Islamic organisations existed in Ger-
many, the majority of their organisational leaders are resident in Germany.
Next to DITIB the second largest umbrella organisation is the Association for
a New World View in Europe (AMTG), which is Islamist in orientation and
includes 262 member organisations. There are a variety of other organisations,
some of which with a militant fundamentalist outlook, the Turkish extremist
group the Grey Wolves, an intellectual ‘order’ with training schools, and 82
Alevite communities.155 Attempts to establish a central representative body
have resulted in the foundation of the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic
of Germany in 1986, which advocates Muslim integration into German society
and the religious practice of Islam in a secular environment.The Central Coun-
cil of Muslims in Germany was founded in December 1994, which aims at im-
proving the legal situation of Muslims and representing the interests of Muslims
in German administrative, social or legal contexts. The variety of organisa-
tions reflects the multi-faceted structure of the Turkish minority. Karakasoglu
concluded that in general, Islamic organisations in Germany “have tended to
argue their case on the basis of European Enlightenment concepts such as
‘human rights’, ‘religious freedom’ and ‘human dignity’”.156
While there are now purpose-built mosques in Germany, Fetzer and Soper
concluded that “German policy continues to disadvantage Muslims in some
ways.” They pointed out that “no Muslim group has yet received the public
corporation status that would secure various privileges for the community and,
even more importantly, demonstrate the state’s symbolic acceptance of the
Muslim presence in Germany.” 157
This stood in contrast to the fact that religion has played a significant role
for most Muslims in Germany. With regard to Turks, it can be said that “what-
ever the different schools of thought and varieties of religious practice among
Turks in Germany, Islam has been the moving force behind the development
of organisational networks within the Turkish minority”.158 Examples of this
155Karakasoglu: Turkish Cultural Orientations in Germany, p.170.
156Ibid, p. 173.
157Fetzer and Soper: Muslims and the State in Britain France and Germany, p. 129.
158Karakasoglu: Turkish Cultural Orientations in Germany and the Role of Islam, p.158.
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are the Turkish religious organisations and the Turkish language press. The
importance of Islam has increased in the lives of Turkish migrants in Germany.
One reason for this could be that during times of high unemployment among
Turks, Islamic organisations provided social and material support, just as they
provide support in other everyday issues like child care and religious educa-
tion.159 They also played a leading role in organising protests when xenophobic
attacks intensified in Germany after unification.
Further reasons for the increasing religiousness of German Turks are the
strong family values in conjunction with the experience of social exclusion.
After their families joined them in Germany and faced with social exclusion,
Turkish migrants “turned back to the cultural and value orientations of their
home country, not to those in the surrounding host society”.160 Everyday
values of ‘family honour’, ‘respect for the head of the family’, ‘regard and
obedience’ became much more relevant again after family reunions and char-
acterised the return to Turkish cultural context and traditions. For Turks in
Germany, the family played a key role: it passes on social norms, provides
material security and contributes to the stability of the established value sys-
tems. In this regard, “the honour of the family itself tends to be linked to the
‘honourable’ behaviour of its female members and their adherence to their tra-
ditional role” but “the extent to which families adhere to these values in their
daily lives depends on the urban or rural living environment and on the social
status, educational qualification or religious orientation of the parents”.161
For the second generation Turkish migrants, religious orientation was even
more strongly linked to experiences of hostility in the German host society.
Studies showed that Islam became an attractive form of identity for young
Muslims who encounter social exclusion in Germany.162 However, the second
159Ibid, p. 166.
160Kolinsky: Non-German Minorities in German Society, p. 161.
161Ibid.
162See No¨kel, Sigrid: Islam und Selbstbehauptung - Alltagsweltliche Strategien junger Frauen
in Deutschland, in: Klein Hessling, Ruth; No¨kel, Sigrid; Werner, Karin (Hrsg.): Der neue
Islam der Frauen, Weibliche Lebenspraxis in der globalisierten Moderne, Fallstudien aus
Afrika, Asien und Europa, Bielefeld: Transcript 1999, pp. 124-146; Tietze, Nikola:
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and third generation Muslims have their own approach to religion, which is
more intellectual than the popular Islam of their parents.163
In addition to the social exclusion Turks experience in Germany, German in-
tegration efforts have tended to be patronising rather than empowering. Since
the 1970s there have been a number of activists, initiatives and action groups
aimed at helping Turks to integrate into German society. They organised
language classes, helped with German bureaucracy and established womens’
circles. These circles were generally liberal in their intention and therefore
believed that adapting to German culture and values would be necessary and
beneficial with regard to integration.164 But although Turks have acquired Ger-
man citizenship in order to become doctors or lawyers, many remain Turkish
and Kolinsky concluded that instead of accepting their situation in Germany
“they are finding their own voice, their own advocates, and their own under-
standing of what it means and what it should mean to be of Turkish origin in
German society”.165
4.2.7 Thinking about antisemitism in a multicultural society
In contrast to Britain, where religion became the issue for social cohesion in
the 1980s, this process took on different forms in Germany. This was partly
because there was no equal struggle for recognition by minorities in Germany.
But most importantly, there was no multicultural framework equal to that in
Britain in which minorities could claim any kind of recognition. While in-
tegration policies introduced an aspect of care into the relationship between
state and minorities, which had previously been absent, these were also char-
acterised by the patronising assumption that minorities could not speak for
themselves.
Although the antisemitism researchers at the ZfA, and those who studied
Islamische Identita¨ten, Formen muslimischer Religio¨sita¨t junger Ma¨nner in Deutschland
und Frankreich, Hamburg: Hamburger Ed. 2001.
163Karakasoglu: Turkish Cultural Orientations in Germany, p. 172.
164Kolinsky, Eva: Introduction, in: Kolinsky, Eva and Horrocks, David (eds.): Turkish
Culture in German Society Today, Oxford: Berghahn 1996, pp.x-xxviii, here p.xix.
165Ibid.
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antisemitism in other contexts, recognised the need to measure Germany’s
attitudes towards foreigners and put this in relationship to Germany’s self-
image as a democracy, in their analysis and methodologies they also became
complicit in denying these minorities their agency. This reflected the way
in which this research was characterised by an absence of Jews and Jewish
issues. Antisemitism research and prejudice research thus became about the
new Germany rather than about Jews or Turks.
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The 1990s and beyond:
universalising and comparing
antisemitism
The previous chapters have dealt with conceptualisations of antisemitism up to
the 1990s as well as the role of Jews, and in relation to them, of other minorities
in German and British discourse. This chapter deals with the question how and
why, on this basis, comparisons between antisemitism and anti-Muslim resent-
ments developed. I argue that comparisons are drawn in line with dominant
national narratives about the place of minorities in each national discourse.
This means that in Germany, comparing antisemitism and Islamophobia is
part of a discourse of normalisation. Antisemitism is normalised by equat-
ing it with other forms of hostility, which is a strategy of dealing with the
Nazi past. In Britain, in contrast, there is a different dynamic: comparing
Muslims and Jews arises naturally out of how minority-majority relations are
understood in a multicultural framework. Jews and Muslims are thought to be
equally affected by racism as they both equally represent the ‘Other’ for British
national identity. In both countries, this has the effect that antisemitism as
a concept has been universalised. Any particular dimension it may have has
been filtered out in order to fit into certain narratives.
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5.1 Britain: Conceptualising Antisemitism in a
multicultural society
The previous chapter showed that over the past five decades, the understand-
ing of the relationship between immigrants and native Britons has changed.
This relationship was first seen in a framework of ‘race relations’, in which im-
migrants were thought to be responsible for any ‘racial tensions’. Over time,
however, it became what can be called multiculturalism, a system in which im-
migrants are even assumed to have contributed to British society. The basic
assumption, however, is still governed by the idea of cultural plurality: there
are distinct social groups that need to be managed. This has had effects on
all ethnic minorities, including Jews, and has strongly influenced conceptuali-
sations of forms of hatred against these minority groups. While neither Jews
nor Muslims in particular were protected by earlier race relations legislation,
they are now both (somewhat) protected as religious minorities in a multicul-
tural state. This is a fairly recent development and the result of a struggle for
recognition from Muslims that began in the 1980s.
As we have seen in the previous chapters, there was a serious gap of con-
cepts of antisemitism in Britain. This gap was only filled from the late 1980s.
Nevertheless, there was a reality of antisemitism, and researchers and practi-
tioners were eager to find ways to categorise antisemitism that satisfied this
reality. This chapter shows that in the 1990s, a particular understanding of
antisemitism developed that was set in this particular framework of minority-
majority relations and was directly influenced by debates about the relation-
ship between Muslims and the British state, but also built on racism theories.
5.1.1 New ways of thinking about minorities and citizenship
From 1997, under ‘New Labour’, there have been important shifts and legisla-
tive initiatives regarding ‘race’ and ‘community’ relations. The Race Relations
Act was amended in 2000, as a result of the Macpherson report, and now re-
quires authorities to address not only institutional discrimination, but to pre-
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vent it pro-actively. The Commission for Racial Equality, founded in 1976,
became the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which not only protects
but promotes equality across age, disability, gender, race, religion and belief,
sexual orientation and gender reassignment.
Tariq Modood described this as a true multiculturalism: “Multiculturalism
(...) has grown up, sometimes in contradictory ways, in response to crises
as well as mature reflection, and so is evolutionary and multifaceted. The
’multi’ is an essential feature of what I am talking about for the policy and
institutional arrangements have grown out of and continue to be part of ways
to address not just Muslims but a plurality of minorities. The ’multi’ does not
merely refer to the fact that a number of minority groups are within the frame
but also to the fact that different kinds of groups are being referred to. Some
groups are defined by ‘race’ or ‘colour’ (...) some by national origins (...), some
by religion (...)”.1
Especially when compared to Germany, this means that in Britain, “mi-
norities are being allowed to maintain and develop their cultural specificities,
with host institutions sensitive to this cultural diversity and (...) encouraged
to modify their procedures and practices accordingly.” 2
This form of multiculturalism has had a profound positive impact for Mus-
lims. With the Racial and Religious Hatred Act in 2006, which came into
force in amended form in 2007 and which outlaws the incitement of hatred
against another person on the grounds of their religion, the British govern-
ment particularly acknowledged and addressed the acute problem of hostility
towards Muslims. This form of multiculturalism also meant that on local levels
Muslims were able to ensure that their requirements are met, for example by
obtaining permission for the building of mosques, practising halal slaughter
1Modood, Tariq: Introduction, in: Meer, Nasar: Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of
Multiculturalism, The Rise of Muslim Consciousness, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
2010, p. X
2Meer, Nasar and Tariq Modood: The Multicultural States We’re in, in: Triandafyllidou,
Anna, Modood, Tariq and Nasar Meer (eds.): European Multiculturalisms, Cultural,
Religious and Ethnic Challenges, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2012, pp. 61 -
87, here p. 65.
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and establishing Muslim cemeteries.3 Furthermore, since religious education
in schools is organised under local authority, Muslims were in some cases able
to secure that their claims concerning religious education in schools are being
met.4 However, only in 2001 were the first two Muslim schools granted state
funding,5 which appears belated in the light of the state funding of several
Jewish, Hindu, and Sikh schools and at least seemingly puts Islam on the level
of a ‘second class religion’.
Muslims were, in addition to that, also able to gain recognition in matters of
law. Joly points out that although their claims regarding the use of Shari’a law
for family matters have not been met, several cases imply “that the cultural
and religious specificities of Muslims are sometimes taken into account.”6 Ac-
cording to Vertovec, traditional Muslim values concerning marriage, polygamy,
divorce, heritage, funerals and slaughter are sometimes factored in by British
courts.7
As Tariq Modood pointed out, however, “the new political relevance of reli-
gion has not come from the state or ‘top-down’ but from the political mobilisa-
tion of specific minorities or parts of minorities who prioritised their religious
identity over that of ethnicity and ‘colour’.8 This development can be traced
by looking at some of the major debates that mark the fight for Muslim recog-
nition.
Since then the issue of Islam in Britain has played a significant role in pub-
lic discourse. In the 1990s “there has been a noticeable increase in derogatory
3See Vertovec, Steven: Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain, in: Yazbeck
Haddad, Yvonne (ed.): Muslims in the West - From Soujourners to Citizens, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 1997, p.174.
4See Nielsen, Jorgen: Towards a European Islam, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2002.
5See Fetzer and Soper: Muslims and the state in Britain, France and Germany, p.45.
6Joly, Daniele and Imtaz, Karima: Muslims and Citizenship in the United Kingdom, in:
Withol de Wenden, Catherine et al. (ed.): New European Identity and Citizenship,
Aldershot: Ashgate 2002, p.117-132, p.127.
7Vertovec: Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain , p.179.
8Modood, Tariq: Introduction, in: Meer, Nasar: Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of
Multiculturalism, The Rise of Muslim Consciousness, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
2010, p. xi.
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images of Islam, patterns of anti-Muslim discrimination in employment, insti-
tutional intolerance of Muslim values, and occasional acts of physical violence
against Muslims in Britain”.9 This development caused the Commission for
Racial Equality to look into cases of religious discrimination already in the
early 1990s as well as the establishment of a Commission on British Mus-
lims and Islamphobia by the Runnymede Trust in 1996, which published the
report Islamophobia: a challenge for us all in 1997, calling for serious anti-
discrimination measures and a betterment of the social status of Muslims in
Britain.
Research suggests that since the Islamist terrorist attacks in New York on
11 September 2001 and London on 7 July 2005, the public perception of Mus-
lims has worsened, and Muslims have increasingly been victims of hate crimes.
This is a European phenomenon: as the EUMC’s Summary Report into Is-
lamophobia in the EU following 11 September 2001 shows, Muslims became
indiscriminate victims of an upsurge of both verbal and physical attacks fol-
lowing the events of 11 September.10
One of the findings of the Runnymede Report was that Muslims have been
overwhelmingly seen as part of a monolithic and static entity. Chris Allen
showed that Muslim “all have become indiscriminately characterised by the
same negative and stereotypical attributes, where all Muslims have the capa-
bility to either be terrorists or at least be supportive of terrorism”.11 With
regard to media representation, Chris Allen stressed that “Islam and Muslims
have been clearly presented in terms of being incompatible with the norms of
‘our’ (British) society and ‘our’ (British) way of life.”12
The London bombings of 2005 have warranted the government to imple-
ment not only anti-terrorism policies, but also to inquire how British Muslims
become radicalised and how this could be prevented. The Home Office estab-
lished seven working groups under the title ‘Preventing Extremism Together’
9Vertovec, Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain, p.24.
10See Allen, Christopher and Nielsen, Jorgen: EUMC Summary Report on Islamophobia in
the EU following 11 September 2001, Vienna 2002.
11Allen, Chris: Islamophobia, Farnham: Ashgate 2010, p. 86.
12Ibid, p. 87.
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in 2005, focussing on Muslim youth, education, women’s issues, regional, lo-
cal, and community projects, the training of imams and the role of mosques,
community security and police relations, and tackling extremism and radi-
calisation. The reports published by these groups suggested an inquiry into
the process in which some Muslims become radicalised and emphasised that
the solutions to radicalism and extremism lie in “tackling inequality, discrim-
ination, deprivation and inconsistent Government policy, in particular foreign
policy”.13 In 2006 the government launched the Commission on Integration
and Cohesion, which published its report in 2007. The Commission suggested
new ways of approaching integration and cohesion and policies that enable
local communities to enhance integration. The underlying assumption of the
report was that radicalisation was caused by a lack of integration. For this the
report has been criticised, as it neglected to take into account other factors
that may affect or cause Muslim radicalisation, like British foreign policy.14
Although the New Labour approach to community relations has on the whole
brought important changes to anti-discrimination legislation and its imple-
mentation, some scholars detect a retreat of multiculturalism under Labour,
relating to failure of multicultural policies but also a new assertiveness of the
liberal state to impose liberal principles. Labour’s policies and actions could
be interpreted as a move from multiculturalism to civic integration, especially
since its reaction to the 2001 riots in various English cities and the subsequent
Cantle Report.15
Nasar Meer, on the other hand, stressed that there is certainly not a retreat
from multiculturalism. The establishment of the aforementioned Equality and
Human Rights Commission, which operates on the basis of a single Equal-
ity Act and which is a single point of contact to provide information for the
public, is an enhancement. Muslim integration and matters are no longer dis-
cussed in terms of ’race’ or ethnicity, but in a framework of multiculturalism
13Cited in Brighton: British Muslims, multiculturalism and UK foreign policy, p.2.
14Ibid.
15See Joppke, Christian: The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: theory and
policy, in: British Journal of Sociology Vol 55, Issue 2, 2004, pp. 237-257.
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that acknowledges the intersectionality of forms of discrimination. He also
explained that “This recognition of complex discrimination is (...) coupled
to a new emphasis on a journey into citizenship in which the acquisition of
citizenship marks neither the beginning nor the end of the processes of inte-
gration.”16 This idea of a journey into citizenship was exemplified in the Paths
to Citizenship Green Paper of February 2008. As Meer puts it, the dynamic of
British multicultural citizenship “has successfully and legislatively embedded
a recognition of ‘difference’ - with the goal of promoting equality of access and
opportunity - into Britain’s self-image, and that this has led to some significant
accommodations for certain groups. British Muslims are presently appealing
to this tradition as one means of achieving greater civic inclusion and elevating
their civic-status”.17
5.1.2 Forging alliances
From a point of view of multiculturalism, it makes sense for minorities to
forge alliances: in a majority-minority relationship, it can be beneficial for
minorities to unite their fight for common goals. In the context of British
multiculturalism, which promotes diversity, fighting for recognition of religious
practices and cultural plurality, combating hate crime and promoting equality
are all areas of common interest to Jews and Muslims in the UK.
One of the first indicators that there was a trend to subsume the fight
against antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentments in one category was the
1994 Runnymede Trust report A Very Light Sleeper, a forerunner of the later
report on Islamophobia. What was new about the report was that it portrayed
antisemitism as racism and as more dangerous than previously thought. In its
policy recommendations it stated that antisemitism cannot be regarded as only
an attitude of a right-wing fringe, but is something that has to do with notions
and concepts of ‘being British’. It also argued in favour of fighting different
racist prejudices together: “Action against antisemitism should be integrated
16Meer and Modood: The Multicultural States We’re in, p. 67.
17Meer, Nasar: Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism, p. 5.
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with action against other forms of racism”.18 The report outlined that
“The struggle against racism needs to be holistic and indivisible:
an attack on one minority group is an attack on all. Antisemitism
clearly has both similarities and connections with forms of racism
directed at non-white people. Too often in recent years, however,
the seriousness and existence of modern antisemitism have been
forgotten, and the links with other forms of racism have been ob-
scured.”19
The tone of the report was markedly different to the words of the Chief Rabbi
on the situation of the Jewish community discussed in the previous chapter.
The report instead defended multiculturalism as a strategy to prevent racism.
One of the key policies stated that “Both liberal democracy and cultural plu-
ralism need to be strengthened”.20 Also outlined are issues regarding practical
multiculturalism. The report asked how society can balance values and mean-
ings with the need for minorities to have their freedom for development. Dual
loyalties should be positively welcomed and there should be real choices with
regard to ‘assimilation’ and ‘integration’. 21
These issues were seen as inherently connected with the fight against anti-
Muslim resentments and the interests of the Muslim community in particular.
One of the members of the Runnymede Trust commission, Akbar Ahmed, em-
phasised the importance of dialogue and openness between different religions
and cultures. One of his reasons to join the commission was: “I felt that a
Muslim voice representing broad Muslim opinion was crucial in understanding
the problem of antisemitism in the UK and to convey the feelings of Mus-
lims to the Commission. If Jews are easily stereotyped and misunderstood so
too are Muslims. There is a real danger of seeing Muslims - or Jews - as a
18A Very Light Sleeper. The Persistence and Dangers of Antisemitism, Review by the
Runnymede Commission on Antisemitism, January 1994, London: Runnymede Trust, p.
7.
19Ibid, p. 12
20Ibid, p. 7.
21Ibid, p. 13.
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monolith.”22 He further stated that he hoped that through the Commission
“both communities would be able to move closer towards each other”, as it is
“imperative that people of good will from all sides play their part in dialogue
and discussion.”23
The report firstly marked a change in the way antisemitism was framed: it
was defined as racism and central to the formation of Britishness. It secondly
marked a change in the way the Jewish community was portrayed. Instead of
pointing out that it was different to other minorities - more loyal and willing
to integrate - it sought to unite with other minorities in opposition to the ma-
jority culture. Instead of stressing how ‘British’ Jews were, the report showed
that Jews were also a racialised minority. Since the report, the dialogue that
Ahmed was talking about has been continued, for example in interfaith groups
such as Alif-Aleph or the Joseph Interfaith Foundation, whose work exclusively
deals with Jewish-Muslim relations. However, this is not always an equal rela-
tionship. In British multiculturalism, and in line with a development towards
a national narrative of ‘journeys into citizenship’, the Jewish community is
still seen as a model of integration into British society, especially for the Mus-
lim community. The Jewish approach to integration into British society is
thus still seen as a particular successful one. There are also issues that are a
‘thorn’ in the alliance between Jews and Muslims, and are also problematic for
a straightforward narrative of Jewish integration. One of these is Holocaust
remembrance.
As described in the previous chapter, there was a universalistic tendency
in British Holocaust remembrance. This was still characteristic for Holocaust
remembrance in Britain from the 1990s onwards, but the focus has shifted from
remembering the ‘casualties of war’ towards remembering victims of genocide
and racism in general. In Britain, a ceremony to mark Holocaust Memorial
Day on 27 January - the liberation of Auschwitz - was first held in 2001. For
the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust it is a day to remember all the people killed
in the Holocaust and subsequent genocides, to honour their survivors and to
22Ibid, p. 15.
23Ibid.
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learn from their experience.
For critics of the Holocaust Memorial Day, however, this was not enough.
Nira Yuval-Davis and Max Silverman for example pointed out that the Memo-
rial Day completely neglected to incorporate how Britain denied Jewish refugees
entry into the country, and that it also neglected to take into account other
forms of racism. From their point of view, a memorial day against genocides
should be based on the opposition to all forms of racism, especially those
dominant in Britain itself:
“We have suggested (...) that antiracism needs to be founded on
a more comprehensive understanding of the multidimensional na-
ture of racialized discourses and racialized minorities. We need to
establish a framework in which antisemitism and antiblack racism
(not to mention other forms of racism against Muslims, asylum
seekers, gypsies and so on) can be viewed in terms of their inter-
connections. The Holocaust Memorial Day may have allowed for
a consideration of forms of recent genocide other than the holo-
caust itself, but it does not appear to allow for a more searching
understandig of forms of racialization and racism.”24
In this sense, they ask for a ‘National Day against Racism’ dedicated to
examining Britain’s own racist discourses and practices. Yuval-Davis and Sil-
verman were not alone in arguing that the Holocaust Memorial Day focussed
too much on the Jewish genocide. For some leaders of the Muslim community,
however, the issue was a different one. In a press release of 26 January 2001,
the Muslim Council of Britain stated that it would not attend the Holocaust
Memorial Day ceremony, because “it totally excludes and ignores the ongoing
genocide and violation of Human Rights in the occupied Palestinian territories
and because it includes the alleged Armenian genocide as well as the so-called
gay-genocide.”25 The boycott of the Holocaust Memorial Day lasted until
2010, when the MCB sent a junior representative to the ceremony.
24Yuval-Davis, Nira and Silverman, Max: Memorializing the holocaust in Britain, in: Eth-
nicities, Vol 2, No. 1, 2002, pp. 107-133, here p. 119.
25See MCB Press Release of 26 January 2001: Holocaust Memorial Ceremony- MCB re-
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Although the MCB can not claim to represent the Muslim community as a
whole, their boycott showed that the issue of Israel and Palestine was and is of
high importance to Muslims in Britain. Although it expressed empathy with
the victims of the Holocaust, they felt that the more pressing issue at hand
was the ‘Israeli occupation of Palestine’:
“There is great concern in the community that our government has
done precious little to make clear its moral outrage nor has it ex-
ercised its considerable economic and political influence in order to
help bring about an end to both the Israel occupation and unceas-
ing brutalisation of the Palestinian people and the deadly violation
of their human rights. More recently, hundreds of children and
civilians have been killed.”26
This debate showed that some parts of the Muslim community felt that
the national Holocaust remembrance ignored their position and their boycott
was seen as offensive to the Jewish community. Although it highlighted how
Jewish and Muslim positions in Britain differ and how fraught Muslim-Jewish
relations can be, in public discourse there were nevertheless tendencies to lump
Jews and Muslims together in one general ‘immigrant community’. This had
profound effects on the understanding of antisemitism.
5.1.3 The Narrative of Waves of Immigration
In contrast to earlier notions of exclusive Britishness, in the late 1990s and
2000s developed a public acknowledgement of the contribution of immigration
to British society. This was exemplified in government reports like that of
the Commission for Racial Equality: Roots of the Future: Ethnic Diversity
in the Making of Britain (1996), which stressed the contribution made by
minority groups to Britain. A similar approach was taken in Life in the United
Kingdom: A journey to Citizenship in 2004. This report stated that “We are a
grets exclusion of Palestinian tragedy [online], Available from:http://www.mcb.org.uk/
news260101.html [Accessed on 24 September 2013]
26Ibid.
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nation of immigrants - able to trace our roots to countries throughout Europe,
Russia, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean”.27 Immigration to
Britain is in this context perceived as a process that took place in different
‘waves’ of immigrants coming to Britain over time and eventually becoming
part of British society. Robert Winder’s and Panikos Panayi’s works followed a
similar thought pattern. 28 They described the immigration of first Huguenots,
of Irish, then Jews, and more recently the arrival of immigrants from former
Colonies, who all faced similar struggles on their journeys into British society.
Later, the image of immigration in ‘waves’ also became a theme in culture,
perhaps best exemplified in the 2009 play England people very nice by Richard
Bean.
Tony Kushner showed that this is a national narrative, rather than the recog-
nition of actual migrant journeys. Thus, there is a streamlining of the stories of
immigration to form a picture of inclusive and liberal Britishness coupled with
the ommittance of journeys that do not fit well into this narrative. With regard
to Jews, for example, this meant that the Kindertransports, which were organ-
ised by the British government and volunteer organisations in 1938 and saved
almost ten thousand mostly Jewish children from Nazi persecution became a
nationally celebrated and often remembered event, while the more uncomfort-
able part of this journey - the exclusion of parents, many of whom perished in
the Holocaust - remains unmentioned in the celebrations.29 Nevertheless, this
particular narrative of ‘waves’ of immigration arriving and eventually becom-
ing part of British society provided the framework for comparisons between
Jews and Muslims.
27Cited in Kushner, Tony: The battle of Britishness, Migrant journeys, 1685 to the present,
Manchester: Manchester University Press 2012, p. 13.
28See Panayi, Panikos: An Immigration History of Britain. Multicultural Racism since 1800,
London: Longman 2010; Winder, Robert: Bloody Foreigners. The Story of Immigration
to Britain. London: Little, Brown, 2004.
29See Kushner, Tony: The Battle of Britishness, Chapter 5.
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5.1.4 Comparing Jews and Muslims in Britain
As established in the previous chapters, there were strong tendencies in Britain
to subsume Jewish and Muslim immigration experiences under one category
and to see antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’ as similar forms of resentments.
This is a result of the way minority-majority relationships were understood and
was most often expressed in comparisons in which a past Jewish integration
experience was seen as a model for a present Muslim integration experience.
One of these comparisons was drawn by Sander Gilman, who examined
whether the experience of Diaspora Judaism in the eighteenth and nineteenth
century can serve as a model for Islam in today’s multicultural Europe through
an analysis of (past) Jewish and (present) Muslim fiction. His analysis was
based on the fact that in both cases “a religious minority enters into a self-
described secular (or secularising) society that is Christian in its rhetoric and
presuppositions and that perceives a ‘special relationship’ with its minority”.30
He argued that modern Judaism was established through a series of cultural
negotiations in the Diaspora and that there was a process of acculturation
through high culture and Bildung, especially through literature. This process
of acculturation may then “provide some indicators for the world of Euro-
pean Muslims in regard to their rethinking of their identity as ethnic culture
bearers”.31 He argued that there were already parallels between the Jewish,
Hispanic, and African-American minority experience and that this indicated a
possible similarity between the Jewish and Muslim experience as well.
Gilman of course neglected to take into account fundamental aspects of the
history of the Jewish community. When Jews immigrated to Britain in the
1880s and 1890s, the established Jewish communities felt responsible for them
even though the immigrants’ Jewish culture was different to the established
one. The immigrants did not immigrate as members of European states, but
as members of a persecuted minority with a particular Jewish culture that
had developed within a minority situation. Anglo-Jews responded towards
30Gilman, Sander: Multiculturalism and the Jews, New York: Routledge 2006, p. 7.
31Ibid, p.22.
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Jewish immigrants by trying to ‘anglicise’ them as quickly as possible. This
response can be interpreted as a reaction to anti-Jewish hostility relating to the
process of Jewish emancipation, and it is doubtful whether easy comparisons
can be drawn to the experience of other minorities. But comparisons are also
drawn from a different perspective. In comparisons evolving around theories of
racism, it is not so much a Jewish or Muslim experience that is taken as a basis
for a comparison, but theories about the perception of Jews and Muslims by
the majority society. These comparisons build on theories of a Jewish ‘Other’.
5.1.5 The Jewish ‘Other’: theories of antisemitic discourse
When historians reviewed antisemitism in British history from the beginning of
the 1990s, they concluded that there was in fact a trend towards an ethnically
exclusive English identity that forced Jews to show their loyalty and civic
endeavour.32
Of course, not all Anglo-Jewish historians agreed with these new ideas about
British antisemitism. In his study on Englishmen and Jews in Victorian Eng-
land, David Feldman argued that it is revisionist to suggest that liberalism pro-
duced hostility to Jews. He agreed with Todd Endelman that “anti-Semitism
was a feeble weed in the garden of England”.33 He came to this conclusion
after analysing attitudes towards Jews in Victorian England in their context
of political debate and social interaction and by adopting “a more dynamic
understanding of the political and cultural meanings of anti-Jewish attitudes
for those who held them.”34 This led him to the question of not why people
objected to Jews, but “what they meant when they were doing do”. With his
research he intended to produce an answer that “lead beyond the phenomenon
of antisemitism and attitudes to the Jews towards a consideration of those col-
32See Cesarani, David: ’An Embattled Minority’, in: Kushner, Tony and Kenneth Lunn
(eds.): The politics of marginality: race, the Radical Right and minorities in twentieth
century Britain, London: Cass 1990, pp. 61-81.
33Feldman, David: Englishmen and Jews, Social Relations and Political Culture, 1840-1914,
New Haven: Yale University Press 1994, p. 27.
34Ibid, p. 14.
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lectivities in English society which strove to accommodate the Jewish presence
as well as those which aspired to exclude it.”35 Although the material Feld-
man presented showed that Victorians held a plethora of stereotypical views
of Jews - Jews as financiers, as powerful - he argued that these were not about
Jews as much as they were about the nation and who could be accommodated.
He concluded that there were no deterministic views of Jews, but that there
were discontinuities, which meant that “to categorise individuals, discourses
or institutions as anti-Semitic or tolerant, or to fix the degree of anti-Semitism
or tolerance they displayed, prove to be inert”.36
Feldman therefore suggested that in mid-Victorian England, attitudes to-
wards Jews emerged from discussions and debates in which Jews were not the
central category but to which they were related. “The Jewish issue arose in
political argument as one facet of a debate between contending visions of that
nation. Since conceptions of the nation changed over time so too did contro-
versy over the Jews.”37 He stressed that this controversy sparked longstanding
stereotypical images of the Jew, but that the discontinuities in attitudes to-
wards Jews make it impossible to use the category antisemitism, as the issue
was rather the question whether Jews could be contained within the national
community. He argued that “Jewish emancipation was an episode in the his-
tory of nationalism as well as of liberalism in England”. For Jews this meant
that “they were not merely acquiring as individuals the same rights as other
citizens, it also meant they were being allowed access to a positive community
- the nation.”38
Nevertheless, he argued that after 1885, the ‘Jewish problem’ was impacted
by the growth of collectivism and new visions of the national community that
were used to express a new relation between state and society.39 He suggested
that the new concept of citizenship had a more positive role for the state,
but that it also gave rise to the understanding that the social rights enjoyed
35Ibid.
36Ibid, p. 136.
37Ibid., p.135f.
38Ibid, p.47.
39See ibid, p.263.
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by individuals were defined by their contribution to society. Consequently,
the growing prominence of both radical Conservatism and new Liberalism in
British politics after 1900 again raised the question whether Jewish immigrants
could be integrated into English society. Through the Aliens Act of 1905 it
was intended to regulate immigration concerning the individuals ’usefulness’ to
English society. Feldman describes the Act as “an expression of the collectivism
of the right” and “ an attempt to re-draw the boundaries of the state and the
ideology of the nation.”40
Feldman’s idea was to analyse attitudes to Jews not from the vantagepoint of
the Jewish minority but that of the Gentile majority. He concluded that from
this perspective, it became evident that the use of anti-Jewish stereotypes was
not about Jews, but about national identity and about “competing visions of
national community”.41 Victorians were either tolerant or intolerant towards
Jews, but in either case, their attitude was not about Jews. On the one hand,
Feldman was right. As the example of Germany shows, expressing anti-Jewish
stereotypes may serve the purpose of creating national identity, even in the
absence of actual Jews. However, Feldman betrayed a very concretistic view
of antisemitism when he assumed that antisemitism is only expressed in the
context of actual social relations. He further assumed that someone’s motive
when expressing anti-Jewish attitudes was the decisive factor in determining
whether a position or expression was antisemitic or not. From this perspective,
as soon as the motive of a person is pro-emancipation, their utterances cease
to be antisemitic, even when they contain stereotypical views about Jews. As
David Cesarani has pointed out, in such cases it is necessary “to deconstruct
the rhetoric about Jews, rather than to disembark on a futile mission to dissect
the ‘actual’ social relations being described or the ‘motive’ of those involved”.42
Feldman’s view was neither in line with recent developments in the study
of antisemitism, nor in line with developments in the understanding of racism,
which focussed on racial ideology and its expressions in discourse. The study
40Ibid., p.290.
41Ibid, p. 380.
42Cesarani: The Study of Antisemitism in Britain, p. 258.
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of antisemitism in Britain thus moved into the opposite direction of what Feld-
man had suggested: with the help of methods and tools from racism studies,
discourses about Jews were analysed.
As mentioned previously, Bryan Cheyette for example emphasised that there
was in fact an anti-Jewish cultural discourse in British society at least up to
1945. By investigating the discursive reproduction and usage of the image
of ‘the Jew’ in modern English literature, he found out that ‘the Jew’ could
be various, contradictory things and was used to construct British national
identity. This did not necessarily happen by using ‘the Jew’ in negative terms,
but as part of a ‘semitic’ discourse in which ‘the Jew’ was constructed as ‘the
Other’ to Englishness.43
Cheyette’s approach is particularly interesting because it is based on the
theoretical approach of sociologist Zygmunt Bauman. In his book on Moder-
nity and the Holocaust Baumann made the case for a sociological approach
to the Holocaust. On the basis of sociological theories he suggested to inter-
pret the Holocaust “as a rare, yet significant and reliable, test of the hidden
possibilities of modern society.”44 His understanding of antisemitism is based
on this approach. He criticised previous approaches to understand the Holo-
caust, which, so he argued, interpreted it either as something that happened
to the Jewish people and was seen as the outcome of the persistent Christian
Jew-hatred and therefore unique. Or it was seen as an extreme case of social
hostility, like other genocides, which modern society will inevitably overcome.
His suggestion, however, was to understand the Holocaust as a problem of the
rational society, civilisation and culture, as a problem of modernity. Bauman’s
theory placed an emphasis on bureaucracy; he argued that “it was the spirit
of instrumental rationality, and its modern, bureaucratic form of institution-
alization, which made the Holocaust-style solutions (...) ’reasonable’”.45
43Cheyette, Brian: Constructions of ‘the Jew’ in English Literature and Society, p. 8; see
also Cheyette, Bryan and Nadia Valman (eds): The image of the Jew in European Lib-
eral Culture 1789-1914, London: Vallentine Mitchell 2004, introductory and concluding
chapters.
44Bauman, Zygmunt: Modernity and the Holocaust, Cambridge: Polity Press 1989, p. 12.
45Ibid, p, 18.
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Bauman’s understanding of the Holocaust is the crucial basis for his inter-
pretation of antisemitism, which also relates to Hannah Arendt’s approach to
the subject. Like Arendt, he established that Jews were seen as a non-nation
and therefore different to other ‘foreigners’, who would eventually belong to
some nation, even if it was one deemed to be inferior. He stressed that “the
world tightly packed with nations and nation-states abhorred the non-national
void. Jews were in such a void: they were such a void”.46 Modernity however,
was what made racism possible, or, in fact, demanded racism. Modernity -
which is bureaucratic social order - demands flawlessness. Racism, therefore,
was “a practice that combines strategies of architecture and gardening with
that of medicine - in the service of the construction of an artificial order,
through cutting out the elements of the present reality that neither fit the vi-
sualized perfect reality, nor can be changed so that they do”.47 He understood
the Third Reich as such a visualization of perfection. Therefore, the National
Socialist project “was an exercise in social engineering on a grandiose scale.”48
He emphasised that the Jews were not simply aliens that needed to be fenced
in, but that they were perceived as the anti-race, “a race to undermine and
poison all other races, to sap not just the identity of any race in particular,
but the racial order itself”.49 Most importantly, however, he stressed that the
source of this is Enlightenment, because it installed the worship of nature and
science.50 What is important about Bauman’s approach is that it takes the
Holocaust as its analytical basis and is therefore different to most other ap-
proaches to antisemitism in Britain at the time. Bauman, a Polish Jew who
has lived in England since 1971, developed his theory of antisemitism from a
different viewpoint than Anglo-Jewish historians and sociologists.
Just like Cheyette, Frank Felsenstein similarly analysed English cultural at-
titudes towards Jews from the seventeenth to the nineteenth-century and came
to the conclusion that most scholars have dismissed and underestimated eigh-
46Ibid, p. 53.
47Ibid, p.65.
48Ibid, p. 66.
49Ibid, p. 68.
50Ibid
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teenth century antisemitism. He argued that there was a certain stereotypical
assertion about Jews that was deeply ingrained in popular wisdom at the time
and that the acceptance of Jews by the English “was frequently compromised
through the haphazard endurances of anti-Semitic myths and folktales, many
of which can be traced back at least to medieval times and more often than
not to exegesis of the text and meaning of the Bible”.51 The Jew was in fact
perceived as “the perpetual outsider whose unsettling presence serves to define
the bounds that separate the native Englishmen from the alien Other”.52
In other studies, too, the image of ‘the Jew’ - and ‘the Jewess’- in British
literature in different periods was critically investigated.53
This new approach to study and understand anti-Jewish resentments moved
away from ‘interactionist’ theories and tried to assess these resentments as
part of a process of ‘Othering’, for which the racists and the structures they
produce, not those affected by racism, are responsible. This new approach
required previous findings on antisemitism, anti-alienism and fascism in Britain
to be reassessed. From this perspective, Tony Kushner for example emphasised
that there is no clear dividing line between fascist and popular antisemitism.
He cited sources that show how many Britons shared the fascists’ attitudes
towards Jews, only that unlike the fascists, they did not intend to take action
on the grounds of these attitudes.54 Political antisemitism was thus not totally
isolated and it could “reinforce hostility to Jews from all sections of British
51Felsenstein, Frank: Anti-Semitic Stereotypes, a Paradigm of Otherness in English Popular
Culture, 1660-1830, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1995, p.2.
52Ibid, p.3.
53See Spector, Sheila (ed.): British romanticism and the Jews: history, culture, literature,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2002; Lampert, Lisa: Gender and Jewish difference
from Paul to Shakespeare, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2004; Davi-
son, Carol Margaret: Anti-Semitism and British Gothic Literature: Basingstoke: Pal-
grave Macmillan 2004; Valman, Nadia: The Jewess in nineteenth century literature,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007.
54See Kushner, Tony: The paradox of prejudice: The impact of organised antisemitism in
Britain during an anti-Nazi war, in: Lunn, Kenneth and Kushner, Tony (eds.): Tra-
ditions of Intolerance, Historical perspectives on fascism and race discourse in Britain,
Manchester: Manchester University Press 1989, pp. 72-90, here p. 80.
222
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism
society”.55
With regard to the antisemitic riots in 1947, which David Leitch had ex-
plained as connected to Jewish terrorism in Mandate Palestine, Tony Kushner
pointed to the wider context of British racism and emphasised that the ri-
ots were an indication of who did and did not belong to British society. He
suggested that they defined the status of minority groups and under what con-
ditions they would be tolerated. He concluded that “the riots of 1947 , whilst
part of the story relating to the final years of Britain and Palestine, are also
integral to our understanding of British national identity in the immediate
post-war year”.56 Kushner also took into account that the immediate postwar
period was characterised by a tendency of inward-looking nationalism that also
shaped the post-war immigration policies. He interpreted the riots as part of
the immigration debate that represented a process of forming a new British
identity.57
Building on this, Kushner and Lunn criticised the insularity with regard
to the analysis of minorities. They argued that this has led to “a failure to
recognize the ethnic diversity of the British” as well as “an equal reluctance to
identify a parallel tradition [my emphasis] of intolerance towards the ethnic,
racial, and religious minorities’ of Britain”.58
Elsewhere Kushner argued that there is an analytical necessity to embrace
an inclusive racialisation problematic.59 His approach was based on Miles,
who had demonstrated how racism is not confined to Western European na-
tion states shaped by the consequences of colonial migrations and should not
55Ibid.
56Kushner, Tony: Anti-Semitism and Austerity: The August 1947 Riots, in: Panayi,
Panikos (ed): Racial Violence in Britain, 1840-1950, Leicester: Leicester University Press
1993, pp. 149-168, here p. 152.
57Ibid, p. 159.
58Kushner, Tony and Lunn, Kenneth (eds.): The Politics of Marginality, Race, the Radical
Right and Minorities in Twentieth Century Britain, London: Frank Cass 1990, Intro-
duction, p. 1.
59See Kushner, Tony: Racialization and ’White European’ Immigration to Britain, in:
Murji, Karim and John Solomos: Racialization, Studies in Theory and Practice, Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press 2005, pp.207-225, here p. 208.
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be interpreted as continuous and unchanging. In addition, Miles showed the
independence of the process of racialisation from biological traits by using the
racism against the Irish as an example. Similarly, Kushner argued that the
problem is not race, but racisms, not relations between races but relations
which have been racialised, not the physical attributes of Blacks or their pre-
sumed inferiority, but the motivation of non-Blacks and the obstacles they
impose. From this perspective he showed how Jews have been racialised in
British history.60
To an extent, this idea was echoed by other antisemitism researchers. The
idea was to categorise antisemitism as a form of racism parallel to other forms
of racism, which all operate through a process of creating the ‘Other’ to British
identity. On the one hand, this meant that for the first time, antisemitism was
taken seriously by researchers. On the other hand, however, this also meant
that antisemitism could not be portrayed as something particular or unique. In
this context, even the term antisemitism did not make sense any more. David
Cesarani stressed that he did not want to use the term antisemitism, but in-
stead speak of “a discourse about Jews which makes use of certain stereotypes.
These images of the Jews are positive or negative depending on the context
and the intention (as distinct from the motive) of the user. The Jew is con-
structed as the Other in this discourse, a process which occurs in the case of
women and predominantly, not exclusively, non-white, non-Christian ethnic
minorities in Western societies. (...) Hence it is important to understand that
Jews are constructed in culture as the Other in ways that are not unique.”
[My emphasis].61 Although Cesarani still maintained that there was a ‘sin-
gularity’ of anti-Jewish discourse, his colleagues stressed even more that the
Jewish experience in Britain was similar to other immigration and integration
experiences.
These newer approaches understood antisemitism as not limited to an ex-
tremist fringe and related to other forms of anti-‘alien’ hostilities in its ability
60Ibid, p. 210
61Cesarani, David: Antisemitism in the 1990s: A Symposium, in: Patterns of Prejudice,
Volume 25, Number 2, Winter 1991, pp. 13-16, here p. 13.
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to construct national identity. This had two effects: on the one hand it was
a clear deviation from earlier approaches that had generally marginalised an-
tisemitism and praised English tolerance. On the other hand, by using tools
and methods created to study discrimination of recent immigrants, it created
an image of a unity between Jews and other minorities, as they were shown to
be affected by similar discrimination experiences. There is thus a universal-
ising tendency within British antisemitism research, in which antisemitism is
categorised as a form of racism, and which positions Jews alongside other mi-
norities in Britain. It is important to note that this also meant to ‘let go’ of the
Holocaust as a major analytical reference when conceptualising antisemitism.
5.1.6 Post-structuralist and post-colonial approaches to
racism
While in the 1990s, efforts were made to theorise antisemitism within a gen-
eral framework of racialisation processes, newer conceptual developments in
racism research became much more difficult to harmonise with concepts of any
form of anti-Jewish hostility. Poststructuralist and postmodernist approaches
to racism investigate how ideological relations can provide a basis for the ar-
ticulation of racist discourses and practices.62 Post-colonial studies analyse
the cultural legacy of colonialism in literature, film, philosophy, religion, ge-
ography, gender studies, sociology and political science with a post-modern
approach.63 These approaches developed within the specific context of the
aftermath of colonial immigration to countries like Britain, France, and the
United States and were an attempt to deconstruct persisting colonial power
relations. Not only did these approaches not consider antisemitism in their
analysis, they also, as will be shown below, provided ground for the equation
of Zionism with racism.
One major theoretical contribution to this approach was made by the Ameri-
62Solomos: Race and Racism in Britain, p.30.
63See for example: Bhavnani, Kum-Kum and Ann Phoenix: Shifting Identities, Shifting
Racisms, A Feminism and Psychology Reader, London: Sage Pub. 1994.
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can scholar Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, who introduced the terms ‘subaltern’,
who are the ‘cultural others’, and ‘essentialism’ when talking about minori-
ties in Western societies and their political domination and cultural erasure.64
One aspect of postcolonial studies is the attempt to identify and deconstruct
‘colonial structures’ in general. The aim is to show that the whole way of
thinking about race, culture, and identity is a product of ‘Western’ or ‘Euro-
pean’ culture. It is a radical approach in so far as it claims that not only the
way the ‘Western’ world thinks about culture or identity is questionable, but
that the idea of cultures and identity in themselves may originate in Western
thought and may not be applicable to the rest of the world. The claim is not
that Western thought is flawed, but that it is not ‘true’ or ‘truer’ than other
ways of thinking. Colonialism did therefore not only entail a physical domi-
nation and exploitation of other parts of the world, but also a colonisation of
thought. Not only the content but also the structures of Western science, for
example, are seen as inherently colonial. Post-structuralist and post-colonial
scholars try to reflect and deconstruct this all-encompassing colonisation for
example in their ways of writing. Their texts are often very abstract and re-
main relatively vague in their argument and content - on purpose. One of their
main subjects is the relationship between minority and majority cultures in
the ‘Western’ world that result out of the legacy of colonialism. This approach
developed in the 1980s, but became more established in the 1990s.
Homi Bhaba for example made a case for the fluidity of cultures, for cultural
‘hybridization’.65 He argued that this applies more to minority cultures which
are therefore ‘partial cultures’, cultures that are in-between, because minori-
ties ‘occupy historically and temporally disjunct positions within the nation’s
space’.66 Minority cultures are therefore different to majority cultures not in
their content, but in their stage of development as cultures. Because they are
64See Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty: Can the subaltern speak?, Nelson, Cary and Lawrence
Grossberg (eds.): Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Champaign: University of
Illinois Press 1988, pp. 271-315.
65See Bhabha, Homi K.: Culture’s In-Between, in: Hall, Stuart and Paul Du Gay (eds.):
Questions of Cultural Identity, London 1996, pp. 53-60, here p. 54.
66Ibid, p. 57.
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neither ‘at home’ in their ‘host’ nation, nor completely identical to the culture
of where they come from.
According to Bhabha, multiculturalism is discriminating in so far as the lib-
eral idea of cultural diversity strives for cultures of equal value existing next to
each other, but from a majority culture’s point of view. They do not acknowl-
edge the ‘disjunctive temporalities’ of minority cultures. Bhaba advocated the
concept of ‘hybridity’ as a strategy for minority cultures to contest majority
cultural authority. This strategy is not assimilation nor collaboration, but
“the hybrid strategy or discourse opens up a space of negotiation”.67 Bhabha
acknowledged that cultures are not fixed entities but in a constant process
of producing themselves. Especially minority cultures should therefore invent
themselves as hybrid cultures, a minority culture shaped by its particular his-
tory of existing within a majority culture. He pointed out that this includes
the construction and re-construction of historical narratives, but sees this as a
chance for healing, a chance for ‘working though the present’.68
John Solomos emphasised that post-colonial studies are not (yet) the main-
stream approach in racism studies in Britain. However, there are centres for
post-colonial studies at many universities in the UK and academic journals
dedicated to the subject.69 With regards to the study of racism, the impor-
tant point that the post-colonial approach raises is that racism is not confined
to certain parts of society, not even confined to certain discourses but is a
basic structure of Western European discourse and thought. Post-colonialists
recognise for example that Western European languages are not ’neutral’ - if
that is possible at all - in themselves but are structurally open to racism be-
cause of the way they linguistically create identity and difference. Racism is
far reaching and deeply rooted and the fight against it requires thorough social
self-reflection.
However, with its strong focus on colonialism and its effects, this approach
67Ibid, p.58.
68Ibid, p, 59.
69see for example Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, London:
Routledge.
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is not necessarily helpful in understanding racism in general, or antisemitism
in particular. It assumes the connection of racism and colonialism and ne-
glects to take into account a possible different history of racism. In addition,
it does not recognise racisms that affected people who were not colonised. A
generalisation of post-colonial theories when investigating racism in contem-
porary Britain may therefore result in foreshortened analyses of racism as well
as exclusions of forms of racism that do not fit into a colonial pattern. Other
racism researchers have recognised this and developed approaches that are less
dependent on a colonial frame of reference. Most notably, Floya Anthias and
Nira Yuval-Davis have argued that race should be conceptualised as ethnicity.
The authors critically analysed concepts of race and racism and argued that
‘race’ “must be located within the wider category of ‘ethnos’ that provides its
analytical axis. Racism, on the other hand, cannot be seen as derivative of
race or ethnic phenomena, but needs to be understood with reference to the
discourses and practices by which ethnic groups are inferiorized, excluded and
subordinated.”70
In her later book Gender and Nation, Yuval Davis positioned herself be-
yond the modernist/postmodernist debate. Her point was to mainly criticise
identity politics, and to promote what she calls a transversalism, which can
be understood as related to an approach of intersectionalism. She pointed
out that identities are constructed along many factors, including race, gender,
religion etc. and that it is wrong to have essentialist notions about groups.
She stressed that cultures are in fact heterogeneous and there are shifting
boundaries for the individuals involved.71
5.1.7 A new antisemitism?
In light of these recent developments within racism studies and how anti-
semitism research has depended on its concepts, it became more difficult to
70Anthias, Floya and Yuval-Davis, Nira: Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender,
Colour and Class and the anti-racist struggle, London and New York: Routledge 1992,
Introduction, p. viii.
71See Yuval-Davis, Nira: Gender and Nation, London: Sage 1997, pp. 125-131.
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contain antisemitism in a conceptual framework of racism. However, rather
than rethinking their conceptualisation of antisemitism, some historians and
social theorists have reacted to these developments by dismissing those ele-
ments of antisemtism that do not fit into a postmodern or post-colonial concept
of racialisation. This became particularly evident in debates about a possible
‘resurgence’ of antisemitism in the form of anti-Zionism.
Debates on Zionism and Israel and on antisemitism and its ‘new’ forms in
Britain and elsewhere, in academia as well as in public,72 centred around cur-
rent appearances of anti-Jewish hostility on the Left, among anti-racists and
among Muslims as well as on Holocaust denial with regard to Israel and Zion-
ism. Within these debates it was generally agreed that today’s anti-Zionism
emerged in relation to the Six Day War in the 1960s - early discussion on this
‘new’ antisemitism can in fact be traced back to the 1970s.
Some scholars pointed out that the focus on Israel as the Jewish state was the
novel feature of this ‘new’ antisemitism. In addition, they emphasised that it is
a continuation of older forms of antisemitism and that it united unusual allies
like Leftists, Islamists and the radical right. Very early on, Robert Wistrich
for example pointed out the links between classical and ’new’ antisemitism,
the acutest manifestations of which he saw among Muslims and the political
Left.
“Both ideologies seek in practice to deprive the Jew of his right to
an equal place in the world; to limit his activity and freedom of
movement; his human civic and political rights, and even his very
right to exist - at least in the more radical formulation.”73
Wistrich saw this threat as mostly emanating from Arab countries, but also
72For a discussion on ’new’ antisemitism see for example Iganski, Paul and Barry Kosmin:
A New Antisemitism? Debating Judeophobia in 21st-century Britain, London: Institute
for Jewish Policy Research, Profile Books: 2003.
73Wistrich, Robert: Anti-Zionism as an expression of Anti-Semitism in Recent Years, Lec-
ture held on 10 December 1984 at the Study Circle on World Jewry at the home of the
President of Israel. [online] Available from: http://sicsa.huji.ac.il/Antizionism.
htm, [Accessed on 26 March 2011].
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pointed out that this form of antisemitism in its Soviet version is adopted by
Western Europe’s political Left, particularly Trotskyists. He emphasised that
“this trend is most striking in Great Britain (...), a country which in the last
decade has proved increasingly receptive to the most varied kind of anti-Zionist
rhetoric”.74
More recently, Anthony Julius argued that anti-Zionism, the ’new anti-
semitism’ in Britain, was a resurgence of older forms of antisemitism but that
its novel feature was its appearance on the political Left:
“It first emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s in consequence of
the Six Day War, but became hegemonic in the 1990s and 2000s in
consequence of certain developments mostly unrelated to the Mid-
dle East. It is to be distinguished from the ‘old antisemitism’ be-
cause it takes Israel and the Zionist project as its collective term for
the Jews, because its geographic hub is Western Europe, because it
is adopted by people who profess deep hostility to anti-Semitism,
because self-identified Jews are among its advocates, and because it
comes from the Left - indeed, has become part of the common sense
among people of broadly progressive temper. It is taken to be con-
tinuous with the ‘old antisemitism’ in it principal stratagems and
tropes, while novel in its specific focus upon the Jewish state.”75
Julius explained this progressive leftist anti-Zionism out of its anti-national
cosmopolitan stance as well as its opposition to globalization and ‘neolib-
eralism’. In his view, the anti-national position opposes unrestrained state
sovereignty and endorses international and transnational legal institutions, it
values human rights above national security and esteems post-national forms
of citizenship identities. He emphasised that the globalization opponents have
abandoned the leftist idea of an international proletariat in favour of the
transnationalism of the Muslim Umma and are vaguely opposed to anything.76
74Ibid.
75Julius, Anthony: Trials of the Diaspora: A History of Anti-Semitism in England, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2010, p. 441.
76Ibid, pp. 453-454.
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According to Julius, both positions are open to antisemitism because they are
preoccupied with the ‘fight for Palestine’ but conceive the reality of its sub-
ject, Israel and Zionism, in a partial and distorted form.77 Julius pointed out
that this secular form of anti-Zionism is closely connected to contemporary
confessional, Muslim, Jewish and Christian, anti-Zionisms.78
Even though Julius categorised antisemitism as racism, approaches like those
of Wistrich and Julius do not fit well into general trends in British antisemitism
research, which are more concerned with processes of racialisation that help
to form British national identity. Within this context, there is a tendency
to postulate that anti-Zionism, or certain forms of it, cannot be considered
antisemitism. British scholar Brian Klug, for example, argued that hostility
towards Israel cannot be considered antisemitic, because it does not target
Israel as a Jewish state, “but as European interloper or as American client or
(...) as oppressor”, which he considered perfectly legitimate.79
Categorising anti-Zionism as antisemitism has often been dismissed as an-
alytically flawed. David Cesarani, for example, warned against the conflation
of anti-Zionism and antisemitism.80 Tony Kushner came to the inevitable con-
clusion that other forms of racism are worse than antisemitism: “State and
popular animosity towards such groups has been of far higher level of intensity
than that against Jews even with a so-called ‘resurgence’ of antisemitsm.”81
He, too, warned against alarmism: “Jewish fears are certainly not without
foundation and any form of intolerance must be opposed by effective pan-
European laws and popular protest, but Jewish leaderships and those involved
in the study, monitoring and countering of antisemitism have a duty to main-
77Ibid, p. 455.
78see Ibid, chapter 8, pp. 532 ff.
79See Klug, Brian: The collective Jew: Israel and the new antisemitism, in: Braun, Christina
von and Eva-Maria Ziege (eds): Das ’bewegliche Vorurteil’, Aspekte des internationalen
Antisemitismus, Wu¨rzburg: Koenigshausen & Neumann 2004, pp. 221-239, here p. 235.
80Cesarani, David: Antisemitism in the 1990s: A Symposium, in: in: Patterns of Prejudice,
Volume 25, Number 2, Winter 1991, pp. 13-16, here p. 15.
81Kushner, Tony: Antisemitism in the 1990s: A Symposium, in: Patterns of Prejudice,
Volume 25, Number 2, Winter 1991, pp. 37 -39, here p. 37.
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tain a sense of proportion over the issues.”82
It is interesting to note that at the time, even those who argued that there
was antisemitism in Britain beyond a right-wing fringe were extremely cau-
tious to call anti-Zionism antisemitism, or to accept that it could be a danger
to the Jewish community. The authors of A Very Light Sleeper, noted that
“anti-Zionism in its various forms has generally become a much weaker phe-
nomenon”.83 Conflating anti-Zionism and antisemitism was generally thought
to be alarmist. In 1991, Patterns of Prejudice published, together with the
Institute of Jewish affairs, a special issue on Antisemitism in the 1990s: A
Symposium, a collection of essays from Jews and non-Jews from around the
world on the issue of antisemitism. Anthony Lerman, at the time Editor of
Patterns of Prejudice and Executive Director of the Institute of Jewish Affairs
no less, spoke out against alarmism with regard to antisemitism: “We are wit-
nessing a resurgence of antisemitism - but it is a limited resurgence and does
not alter the underlying picture of antisemitism as essentially a marginal phe-
nomenon”. He thought that “it remains marginal for essentially two reasons:
first, the extent and degree of counterveiling forces - education, political op-
position, Jewish defence and so on; second, the extremely unlikely possibility
of antisemitism having a serious operative impact on Jews - in most of the
places where antisemitism is resurgent, Jews are very few in number, are free
to emigrate or can be evacuated in an emergency.” 84
What first appears as a paradox makes sense when considering the overall
trend at the time towards explaining British Jewish history was one of the
various ‘journeys’ into citizenship. In this context, there was thus nothing
special about hostility towards Jews. Neither concepts of antisemitism that go
beyond localised forms of animosity towards Jews as immigrants in Britain,
nor concepts of anti-Zionism as a form of antisemitism fit into a narrative of
‘journeys’ into British citizenship. To make Jews similar to other minorities,
82Ibid, p. 38.
83Runnymede Trust: Anti-Semitism: A Very Light Sleeper, p. 49.
84Lerman, Anthony: Antisemitism in the 1990s: A Symposium, in: Patterns of Prejudice,
Volume 25, Number 2, Winter 1991, pp. 43-46, here p. 43.
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hostility towards them can neither be particular, nor extend beyond the Jewish
community in Britain.
Opposition to antisemitic forms of anti-Zionism become even more difficult
when critical approaches to hostilities towards any minority are equally based
on ‘race’. If Jews are a racialised minority and victims of British notions
of national identity, it is difficult to oppose those who argue that Palestini-
ans are a racialised minority who are perceived as victims of Jewish notions
of national identity. This difficulty also became evident in the report of the
All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism in 2006. The inquiry had
been established to investigate whether the belief held by many in the Jew-
ish community that antisemitism was rising, was justified. After gathering a
plethora of evidence, the inquiry came to the conclusion that this belief was
indeed justified. One aim of the report was to define the term ‘antisemitism’.
One the one hand, the report used the definition of racism as expressed in the
Macpherson Report of the Stephen Lawrence inquiry, which established that
a racist act is defined by its victim. Accordingly, “any remark, insult or act
the purpose or effect of which is to violate a Jewish person’s dignity or create
an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for
him is antisemitic. This reflects the definition of harassment under the Race
Relations Act 1976. This definition can be applied to individuals and to the
Jewish community as a whole.”85 However, anti-Zionism was one element of
antisemitism that, although it made up the majority of evidence, could not
be grasped by this definition. The inquiry therefore recommended to add the
EUMC working definition of antisemitism, mentioned earlier, which catalogues
a number of antisemitic forms of anti-Zionism. The EUMC definition of anti-
semitism was added because it was clear that it would be difficult to account
for antisemitic forms of anti-Zionism within the existing definition of racism
in Britain. The problem is that anti-Zionism is a specific element of anti-
semitism, and therefore not easily accommodated in common understandings
of minority-majority relationships in Britain, which universalise minority ex-
85All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism: Report of the All-Party Parlia-
mentary Inquiry into Antisemitism, London, September 2006, p. 2.
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periences into one ‘journey into citizenship’. This becomes especially apparent
in contrast to Germany, where a very different narrative of minority-majority
relations takes centre stage.
In one way or another, ‘race’ is the underlying category of most approaches
to antisemitism in Britain. This is also true for those approaches that want
to combine an anti-racist struggle with an analysis of antisemitism without
defining it away or limiting its scope. In an attempt to do so, Robert Fine
proposed a new way of thinking about antisemitism. He criticized the way in
which the debate about the ’new’ antisemitism has polarized those who see
antisemitism as a serious threat and those who see antisemitism as confined
to history. Instead, he argued, one should accept, based on Hannah Arendt’s
social theory, the universal responsibility that resulted out of the Holocaust and
antisemitism. This means to address racism in all its forms and appearances
and to see the interconnection between antisemitism and other racisms.86
What Fine suggested, however, is precisely not what characterised most
British approaches to antisemitism. Rather, the majority of antisemitism re-
search in Britain became complicit in what David Seymour has called Holo-
caust dissolution, a concept building on the idea that the “memory of the
‘new Europe’ rests ultimately on dissolving its specifically Jewish dimensions
of genocide into an overarching concept of ‘modernity’ – a modernity now
transcended, but thought to capture the essence of the ‘old’ Europe.”87
The dissolution of the Holocaust David Seymour talks about has had signifi-
cant repercussions for any conceptualisations of both racism and antisemitism.
It not only meant that the Holocaust has lost its significance and particularity,
but, paradoxically, that it no longer figures as an analytical tool in concepts
of antisemitism. As a consequence, neither racism nor antisemitism are in-
terpreted through the Holocaust, but through a universal history of racism in
86See Fine, Robert: Fighting with phantoms: a contribution to the debate on antisemitism
in Europe, in: Patterns of Prejudice, Vol 43, No 5, 2009, pp. 459-479.
87Seymour, David: ‘New Europe’, Holocaust Memory, and Antisemitism, in: Small, Charles
A. (ed.): Global Antisemitism, A Crisis of Modernity, Vol. I Conceptual Approaches,
New York: ISGAP 2014, pp. 21 - 28, here p. 21.
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which the Holocaust was just one episode. This form of Holocaust dissolution
can also be detected in the study of antisemitism, and it becomes particu-
larly evident when antisemitism is compared with ‘Islamophobia’ or when it is
argued that ‘Islamophobia’ has replaced antisemitism.
5.1.8 The emergence of ‘Islamophobia’
Since the late 1980s the issue of Islam in Britain has played a significant role
in public discourse and the situation of Muslims became a topic of research.
Although there is not nearly as much research on this topic than on the topic of
antisemitism, several studies have for example dealt with Muslim recognition
and participation in particular.88
The increased public attention to Muslims and Islam and the discrimination
against them in recent times has warranted anti-racist organisations to focus
on campaigning against Islamophobia in particular. However, because the con-
ceptualisation of a particular anti-Muslim hostility, as opposed to for example
anti-‘Black’ racism, is relatively young, it remains an open discussion how to
actually grasp and define Islamophobia. Research on Islamophobia is still in
its early stages. However, an increase in hostility against Muslims caused the
Commission for Racial Equality to look into cases of religious discrimination
already in the early 1990s as well as the establishment of a Commission on
British Muslims and Islamphobia by the Runnymede Trust in 1996, which
published the report Islamophobia: a challenge for us all in 1997, calling for
serious anti-discrimination measures and a betterment of the social status of
Muslims in Britain.
The Report defined Islamophobia through eight open and closed views of
Islam. Distinctions were made between whether Islam is seen as monolithic
or diverse, whether it is seen as separate or interacting, whether as inferior
or different, whether as an enemy or a partner, whether as manipulative or
88See especially Nielsen, Jorgen: Islam, Muslims and British local and central government,
CSIC Research Papers 6, Birmingham: Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-
Muslim Relations, 1992.; Modood, Tariq et al: Ethnic minorities in Britain, diversity
and disadvantage, London: Policy Studies Institute 1997
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sincere, whether criticism made by Islam of the ‘West’ was rejected or consid-
ered, whether discrimination against Muslims was defended or criticised and
whether Islamophobia is seen as natural or problematic. According to this
definition, Islamophobia occurs when Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, as
separate from other cultures, as inferior to the West, as barbaric, irrational,
primitive, sexist, violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism and
engaged in a clash of civilisations.89. According to the Report, Islamophobia
manifests in social exclusion, discrimination, violence and prejudice and the
media plays an important role in disseminating negative images about Islam.90
The Runnymede Trust Report can be considered the most influential work on
Islamophobia to date. There is hardly a study that does not build on its
definition of ‘Islamophobia’.
Robert Miles and Michael Brown additionally stressed that Islamophobia
can be “defined primarily as a hostility towards Islam, rather than Mus-
lims, though it must manifest itself (secondarily) as hostility towards Mus-
lims. When the hatred of the theology is not present, we are more likely to
be seeing an anti-immigrant sentiment, racism or xenophobia”.91 Miles’ and
Brown’s addition to defining Islamophobia illustrated that there is a variety
of hostilities that can affect Muslims.
Concurring with the Report, Steven Vertovec for example emphasised that
in the 1990s “there has been a noticeable increase in derogatory images of
Islam, patterns of anti-Muslim discrimination in employment, institutional
intolerance of Muslim values, and occasional acts of physical violence against
Muslims in Britain”.92
In his more recent account on Muslims in Britain before and after 11 Septem-
ber 2001, Tahir Abbas similarly used the Runnymede definition to point out
the dangers of the media bias against Muslims since that day.93 It was also the
89Runnymede Trust Report: Islamophobia, A Challenge for Us All, London, 1997, p. 16.
90Ibid.
91Brown, Malcolm and Miles, Robert: Racism, London: Routledge 2003, p.166.
92Vertovec, Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain, p. 24.
93See Abbas, Tahir: British South Asian Muslims: before and after September 11, in:
Abbas, Tahir (ed.): Muslim Britain, Communities under Pressure, London: Zed Books
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basis for Chris Allen’s investigation into new forms of discrimination, in which
he came to the conclusion that “the anti-Muslim discourse prevails to the ex-
tent that society is becoming increasingly receptive to such ideas”.94 Allen
suggested that this new form of discrimination calls for protection against re-
ligious discrimination next to protection against racial discrimination, which
had been established in Britain with the Race Relations Acts since 1976.95
These contributions are also part of a highly politicized debate about Mus-
lims in Britain and the discrimination against them. One concern regarding
the relationship between British Muslims and the British public has been the
attitude of Muslims to violence and terrorism, which was perceived to be apolo-
getic if not supportive of Islamist terrorist acts. The Gallup Co-Exist survey
2009 points out that 37 per cent of British Muslims find it morally justified to
use violence for a noble cause.96 A ‘noble cause’ is not further defined. Other
findings in fact sugggest that Muslims have a variety of views on whether and
how acts of violence can be justified within Islam. Views regarding suicide
bombings for example are complex and variable.97
The often derogatory representation of Muslims in British media does not
reflect the reality of Muslims living in Britain. The character of Muslim com-
munities in Britain and the range of interpretations of Islam are very differ-
entiated. Muslims have responded in various ways to life in Britain. There
have been tendencies of rejection of participation in British culture, but also
secularisation and integration efforts. Although there is a movement towards
Islamic homogeneity that seeks to re-establish a global collective Muslim iden-
tity as an answer to what is perceived as ’Western dominance’, this movement
2005, pp. 3-17, here p. 11.
94Allen, Chris: From Race to Religion: the New Face of Discrimination, in: Abbas: Muslim
Britain, pp. 49-65, here p. 50.
95Ibid, p. 52 f.
96The Gallup Co-Exist Index 2009, A Global Study of Interfaith Relations
[online] Available from: http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/153578/
REPORT-Gallup-Coexist-Index-2009.aspx [Accessed on 12 February 2010], p. 40.
97See Ansari, Humayun: Attitudes to Jihad, Martyrdom and Terrorism among British
Muslims, in: Abbas, Tahir: Muslim Britain, Communities under Pressure, London: Zed
Books 2005, pp. 144-163.
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is in itself diversified and challenged. In sum, there is in fact not a neatly iden-
tifiable British Muslim identity, “but a range of identities co-existing within
Britain’s Muslim communities”.98
In this context, it is far from agreed upon what constitutes ‘Islamophobia’ or
how anti-Muslim resentments should be defined and understood. Fred Halliday
for example criticised the Runnymede approach. He argued that the term
‘Islamophobia’ is misleading because it is not ‘Islam’ as a religion or a culture
that is being attacked, but Muslims as a people. He stressed that it is wrong to
assume that religion was the core of the conflict, but that there may be more
contingent and contemporary forces at work.99 He further emphasised that
today, not Islam as a faith but Muslims as a people, especially as immigrants,
are considered to be the enemy, which calls for using the more accurate term
‘anti-Muslimism’ instead of ‘Islamophobia’ when referring to contemporary
hatred of Muslims.
Halliday rightly stressed that it is important to acknowledge that hostility
towards Muslims throughout history as well as today can have a a variety of
causes and is not necessarily rooted in the hostility towards their religion, but
perhaps also or instead towards their national and ethnic origins. However,
contemporary hostility to Islam does not only appear as hostility to Muslims as
‘a people’ or as individuals, but the values and traditions of what is perceived
as Islam are considered a threat to European and ‘Western’ national values as
well. The perceived enemy may therefore be Islam as a faith and a culture as
well as Muslims as a people (as immigrants and bearer of this ‘enemy’ faith),
which makes anti-Muslim hostility very difficult to grasp and define. Neither
‘anti-Muslimism’ nor existing categories like ‘racism’ or ‘xenophobia’ would
grasp all the dimensions that are possibly included in anti-Muslim hostility. A
case could therefore be made for using the term ‘Islamophobia’, but existing
definitions include the danger of political instrumentalisation.
But Halliday criticised the term ‘Islamophobia’ for reproducing the distor-
98Ansari: The Infidel Within, p. 394.
99See Halliday, Fred: ‘Islamophobia’ reconsidered, review article in: Ethnic and Racial
Studies Volume 22 No 5, 1999, pp. 889-902, here p. 897.
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tion that there is one Islam and for obscuring the reality of diversity between
and within Muslim communities.100 He pointed out that the term can easily
be used to classify critics of Islamic traditions on human rights grounds as well
as Muslims challenging conservative readings of Islamic texts as Islamophobes.
Regarding the Runnymede report in particular he argued that “the danger in
these reports is that they are defined, if not monopolised, by representatives
of religious bodies, and of community organsations”, which may silence any
critical examination.101 Like Halliday, other critics dismissed the validity of
the term ’Islamophobia’, questioned the subject it intended to describe and
argued that it is merely used for illegitimate political reasons. These critics
claimed that the existing broad definition of Islamophobia was used to silence
any valid critique of Islam102 for example the critique of oppression of women
in Islam.103
This danger was in fact inherent in many broadly applied definitions, like the
one by FAIR, The Forum against Islamophobia and Racism, a London-based
organisation established in 2001. FAIR defines ‘Islamophobia as “fear, hatred,
or hostility directed towards Islam or Muslims”.104 This definition remains
very general and could easily be instrumentalised for political ends, because
‘fear, hatred, or hostility’ lacks a further definition and objectivity and can
include criticism as well as exaggerated fear and hatred.
As the FAIR definition shows, however, and despite Halliday’s critique, the
Runnymede Definition was overwhelmingly accepted by scholars and is still
used today. Most recently, Chris Allen has applied it in is book Islamophobia.
He acknowledged that the concept is contested and suggested a new definition
of ‘Islamophobia’, but based on the theoretical content of the Runnymede def-
inition. He argued that there are three different components of Islamophobia,
100Ibid, p 898.
101Ibid, p. 899.
102See Malik, Kenan: Islamophobia Myth, in: Prospect, Issue 107, 20 February 2005.
103See for example Fourest, Caroline and Venner, Fiametta: Islamophobie?, in: Jungle
World, Nr. 51, 10. Dezember 2003.
104See the definition of ’Islamophobia on FAIR’s Website [online], Available from: http:
//www.fairuk.org [Accessed on 5 March 2010].
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namely that is is an ideology, that there are ‘modes of operation’ in which
this ideology is sustained and that there are exlusionary practices.105 He thus
concluded that
“Islamophobia is an ideology, similar (...) to racism (...), that sus-
tains and perpetuates negatively evaluated meaning about Muslims
and Islam in the contemporary setting in similar ways to that which
it has historically, although not necessarily as a continuum, subse-
quently pertaining, influencing and impacting on social action, (...),
shaping and determining understanding, perceptions and attitudes
in the social consensus (...) that inform and construct thinking
about Muslims and Islam as Other.”106
Allen added, however, that exclusionary practices are only ‘Islamophobia’ if
there is an acknowledged ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ element present. Allen’s defi-
nition remained very close to the Runnymede definition, although he made it
more usable by adding particular islamophobic exclusionary practices. Inter-
estingly, however, he emphasised that ‘Islamophobia’ is only similar to racism
and not the same phenomenon. Other theoretical approaches, on the other
hand, have tried to conceptualise anti-Muslim resentments as racism.
Pnina Werbner’s theoretical approach to the issue is one example, and her
approach also showcased the idea that current racism against Muslims has
replaced earlier forms of racism. Werbner analysed anti-Muslim resentments,
and other racisms for that matter, with regard to modern and postmodern
nationalism in which an ‘Other’ (‘folk devils’) is constructed as a threat to
the purity and order of the nation. She acknowledged that there have been
various forms of racism, but argued that ‘Islamophobia’ is the racism of the
postmodern age. This is because
“The tension within the nation-state between individual citizenship
rights and the reproductions of the nation as a unified moral com-
munity requires that cultural pluralism within the nation-state be
105Allen, Chris: Islamophobia, p. 188 f.
106Ibid, p. 190.
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grounded in shared ethical convictions about the validity of cultural
difference. The globalized images of the Muslim religious fanatic
seem to deny the possibility of such ethical commonalities.”107
Werbner therefore traced anti-Muslim resentments in the contemporary func-
tion they have for the construction of national identity. Although it may be
questionable whether ‘Islamophobia’ is indeed the most important racism of
today, her approach took into account the context of national identity forma-
tion and racism. Her theoretical approach intended to be inclusive of different
forms of racialisation, apart from those related to colonialism. However, her
approach not only equated ‘Islamophobia’ with other forms of racism, like an-
tisemitism, it also relegated antisemitism exclusively to the past. This idea of a
past antisemitism that has been replaced by newer forms of racism, especially
Islamophobia, also became apparent in the concept of ‘cultural racism’.
5.1.9 The ‘new’ racism and comparisons with antisemitism
As Werbner’s approach touched upon, what became a significant analytical cat-
egory for racism theories was culture. This approach was particularly fitting
to describe both antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentments. As discussed ear-
lier, the changes in British public discourse and policy in the 1980s prompted
novel theoretical approaches to analyse racism in Britain, some of which also
incorporated theorisations of anti-Muslim resentments. Authors saw a ‘new
racism’ that used notions of culture and nation instead of pseudo-biological
traits to differentiate groups and construct a sense of Britishness.
In his analysis of racism, Etienne Balibar explained that contemporary
racism did not necessarily rely on ‘biological’ signifiers to mark out the Other
any more. Instead, he observed the establishment of a ‘racism without races’.
There was, as it were, a racism “whose dominant theme is not biological hered-
ity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first
sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation
107Werbner, Pnina: Islamophobia: Incitement to religious hatred - legislating for a new fear?,
in: Anthropology Today, vol 21, no 1, February 2005, pp. 5-9, here p. 9.
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to others but ‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility
of life-styles and traditions”.108 Within the racism Balibar described, culture
is racialised. ‘Cultures’ are seen as homogenised, monolithic entities. Other
‘cultures’ are not necessarily seen as negative, but believed to be inherently dif-
ferent. Balibar argued that this belief has effects similar to biological racism.
The behaviour of people and what is believed to be their ‘character’ is not
explained in terms of biology, but in terms of their belonging to historical
‘cultures’. He showed that seemingly progressive anti-racists were in fact cul-
turally racist because they argue that a ‘mixing of cultures’ would result in
the death of their tradition and identity.109 In other words, “culture can also
function like a nature”.110
This analysis of ‘cultural racism’ had a profound influence on later compar-
isons between antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentment. Although Balibar for
example described this form of racism to be a relatively recent development, he
also pointed out that there has always existed a racism that does not rely on
the pseudo-biological concept of race and that its prototype is antisemitism.111
In fact, he said that “anti-Semitism is supremely ’differentialist’ and in many
respects the whole of current differentialist racism may be considered, from the
formal point of view, as a generalized anti-Semitism”.112 He further argued
that this perspective is particularly useful when interpreting contemporary
anti-Muslim resentments.
Balibar’s argument for the comparability of antisemitism and anti-Muslim
resentments was further elaborated on in a more recent paper by Nasar Meer
and Tesehn Noorani. They argued that there are “important analogies in
the racial content of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment”. They cate-
gorised both antisemitism and Islamophobia as forms of cultural racism. In
108Baliber, Etienne: Is there a ‘Neo-Racism’?, in: Balibar, Etienne and Immanuel Waller-
stein: Race, Nation, Class. Ambiguous Identities. London/New York: 1991, pp. 17-28,
here p. 21.
109See ibid, p. 22.
110Ibid.
111Ibid p.23.
112Ibid, p. 24.
242
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism
this prevalent form of contemporary racism “cultural difference functions like
nature”. They argued that because there has been a strong focus on cultural
difference besides alleged biological difference in pre-Second World War anti-
semitism, it can be understood as cultural racism’s prototype. Thus, there
are “forms of pathologising” earlier Jewish minorities and present Muslim mi-
norities that are “constituted through a cultural racism”. The main point of
comparison, they argued, is “the way in which British Jews were associated
with anarchism and Bolshevism”, for which an analogy operates for “funda-
mentalist Muslims/Islamic Terrorists”.113 What Meer and Noorani did here
was to utilise Anglo-Jewish history to point out similarities between what they
consider racism against Jews and Muslims.
A very similar approach was that of Thomas Linehan. When examining
to what extent discourses on immigration in contemporary Britain resemble
antisemitic discourses in Britain during and between the two World Wars,
Linehan came to the conclusion that “Asian Muslims, like earlier with Britain’s
Jews, are being cast as the ultimate alien ‘Others’, outsiders or ‘strangers’ who
seem always to be operating beyond the frame of mainstream society and its
norms and conventions.”114
Linehan’s concept of antisemitism was such that he saw important analogies
to Islamophobia. Building on an analysis of ‘cultural racism’, Linehan differ-
entiated between conspirational, cultural, religious and economic antisemitism
that emanated from far-right groups in Britain during and between the World
Wars. With the exception of its economic element, he concluded that past
antisemitism was parallel to contemporary Islamphobia. He stressed that con-
spirational Islamphobia “has its roots, as did Jewish conspiracy theories during
the Great War and the post-Bolshevik Revolution years, in wider geopolitical
113See Meer, Nasar and Noorani, Tehseen: A sociological comparison of anti-Semitism and
anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain, in: The Sociological Review, No. 56, Issue 2, 2008,
pp. 195-219, here pp. 198, 206, 212.
114Linehan, Thomas: Comparing Antisemitism, Islamophobia, and Asylophobia: The British
Case, in: Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, Vol 12, Issue 2, October 2012, pp. 366-
386, here p. 366.
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tensions and associated fears concerning national security.”115
He also explained the fear of “gradual Islamisation’ in reference to earlier
forms of antisemitism:
“There are parallels between this perception of an expansionist
Islamic project and the earlier myth of the Jewish bid for world
power. Both phobias tend to greatly inflate the perceived threat,
magnify the power of the protagonist, whether the ‘internal enemy’
was the Islamist jihadist of the Jewish Bolshevik, Anarchist, or
Financier, and construct all members of the ‘settler’ community as
real or potential antagonists who post a threat to safety, cohesion,
and values of the ‘host’ society.”116
As this quote shows, Linehan, just as Meer and Noorani, developed concepts
of racism within a framework of immigration and settlement of minority groups
in contemporary Britain. They saw antisemitism as firmly remaining in the
past, because in their mind, new minority groups, mainly Muslims, have taken
the place of Jews. Antisemitism was subsequently interpreted through the lens
of contemporary hostility against Muslims. This pattern of conceptualising
antisemitism also became evident in comparisons between antisemitism and
‘Islamophobia’ that were drawn within a framework of theories of ‘Orientalism’,
which are related to concepts of cultural racism and discourses of the ‘Other’.
5.1.10 Orientalism
One theoretical approach that is particularly fitting to describe hostility against
Muslims is situated in post-colonial studies, which have uniquely shaped and
influenced the study and theorisation of ‘Islamophobia’. This is mainly due
to one of the main theoretical works of post-colonialism, the book Orientalism
by Edward Said, which dealt with the Western colonialist construction of the
‘Orient’ and ‘Orientals’. Said pointed out that he does not see an imperial-
ist plot to hold down the ‘Oriental’, but that there is a colonial discourse,
115Ibid, p. 376.
116Ibid, p. 377.
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a ‘geopolitical awareness’ represented in aesthetic, scholarly economic, soci-
ological, historical and philological texts. This representation is intended to
“control, manipulate, even to incorporate what is a manifestly different (..)
world”.117
Edward Said argued that British scholarly as well as artistic discourse from
the eighteenth century on has constructed an ‘Orient’, that entailed parts of
Arabia and Asia but which did not exist in reality, for the means of legitimis-
ing imperial hegemony. He argued that this ‘Orientalism’ essentialised people
from the ‘Orient’ and established a superiority of Britons and Britain over other
people and other parts of the world and has shaped British responses to Islam
ever since.118 Although Said made an important contribution to the study of
discourse formation regarding Islam in Britain - perhaps less so elsewhere -
his findings have to be treated carefully. Robert Irwin, for example, pointed
out that it cannot be easily concluded that British scholarly attention towards
Islam or the Arab World was consistently negative and argues that it was in
fact more varied and rich than Said admits. He brought forward numerous
examples of scholars who studied Islam with ‘a lust of knowing’ rather than a
condescending intent - or discursive effect - and took into account the impor-
tant contribution that German scholars made towards British ‘Orientalism’,
which was almost completely neglected by Said. He concluded that “if there
was a connection between nineteenth century imperialism and Orientalism, it
was chiefly this - that imperial servants, lonely and bored in remote outposts,
took up the study of exotic languages and histories as their hobby”.119 Al-
though this might be polemically exaggerated, it needs to be acknowledged
that British responses to Islam since the seventeenth century, as Linda Col-
ley points out, were never static or uniform. “They changed in tandem with
shifts in the intellectual scene, and in the power and reputation of the great
Islamic empires.” They also changed “in accordance with the estimates made
117Said, Edward: Orientalism, London: Penguin 2003 (first edition published by Routledge
and Kegan Paul in 1978), p.12.
118See Said, Edward: Orientalism, London: Penguin 1978.
119Irwin: For Lust of Knowing, London: Penguin 2006, p.147.
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by Britons of their own state and of its potential.”120 These aspects have to be
taken into account when looking at the reality of a Muslim presence in Europe
and when debating the dimensions of British ‘Islamophobia’.
On the other hand, Said rightly detected that there was an inherent racism
in the way British colonialists viewed Muslims. In the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, Britons generally viewed Muslims - not necessarily as Mus-
lims but as members of their ethnicity or ‘race’- as ‘subject people’. There
was a widespread hostility, which became especially apparent in the way Mus-
lims were used and treated as servants. Muslims, on the other hand, did not
necessarily see themselves that way and did not always meekly endure their
fate as slaves. Any social interaction between Britons and Muslims, however,
was characterised by this imposed hierarchy. But there were also examples
of British slave owners who were fascinated and impressed by their servant’s
religious devotion and even granted them freedom. In addition, despite the
subordinated social status of Muslims in Britain, some Indian Muslim trav-
ellers who did not see themselves or their civilisation as inferior were in fact
highly welcomed by British elite circles.121 Also, “there was much less of the
condescension and patronising arrogance that characterised contact between
the colonisers and the colonised from the middle of the nineteenth century”.122
Although interracial sexual relations and mixed marriages were disapproved
of, they were not uncommon. Yet there was still popular prejudice related to
British dominance and perceptions of Christian superiority. As Ansari indi-
cated, this has to be seen in the context of a development of pseudo-scientific
race theories in Britain, which greatly affected Muslims as ‘blacks’.123
In this context it is thus not surprising that the basic premises of Said’s
theory became highly influential for studies assessing anti-Arab or anti-Muslim
discourses. Said argued that the discourse of the ‘Orient’, which is depicted
as backward and wild, is used to construct a European self by establishing
120Colley, Linda: Captives - Britain, Empire and the world, 1600 - 1830, London: Pimlico
2002, p.113.
121See Ansari: The Infidel Within, pp. 53-56.
122Ibid, p. 57.
123ibid, pp. 58-61.
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a binary of ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’. He described this colonial pattern of
representation as ‘Orientalism’ and emphasised that in the latest phase of
‘Orientalism’, which began after the Second World War, the Arab Muslim is
seen as the ‘Oriental’, especially in US media, where Arabs are constructed
as menacing and evil.124 Said repeated this argument in more detail in his
later book Covering Islam, in which he investigated contemporary Western
perceptions of the Islamic world.125 Ziauddin Sardar developed this concept
further in his book Orientalism, in which he argued that the West constructs
an Orient on which to project its fears.126 This argument has often been related
to a critique of what is called Eurocentrism, a view of the world that centres
around Europe or the West and that automatically marginalised other views
of the world.
The idea of an ‘Orientalist’ discourse built the basis for studies on anti-
Muslim resentments and stereotyped representations in Britain. Elizabeth
Poole used Said’s theory to analyse recent representations of Islam in British
media. She understood these representations in the context of constructions
of an ‘Other’ to ‘the West’. She argued that
“Political Islam, which has emerged out of different experiences
of colonialism and oppression, its initial signifier being the Iranian
Revolution (1979), has allowed ‘the West’ to construct Islam as the
new enemy (a global force that represents an ideological and physi-
cal threat) based on an historically polarized relationship. This has
been necessary for ‘the West’ in order to reassert its power over an
economically rich area and, in doing so, to defend its supreme West-
ern identity. Consequently, the media as an instrument of public
ideology demonizes Islam, portraying it as a threat to Western in-
terests, thus reproducing, producing and sustaining the ideology
124Ibid, chapter 3, part 4.
125See Said, Edward: Covering Islam, How the Media and the Experts Determine How We
See the Rest of the World, London: Vintage 1997 (first published by Routledge and
Kegan Paul in 1981).
126Sardar, Ziauddin: Orientalism, Buckingham: Open University Press 1999.
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necessary to subjugate Muslims both internationally and domesti-
cally.”127
Orientalism is an analytical category in a number of studies on represen-
tations of Muslims in British media.128 In John E. Richardson’s study on
election reporting of Muslims in British newspapers, which was part of a wider
research project conducted for the Commission of Racial Equality, the author
argued that Muslims in Britain are represented as a single and essentialised
Muslim community that is the most significant threat to European civilisation.
According to the author, this was due to the West’s Orientalism: “The con-
struction of a single Orient is one of the more significant accomplishments of
Orientalist representations.”129 As a consequence, Muslims as a “social group
become viewed as being so different that they threaten social stability”.130
Representations of Muslims in Britain and the discrimination against them
is then understood as both a result out of colonialism as well as a form of
continued colonialism that requires to subjugate the ‘Orient’ and Muslims in
reality as well as in discourse. There is in fact no theorisation of ‘Islamopho-
bia’ that does not in some way relate to Said’s theory of ’Orientalism’. The
major flaw in this line of thought is of course that anti-Muslim resentments
are not wholly explicable through the way in which Muslims are represented
in discourse, but the context has to be taken into account. Perceptions and
representations of Muslims are not completely detached from factual develop-
127Poole: Reporting Islam, p. 17; see also Hippler, J. and A. Lueg (eds.): The next threat:
Western perceptions of Islam, London: Pluto Press 1995.
128See Moore, Kerry; Mason, Paul and Lewis, Justin: Images of Islam in the UK: The
Representation of British Muslims n the National Print News Media 2000-2008, Cardiff:
Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies 2008; Richardson, John E.:
(Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers,
Amsterdam: John Benjamins 2004; Saeed, Amir: Media, racism and Islamophobia: the
representation of Islam and Muslims in the media, in: Sociology Compass, Vol 1, No 2,
2007, 443-462.
129Richardson, John E.: ‘Get shot of the lot of them’: election reporting of Muslims in
British newspapers, in: Malik, Maleiha (ed.): Anti-Muslim Prejudice. Past and Present,
London: Routledge 2010, pp. 147-168, here p. 147.
130Ibid, p. 146.
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ments. But what is more important is that the study of ‘Orientalism’, and in
relation to that, the concept of the ‘Other’, have shaped conceptualisations of
antisemitism as well.
5.1.11 The Orientalised Jew
The concept of Orientalism was developed in the particular context of post-
colonialism. It was an attempt to explain how colonial power structures were
established and have been perpetuated into the present day. At first sight, Ori-
entalism does not easily incorporate concepts of antisemitism. As discussed
earlier, Jewish immigrants to Britain have not been colonised. Quite the op-
posite, they have been seen as colonisers themselves. Antisemitism researchers
have therefore tried to promote concepts of racism that are independent from
colonialism and include racialisation of Jews and other minorities without a
colonial experience. However, these concepts of antisemitism still built on
concepts of racism that were developed in the context of colonial immigra-
tion to Britain. As this chapter has shown, the understanding of antisemitism
has therefore been derived from developments in the understanding of racism.
The same pattern is in fact evident with the concept of Orientalism. Newer
approaches to antisemitism argue that the Jewish “Other” is the orientalised
Jew. Orientalisation thus includes Muslims and Jews.
This was for example the premise in Didi Herman’s book on Jews and Jew-
ishness in English law. As a starting point of her research Hermann argued - in
line with for example Tony Kushner - that Jews are generally not considered
in racism theories: “we have a very partial picture of racialization processes in
England, and there is an erasure of peoples who do not conform to phenotyp-
ical or twentieth-century postcolonial paradigms.”131 She then suggested that
Orientalism might in fact be a useful category when analysing processes of
racialization that have affected Jews: “orientalism provides a useful shorthand
to signify a range of judicial practices towards Jews and Jewisness. These
131Herman, Didi: An Unfortunate Coincidence. Jews, Jewishness and English Law, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2011, p. 14.
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include particular ways of characterizing people and practices that have come
from ‘the east’, along with recurring restatements of what is ‘English’.”132 Her-
man’s methodology was explicitly drawn from Said’s concept of Orientalism,
“where he argued for work that highlighted processes of representation”.133
Herman stressed that she is “less interested in identifying ‘antisemitism’, and
more interested in exploring racialized understandings”.134 In line with pre-
vious antisemitism scholars, who based their understanding on concepts of
racism, and who questioned the validity of the term ‘antisemitism’, Herman,
too, rejected the term. She drew from David Feldman, who had said that an-
tisemitism “has a tendency to reduce the historical question to one of whether
an individual was for or against the Jews”.135 As this is not her intention,
Herman stressed that she did not want to catalogue instances of racism, but
rather analyse racial discourse: she rejected Anthony Julius’ interpretation
of antisemitism as hatred or malice, as her point is to show that there is an
‘ambivalence’ in English culture towards Jews.136
But Herman’s approach was not entirely new. On the one hand, it built on
approaches in gender studies that seek to understand representations of mi-
nority women137 On the other hand, it drew from works on the persecution of
minorities in medieval Europe. R.I. Moore for example showed that the treat-
ment of minority groups, including Jews, but also lepers, in medieval Europe
cannot be explained independently, but was part of a ‘pattern of persecution’
that did not discriminate between victims.138 A similar conclusion was drawn
by Ivan Kalmar and Derek Penslar, who argued that both Jews and Muslims
were the Oriental ‘Other’ to the Christian West.139 When analysing compar-
132Ibid.
133Ibid, p. 24.
134Ibid.
135Cited in ibid, p. 25.
136Ibid.
137See, for instance, Malik, Maleiha: Feminism and Minority Women, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010; Lewis, R.: Gendering Orientalism: Race, Femininity and
Representations, London: Routledge 1996.
138See Moore, R.I.: The Formation of a Persecuting Society. Authority and Deviance in
Western Europe 950-1250, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1987.
139See the introduction in Kalmar, Ivan Davidson and Penslar, Derek J (eds.): Orientalism
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isons between antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’, this approach to antisemitism
is particularly relevant as it proposes that there is a long history of a parallel
exclusion of Jews and Muslims from European society.
This is also what Didi Herman suggested in her above mentioned study. As
commented on in the previous chapter, Herman showed that there were orien-
talising and racialising processes with regard to the representation of Jews in
English legal history. She concluded that her critique of legal texts showed that
“current attempts to analyse Islamophobia in England would greatly benefit
from some historical knowledge of how Jews and Jewishness have been un-
derstood”.140 Her findings led her to the conclusion that there is a strong
Christian normativity within the British legal system, which has in fact af-
fected both Jews and Muslims: “it must be possible to name the asymmetric
power Christianity in various forms has in the world today and has had ever
since its early form fused with imperial state power in the Roman and Byzan-
tine empires. This is a power that has had material effects through, among
other things: a long European history of anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic thinking
and practice; in past colonial projects of domination, and in current ones that
justify the post 9-11 ‘war on terror’ on the grounds that Christian civilization
(and democracy) - associated with the Western values of North America and
Europe - are under threat.”141
Herman’s approach saw Jews and Muslims both as the ‘Oriental Other’ to
British or Western identity. This was also Maleiha Malik’s interpretation of
a recent debate about the ban of the full face-veil in Britain. Malik argued
that “today’s debates about, and treatment of Muslim women are akin to the
way heretics, lepers and Jews were talked about in medieval Europe”.142 She
and the Jews, Waltham, Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press 2005.
140Herman: An Unfortunate Coincidence, p. 14.
141Ibid, pp. 18-19.
142Malik, Maleiha: Full-face veils aren’t barbaric – but our response
can be, in: The Guardian, 17 September 2013 [online], Avail-
able from: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/17/
full-face-veil-not-barbaric-debate-muslim-women [Accessed on 17 Septem-
ber 2013].
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stresses that in medieval Europe, there was a legal shift towards persecution of
those groups that were considered incompatible with ‘emerging definitions of
what it meant to be European’. There are parallels with Muslims today: “Post
9-11 and 7-7 discussion of Muslims have generated an anti-Islam ideology that
has now been adopted by the far right throughout Europe.”
Malik and Herman represent the latest development in antisemitism schol-
arship: to use the concepts of ‘Orientalism’ and ‘Christian normativity’ to
analyse representations of Jews and Muslims in British discourse. Their argu-
ment is that being the ‘Other’ to this Christian and orientalising discourse is
what Jews and Muslims, and possibly other minority groups, have in common.
Both Maleiha Malik and Didi Herman see themselves as part of critical Jewish
or ethnic minority studies. However, their concepts remain within categories
that are very specific to British history. The exact thing that they want to crit-
icise, the creation of ‘Englishness’, is the very thing they cannot escape. Their
concepts remain in line with a consensus on what constitutes antisemitism and
what constitutes racism in a multicultural framework. In this context, both
Jews and Muslims are seen as minorities opposed to majority society. Schol-
arship on antisemitism and racism seems to have naturally gravitated towards
confirming this basic assumption of multiculturalism, rather than questioning
it.
These comparisons are not, like in Germany, part of a discourse of normal-
isation that seeks to normalise the German past, but they function as part
of discourse of negotiation of the place of minorities in British society. Thus,
even though these comparisons may intend to be critical, they nevertheless
oversimplify concepts of antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentments.
This chapter shows that the comparisons between antisemitism and ‘Islamo-
phobia’ have developed very differently in Britain and Germany. Nevertheless,
they both perpetuate particular notions of national identity. In a sense, this
specific interpretation of minority persecution in history is related to interpre-
tations of contemporary minority-majority relationships in Britain. Within
multiculturalism, all minorities are, or at least can be, equally affected by pro-
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cesses of racialisation. The most important conclusion of these texts is that
there is nothing specific about the persecution of Jews, on the contrary, Jews
and other minorities are similarly affected by Christian normativity, or exclu-
sive notions of national identity. These approaches can therefore be located
within a framework of a particular understanding of racism as a discursive
practice that resulted out of the British colonial historic context.
What is most striking about this theory about antisemitism is that it makes
only casual references to the Holocaust, if at all. It does not acknowledge
a history of antisemitism in particular. In that sense it is a truly multicul-
tural approach by equating different minorities. More importantly, however,
it considers the West’s relationship with parts of the world that have been
constructed as the ‘Orient’ as the most fundamental category in theorising
racism. As this chapter has shown, this is also due to the changing notions of
citizenship and religion that developed in the process of a Muslim struggle for
recognition. The inherent danger in this approach is a differentiation between
those Jews who can be considered ‘Oriental’, and become victims of racist
discourse, and those who themselves are perceived as ‘Orientalist’, and thus
as producing racist discourse. This becomes even more evident in compari-
son with approaches to antisemitism, racism, and anti-Muslim resentments in
Germany, which have taken a different path, but produced very similar results.
5.2 Germany: Conceptualising Antisemitism in
the context of a new found national
self-understanding
Just as in Britain, in Germany, too, there were universalising tendencies with
regard to the understanding of antisemitism and racism. However, in the Ger-
man context, it has to be taken into account that the Nazi past remained
central for the formation of German identity. What this chapter shows is
that from the 1990s, new forms of Holocaust remembrance realised the ear-
lier desire of the German public to become ‘normal’, and the Nazi past was
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positively integrated into a new German identity. What I argue is that anti-
semitism research became part of this normalisation process as well. Building
on what was discussed in the last chapter, I show how in the context of new
understandings of German citizenship in a multicultural reality, antisemitism
theories increasingly moved away from a concept of any particularity of anti-
semitism and towards abstract theories of prejudice, which neglected to take
into account actual experiences of Jews or other minorities.
5.2.1 Right-wing extremism and theories of deprivation
While the last chapter described how racism research had been largely marginalised
until the end of the 1980s, the wave of right-wing violence that shook the newly
united Germany in 1991, the arson attacks on the homes of asylum seekers in
the former East German towns of Hoyerswerda and Rostock, prompted re-
search on both the radical right as well as on general racism in the context
of united Germany. The focus of this research was to understand the charac-
ter of the racist attacks and the ideology behind it as well as to explain the
attraction of right-wing ideas for young men from the former East Germany.
Initially, these studies downplayed any connections between radical right-wing
attitudes and attitudes in mainstream society.
In several studies on the subject, Christoph Butterwegge convincingly showed
that the contemporary racism of the radical right in Germany ran along
‘vo¨lkisch’-nationalist lines.143 However, he also emphasised that the manifes-
tation of radical right-wing violence at the beginning of the 1990s was related
to the social situation in Germany. He pointed out that the poverty that had
spread after the recession in Germany in the early 1980s led to a decrease in
solidarity and welfare and and increase of egoism, deregulation, consumerism
and conformity, which was, in his view, a breeding ground for right-wing pop-
ulism.144 Butterwegge’s approach to understand racism therefore relied on a
143See Butterwegge, Christoph: Der Funktionswandel des Rassismus und die Erfolge des
Rechtsextremismus, in: idem and Ja¨ger, Siegfried (eds.): Rassismus in Europa, Ko¨ln:
Bund Verlag 1993, pp. 181-199.
144Ibid, p. 185.
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theory of economic deprivation, which saw economically deprived young males
as vulnerable to right-wing recruitment.
A similar but more multi-levelled theoretical approach to the issue was dis-
played in Wilhelm Heitmeyer’s early study on right-wing violence among young
men. This study, too, was generally based on a theory of deprivation. How-
ever, he took into account that economic deprivation does not necessarily lead
young men to become right-wing activists, but that particular factors in an
individual’s socialisation process benefit the attraction to right-wing ideology,
only one of which is economic deprivation. On a wider social level, Heitmeyer
agreed with Butterwegge that there are increasing individualisation tenden-
cies and decreasing solidarity in conjunction with increasing instability and
social inequality.145 However, whether an individual actually becomes radical
was also dependant on the milieu structure they lived in as well as on indi-
vidual psychology.146 Contrary to Butterwegge, Heitmeyer emphasised that it
is wrong to assume that the right-wing extremism of the united Germany is
related to earlier right-wing ideologies.147
Although outbursts of racial prejudice and violence prompted research on the
issue, there was in fact no systematic investigation or theorisation of hostility
against non-German and non-Jewish minorities in wider German society. Stud-
ies focused primarily on right-wing extremism and scholars who pointed out
the relation between right-wing ideologies and mainstream racism remained
rare and relatively isolated. But theoretical and empirical approaches to racist
outbursts in re-united Germany soon took into account the attitudes of Ger-
man society as a whole, rather than focusing on the right-wing movement in
particular. In a more sophisticated theoretical approach, Nora Ra¨thzel thus
explained the appearance of racist violence in Germany after 1990 with a quest
for German identity. In her study on media depictions of ’foreigners’ after the
violence she observed that ‘foreigners’ were constructed as the Other to the
145See Heitmeyer, Wilhelm: Die Bielefelder Rechtsextremismus Studie, Weinheim und
Mu¨nchen: Juventa 1992, p. 16 ff.
146Ibid, pp. 21-26.
147Ibid, p. 25.
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newly re-united Germany. Their function was to create an image of a ho-
mogenised Germany, a harmony between East and West Germany in their
dislike of the ‘alien’.148 In addition, Margaret Ja¨ger pointed out that after
1990, a reappearance of ideas inspired by vo¨lkish thought could be detected
in public discourse. She emphasised that the discourse of the radical right
centred around the German nation and German identity.149
To a degree, the findings of these discourse-analytical approaches were later
recognised in other social research. A later study by Christoph Butterwegge
and Alexander Ha¨usler, for example, concurred with this finding. They added
that the appearance of ‘vo¨lkisch’ ideas can not only be observed in right-wing
discourse, but in mainstream discourse as well. They concluded that racism
and nationalism were characteristic for authoritarian developments in in Ger-
man society.150 Their argument was based on the observation that through-
out the 1990s, national identity became a topic of significant public interest,
‘German values’ and ‘German interests’ were discussed and multiculturalism
rejected. They also pointed out that there was at the same time the paradoxi-
cal tendency to deny the occurrence of racism in the German political ‘middle’
in conjunction with strong opposition against the radical right. When racism
was discussed within mainstream discourse it was portrayed as a marginal
phenomenon originating in the radical right.151
The studies of right-wing ideology in the context of German identity, over-
shadowed by racist outbursts, also resonated within antisemitism research.
Studies began to focus on mainstream attitudes towards Jews rather than the
radical right. In his study Demokratie und Judenbild in which he investigated
148See Ra¨thzel, Nora: Zur Bedeutung von Asylpolitik und neuen Rassismen bei der Reorgan-
isierung der nationalen Identita¨t im vereinigten Deutschland, in: Butterwegge, Christoph
and Ja¨ger, Siegfried (eds.): Rassismus in Europa, Ko¨ln: Bund Verlag 1993, pp. 213-229.
149See Ja¨ger, Margaret: Gefa¨hrliche Erbschaften: Die schleichende Restauration rechten
Denkens, Berlin: Aufbau 1999, p. 100.
150See Butterwegge, Christoph and Haeusler, Alexander: Rechtsextremismus, Rassismus und
Nationalismus: Randprobleme oder Pha¨nomene der Mitte?, in: Butterwegge, Christoph:
Themen der Rechten, Themen der Mitte: Zuwanderung, demografischer Wandel und
Nationalbewusstsein, Opladen: Leske und Budrich 2001, pp. 217-266, here p. 220
151Ibid, p. 228.
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anti-Jewish resentments in German political culture, Lars Rensmann acknowl-
edged the numerous and distinct theoretical approaches to antisemitism and
incorporated them into his analysis of several antisemitism scandals of the
1990s and early 2000s in Germany. He gave a comprehensive overview over
every aspect of contemporary antisemitism in Germany in right-wing extrem-
ism as well as mainstream society, and in its different appearances as classical
antisemitic conspiracy theories, coded and secondary antisemitism, Holocaust
denial and left-wing anti-Zionism by analysing public scandals like the Walser-
debate or the Goldhagen-debate and their subsequent discussion in the media.
In contrast to Bergmann and Erb, Rensmann did not see an anti-antisemitic
consensus in German public. Instead, he argued that the way antisemitism
is dealt with is very complex. His findings on the public debates and scan-
dals showed that antisemitism in fact became political again and that these
antisemitic eruptions were accompanied by a general turn to the right and to
nationalism. However, he also emphasised that antisemitic stereotypes were
not confined to the Right - and not to the Left either - but could be found in
every social spectrum. He concluded that antisemitism had increased, despite
the fact that it was still considered a taboo to voice antisemitism in public.
These debates in fact showed that there is a stronger emphasis on questions
of national identity. Hostility towards Jews re-appeared on a political level in
right-wing extremism, but was also existent in a latent form in mainstream
society.152 The debates that Rensmann analysed do not only have to be seen
as a reappearance of antisemitism, but have to be understood in the context
of changes in German national self-understanding. First and foremost, this
meant that the Holocaust took on a different meaning for re-united Germany.
One effect of this new meaning of the Holocaust was that it also changed the
way contemporary antisemitism was understood.
152Rensmann, Lars: Demokratie und Judenbild, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fuer Sozialwis-
senschaften 2004, concluding chapter.
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5.2.2 Remembering the Holocaust: the Goldhagen debate
From the 1990s onwards, Holocaust remembrance in Germany moved from a
defense reflex and an unwillingness to deal with the past to positively integrat-
ing the Holocaust into the German national narrative. This was accompanied
by a process of normalisation of both the Holocaust, as well as antisemitic
rhetoric. One major milestone for this was the Goldhagen-debate, about a
decade after the Historikerstreit. When Daniel Goldhagen’s book Hitler’s will-
ing executioners was published in Germany in 1996, the media reaction to it
was overwhelmingly hostile. Many historians criticised Goldhagen for making
a very thin scholarly contribution and the publisher for overhyping the book.153
Reviews of the book followed a similar pattern as during the Historikerstreit.
Thus, many reviews of Goldhagen’s book displayed what can be described as
a guilt-defensive antisemitism, as there was an outright refusal to properly
deal with what Goldhagen had actually said in his book.154 Instead, reviews
were full of hostile-aggressive behaviour, as well as defamations and antisemitic
stereotypes. Goldhagen was criticised for accusing Germans of being collec-
tively guilty of the Holocaust, Jews were in turn accused of libel, vengeance,
and anti-German racism.
In Ein Volk von Endlo¨sern, Norbert Frei for example criticised Goldhagen
for presenting the German people as a nation that wanted the genocide. He
pointed out that Goldhagen’s book was a provocation intended to make his
career. He accused Goldhagen of not practising proper history by using mainly
secondary literature and easily available sources. In order to contrast what he
saw as an extreme Sonderweg argument that Goldhagen made in his book,
153For an overview of the debate see for example Shandley, Robert R.: Unwilling Germans?
The Goldhagen Debate, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, and for a
collection of press cuttings see Schoeps, Julius: Ein Volk von Mo¨rdern? Die Dokumen-
tation zur Goldhagen-Kontroverse und die Rolle der Deutschen im Holocaust, Hamburg:
Hoffmann und Campe 1996.
154See Rensmann, Lars: Demokratie und Judenbild: Antisemitismus in der politischen Kul-
tur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fu¨r Sozialwissenschaften,
2004, pp. 339-349.
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which branded German society as a whole as antisemitic, Frei pointed out
that there were in fact Germans who were sympathetic with Jews and showed
that they cared, but were also afraid of being denounced for doing so.155
In an article in the FAZ, Frank Schirrmacher concluded that
“Goldhagen’s book has little to do with scholarship and with demon-
strability. It is a curious countermanifesto against the civilizing ef-
forts to which the Germans have subjected themselves since 1945,
and in its attitude and language it recalls the many psychological
reports that the Allies had drawn up all over the country from
March 1945 until the summer of 1947. It gives rise to that kind of
inconsequential self-accusation that is really nothing other than a
comprehensive form of self-appeasement.” 156
Publicist Rudolf Augstein, in Der Soziologe als Scharfrichter, also valued the
book’s academic contribution as zero. He argued that the police men Gold-
hagen portrayed in his book do not in fact represent German society - which
Goldhagen claimed they did - but that they were very simple men, because the
braver and smarter ones were able to escape killing duties. Still, even those
who murdered felt that they had no choice. Moreover, however, Augstein
pointed out that only Jewish columnists - and certainly not historians - had
lauded the book. He found the accusation that there was an ‘eliminationist’
character in German antisemitism for at least 150 years prior to Hitler ‘at best
ignorant, if not downright mean-spirited.’.157
A curious bias became evident in Augstein’s and other reviews. German
critics questioned Goldhagen’s ability to be objective, as he was the son of a
survivor. Omer Bartov rightly pointed out that this was a uniquely German
viewpoint:
“while in the United States Goldhagen’s family history was seen as
a validation of his work, and as adding moral authority to his text,
155See Frei, Norbert: Ein Volk von Endlo¨sern, in: Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung, 13./14. April 1996.
156Schirrmacher, Frank: Hitlers Code, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 April 1996.
157See Augstein, Rudolf: Der Soziologe als Scharfrichter, in: Der Spiegel, 15. April 1996.
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in Germany curious assumption was made that Germans could
somehow maintain greater ‘scientific’ detachment from the horrors
of the Holocaust than Jews, who, unlike their German counter-
parts, would never be liberated from their ‘understandable’ mysti-
fying predilections and emotional involvement.” 158
In line with this bias, Historian Eberhard Ja¨ckel called Goldhagen’s book
‘a failure of a dissertation’, ‘faultily researched’ and accused Goldhagen of
anti-German racism, as the book is ‘a relapse to the most primitive of all
stereotypes.’ 159 However, while many reviewers displayed hostility and even
antisemitism, other historians argued that while the book may be flawed, it
would also be wrong to reject it outright, as it contained several elements worth
discussing. This was for example argued by Ulrich Herbert160 and Hans Ulrich
Wehler. The book also received positive reviews from Jewish historians like
Julius Schoeps and Micha Brumlik.
Geoff Eley rightly pointed out that the Goldhagen debate was not about the
content of the book at all. He admitted that book showed many flaws and that
there is not enough evidence to speak of an ’eliminationist antisemitism’. He
also stressed how Goldhagen ignored large parts of Holocaust historiography.
However, he came to the conclusion that there was what he called a ’Goldhagen
effect’, which became evident in the controversy around the book, and which
was part of a number of debates that started with the Historikerstreit:
“The book’s reception and the remarkable enthusiasm around its
publication and the author’s public appearances weren’t ’about’
the substantive historical and historiographical arguments at all.
They were the latest instalment in a long-running public struggle
to ground the ethics of democratic citizenship in a country where
fascism seemed to have successfully claimed - and disqualified - the
158Bartov, Omer: Reception and Perception: Goldhagen’s Holocaust and the World, in: Eley,
Geoff (ed.): The ‘Goldhagen Effect’, History, Memory, Nazism - Facing the German Past,
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 2000, pp. 33-88, here p. 46f.
159See Ja¨ckel, Eberhard: Einfach ein schlechtes Buch, in: Die Zeit, 17 May 1996.
160Wehler, Ulrich: Die richtige Frage, in: Die Zeit, June 14 1996.
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national past as a source of inspiration. Goldhagen’s book regalva-
nized public attentions for a self-critical perspective precisely as the
countervailing pressures mounted for bringing Germany’s struggle
with the Nazi past to some final and reassuring closure.”161
While the book was vilified by German critics, it was in fact a commercial
success. Omer Bartov argued that this was because it spoke to the third
generation. The book and the rhetoric Goldhagen used to promote his book on
the tour through Germany managed to “distance the younger generation from
the event and its ostensible primary cause, by emphasizing ... that postwar
Germany had gone through a complete metamorphosis and was therefore no
longer plagued by that unique brand of antisemitism that had previously made
it essentially different.” 162
What was striking however, was that not only many historians refused to
deal with Goldhagen’s hypotheses, but that German social research focussed
on the Goldhagen debate rather than his hypotheses. To be sure, the anti-
semitic content of articles published in context of the debate has been widely
analysed. But what Philosopher Ju¨rgen Habermas had said about Goldhagen’s
book and its potential usage did not actually happen. Habermas had publicly
defended Goldhagen during the debate and stressed the validity of his findings.
When the Bla¨tter fu¨r deutsche und internationale Politik awarded Goldhagen
their Democracy Prize in 1997, Habermas gave a speech in which he criticised
those historians who had rejected the book and thanked Goldhagen for paving
the way for an “ethical-political discourse of collective self-understanding”. He
argued that through Goldhagen’s work it was possible to detect specific tra-
ditions and mentalities that can then be changed and transformed through
political enlightenment.
However, with two notable exceptions, the content of Goldhagen’s study
has not been ‘worked through’ by German sociologists. The debate was rather
161Eley, Geoff: Ordinary Germans, Nazism, and Judeocide, in: Eley, Geoff (ed.): The ’Gold-
hagen Effect’, History, Memory, Nazism - Facing the German Past, Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press 2000, pp. 1-32, here p. 30f.
162Bartov: Reception and Perception: Goldhagen’s Holocaust and the World , p.50.
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seen as yet another scandal in which antisemitic remarks were made, but which
were quickly countered by strong anti-antisemitic elements in German society.
This interpretation stood in stark contrast to what Lars Rensmann concluded
about another debate just two years later. This debate ignited when writer
Martin Walser gave a speech on 11. October 1998 after receiveing the peace
price of the German book trade. In his speech, Walser criticised German in-
tellectuals for continuing to emphasise Germany’s ‘shame’, which he said was
instrumentalised in the name of a ‘negative nationalism’. These ‘smart intellec-
tuals’ were using Auschwitz as a ‘moral cudgel’ to threaten all Germans, who
were actually a ‘normal’ nation and society. At the time, his speech was very
well received, but after Ignatz Bubis, leader of the Central Council of German
Jews, judged it as incitement, an intense and long lasting debate ensued. Most
voices in the debate actually agreed with Walser. Bubis’s critique was in most
cases judged as oversensitivity, but in many cases Jews in general were accused
of instrumentalising Auschwitz to insist on German guilt, sometimes even for
financial gains. Lars Rensmann pointed out that there were less critical voices
than during other debates. Many newspaper articles in fact insisted on the
normality of the German population. He interpreted this as a discourse shift:
what was previously taboo to be expressed in public was suddenly not any
more, so that there was in a sense a normalisation of antisemitic discourse.163
This normalisation of antisemitic discourse was related to a general process
of normalisation of German identity. While the previous chapters touched
upon the desire of the German public to become ‘normal’, this chapter shows
that the period after unification was a time when it gradually became a reality.
This normalisation process has to be seen as part of a larger process of German
identity formation. While for a long time, Holocaust remembrance in Germany
was characterised by fending off guilt, after the Goldhagen debate, this attitude
changed or transformed into a different national narrative: the Second World
War and Shoah became the centres of reference for a positive new Germany.
This position is closely connected to the perception of Germans as victims of
163Rensmann: Demokratie und Judenbild, p. 372.
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the Second World War.164
Taking into account more recent cultural representations of the Nazi past, for
example films like Downfall (2004), it became evident that Germans began to
increasingly consider themselves and their ancestors as victims of an irrational
clique that acted out their brutal plan to dominate Europe. National Socialism,
the Second World War and the Shoah thus became a history lesson for the
German nation. A lesson that, although it almost destroyed them, left the
Germans as an especially refined people behind. In this context, Germans do
not have to deny their guilt any more, but can freely admit to being guilty of
not resisting a brutal dictatorship. But in addition to this form of redemption,
the Holocaust also became a history lesson and provided German society with
an increased awareness of necessary resistance against human rights abuses
today, especially possible genocides in other countries. This new found identity
along with the desire for normality found its concrete form in the Holocaust
Memorial in Berlin, which the government decided to build after a long debate
and which was unveiled in 2008. The Holocaust Memorial can be interpreted
as the end of the ‘Schlussstrich’-Debate. It allowed Holocaust commemoration
publicly in the heart of the new Republic. Guilt is no longer denied, but
positively integrated into German identity. Then-chancellor Gerhard Schro¨der
said about the memorial that is should be a place where Germans like to go. In
this light, the Holocaust Memorial becomes a symbol for a new ‘Schlussstrich’,
it made history out of and at the same time reinvented a German identity.
After unification, German reactions to the Nazi past slowly changed. How-
ever, Holocaust remembrance remained central for a German self-understanding.
As Atina Grossman described this process:
“Certainly in the last twenty years, but in many ways from the
very onset, national identity (and political legitimacy) in the Fed-
eral Republic was shaped by the confrontation - whether willing or
not - with the Holocaust and the persecution of Jews [...] postwar
German identity had depended on, and profited by, this appropria-
164See for example Heer, Hannes: Vom Verschwinden der Taeter, Berlin 2006 (2nd ed.).
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tion of the experience of their Jewish victims. Remembrance of the
Holocaust has become an integral part of West German national
identity.”165
However, what this significance of the Holocaust to German identity also
entailed was that it did not relate to actual Jews living in Germany. This had
detrimental effects on German-Jewish relations. It is important to understand
that all the debates discussed above functioned as a way of negotiating Ger-
man identity, rather than Jewish identity in Germany. Actual Jews living in
Germany rarely figured in these debates, let alone contributed to them, but
these debates related to Jews only as an abstraction. Jews were in that sense a
vehicle to negotiate German identity. If anything, Jews are even more absent
in German public discourse than before. Atina Grossman argued that there
was a new obsession with Ta¨ter (perpetrator) rather than Opfer (victims) but
that this attention “complemented, if it did not displace, a preceding and often
romanticized fascination with Opfer (victims), especially Jews, Jewish culture,
and, in a different fashion, women”.166
It is therefore not surprising that despite high levels of integration of Jews
in Germany today, despite Germany’s post-war agreement to compensate the
survivors of the Holocaust and despite the fact that their main representative
body, the Central Council of Jews in Germany, was granted equal status to
the main Christian Churches and receives state funding since 2002, Germans
and Jews remain set apart by history. The inadequate denazification process,
the persistence of postwar antisemitism, and variable attempts in Germany to
come to terms with the past have impacted the social and political relations
between Jews and Germans so much that “Jews in contemporary Germany
are still struggling to find their place in German society, but their struggles
today are with the trauma of the Holocaust, and with the people of the nation
165Grossman, Atina: The Goldhagen Effect: Memory, Repitition, and Responsibility in the
New Germany, in: Eley, Geoff (ed.): The ’Goldhagen Effect’, History, Memory, Nazism
- Facing the German Past, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 2000, pp.
89-129, here p. 92.
166Ibid, p. 116.
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responsible for its occurrence.”167
5.2.3 Remembering the Holocaust in a multicultural context
But the German process of coming to terms with its past has not only had
effects on the Jewish minority, it has impacted other minorities living in Ger-
many as well. As Leslie Adelson has pointed out, because the Third Reich
and the Holocaust were key points of reference for Germans, this built “an
interpretative landscape in which Germany’s resident Turks have tended to
figure only indirectly, if at all.”168
Using a more textual approach Leslie Adelson focused her analysis on German-
Turkish literature. She pointed out that, rather than assuming an analo-
gousness, the Turkish immigration experience in Germany needs to be under-
stood within the context of a “triangular relationship” of Germans, Turks and
Jews.169 She emphasised that Turks who immigrated into a post-Holocaust
Germany were excluded not despite but because of the Holocaust: because
Turks have not shared this particular and utmost significant historical event,
they were not welcomed into German society and had to remain outside.
German-Turkish literature was then often concerned with the ‘immigration
into Germany’s past’ that seemed at the same time impossible and neces-
sary for acceptance. The middle of the triangle, then, is the Holocaust. Her
approach was not directly concerned with hostility towards Muslims but it nev-
ertheless illustrated the centrality of the Holocaust for German - and perhaps
even European - identity and the changes it has brought.
According to Adelson, there is a German-Jewish dichotomy in which Turks
do not figure, and in order to change this, Turks must, in a sense, immigrate
into the defining chapters of German history as Germanness is defined by the
167Rapaport, Lynn: Jews in Germany after the Holocaust, Memory, identity and Jewish-
German relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997, p.38.
168Adelson, Leslie: Touching Tales of Turks, Germans, and Jews: Cultural Alterity, Histor-
ical Narrative and Literary Riddles for the 1990s, in: New German Critique, No. 80,
Special Issue on the Holocaust (Spring-Summer 2000), pp. 93-124, here p. 95.
169See Ibid.
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Holocaust. One character in German-Turkish writer Safer Senocak’s novel
Gefa¨hrliche Verwandschaft (1995) seemed to have acutely felt this when he
asked himself: “So I had missed the historical event. Do I still belong here?”170
Perhaps unexpectedly, this question of belonging of Turks in Germany has
been dealt with by antisemitism researchers. More recently, there has been a
move towards more inclusive theories of social prejudice. On the one hand, this
reflects the processes of normalisation with regard to Holocaust remembrance
mentioned above. Antisemitism loses its specificity and Jews their ‘special’
position for the formation of German identity. On the other hand, however,
newer theories on antisemitism acknowledge the reality of hostility against mi-
norities in Germany. Theories on antisemitism in Germany have, from very
early on, attempted to find an explanation for both antisemitism and racism
in one theoretical approach, and put antisemitism in relation to recent immi-
gration. The period after unification increased the urgency to find theoretical
approaches that would not completely ignore the new reality of minority com-
munities living in Germany. There was a need to find an approach that would
explain the antisemitism still present among a large number of Germans, as
well as forms of racism against immigrants. One of those approaches was the
theory of the ’third person’.
This theoretical contribution has been made by sociologist Klaus Holz, who
based his argument and theory on Hannah Arendt’s and Zygmunt Bauman’s
approach to antisemitism. Holz was mostly concerned with the way in which
antisemitism is communicated and what this means for the construction of na-
tional identity. He argued that there are semantic constructions of the images
of the national self and the ‘Other’. The Jews are constructed as the ‘third
person’ to this bi-polar scheme, because they are not perceived as members
of other nations, but as destroyer of the national order.171 However, the flaw
in this approach was that Holz developed a model for antisemitism which can
170as cited in Adelson: Touching Tales, p. 122. - the character referred to the fall of the
Berlin wall, but Adelson stressed that this might as well be a reference to the Holocaust.
171See Holz, Klaus: Nationaler Antisemitismus: Wissenssoziologie einer Weltanschauung,
Hamburg: Hamburger Edition 2001, p. 280.
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be applied at any time and at any place, and does not acknowledge historic
specificities of nationalisms and antisemitisms, but his approach itself is in
that sense very specific to the current German context. The idea of the Jew as
‘the third person’, he is able to stress the specificity of antisemitism while at
the same time acknowledging that there are other ‘Others’. But while Holz in-
sisted on the particularity of Jews for German nationalism, other antisemitism
researchers let go of this idea in favour of an all-encompassing approach to
both antisemitism and other forms of hostility.
5.2.4 Understanding antisemitism in multicultural societies:
the theory of ‘group-related hostility’
This theoretical development was related to the emergence of prejudice re-
search that was inspired by social-psychological research on antisemitism in
particular, and in fact used its methods and theories. In 1987, Werner Bergmann
had proposed that future psychological research on antisemitism needed to be
based on psychological theories of group relations.172 He dismissed earlier theo-
ries that tried to explain antisemitism on an individual level because they had
failed to explain racial prejudice.173 Instead, he suggested an antisemitism
research based on theories of the formation of group relations.174 This the-
ory, in turn, built on earlier research on prejudice undertaken by American
social-psychologists, who tried to explain social hostility with group identifi-
cation, social deprivation and mobility, perceptions of economic competition
and ethnocentrism on a group instead of an individual level.175
These theories formed the basis of Wilhelm Heitmeyer’s long-term social-
psychological study on ‘group related hostility’, initiated in 2002. Based at the
Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence at Bielefeld
University, it has become the largest and most influential study on racial and
other prejudice in German society and its findings are published yearly in
172See above section on Antisemitism Research in Germany.
173See Bergmann, Werner: Group Theory and Ethnic Relations, p. 139.
174Ibid, p. 140.
175Ibid.
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‘Deutsche Zusta¨nde’.176
The concept of ‘group related hostility’ is based on the idea that a mentality
of inequality is the basis for various forms of prejudice. Heitmeyer identified
seven ‘elements’ of group related hostility in Germany: racism (biological in-
equality), hostility against ‘foreigners’ (cultural prejudice), heterophobia (prej-
udice against members of the own group displaying ‘abnormal’ characteristics
like homosexuality, homelessness, disabilities), Islamophobia (prejudice against
Muslims), belief in the prerogative of the already established, and sexism.177
However, these elements do not exist isolated from each other but are related.
Pardoxically, however, newer developments in the understanding of anti-
semitism in Germany became part of a process of normalisation themselves.
There was a move away from insisting on the particularity of antisemitism and
towards equating antisemitism with other forms of hostility. While on the one
hand, this integrated approach ‘normalises’ antisemitism and categorises it as
merely one prejudice among many, this theoretical development also has to be
seen in the context of changing notions of German citizenship. While attitudes
of Germans may still maintain exclusive ideas of Germanness, on a political
level, the reality of immigration and settlement of minorities in Germany has,
in fact, slowly been acknowledged. In this context there is a need to adapt
theories of hostility towards minorities to this new reality. In that sense, there
is evidence towards a German form of ‘multiculturalism’ based partly on the
British model.
5.2.5 German multiculturalism
Since the 1990s, Germany’s approach to minority integration has slowly changed.
While the German state for a long time completely ignored its responsibility
in fostering integration of ‘guestworkers’ and their families, integration efforts
intensified in the 1980s and 1990s. The new nationality law of 1999 allowed
176See Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (ed.): Deutsche Zusta¨nde, volumes 1-9, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp 2002-2010.
177See Heimeyer, Wilhelm (ed.): Deutsche Zust´’ande, volume 3, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp 2005, pp. 13-34.
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the acquisition of German citizenship after eight years of legal residence, giv-
ing many young Turks the opportunity to gain German citizenship easier and
faster than before.178 Many young Turks were also given access to German
public education and training programmes, but the majority of them contin-
ued to be employed in unskilled or semi-skilled economic sectors. Only a small
number advanced into skilled labour and the move into the middle class has
been a particularly slow process.179 There is an increasing number of Turkish
professionals, intellectuals, writers, artists and filmmakers. But their cases,
even their success, often exemplify the exclusionist character of German cul-
ture. The entrance of German-Turkish figures and subjects into mainstream
culture in Germany is still perceived as an exotic and folkloristic phenomenon.
This is not only true for German-Turkish film but also for German-Turkish
literature. Although German-Turkish writers like Feridun Zaimoglu and Safer
Senocak have established themselves as successful writers in Germany and their
work deals with ethnic ambiguity of Turkish Diaspora identities in Germany,
their work is perceived as ‘Turkish’ rather than ‘German’ or ‘German-Turkish’,
which is a phenomenon that can be described as a “habit of thought that im-
plicitly relegates Turks in Germany to a place imagined to be outside Germany
and outside modernity.”180 Taking part in the German cultural sphere is con-
sidered to be insufficient in order to be German.
As Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood concluded in their comparative study on
citizenship in Europe:
“Following decades of pursuing an ethno-national citizenship, Ger-
many has since the late 1990s undergone significant changes in its
management of immigration and integration, and in its conception
of citizenhip. While the federal policies had previously focused al-
most entirely on the control and return of migrants, in 1998 the
178Freyer-Stowasser: Turks in Germany, p. 65.
179Ibid, pp.62-64.
180Adelson, Leslie A. (2000): Touching Tales of Turks, Germans and Jews: Cultural Alterity,
Historical Narrative, and Literary Riddles for the 1990s, in: New German Critique, No
80, Special Issue on the Holocaust, pp. 93-124, here p. 118.
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Red-Green government characterised Germany as an ‘immigration
country’ and amended the Citizenship Law (2000) to introduce
the principle of ius soli. These developments have been accompa-
nied by others such as the introduction of the Immigration Law
(2005) which encourages the cultivation of ‘integration’ strategies,
and which in turn was followed by the invitation to migrants and
civil society actors to take part in a National Integration Summit
(2006). Yet the content of this ‘integration’ has also included a
nationalist imperative, whereby newcomers are expected to under-
take 300 to 600 hours of German language classes and lessons on
German society and history.” 181
The new German self-understanding became especially apparent in the way
the German state has changed its approach to the Muslim community. Re-
cently, the German state has sought ways to integrate Muslims into German
society and to engage in a dialogue with Muslim communities. The Islamkon-
ferenz, a meeting between German state officials and delegates of several Mus-
lim organisations, was hosted in Berlin in 2006 and in subsequent years. As
a result of these meetings, the Koordinierungsrat der Muslime in Deutschland
(coordination council of Muslims in Germany) was founded by the four largest
Muslim organisations: the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (central
council of Muslims in Germany) (ZMD), the Tu¨rkisch-Islamischen Union der
Anstalt fu¨r Religion (DITIB), the Islamrat fu¨r die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
(Islam council for the Federal Republic of Germany) (IRD) and the Verband
der Islamischen Kulturzentren (association of Islamic cultural centres) (VIKZ).
Tezcan Levent points out how these efforts by the German government are in-
tended to change the Muslim organisational structure in Germany. He stresses
that there is a request for a central Muslim organisation in political and public
discourse and that this organisation, representing a nationally domesticated Is-
lam, is expected to take over integration efforts. The Imam is supposed to play
181Meer, Nasar and Modood, Tariq: Framing Contemporary Citizenship and Diversity in
Europe, pp. 33-60, here pp. 35 f.
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a central role in these efforts by acting as a guide for a controlled integration
and by representing the community, thus having a ‘pastoral’ role.182
This new approach by the German state is perhaps an effort towards a more
British model of multiculturalism, based on fostering a relationship between
state and minority culture, rather than the German model of denying respon-
sibility for integration. Angela Merkel said that multiculturalism is dead, al-
though the country never adopted such a policy.183 With that, she expressed
exactly the opposite: the German self-understanding has changed in the past
20 years. The German state is increasingly seeking dialogue with minority
communities, and not only with Jews. In contrast to Britain, however, this
is less about how minority communities see themselves, but about how the
German state wants to relate to them.
5.2.6 Ethnic minority research
Still, this development towards multiculturalism has also been reflected in
social research, although the acknowledgement of a hostility that affects Mus-
lims in particular is relatively new to German research on resentments and
prejudice. This has to do with the way in which non-Germans were mainly
perceived as members of ‘foreign’ nations, mainly as Turks, and the way in
which this shaped research on the topic. Werner Schiffauer pointed out that it
was in fact only after September 11th that immigrants in Germany began to
be primarily perceived as Muslims, and only secondarily as members of other
nations.184 Consequently, research on hostility towards them in particular has
only recently been established.
However, similar to earlier studies on ‘guestworkers’, research focused heavily
on Muslims as an object of research. Studies have investigated their social sta-
182See Levent, Tezcan: Governmentality, Pastoral Care and Integration, in: Al-Harmaneh,
Ala and Joern Thielemann (eds.): Islam and Muslims in Germany, Leiden: Brill 2008.
pp. 119-132.
183See Meer: Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism, p. 1.
184See Schiffauer, Werner: Der unheimliche Muslim - Staatsbu¨rgerschaft und zivilge-
sellschaftliche A¨ngste, in: Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika and Tezcan, Levant (eds.): Konfliktfeld
Islam in Europa, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2007, pp.111-133, here p.115.
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tus, their religiousness and their attitudes rather than the resentments against
them.185
But this idea of dealing with Muslims through studying them became even
more blatantly obvious in the 2007 quantitative study “Muslime in Deutsch-
land”, which had been commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior. It focused
on Muslims of all backgrounds in Germany and their attitudes towards religion,
state, and democracy. The study revealed that religion was highly important
for Muslims in Germany and that religious ties were far more intense compared
to non-Muslims.186 However, the forms of religiousness were varied and the
study made a distinction between fundamentalist, traditional and orthodox
orientations. Curiously, their numbers indicated that about 40% of German
Muslims were fundamentalist, but it was stressed that this did not necessarily
correlate with anti-democratic attitudes. It was further suggested that around
12% of Muslims in Germany were strongly morally critical towards Western
democracies and societies and propagated the use of physical and death penal-
ties according to Islamic law. The reasons for this were thought to be varied:
whereas a subgroup within these 12% belong to an educated, individually less
discriminated group that developed these attitudes because of the perception
of a collective discrimination experience towards Muslims in Germany, another
subgroup, a less educated one, developed this attitude out of individual experi-
ences of discrimination.187 The study also indicated that there were tendencies
of self-exclusion among yet another subgroup with a traditional religious atti-
tude that is opposed to integration.188 Another conclusion the study drew was
that the attitudes of this minority of Muslims in Germany could be compared
to xenophobia and right-wing extremism among ‘white’ young Germans, as
they similarly seek for simple solutions, clear rules and have a binary world
185See for example Tietze: Islamische Identita¨ten, and No¨kel: Islam und Selbstbehauptung.
186See Brettfeld, Katrin and Wetzels, Peter (ed.): Muslime in Deutschland - Integration,
Integrationsbarrieren, Religion sowie Einstellungen zu Demokratie, Rechtsstaat und
politisch-religio¨s motivierter Gewalt, Hamburg 2007, p.493.
187Ibid, p.494.
188Ibid.
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view.189 Although the study perhaps overemphasised the negative aspects of
Muslim attitudes in Germany, it is the largest study of its kind so far in Ger-
many and their main findings do not disagree with other findings, like those of
Sigrid No¨kel and Nicola Tietze. There were a number of issues with this study,
but one of them was certainly that it failed to see that attitudes among Mus-
lims in Germany cannot be seen out of context of the heritage of Germany’s
failure to accommodate their needs and the institutional discrimination they
encountered.
While social research was thus slow to truly embrace multiculturalism in its
methodologies, there were nevertheless a small number of historical studies that
looked the presence of Muslims in Germany and their contribution to German
society beyond ‘guestworker’ immigration. Gerhard Ho¨pp, for example, wrote
about the establishment of Muslim communities in Germany before and during
the First World War.190
His findings showed that there was a Muslim presence in Germany long
before Turks arrived as ‘guestworkers’. This Muslim presence was established
when during the Wars with the Turks, Turkish fighters (Beutetu¨rken) were im-
prisoned on German soil, and when Prussia recruited Volga Tatars and Bosnian
Muslims for their Ulan regiment between 1741 and 1745.191 These regiments
recruited more Tatars over time and Friedrich II granted them and their fami-
lies the right to settle in Germany and practise their religion. He even assured
them that he wanted to build mosques for them and treat them as any other
subject.192 The Muslim communities in Germany grew when Ottoman dele-
gates and Arab Muslims came to Germany, and Berlin in particular, where a
cemetery was established for those who died there.193 After 1871 a number
of Muslims had settled in Germany as lecturers, students, apprentices, teach-
189Ibid, p.500.
190See Ho¨pp, Gerhard: Muslime in der Mark. Als Kriegsgefangene und Internierte in
Wu¨nsdorf und Zossen, 1914-1924, Zentrum Moderner Orient, Geisteswissenschaftliche
Zentren Berlin e.V., Berlin: Das Arab. Buch 1997, p. 9.
191See bid, p. 10.
192Ibid.
193See ibid, p.11.
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ers, merchants, entertainers and diplomats.194 This community grew with the
arrival of Muslim soldiers and officers that came to Berlin and Potsdam for
military training to fight on Germany’s side and the imprisonment of a signif-
icant number of Muslims from Algeria, Senegal, Siberia, India and Morocco
who fought in the British, French, and Russian forces. These prisoners of war
were brought together in a single prison in Zossen near Berlin, where even a
mosque was built to enable them to carry out their religious rituals.195
But researchers also became interested in stereotypical representations of
Muslims in Germany’s past and present. In cultural studies, and inspired
by theories of ‘Orientalism’, scholars have applied a theoretical framework of
post-colonialism to the German case in order to account for specific prejudices
against immigrants from ‘Oriental’ countries and regions.
Approaches to anti-Muslim racism in cultural studies
Apart from the more social scientific and linguistic approaches to contempo-
rary racism mentioned in the previous chapter, representations of Turks and
Muslims have thus become a subject for German cultural studies. Early studies
of this kind in fact date back to the 1970s. They focus on cultural represen-
tations and perceptions of Turks in medieval and early modern times as well
as in present day Germany. Senol Ozyurt investigated the image of the ‘Turk’
in German folk songs since the 1300s and came to the conclusion that they
expressed a bipolarity of the ‘good Christian’ and the ‘barbarian Turk’. While
the Christian was always presented as great, good, brave and noble, the Turk
was depicted as barbaric.196
Scholars also analysed the way Turks and Arabs had been depicted in early
German scholarship and came to the conclusion that there was an inherent
feeling of superiority among Christian Germans towards Turks and Arabs. In
his research of the study of Arab and Islam at German Universities, Rudi Paret
traced the beginnings of ‘Orientalist’ scholarship back to the 12th century,
194Ibid.
195See ibid, pp. 38 f.
196See Ozyurg, Senol: Tu¨rkenlieder und Tu¨rkenbild, Mu¨nchen: Wilhelm Fink 1972, p. 101.
274
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism
when the Koran was first translated into Latin. He interpreted the study
of Islam as part of a Christian missionary ideology, of which the aim was
to convince Muslims that their religion was inherently flawed. He concluded
that during the middle ages the western attitude concerning Islam can be
characterised as apologetic and polemic and that interpretation of primary
sources was blinded by the assumption that Islam was the enemy religion.197
In contrast to later, more critical approaches, Paret betrayed an inadequate
understanding of ‘Orientalism’. He thought that a turn towards more positive
interpretations of Islam since the 19th century meant that intent and content
of the study of Islam and Arabic had dramatically changed. He did not see
any problematic ‘exoticism’ in the way scholars showed their appreciation of
the intellectual world that is represented by Islam and its various forms of
appearance and that has influenced Arab literature. 198
From the end of the 1980s, this theoretical approach to racist discourse be-
came more established. Inspired by American and British postcolonial studies,
German cultural studies began to use Edward Said’s theory of an ‘Orientalist’
colonial discourse that created the image of a backward and underdeveloped
‘Orient’ to legitimise colonialism in their approaches to German depictions of
Turks and the ‘Orient’. Cornelia Kleinlogel’s study on the image of the Turk
in early modern German literature emphasised that, while German texts ini-
tially depicted Turks as threats, this image was first succeeded by a dramatic
exotism and later by a more sexualised image in the 19th century. After what
she calls the ‘pornographic turn’, the Orient was depicted as sensual, erotic
and luscious, and thus as a dangerous allurement. She argued that this image
197See Paret, Rudi: Arabistik und Islamkunde an deutschen Universita¨ten, Wiesbaden 1966,
p. 2.
198Ibid., p.3. on this subject see also Alexander Haridi’s study on secular Islam scholarship.
He showed that although there was an attempt to systematise the study of Islam by
applying a secular and materialist analysis, the attitude towards Islam was characterised
by the attempt to show Europe’s superiority: not as before on a theological, but now
on a secular level. - Haridi, Alexander: Das Paradigma der “Islamischen Zivilisation” -
oder die Begru¨ndung der deutschen Islamwissenschaft durch Carl Heinrich Becker (1876-
1933), Wu¨rzburg: Ergon 2005, p. 17.
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is still used today.199 Apart from literature, the ‘Orientalism’ discourse also
became the subject of studies of German art.200
The theory of ‘Orientalism’ in fact became the most dominant interpreta-
tion of the history of anti-Turkish prejudice in Germany. The material Margret
Spohn collected for her study on the history of anti-Turkish prejudice in Ger-
many showed that Germans considered the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire
as a threat. During the Wars with the Turks in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, German clergy and gentry agitated against Turks by creating im-
ages of a ‘barbaric mortal enemy’ and ‘anti-Christ’ who intends to annhiliate
all Christians.201
Bernd Bauknecht applied the theory of ‘Orientalism’ in a more consequent
way and also related it to racism based on skin colour. He pointed out that al-
ready during medieval times, Muslims - called Saracens then - were considered
black and because the colour black was a symbol for death and the under-
world, Muslims were regarded as evil. But he also highlights that Europe’s
relation to the “Orient” was characterised not only by xenophobia but also
by exoticism: the image of the strange and exotic “Orient” functioned and
still functions as a means to form a ‘pure’ European identity.202 According
to Bauknecht, depictions of the Orient and Islam since the fourteenth cen-
tury have to be read in connection with political and social circumstances and
struggles. He argued that members of the church were very careful to speak
positively about Islam out of fear of excommunication. The gentry, however,
in seeking to distinguish themselves from the clergy as well as the lower social
stratum, wanted to show its imperial power by collecting exotic souvenirs and
199See Kleinlogel, Cornelia: Exotik-Erotik, zur Geschichte des Tu¨rkenbildes in der deutschen
Literatur der fru¨hen Neuzeit (1453-1800), Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 1989, pp. 1,
97, 415.
200See Gu¨nther, Erika: Die Faszination des Fremden, Der Malerische Orientalismus in
Deutschland, Mu¨nster: Lit Verlag 1990.
201See Spohn, Margret: Alles getu¨rkt. 500 Jahre (Vor)Urteile der Deutschen u¨ber die Tu¨rken,
Oldenburg 1993, p.29.
202See Bauknecht, Bernd: Muslime in Deutschland von 1920 bis 1945, Ko¨ln: Teiresias
2001,p.33.
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adopting a luxurious lifestyle that inherited elements of the - real or imagined
- “Orient”.203 For craftspeople and peasants, Bauknecht points out, the rejec-
tion of everything Oriental was thus a rebellion against the authorities. He
highlights as an example the usage of costumes during carnival that exhibited
a critique of a luxury and decadence - people dressed up as “wild black men”,
“seductive women”, and “barbarians”.204 He argued that Oriental literature
and art was very popular but often served two functions. It depicted ‘oriental
people’ as uncivilised, uneducated and raw and thus legitimised white men’s
domination over these people while at the same time, through the depiction of
wild and untamed sexuality and physicalness as well as total control over the
female body, it satisfied white male fantasies.205
More recently, Almut Ho¨fert emphasised that medieval depictions of Turks
were dependent on the dominant Christian worldview, which understood Islam
only in relation to Christianity. The dominant perception was that Muslims
were godless heathens or heretics who harassed Christians, which the latter
took as a sign of the beginning of the end of the world.206 Ho¨fert explicitly
stated that her work is inspired by postcolonial studies and that her intention
is to deconstruct the dichotomy of the Western and non-Western world.207
Cultural representations of Turks and ‘foreigners’ in Germany have also
been subject of studies with a more contemporary focus. Nazire Akbulut
investigated depictions of Turks in German literature of the 1980s. She came
to the conclusion that Turks are represented in a way that is sympathetic
of their situation in Germany, but nevertheless cliche´d.208 Georg Seesslen’s
203Ibid, p.34-35.
204Ibid.
205Ibid, p. 37 f.
206See Ho¨fert, Almut: Das Gesetz des Teufels und Europas Spiegel. Das christlich-
westeuropa¨ische Islambild im Mittelalter und in der fru¨hen Neuzeit, in: Attia, Iman:
Orient- und Islambilder, Interdisziplina¨re Beitra¨ge zu Orientalismus und antimuslimis-
chem Rassismus, Mu¨nster: Unrast 2007, pp. 85-110, here p. 92.
207See Ho¨fert, Almut: Den Feind Beschreiben, Tu¨rkengefahr und europa¨isches Wissen u¨ber
das Osmanische Reich 1450-1600, Frankfurt am Main: Campus 2003.
208See Akbulut, Nazire: Das Tu¨rkenbild in der neueren deutschen Literatur 1979-1990,
Berlin: Ko¨ster 1993, p. 31.
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study of representations of ’foreigners’ in German film similarly showed that
in the 1970s minorities were depicted from a humanist-pedagogical perspective,
benevolent, but stereotypical.209
Studies of this kind have to be understood not only in relation to British
postcolonial studies, which form their theoretical basis, but also in the context
of developments in Germany towards a multicultural society. These studies
are attempts to explain anti-Turkish resentments in light of the reality of a
Turkish minority in Germany. Most recently, and based on Edward Said’s
theory of ‘Orientalism’, Iman Attia argued that with regard to anti-Muslim
racism, it is important to acknowledge that German knowledge about Islam is
actually a constructed image of an ‘Orient’, which affects Muslims in Germany
today.210 Although she admits that Said’s hypothesis of a colonial construction
of an ’Orient’ does not apply to Germany as much as it applies for example
to Britain, she argues that there has been a similar dynamic for Christian
constructions of Muslims as the ’Other’ to Christian Europe, traces of which
can be found in German discourse even today.211 According to Attia, this
dynamic functions as a means to reproduce power relations in contemporary
Germany.212
While Attia’s approach was based relatively straightforwardly on Said’s the-
ory of ‘Orientalism’ and colonial power relations, Nina Berman has been more
balanced in her approach to the issue. She emphasised that images of Turks
and the ‘Orient’ throughout Germany’s history relied on Germany’s economic
and military status as well as on political relations and fluctuated between fear
and fascination.213 The effect, however, has been the production of a power-
209See Seesslen, Georg: Das Kino der doppelten Kulturen, in: epd Film, No 12, 2000, p. 2.
210See Attia, Iman: Kulturrassismus und Gesellschaftskritik, in: Attia, Iman (ed): Orient-
und Islambilder, Orient- und Islambilder, Interdisziplina¨re Beitra¨ge zu Orientalismus und
antimuslimischem Rassismus, Mu¨nster: Unrast 2007, pp. 5-29, here p. 5.
211Ibid, p. 9.
212Ibid, p. 21.
213See Berman, Nina: Historische Phasen orientalisierender Diskurse in Deutschland, in:
Attia, Iman: Orient- und Islambilder, pp. 71-83.; see also Berman, Nina: Orientalismus,
Kolonialismus und Moderne: Zum Bild des Orients in der deutschen Kultur um 1900,
Stuttgart: Metzler 1997.
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ful stereotypical image of the ‘Orient’ that affects Muslims living in Germany
today.
These explanatory approaches to anti-Muslim racism in Germany - and es-
pecially the ones based in cultural studies even try to trace continuities in
representations over time - were clearly inspired by British post-colonial the-
ories on racism, and tried to apply this to the history of German-Ottoman
relations. Their aim was to understand attitudes of Germans towards Turks
in Germany today in relation to the history of Germany’s relationship with
the Ottoman Empire, rather than in relation to Holocaust history. This was
an explicit attempt to separate the study of racism from its reference to the
Holocaust. Attia had in fact criticised how Turkish and Arab experiences in
Germany were interpreted in a framework of German-Jewish relations, and
not acknowledged or dignified in their own right.214
But in contrast to developments in Britain, where post-colonial approaches
to racism are much better established, and also eventually provided a frame-
work to interpret antisemitism, these approaches were not in any way inte-
grated into research on antisemitism, or sought a dialogue with them. However,
it is at this juncture where comparisons between antisemitism and ‘Islamopho-
bia’ in particular become significant.
5.2.7 Comparing Antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’ in
Germany
On the one hand, German theories on antisemitism and anti-Muslim resent-
ments do not allow for easy comparisons. The place of Jews in the public eye
is so different to that of Muslims that it seems far fetched to compare the two.
While Jews play a central role for the formation of German self-understanding,
Muslims play, if at all, a supporting role.
In German antisemitism research, the idea that antisemitism and ‘Islamo-
phobia’ can be directly compared only came up very recently. The first com-
parison was drawn by Sabine Schiffer in her book on Islam in German media.
214See Attia: Kulturrassismus und Gesellschaftskritik, p. 15.
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Here she argued that not only do anti-Muslim stereotypes regularly appear
in mainstream media, but that these stereotypes are exactly like those used
against Jews in Germany at the end of the 19th century. This comparison
was the main focus of her later book Antisemitismus und Islamophobie - ein
Vergleich (Antisemitism and Islamophobia - a comparison), co-authored by
Constantin Wagner. Although the authors admitted that there are important
differences between antisemitism and hostility against Muslims, they stressed
that the discrimination experiences of Jews at the end of the 19th century and
Muslims today were very similar.215 In both cases, Jews and Muslims have
been perceived as an enemy. While today, the economic crises leads to social
instability, insecurity, a fear of globalisation and the creation of Islam as an en-
emy, this was also the case for Jews at the end of the nineteenth century, when
after the end of the German-French war in 1871, there was similar insecurity
and instability with regard to the future.216
The two scholars used the antisemitic discourse of late nineteenth century
Germany to analyse modern day Islamophobia. Antisemitism, in other words,
is used as a paradigmatic tool to understand Islamophobia. They argued that
there are striking parallels: while nineteenth century Jews were for example
accused of disloyalty, this is also true for today’s Muslims. Thus, the decisive
characteristics of the anti-Jewish resentments of the past - the perception of
Jews as the ultimate ‘other’ to German nationalism, the resentment against
them within all classes and social strata but especially among intellectuals,
the use of anti-Jewish stereotypes in political statements and for political ends
- are alleged to reappear in anti-Muslim hostility. The racist discourse then
and now functions for excluding the ‘other’ and legitimates a hierarchy that
has led to the persecution and extermination of Jews and may well lead to the
same fate for Muslims, if the warning signs that the history of antisemitism
illustrates are not heeded.217
215Schiffer, Sabine and Wagner, Constantin: Antisemitismus und Islamophobie - ein Vergle-
ich. Wassertru¨dingen, HWK Verlag 2009, p. 71.
216Ibid, p. 73.
217Ibid, p. 199 f.
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According to Schiffer and Wagner, both antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’,
have a long history, in the form of Christian anti-Judaism and Orientalism and
colonialism respectively.218 The authors further gave examples of how random
citations from the Torah in nineteenth century Germany and the Qur’an in
Germany today were and are used in similar ways to show that Jews then and
Muslims today are a danger to Western society. Both forms of racism, as they
categorised it, rely on irrational conspiracy theories, and both Jews in the past
and Muslims today are faced with the demand to fully assimilate into German
society, while they are at the same time accused of only faking their allegiance
to the German nation.219 Unlike most approaches to antisemitism, Schiffer
and Wagner’s approach drew its theoretical groundings from the ‘Orientalism’
research mentioned earlier.
Schiffer was supported by well-known antisemitism researcher Wolfgang Benz.
In a paper presented at the conference Feindbild Islam - Feindbild Jude at
the Centre for Antisemitism Research in Berlin in December 2008, at which
Schiffer also spoke, Benz pointed out that there are significant parallels be-
tween antisemitism and hostility towards Muslims: the same stereotypes and
constructs that are used as instruments within antisemitism reappear in anti-
Muslim resentments. According to Benz, these include conspiracy theories as
well as alleged religious principles.220 He drew a direct comparison between
resistance against the building of synagogues in 19th century Germany, and
the movements against the building of mosques in Germany today.221
In the context of recent developments of how antisemitism is conceptualised
in Germany, his comparison made sense. Benz argued that antisemitism re-
search is meant to use the methods and tools developed to understand hostility
towards Jews to analyse hostility levelled against other groups as well. His ap-
proach is part of the group-focused enmity-approach, which is the basis of
218Ibid, p. 84-85.
219Ibid, p. 98-99.
220See Benz, Wolfgang: Einfu¨hrung zur Konferenz ‘Feindbild Islam - Feindbild Jude’, in:
Benz, Wolfgang (ed.): Islamfeindschaft und ihr Kontext- Dokumentation der Konferenz
‘Feindbild Islam - Feindbild Jude’, Berlin: Metropol 2009, pp. 9–20, here p. 10.
221Ibid, p. 20.
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mainstream antisemitism research in Germany today. As Benz said himself:
Antisemitism researchers are experts in researching prejudices and their aim
is to transfer the dynamic and function of hostility towards certain groups.222
Benz has since further developed his idea to apply the methods used in anti-
semitism research to analyse anti-Muslim resentments in particular in his book
Die Feinde aus dem Morgenland (Enemies from the Orient).223
The idea of making antisemitism comparable fits in the context of general
developments of how the Nazi past is dealt with in contemporary Germany.
The idea to remove antisemitism from the special position it may once have
had is in line in with the idea to universalise the Holocaust and turn it into a
general reference for genocide and atrocity. Antisemitism is thus perhaps still
singular, but not different from other forms of ‘group focused enmity’, which
may, in other contexts and in worst cases, even lead to genocide.
However, as the ‘group-focused-enmity’-approach is just one of various ap-
proaches to antisemitism, Schiffer and Benz received criticism for their compar-
ison, for example from researcher and writer Matthias Ku¨ntzel, whose expertise
lies in Muslim antisemitism. Others pointed out that this approach neglects
to take into account particular stereotypes that only appear in antisemitism,
like the identification of Jews with international capital, the international con-
spiracy, the perceived threat of extermination, and that there is no parallel to
the alleged ‘Jewish power’.224 However, it is important to note that these crit-
ical voices are not what could be considered the mainstream of antisemitism
research, nor that their understanding of antisemitism is always right.
One accusation that could be levelled against the critics of a comparison be-
tween antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentment is that insisting on the speci-
ficity of antisemitism is a purely German interest, in which the particularity of
antisemitism is seen as a form of distinction. But this is also true for the oppo-
222Ibid, p. 19.
223See Benz, Wolfgang: Die Feinde aus dem Morgenland - Wie die Angst vor den Muslimen
unsere Demokratie gefa¨hrdet, Mu¨nchen, CH Beck 2012.
224See Krauth, Stefan: Antiislamosemitophobismus, in: Jungle World No. 51, 18. De-
cember 2008 [online], Available from: http://jungle-world.com/artikel/2008/51/
32312.html, [Accessed on 18 December 2013].
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site: insisting that antisemitism is just like other forms of hostility supports a
discourse of normalisation, and is therefore of national interest. Germans can
believe that they are just like any other nation and can on the one hand finally
let the past rest and on the other use it as a pedagogical tool to educate others.
This is most poignant in an international context. The message is that what
can happen here can happen anywhere and anytime. Sabine Schiffer expressed
this directly when she said that unexpected hostilities can surface and lead, in
their worst case, to a new crime against humanity.225
In that regard, Schiffer’s and Benz’ approach to comparing antisemitism
and anti-Muslim resentment is very German: it fits very well into a contem-
porary German narrative of the past and its meaning for the present. In line
with this narrative there is a striking absence in the discussion about compar-
isons. Those who would be directly affected by antisemitism or anti-Muslim
resentment do not get a voice.
But while comparisons are on the one hand part of a normalisation discourse
themselves, they also have to be understood in the context of Germany’s new
understanding as a country of immigration. There is a reality of different
minorities living in Germany, and a reality of discrimination against these mi-
norities. Conceptualising antisemitism within this context means to put it in
relation to other forms of social hostility. In the absence of a significant dia-
logue between approaches to antisemitism based on Germany’s Nazi past and
approaches to racism based on Germany’s other past, comparative approaches
to antisemitism are thus seeking a form of integration by proxy: If, as touched
upon earlier, Turks, in order to become German, have to immigrate into Ger-
many’s past, perhaps it is a form of immigrating into Germany’s past to equate
their experience with that of the Jews. If Turks cannot become Germans, they
can at least become the ‘new Jews’.
225Schiffer and Wagner: Antisemitismus und Islamophobie, p. 8.
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Conclusion
Just as there is a discourse about Jews, there is a discourse about antisemitism,
too. In this discourse, ideas about what antisemitism is are expressed and nego-
tiated. If one looks at this discourse in particular contexts, like contemporary
British and German societies, it becomes evident that concepts of antisemitism
are constructed to relate to particular narratives of what the past means for the
present. These narratives are born out of concepts of citizenship and national
identity.
However, just because theories of antisemitism are part of a discourse, that
does not mean that antisemitism is only a construct and not also a reality. As
I have shown in the first chapter, there is a reality of anti-Jewish prejudice,
persecution and extermination throughout history, and remnants of this his-
tory extend into the present. This is acutely felt by Jewish communities across
Europe today.
Notwithstanding the facts, however, the question that led this research is
how these facts are interpreted and made sense of. How is antisemitism under-
stood? This question is particularly relevant in the context of multiculturalism
in Western European societies, where large parts of society hold a multitude
of prejudices against ethnic minorities other than Jews. With this in mind,
I asked how concepts of antisemitism allow for comparisons between anti-
semitism and anti-Muslim attitudes and what value these comparisons have.
To that end, I analysed and compared the genealogy of German and British
theories on antisemitism since the 1950s in the context of recent immigration of
non-Jewish minorities, as both countries have very different histories regarding
this issue.
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The result is that despite the historical differences of both countries, in the
past few decades there has been a development towards denying any particu-
larity of antisemitism, and instead emphasising that Jews are just like other
minorities, and antisemitism just like any other form of hostile attitude to-
wards another group. This meant that theories became dominant that saw
antisemitism as one form of prejudice, or one form of racism among others.
On the one hand, this is a good thing. There is much value in minorities
standing together against discrimination and hate crimes, which affect them
in similar measures. This research has shown that in Germany especially, the-
ories about antisemitism have been used as a model to understand other forms
of prejudice. This stands in contrast to denying today’s multi-ethnic reality
and its accompanying racism. Concepts of antisemitism can therefore serve to
make contemporary racism intelligible. On the other hand, however, there is
a danger that such a model moves too far away from reality and becomes a
narrative rather than something that describes reality. This understanding of
antisemitism is closely related to how Germany interprets its past. Germany’s
interpretation of its own past moved from vehemently denying any guilt asso-
ciated with the Holocaust, to positively incorporating it into German national
identity. One way of doing this was to emphasise the European aspect of ‘the
catastrophe’, and to point out the guilt of others. The result of this way of por-
traying the past is that antisemitism looses its particularity – and so does the
Holocaust. Germany becomes a nation among others, with a history of atroci-
ties similar to that of other nations. In Germany, this theoretical development
initially bore out of critical intellectual movements with the intention that the
Shoah shall never be repeated, but it eventually came to serve a narrative of a
reunited and multicultural nation, although there is some continuation of crit-
ical theories of antisemitism as well. Because antisemitism plays such a major
role in German identity, there is little danger that comparing antisemitism
will eventually lead to it being considered of no analytical value as a category,
which is a dominant development in Britain.
In Britain, there have been strong tendencies to vehemently deny any par-
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ticularity, seriousness or even the existence of antisemitism. It is important
to note that in some sense, antisemitism theories in Germany and Britain de-
veloped diametrically opposed to each other. While in Germany, concepts of
antisemitism became a model for concepts of racism and other forms of prej-
udices, in Britain, antisemitism as a particular category had to be extracted
from general racism theories. These racism theories developed in the context
of immigration from Commonwealth countries from the late 1940s onwards,
and attitudes towards British Jews, who had, for the most part, by that time
settled in Britain, were not on their agenda. Newer critical neo-Marxist racism
theories that developed from the 1970s and explained racism based on class
similarly neglected to take antisemitism into account. Because there was a long
tradition within the Jewish community in Britain to refrain from any alarmism
about any hostility against them, there were initially no initiatives to fight for
recognition of antisemitism. However, these started to develop from the 1980s,
when historians started to point out homegrown British hostility against Jews
in British history. The idea was to emphasise that Jews were equally affected
by the racism described in previous theories. In a sense, this strategy backfired.
It firstly paved the way for comparisons between Jews and other minorities.
While this can be helpful and unite minority communities, it can also lead
to a relegation of antisemitism into Britain’s past, as there seem to be other,
more contemporary and urgent forms of racism, like Islamophobia, to con-
tend with. On a theoretical level, as this research has shown, it meant that
antisemitism as a category became almost a taboo. Considered a dated and
defunct category because it grants Jews a particular status, the aim of most
antisemitism researchers today is to analyse how processes of racialisation af-
fect Jews. This is a result of the influence of post-colonial theories on concepts
of racism, which not only exclude antisemitism, but even see Jewish nation-
alism as the worst form of contemporary racism. To be sure, there are those
voices in Britain who fight for the inclusion of a fight against antisemitism in
particular within the anti-racist struggle in general. However, in light of recent
theoretical developments this is most certainly an uphill struggle.
286
6 Conclusion
The most general conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that
different frames of reference lead to different interpretations of the same thing.
National history and traditions inevitably influence our way of thinking. This
research has shown that antisemitism and the way to combat it are thought
of very differently in Germany and Britain, even though there might be, at
times, similar outcomes of these different ways of thinking. What this research
has also shown is the importance of being self-reflective. Only through self-
reflection is it possible to realise that sometimes, what is meant to be critical,
turns out to not be critical at all. It just reifies ways of thinking that support
the exact power structures that were supposed to be criticised. For example,
postcolonial theories aim to deconstruct existing power structures, but they
operate solely within colonialism as a singular frame of reference. Within the
scope of this research, they thus turned out to be very British. Explaining
antisemitism within this frame of reference means to let go of antisemitism
as a term and to attempt to turn Jews into colonised people. Taking a step
further would mean to explain the Holocaust in terms of colonialism. This very
specific viewpoint on antisemitism has its limits. Antisemitism is a particular,
but also a transnational phenomenon. To a large extent, antisemitic attitudes
transcend national borders, and any concept of antisemitism needs to take that
into account.
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